






SPACES	  OF	  SOLIDARITY	  
	  KAREN	  IDENTITY	  IN	  THE	  THAI-­‐BURMA	  BORDERLANDS	  
	  
	  
A	  thesis	  submitted	  in	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy	  
	  
Rachel	  Sharples	  
Doctor	  of	  Philosophy	  
	  
School	  of	  Global	  Studies,	  Social	  Science	  and	  Planning	  








I	  certify	  that	  except	  where	  due	  acknowledgement	  has	  been	  made,	  the	  work	  is	  that	  of	  the	  author	  
alone;	  the	  work	  has	  not	  been	  submitted	  previously,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  to	  qualify	  for	  any	  other	  
academic	  award;	  the	  content	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  the	  result	  of	  work	  which	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  since	  
the	  official	  commencement	  date	  of	  the	  approved	  research	  program;	  any	  editorial	  work	  paid	  or	  












While	  it	  can	  seem	  like	  a	  largely	  solitary	  endeavour,	  this	  thesis	  exists	  because	  of	  many.	  Through	  
their	  encouragement,	  interest,	  friendship	  and	  rigorous	  questioning,	  ‘the	  many’	  have	  helped	  bring	  
this	  thesis	  into	  being.	  This	  is	  an	  opportunity	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  thank	  them.	  
To	  the	  friends	  in	  the	  borderlands	  who	  have	  suffered	  my	  curiosity	  and	  my	  forays	  into	  your	  lives.	  
While	  you	  all	  have	  my	  heartfelt	  appreciation	  and	  respect,	  I’d	  like	  to	  thank	  in	  particular	  Mort,	  Kweh	  
Say,	  Theblay,	  Padi,	  Htoo	  Moo,	  Hten	  Dah,	  Daw	  Nay	  Htoo,	  Gay	  Hu,	  Cha	  Mu	  and	  Tham	  La.	  To	  all	  my	  
colleagues	  at	  Burma	  Issues	  who	  really	  started	  me	  on	  this	  journey.	  You	  taught	  me	  many	  things,	  but	  
in	  particular	  that	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  understand	  and	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  in	  Burma	  through	  the	  
voices	  of	  grassroots	  communities.	  I’d	  particularly	  like	  to	  thank	  Pi	  Lek	  for	  feeding	  my	  intellectual	  
curiosity	  and	  my	  coffee	  habit,	  and	  Ajarn	  Pornpimon,	  an	  inspiring	  and	  original	  thinker	  on	  all	  things	  
Burma	  and	  Thailand.	  
There	  are	  many	  Karen	  people	  who	  over	  the	  years	  have	  shared	  their	  stories	  with	  me.	  These	  stories	  
are	  important	  and	  powerful	  reminders	  of	  life	  in	  conflict	  zones,	  and	  I	  hope	  that	  I	  have	  treated	  them	  
with	  the	  respect	  they	  deserve.	  I	  also	  hope	  that	  the	  need	  to	  tell	  these	  types	  of	  stories	  will	  soon	  end,	  
and	  that	  peace	  and	  stability	  will	  give	  the	  people	  of	  Burma	  the	  ‘home’	  and	  life	  they	  so	  desire.	  And	  
that	  new,	  empowering	  stories	  can	  then	  be	  told.	  
There	  are	  many	  people	  at	  RMIT	  who	  have	  helped	  me	  through	  this	  intellectual	  journey.	  My	  
supervisors	  Damian	  Grenfell	  and	  Paul	  James,	  both	  of	  whom	  in	  their	  own	  ways	  have	  challenged	  and	  
encouraged	  my	  intellectual	  endeavours.	  Damian’s	  patience,	  guidance	  and	  comfy	  op-­‐shop	  chair	  
were	  irreplaceable,	  and	  helped	  see	  this	  through	  to	  completion.	  I’d	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  Kelley	  Johnson	  
for	  her	  early	  contributions	  in	  helping	  to	  form	  this	  thesis.	  Victoria	  Stead,	  Anna	  Trembath,	  Mayra	  
Walsh	  and	  Anne	  McNevin	  for	  the	  many	  conversations	  about	  my	  research	  and	  feedback	  across	  
various	  stages	  of	  the	  process.	  
I’d	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  Heinrich	  Böll	  Foundation,	  Thailand	  who	  provided	  much	  needed	  funds	  for	  
my	  fieldwork	  stints,	  in	  2005	  and	  again	  in	  2008.	  
To	  my	  friends	  and	  family,	  who	  have	  never	  failed	  to	  enquire	  ‘how	  it’s	  going’	  and	  have	  offered	  
encouragement	  and	  consolation	  at	  the	  appropriate	  times.	  




TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  
	  
Acknowledgments…….………………………………………….……………………………………………..…	   iii	  
Map	  of	  Burma	  ……….………………………………………………………………………………..……….…….	   vi	  
Map	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border……….………………………………………………………………….....	   vii	  
Abstract	  ……….…………………………………………………………………………………………..…………....	   1	  
Chapter	  1:	  Introduction………..………………………………………………………………….…………….	   3	  
	   Overview:	  the	  Karen	  in	  a	  borderlands	  space……………………………….………………	   6	  
	   Aims	  of	  the	  thesis	  ……..…………………………………………………………….………………….	   13	  
	   	   Background	  to	  the	  study	  ………..……………………………….……………………..	   14	  
Thesis	  structure	  ………..………………………………………………………….………………...….	   18	  
Chapter	  2:	  Methodology………………………………………………………….……….…………..…....…	   22	  
	   Towards	  a	  methodology	  of	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations’	  ….…….….….	   25	  
	   Participant	  Group	  …………………………………………………………………………………….….	   29	  
	   Location	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  ………………………………………………………………………….…	   31	  
	   Methods	  ………………………………………………………………………………………………….….	   33	  
Chapter	  3:	  ‘Fences	  and	  Neighbours’:	  establishing	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  the	  	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  …………………………………………………………………………………………	   42	  
	   The	  borderlands:	  re-­‐imagining	  political	  space	  ………………………………………….….	   44	  
	   Mapping	  borders:	  the	  body	  politic	  ………………………………………………………….…..	   48	  
	   Closed	  borders:	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  ……………….……	   51	  
	   Border	  crossing:	  global	  mobility,	  population	  and	  cultural	  movement	  ………...	   56	  
Chapter	  4:	  From	  ‘Buffer	  Zone’	  to	  Friendship	  Bridge:	  the	  contemporary	  context	  of	  	  
the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  ………………………………………………………………..…………………	   68	  
	   Refuge	  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..	   70	  
Political	  intensification	  of	  the	  border	  ………………………………………………………….	   73	  
	   Re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  Burmese	  state	  ………………………………………….……	   75	  
Growing	  inter-­‐state	  relations	  ……………………………………………………….…	   78	  
	   Deteriorating	  security	  in	  the	  borderlands	  …………………………………….…	   82	  
Humanitarian	  aid	  ………………………………………………………………………………………..	   86	  
Chapter	  5:	  By	  the	  Shade	  of	  a	  Tree:	  patterns	  of	  activism	  …………….……………………….….	   92	  




	   	   Consolidating	  place:	  controlling	  movement	  …………………………….…..	   96	  
Institutionalised	  labelling:	  controlling	  resources	  .............................	   102	  
	   Controlled-­‐contested:	  the	  political	  self	  .......................................................	   110	  
Chapter	  6:	  This	  Story	  is	  Not	  For	  Myself:	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  ..............................	   117	  
	   International	  networks	  ................................................................................	   118	  
New	  technologies	  ........................................................................................	   123	  
Politically	  conscious,	  politically	  reflective	  ....................................................	   130	  
Activism:	  projecting	  a	  political	  message	  ......................................................	   138	  
Chapter	  7:	  ‘Symbolic	  Anchors	  of	  Community’:	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  .......	   145	  
	   Memory:	  the	  public	  projection	  of	  ‘remembered	  places’	  .............................	   147	  
Re-­‐establishing	  cultural	  practices:	  processes	  of	  cultural	  reification	  ............	   157	  
Imagining	  ‘home’	  .........................................................................................	   164	  
Chapter	  8:	  To	  be	  Karen	  is	  to	  be	  Persecuted:	  identity	  formation	  in	  the	  	  
borderlands	  ..............................................................................................................	   172	  
	   Modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  the	  performative	  dimension	  of	  identity	  ........	   173	  
	   Karen	  identity	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  .........	   176	  
Narrative	  of	  a	  homogenous	  Karen:	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  nationalist	  identity	  ...........	   182	  
	   The	  Karen,	  a	  missionary-­‐colonial	  construct?	  ...................................	   183	  
	   The	  KNU	  and	  establishing	  a	  nationalist	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  ............	   187	  
‘Karen-­‐ness’	  reinforced	  by	  external	  agents	  .....................................	   190	  
Chapter	  9:	  Conclusions	  .............................................................................................	   195	  
	   Spatial	  tension	  .............................................................................................	   196	  
Modes	  of	  social	  practice	  ..............................................................................	   197	  
Identity	  .........................................................................................................	   199	  
The	  future	  of	  the	  borderlands	  .....................................................................	   201	  
Appendix	  ..................................................................................................................	   206	  
	   List	  of	  acronyms	  ...........................................................................................	   207	  
	   A	  note	  on	  use	  of	  names	  ...............................................................................	   209	  






































































This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  becomes	  the	  setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  
practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  It	  uses	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  
as	  a	  social	  construct	  to	  explore	  notions	  of	  space,	  activism	  and	  identity,	  particularly	  through	  an	  
examination	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  the	  narratives	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  who	  reside	  within	  it.	  
This	  thesis	  examines	  how	  a	  group	  of	  Karen,	  displaced	  from	  Burma	  and	  now	  residing	  on	  the	  Thai	  
side	  of	  the	  national	  boundary,	  conceive	  of	  and	  relate	  to	  the	  space	  they	  occupy.	  It	  shows	  that	  at	  the	  
centre	  of	  this	  relationship	  between	  space	  and	  people	  is	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  a	  
broader	  space	  that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  national	  border	  that	  separates	  Burma	  and	  Thailand,	  a	  space	  
that	  this	  thesis	  has	  treated	  as	  a	  ‘borderlands’.	  This	  interchange	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  sociality	  
that	  occurs	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  territorial	  domain,	  and	  is	  broadly	  mapped	  through	  the	  operations	  
of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  two	  key	  agents	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
Drawing	  ethnographic	  field	  work	  into	  conceptual	  considerations	  of	  place	  and	  space,	  this	  thesis	  
found	  that	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  take	  on	  a	  fluid	  and	  contested	  form,	  
framed	  by	  processes	  of	  constructing,	  adapting,	  rejecting	  and	  reifying	  elements	  of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  
and	  political	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  a	  Karen	  narrative	  of	  persecution,	  and	  ultimately	  
establish	  a	  Karen	  political	  self.	  This	  often	  sits	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Thai	  and	  
Burmese	  nation-­‐states,	  which	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  space	  that	  is	  more	  homogenised;	  defined	  and	  
treated	  as	  representing	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  political	  authority	  over	  a	  delineated	  territorial	  domain	  
and	  its	  inhabitants.	  
This	  thesis	  shows	  that	  this	  tension	  provides	  a	  space	  in	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  protest,	  construct	  
and	  redefine	  the	  parameters	  of	  their	  political	  life.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  
–	  patterns	  of	  activism	  that	  establish	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  that	  enable,	  
broaden	  and	  strengthen	  the	  reach	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice,	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  
that	  consolidate	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity.	  These	  practices	  ultimately	  
inform	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
This	  research	  is	  important	  because	  it	  argues	  for	  a	  new	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  
political	  space,	  a	  spatial	  reimagining	  that	  moves	  beyond	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  territorial	  domain	  to	  
emphasise	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  space	  and	  the	  spatial	  aspects	  of	  identity.	  In	  doing	  so,	  this	  
thesis	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  the	  








The	  lives	  of	  the	  porters	  are	  unlucky,	  no	  chance	  to	  survive	  
We	  have	  to	  carry	  unfair	  heavy	  loads	  
We	  have	  wounds	  on	  our	  shoulders	  and	  heads	  
We	  have	  to	  climb	  mountains	  and	  are	  beaten	  like	  cattle	  
We	  have	  to	  suffer	  from	  this	  powerlessness	  
They	  tortured	  us	  cruelly	  
All	  these	  problems	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  military	  government	  
Escaping	  to	  survive	  
Their	  power	  depends	  on	  their	  arms	  
They	  killed	  many	  porters	  
Many	  porters	  have	  sacrificed	  
We,	  the	  escaped	  porters,	  have	  hearts	  filled	  with	  hatred...	  
They	  beat	  and	  injured	  over	  one	  hundred	  of	  us	  porters	  
Don’t	  cry	  porters	  
Together	  we	  will	  carry	  our	  loads	  until	  we	  reach	  the	  frontline	  
Along	  the	  way	  we	  saw	  many	  dead	  porters	  
Who	  died	  from	  landmines	  when	  they	  tried	  to	  escape	  
When	  we	  think	  of	  them	  we	  feel	  pain	  in	  our	  hearts	  
Porters	  run	  to	  escape	  and	  the	  soldiers	  try	  to	  shoot	  them	  
When	  we	  escape	  we	  feel	  grief	  for	  the	  porters	  who	  cannot	  escape	  
When	  we	  think	  of	  this	  we	  want	  to	  fight	  back	  to	  the	  military	  government...	  
Together	  we	  will	  struggle	  from	  now	  on!	  
Poem	  written	  by	  Kyi	  Le,	  a	  porter	  
In	  November	  2003	  twenty-­‐two	  prison	  porters	  arrived	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  Their	  most	  
immediate	  journey	  had	  begun	  in	  various	  Burmese	  prisons	  where	  they	  had	  been	  incarcerated	  for	  
offences	  ranging	  from	  receiving	  stolen	  goods	  to	  buying	  illegal	  lottery	  tickets,	  murder,	  and	  deserting	  
the	  Burmese	  Army.	  These	  twenty-­‐two	  porters	  ended	  up	  in	  Burma’s	  eastern	  border	  area	  of	  Karen	  
State	  where	  they	  were	  used	  as	  human	  labour	  to	  carry	  heavy	  loads	  of	  machinery,	  ammunition	  and	  
food	  for	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  The	  porters	  told	  stories	  of	  being	  used	  as	  landmine	  sweepers	  
(walking	  in	  front	  of	  Burmese	  military	  personnel	  to	  activate	  landmines),	  of	  beatings	  when	  they	  
became	  too	  tired	  to	  walk,	  and	  of	  experiencing	  the	  malignancy	  of	  war.	  Many	  porters	  who	  
attempted	  escape	  were	  killed,	  while	  a	  few	  made	  it	  back	  to	  their	  villages	  or	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border.	  Those	  who	  made	  it	  to	  the	  border	  were	  afforded	  temporary	  security.	  A	  number	  of	  these	  
porters	  then	  did	  something	  that	  was	  only	  made	  possible	  by	  their	  current	  location:	  tell	  their	  stories	  
to	  a	  wider	  international	  audience.	  They	  wrote	  a	  poem	  about	  their	  experience	  and	  spoke	  it	  to	  
camera.	  The	  porters	  were	  entrusting	  their	  story	  be	  told	  and	  their	  message	  heard,	  but	  with	  little	  
idea	  where	  it	  might	  end	  up	  or	  how	  it	  might	  be	  used.	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An	  act	  such	  as	  this	  highlights	  some	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  that	  frame	  this	  thesis.	  In	  a	  straightforward	  
sense	  the	  thesis	  examines	  the	  significance	  of	  what	  is	  being	  said	  and	  where	  it’s	  being	  said,	  and	  the	  
relationship	  between	  them.	  While	  fairly	  standard	  questions,	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  shows	  the	  
answers	  are	  of	  course	  much	  more	  complex.	  At	  one	  level,	  what	  is	  being	  said	  is	  a	  personal	  
experience	  of	  persecution.	  At	  another	  level,	  it	  shows	  a	  conscious	  reflection	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  armed	  
conflict,	  and	  in	  its	  delivery	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  place	  in	  which	  it	  is	  voiced:	  the	  poem	  is	  spoken	  and	  
projected	  from	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  an	  action	  that	  could	  not	  have	  
taken	  place	  inside	  Burma.	  In	  its	  public	  projection,	  the	  porter’s	  story	  became	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  
narrative	  of	  political	  injustice	  that	  is	  produced	  in	  relation	  to	  Burma.	  In	  the	  poem	  the	  porter’s	  talk	  of	  
their	  persecution	  in	  terms	  of	  killings,	  beatings,	  and	  being	  forced	  to	  carry	  heavy	  loads.	  They	  do	  so	  in	  
critical	  terms;	  “Escaping	  to	  survive,	  their	  power	  depends	  on	  their	  arms”.	  The	  porters	  know	  who	  is	  
responsible	  for	  their	  persecution	  and	  that	  the	  perpetrator’s	  power	  lies	  in	  the	  threat	  of	  their	  guns.	  
The	  poem	  also	  frames	  the	  porter’s	  experiences	  in	  a	  way	  that	  promotes	  solidarity	  with	  others	  who	  
share	  similar	  stories,	  ending	  with	  a	  cry	  to	  action:	  “Together	  we	  will	  struggle	  from	  now	  on”.	  This	  is	  a	  
story	  of	  persecution	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  many,	  and	  in	  its	  telling	  it	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  body	  of	  
activist	  material	  that	  I	  argue	  helps	  shape	  the	  identity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
The	  location	  of	  this	  voicing	  of	  persecution	  is	  a	  key	  preoccupation	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Burma	  is	  one	  of	  
Southeast	  Asia’s	  frontiers.	  Its	  southern	  border	  faces	  the	  Bay	  of	  Bengal,	  but	  on	  all	  other	  sides	  its	  
borders	  are	  landlocked,	  shared	  with	  Bangladesh,	  India,	  China	  and	  Thailand.	  From	  the	  time	  of	  a	  
military	  coup	  in	  1962	  until	  the	  early	  1990s,	  these	  borders	  kept	  Burma	  politically	  and	  economically	  
isolated,	  a	  position	  largely	  achieved	  through	  the	  socialist	  path	  pursued	  by	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  
and	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  policy	  of	  national	  unity	  that	  denied	  democratic	  reform	  and	  isolated	  the	  
population	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (Callahan,	  2004;	  Fink,	  2009;	  M.	  Smith,	  1999;	  Taylor,	  1987).	  
With	  more	  than	  52	  million	  people	  and	  over	  130	  ethnic	  nationalities,	  successive	  military	  
governments	  have	  largely	  attempted	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  the	  population	  through	  authoritarian	  
rule,	  and	  with	  little	  tolerance	  for	  political	  plurality	  or	  ethnic	  diversity	  (Silverstein,	  1997;	  Steinberg,	  
2001;	  Taylor,	  1982).	  The	  ramifications	  of	  these	  policies	  are	  particularly	  evident	  in	  Burma’s	  border	  
areas	  where	  ethnic	  populations	  are	  concentrated	  and	  armed	  ethnic	  groups	  opposing	  the	  military	  
dictatorship	  are	  typically	  based.	  Particularly	  since	  the	  1970s,	  these	  policies	  have	  seen	  large	  
numbers	  of	  people	  displaced	  within	  Burma	  and	  many	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  forced	  to	  flee	  across	  
borders	  and	  into	  neighbouring	  countries	  (BERG,	  1998;	  HRW,	  2005).1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Also	  see	  any	  number	  of	  reports	  produced	  by	  the	  Karen	  Human	  Rights	  Group	  (KHRG),	  Amnesty	  International	  
or	  Human	  Rights	  Documentation	  Unit	  (HRDU),	  to	  name	  a	  few	  of	  the	  organisations	  that	  have	  documented	  
these	  abuses	  and	  the	  process	  of	  flight	  over	  the	  years.	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One	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  has	  become	  a	  place	  of	  refuge	  and	  reprieve	  
for	  those	  fleeing	  persecution	  in	  Burma.	  The	  porters	  mentioned	  above	  not	  only	  found	  a	  safe	  and	  
relatively	  familiar	  place	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  they	  were	  also	  afforded	  an	  open	  informal	  
hospitality	  and	  access	  to	  resources	  not	  found	  inside	  Burma.	  There	  is	  some	  historical	  continuity	  to	  
this	  as	  despite	  state	  regulation	  people	  have	  moved	  back	  and	  forward	  across	  this	  modern	  
international	  border	  for	  over	  a	  century.	  But	  in	  constructing	  and	  projecting	  their	  poem	  from	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  the	  porters	  are	  distinguishing	  the	  place	  from	  which	  they	  choose	  to	  tell	  their	  
story;	  the	  location	  of	  this	  act	  of	  cultural	  resistance	  is	  no	  random	  coincidence.	  So	  what	  gives	  the	  
border	  this	  perceived	  status	  of	  refuge?	  How	  does	  this	  largely	  invisible	  line	  on	  the	  ground	  come	  to	  
represent	  differing	  states	  of	  security?	  Why	  did	  these	  porters	  tell	  their	  story	  here,	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  
of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border?	  And	  more	  broadly,	  what	  impact	  does	  the	  telling	  of	  such	  stories	  have,	  
particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  identity,	  agency,	  cultural	  reaffirmation	  and	  solidarity.	  
The	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis	  addresses	  these	  preoccupations.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  becomes	  the	  setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  projection	  of	  
a	  Karen	  identity.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  this	  argument,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  make	  three	  subsidiary	  
arguments	  within	  the	  thesis.	  Together,	  these	  three	  subsidiary	  arguments	  examine	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  the	  practices	  and	  narratives	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  
who	  reside	  there.	  This	  ultimately	  leads	  towards	  the	  position	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  Karen	  identity	  is	  
formed	  in	  and	  through	  the	  dynamic	  of	  this	  relationship.	  
The	  first	  subsidiary	  argument	  this	  thesis	  makes	  is	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  distinct	  
space	  characterised	  by	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain,	  which	  is	  characterised	  by	  
the	  modern	  demarcation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  state	  control	  over	  it,	  
and	  the	  intersection	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations,	  characterised	  by	  a	  fluidity	  of	  movement	  
(of	  information,	  resources,	  ideas,	  culture,	  identity)	  that	  intensifies	  the	  possibilities	  available	  to	  
displaced	  Karen,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  agency	  and	  mobilisation.	  	  
The	  second	  subsidiary	  argument	  is	  that	  these	  social	  relations	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  an	  interchange	  
that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border.	  This	  interchange	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  sociality	  (flows	  
of	  people,	  ideas	  and	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  connections	  to	  family,	  culture	  and	  identity)	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  a	  territorial	  domain	  (the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border).	  It	  is	  framed	  by	  three	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  
that	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  patterns	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  
recovery.	  
The	  third	  subsidiary	  argument	  is	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  formed	  through	  a	  
complex	  process	  of	  identity-­‐making	  that	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  constituting	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both	  real	  and	  imagined	  cultural	  identifiers	  and	  mythologies,	  and	  shaped	  by	  the	  present,	  specifically	  
influenced	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  displacement.	  These	  
arguments,	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  and	  the	  larger	  thesis	  argument,	  are	  elaborated	  upon	  
later	  in	  this	  chapter	  where	  I	  discuss	  the	  thesis	  structure.	  
OVERVIEW:	  THE	  KAREN	  IN	  A	  BORDERLANDS	  SPACE	  
This	  thesis	  comprises	  a	  study	  of	  a	  group	  of	  Karen,	  an	  ethnic	  group	  from	  Burma,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
investigation	  of	  the	  social	  and	  geographic	  space	  they	  inhabit,	  a	  borderlands.	  As	  integral	  
components	  of	  this	  thesis,	  both	  the	  Karen	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  borderlands	  space	  require	  
introduction	  and	  clarification.	  	  
In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  thesis	  I	  firstly	  place	  the	  Karen	  in	  an	  historical	  context,	  before	  bringing	  the	  
focus	  back	  to	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
who	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Like	  most	  ethnicities	  the	  Karen	  harbour	  complexities	  in	  their	  
origins	  and	  in	  identification.	  Having	  some	  understanding	  of	  these	  historical	  complexities	  helps	  
develop	  a	  key	  point	  I	  make	  later	  in	  the	  thesis	  around	  the	  formation	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  that	  it	  is	  projected	  through	  three	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  –patterns	  of	  activism,	  
networks	  of	  solidarity,	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery.	  These	  are	  manifest	  in	  two	  ways	  that	  are	  
significant	  to	  the	  thesis,	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  persecution	  and	  displacement,	  and	  as	  a	  pan-­‐
Karen	  identity	  based	  on	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen.	  To	  understand	  this	  claim	  
around	  Karen	  identity	  I	  must	  first	  put	  the	  Karen	  into	  historical	  context.	  
Secondly,	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  goes	  on	  to	  define	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  that	  
displaced	  Karen	  inhabit,	  arguing	  it	  has	  both	  cultural	  and	  geo-­‐political	  qualities,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  in	  
understanding	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  spatial	  entity	  that	  we	  can	  best	  map	  the	  interchange	  of	  social	  
relations	  that	  occur	  across	  the	  borderlands	  domain	  and	  which	  frame	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  
The	  Karen	  
While	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Karen	  are	  contentious,	  the	  claim	  most	  commonly	  accepted	  by	  early	  
colonial	  administrators	  and	  missionaries	  was	  that	  the	  Karen	  originally	  came	  from	  current	  day	  China	  
(Cross,	  1854;	  Hla,	  1939;	  Marshall,	  1922).2	  What	  is	  more	  evident	  is	  that	  after	  a	  period	  of	  migration	  
the	  Karen	  settled	  in	  areas	  that	  cover	  present-­‐day	  Burma	  and	  Thailand.	  In	  Thailand	  the	  Karen	  are	  
predominantly	  found	  in	  the	  hills	  of	  the	  country’s	  northwest,	  as	  well	  as	  around	  major	  northern	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  There	  is	  much	  literary	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  around	  the	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  Harry	  Ignatius	  Marshall’s	  ‘The	  Karen	  




cities	  like	  Mae	  Sot,	  Chiang	  Mai	  and	  Mae	  Hong	  Son.	  Many	  Karen	  also	  live	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border,	  a	  result	  of	  either	  earlier	  migration	  or	  forced	  displacement	  caused	  by	  conflict	  inside	  Burma.	  
Within	  the	  territorial	  confines	  of	  Burma,	  Karen	  people	  are	  predominantly	  found	  on	  Burma’s	  
eastern	  side,	  in	  Tenasserim	  Region	  and	  Karen	  State,3	  but	  also	  in	  the	  Irrawaddy	  Delta	  to	  the	  west	  of	  
Rangoon.4	  Karen	  in	  these	  areas	  are	  predominantly	  engaged	  in	  agriculture,	  forestry,	  fisheries	  and	  
livestock,	  and	  for	  many	  in	  the	  mountainous	  areas,	  subsistence	  farming.	  Many	  Karen	  are	  also	  found	  
in	  urban	  areas	  like	  Rangoon	  and	  Pegu	  where	  they	  largely	  participate	  in	  the	  urban	  economy	  and	  
lifestyle.	  
Such	  a	  description	  may	  carry	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  a	  homogenous	  Karen	  identity,	  even	  one	  that	  
stretches	  across	  national	  boundaries,	  but	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  a	  syncretic	  nationalist	  
Karen	  identity	  integrates	  the	  Karen	  in	  Burma	  and	  the	  Karen	  in	  Thailand.	  It	  is	  an	  important	  
distinction	  to	  make,	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  putting	  parameters	  around	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  I	  study	  in	  
this	  thesis	  but	  also	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  illustrate	  a	  Karen	  identity	  partially	  formed	  around	  nationalist	  ties	  
to	  territory	  rather	  than	  a	  shared	  ethnicity	  for	  all	  Karen.	  Differences	  in	  culture,	  religion	  and	  
language	  which	  have	  formed	  over	  time	  may	  account	  for	  this,	  but	  one	  would	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  
mechanisms	  of	  the	  respective	  nation-­‐state’s	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  international	  boundary	  that	  
now	  divides	  them	  also	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  (Rajah,	  1990).	  These	  are	  important	  distinctions	  that	  
are	  explored	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis,	  however	  it	  is	  important	  from	  the	  beginning	  to	  note	  that	  
the	  displaced	  Karen	  I	  talk	  of	  in	  this	  thesis	  do	  not	  include	  Thai-­‐Karen.	  This	  is	  because	  despite	  largely	  
conducting	  their	  political	  struggle	  from	  Thai	  territory,	  the	  Karen	  political	  movement	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  borderlands	  has	  made	  no	  real	  attempt	  to	  incorporate	  Thai-­‐Karen	  into	  their	  struggle	  (Rajah,	  
1990).	  
This	  first	  step	  of	  clarification	  is	  however	  not	  enough,	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘the	  Karen’	  of	  Burma	  needs	  
further	  analysis	  before	  we	  begin	  to	  understand	  the	  group	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  discussed	  in	  this	  
thesis.	  Karen	  inside	  Burma	  are	  thought	  to	  number	  between	  5	  to	  7	  million	  (BERG,	  1998).	  Yet	  putting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Across	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  the	  names	  of	  towns,	  cities	  and	  states	  that	  are	  used	  by	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
These	  mostly	  constitute	  the	  names	  prescribed	  prior	  to	  a	  1989	  decision	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military	  to	  change	  the	  
name	  of	  the	  country	  from	  Burma	  to	  Myanmar	  and	  the	  names	  of	  many	  of	  its	  key	  cities.	  There	  is	  obviously	  
both	  a	  logistical	  and	  ideological	  basis	  to	  this.	  My	  main	  reason	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  because	  these	  are	  the	  names	  
used	  by	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  research	  and	  out	  of	  respect	  to	  these	  participants	  and	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  
consistency	  across	  the	  thesis	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  retain	  the	  names	  they	  use.	  However,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  and	  
where	  relevant	  I	  have	  put	  the	  names	  used	  by	  the	  Burmese	  government	  in	  brackets.	  
4	  Burma	  is	  made	  up	  of	  21	  administrative	  divisions.	  This	  includes	  seven	  states	  –	  Chin,	  Shan,	  Kachin,	  Karen	  
(Kayin),	  Arakan	  (Rakhine),	  Mon	  and	  Karenni	  (Kayah);	  seven	  divisions	  or	  regions	  –	  Irrawaddy	  (Ayeyarwady),	  
Pegu	  (Bago),	  Magwe	  (Magway),	  Mandalay,	  Sagaing,	  Tenasserim	  (Taninthayari),	  Rangoon	  (Yangon);	  five	  self-­‐
administered	  zones	  –	  Danu,	  Kokang,	  Naga,	  Pa-­‐O,	  Palaung,	  Wa;	  and	  the	  capital,	  Naypyidaw	  Union	  Territory.	  
The	  states	  are	  named	  after	  the	  seven	  significant	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  Burma,	  but	  while	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  
ethnic	  population	  may	  live	  in	  the	  state	  that	  bares	  their	  ethnic	  name,	  they	  are	  by	  no	  means	  restricted	  to	  
residing	  there.	  For	  example,	  large	  pockets	  of	  Karen	  people	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Irrawaddy	  Delta,	  Mon	  State	  
and	  Tenasserim	  Division,	  as	  well	  as	  Karen	  State.	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an	  accurate	  figure	  on	  Karen	  population	  numbers	  often	  seems	  like	  a	  futile	  business.	  There	  is	  little	  
official	  data	  available	  and	  over	  the	  years	  numbers	  have	  often	  been	  manipulated	  for	  political	  
purposes	  (Cusano,	  2001,	  p.	  141;	  M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  30).	  For	  example,	  the	  1931	  Census,	  considered	  
the	  last	  attempt	  to	  truly	  capture	  Burma’s	  demography	  and	  particularly	  its	  ethnic	  population,	  
numbered	  the	  Karen	  at	  1.3	  million.	  A	  1971	  census	  noted	  3.2	  million	  Karen,	  but	  in	  1983	  the	  
Burmese	  Government	  put	  the	  Karen	  population	  at	  only	  2.21	  million	  (BERG,	  1998,	  p.	  7).	  
While	  an	  accurate	  population	  figure	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  derive,	  so	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  distinction	  of	  the	  
Karen	  as	  a	  cultural	  grouping.	  Across	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  
projected	  through	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  manifest	  as	  narrative	  of	  displacement	  and	  
persecution	  and	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  homogenous	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  allows	  a	  much	  more	  fluid	  and	  
elaborate	  understanding	  of	  identity	  than	  the	  sole	  focus	  on	  a	  homogenous	  Karen	  identity	  would	  
typically	  allow,	  and	  is	  far	  more	  representative	  of	  my	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  There	  is	  much	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  argument	  about	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  
positioning	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  and	  the	  cultural,	  economic,	  linguistic	  and	  religious	  differences	  
between	  the	  various	  people	  who	  call	  themselves	  Karen	  (Cusano,	  2001).	  There	  are	  generally	  
considered	  to	  be	  two	  major	  subgroups	  within	  the	  Karen,	  Sgaw	  and	  Pwo.	  They	  each	  have	  their	  own	  
dialect	  and	  loosely	  speaking	  an	  assigned	  religion:	  Pwo	  Karens	  tend	  to	  be	  Buddhist	  and	  Sgaw	  Karens	  
Christian.5	  Chris	  Cusano	  suggests	  a	  distinction	  could	  also	  be	  made	  between	  lowland	  and	  highland	  
Karen	  (2001,	  p.	  143),	  and	  there	  is	  some	  merit	  to	  this	  categorisation.	  Lowland	  Karen	  are	  typically	  
involved	  in	  the	  mainstream	  economy	  through	  small	  businesses	  or	  employment	  in	  the	  civil	  services.	  
As	  such	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  interact	  with	  non-­‐Karen	  members	  of	  the	  population,	  particularly	  in	  
trade	  and	  schooling,	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  on	  elements	  of	  the	  Burmese	  culture	  and	  speak	  the	  
Burmese	  language.	  They	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  Western	  and	  Burmese	  dress	  and	  
culture.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  highland	  Karen	  are	  more	  isolated	  from	  the	  Burmese	  culture.	  They	  are	  
commonly	  subsistence	  farmers	  living	  in	  Karen	  State’s	  eastern	  mountainous	  terrain	  and	  generally	  
maintain	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  their	  Karen	  language	  and	  culture.	  Highland	  Karen	  can	  be	  economically	  
isolated	  and	  experience	  low	  education	  rates	  (Cusano,	  2001).	  
While	  the	  majority	  of	  Burma’s	  Karen	  population	  is	  estimated	  to	  live	  in	  the	  Irrawaddy	  Delta	  
(Thawnghmung,	  2008),	  the	  Karen	  are	  more	  commonly	  associated	  with	  Karen	  State.	  This	  is	  due,	  at	  
least	  in	  part,	  to	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  Karen	  State’s	  eastern	  hills	  are	  remote	  and	  Karen	  communities	  
living	  there	  have	  more	  easily	  retained	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  Karen	  culture.	  Secondly,	  and	  of	  
particular	  relevance	  to	  this	  thesis,	  is	  that	  Karen	  State	  is	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  Karen	  resistance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Around	  60	  to	  70	  percent	  of	  Karen	  consider	  themselves	  Buddhist,	  while	  the	  remainder	  consider	  themselves	  
Christian	  (25	  to	  30	  percent)	  and	  Animist	  (5	  to	  10	  percent)	  (BERG,	  1998).	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movement,	  and	  claims	  over	  Karen	  territory	  are	  commonly	  found	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  
identity	  from	  the	  borderlands.	  
Burma	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  ethnic	  unrest.	  The	  main	  ethnic	  groups	  are	  the	  Arakan,	  Burman,	  Chin,	  
Kachin,	  Karen,	  Karenni,	  Mon	  and	  Shan.	  Each	  has	  its	  own	  language	  and	  culture.	  But	  even	  within	  
these	  ethnic	  groups	  one	  finds	  a	  multitude	  of	  subgroups	  with	  differing	  dialects	  and	  traditions.	  It	  is	  
generally	  claimed	  that	  there	  are	  over	  100	  ‘national	  races’	  in	  Burma.	  Finding	  an	  adequate	  system	  of	  
governance	  that	  can	  accommodate	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  the	  various	  non-­‐Burman	  ethnic	  minority	  
groups	  has	  dominated	  Burmese	  politics	  since	  independence	  in	  1948.	  Many	  of	  these	  ethnic	  minority	  
groups	  were	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  political	  landscape	  post-­‐independence	  and	  in	  turn	  developed	  
their	  own	  political	  and	  armed	  movements	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  appropriate	  
representation	  in	  the	  independence	  constitution,	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  develop	  resistance	  groups	  
against	  the	  central	  government.	  The	  Karen	  National	  Union	  (KNU)	  formed	  in	  1947	  and	  quickly	  
became	  a	  significant	  armed	  force	  against	  the	  central	  authorities,	  although	  it	  was	  certainly	  not	  the	  
only	  one	  with	  the	  Kachin,	  Shan,	  Chin,	  Mon	  and	  Karenni	  all	  waging	  similar	  battles	  against	  the	  newly-­‐
independent	  government.	  At	  times	  the	  KNU	  controlled	  considerable	  territory;	  in	  1949	  they	  
famously	  took	  control	  of	  Insein,	  an	  outer	  suburb	  of	  Rangoon	  while	  at	  other	  times	  they	  controlled	  a	  
large	  swath	  of	  territory	  from	  Mandalay	  in	  the	  north	  to	  Thaton	  and	  Kawkareik	  in	  the	  southeast	  (M.	  
Smith,	  1999).	  
A	  political	  resolution	  to	  the	  ethnic	  minority	  issue	  caused	  considerable	  concern	  for	  both	  the	  post-­‐
independence	  democratic	  government	  and	  the	  subsequent	  military	  regime.	  When	  General	  Ne	  Win	  
staged	  his	  coup	  in	  1962	  he	  justified	  the	  act	  by	  stating	  that	  “Federalism	  is	  impossible;	  it	  will	  destroy	  
the	  Union”,	  while	  a	  spokesman	  of	  the	  new	  regime	  went	  even	  further,	  stating	  that	  federalism	  was	  a	  
luxury	  Burma	  could	  ill	  afford	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  196).	  Ne	  Win	  saw	  the	  Tatmadaw6	  as	  the	  sole	  
protector	  of	  the	  country’s	  unity	  and	  national	  integrity,	  and	  federalism	  (with	  its	  accommodation	  of	  
ethnic	  representation)	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  this	  unity.	  It	  is	  a	  position	  synonymous	  with	  the	  military	  regime	  
throughout	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s,	  with	  giant	  billboards	  lining	  Mandalay’s	  fortress	  stating:	  
‘Tatmadaw’	  and	  the	  people,	  cooperate	  and	  crush	  all	  those	  harming	  the	  Union’.	  
What	  Ne	  Win	  and	  his	  military	  government	  instigated	  was	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  eradicate	  the	  ethnic	  
opposition	  forces,	  which	  over	  the	  years	  were	  increasingly	  pushed	  back	  into	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  border	  
areas.	  In	  1974	  the	  Burmese	  Army	  implemented	  a	  ‘Four	  Cuts’	  campaign	  in	  Karen	  State7	  which	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Tatmadaw	  is	  the	  Burmese	  word	  for	  the	  Burmese	  Army.	  
7	  Similar	  campaigns	  were	  conducted	  against	  other	  ethnic	  armies	  such	  as	  the	  Kachin	  Independence	  
Organisation	  (KIO)	  in	  Kachin	  State	  and	  the	  Shan	  State	  Army	  (SSA)	  in	  Shan	  State.	  These	  ‘scorched	  earth’	  
campaigns	  were	  a	  strategy	  employed	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military	  as	  far	  back	  as	  the	  1950s	  and	  continued	  well	  
into	  the	  2000s.	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an	  attempt	  to	  cut	  off	  the	  insurgent	  group’s	  access	  to	  food,	  funds,	  intelligence	  and	  recruits.	  But	  
such	  a	  campaign	  was	  never	  going	  to	  simply	  target	  ethnic	  armed	  groups;	  civilian	  villagers	  bore	  the	  
brunt	  of	  this	  campaign.	  The	  Burmese	  Army	  conducted	  a	  systematic	  campaign	  of	  terror	  where	  they	  
attacked	  villages	  and	  burnt	  crops,	  tortured	  and	  killed	  those	  accused	  of	  harbouring	  Karen	  National	  
Liberation	  Army	  (KNLA8)	  soldiers,	  stole	  food	  and	  animals,	  moved	  entire	  villages	  into	  relocation	  sites	  
under	  military	  control,	  made	  impossible	  extortion	  demands,	  used	  villagers	  as	  porters	  and	  for	  
forced	  labour,	  and	  raped	  and	  killed	  at	  will.9	  The	  result	  was	  a	  mass	  movement	  of	  traumatised	  
people,	  many	  eking	  out	  an	  existence	  as	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  (IDP)	  within	  Karen	  State,	  and	  
others	  fleeing	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  where	  they	  sought	  refuge	  in	  Thai	  villages	  or	  post-­‐1984,	  the	  
refugee	  camps.	  
This	  is	  a	  perfunctory	  summary	  that	  serves	  a	  number	  of	  purposes:	  to	  give	  historical	  context	  to	  the	  
conditions	  that	  preside	  in	  Karen	  State	  today,	  to	  give	  a	  demographic	  snapshot	  of	  the	  displaced	  
Karen	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  research,	  and	  to	  give	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  key	  elements	  from	  
which	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  has	  formed.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  Karen	  currently	  residing	  
in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  including	  most	  of	  those	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  research,	  would	  be	  
considered	  highland	  Karen	  from	  the	  eastern	  hills	  region	  of	  Karen	  State,	  the	  area	  of	  land	  
immediately	  adjacent	  to	  Thailand.	  They	  are	  typically	  both	  Pwo	  and	  Sgaw,	  although	  Christian	  Sgaw	  
Karen	  tend	  to	  hold	  many	  of	  the	  leadership	  positions	  of	  the	  Karen	  political	  movement	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  Many	  have	  a	  strong	  connection	  to	  the	  KNU	  which	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  presence	  in	  
the	  hills	  region	  of	  eastern	  Karen	  State	  and	  the	  main	  proponent	  of	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  nationalist	  
Karen	  identity.	  Most	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  share	  a	  common	  experience	  of	  
persecution	  and	  displacement	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  civil	  war	  that	  has	  consumed	  Karen	  State	  for	  more	  
than	  fifty	  years.	  This	  unresolved	  conflict	  continues	  to	  have	  considerable	  impact	  upon	  villagers	  in	  
Karen	  State,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  group	  of	  traumatised	  individuals,	  having	  fled	  into	  Thailand	  and	  settled	  
into	  refugee	  camps	  or	  local	  Thai	  communities,	  that	  make	  up	  the	  group	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  
discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  While	  most	  tell	  a	  story	  similar	  to	  the	  circumstances	  listed	  in	  the	  paragraph	  
above,	  it	  is	  their	  presence	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  that	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  arguments	  made	  
in	  this	  thesis.	  From	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  displaced	  Karen	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐establish	  some	  form	  of	  
community,	  cultural	  identity	  and	  political	  agency.	  They	  do	  this	  through	  acts	  that	  develop	  an	  
alternative	  articulation	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  space	  in	  which	  they	  reside,	  an	  articulation	  that	  often	  
sits	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  of	  the	  space.	  This	  alternative	  space	  forms	  opportunities	  
for	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  undertake	  social	  practices	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  
identity.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  space	  that	  I	  now	  turn.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  KNLA	  is	  the	  military	  arm	  of	  the	  Karen	  National	  Union	  (KNU).	  




A	  borderlands	  space	  
The	  concept	  of	  borderlands	  is	  elaborated	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  but	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  lay	  
out	  some	  of	  the	  key	  components	  of	  the	  term	  here.	  The	  location	  of	  acts	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  
resistance	  such	  as	  the	  porter’s	  poem	  occurs	  in	  a	  complex	  political	  space	  that	  highlights	  a	  key	  
thematic	  concern	  of	  this	  thesis:	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space.	  In	  this	  
thesis	  a	  ‘borderlands’	  domain	  is	  a	  space	  defined	  as	  having	  two	  intersecting	  components:	  loosely	  
bounded	  geographical	  places	  where	  people	  live	  and	  interact	  with	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  
institutions	  associated	  with	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state	  boundary	  (Gupta	  &	  Ferguson,	  1992),	  
and	  a	  space	  where	  the	  social	  interactions	  across	  the	  boundary	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  borderlands	  as	  
a	  space	  of	  cultural	  significance	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999).	  	  
This	  definition	  incorporates	  two	  important	  elements	  that	  shape	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  
borderlands.	  Firstly,	  I	  take	  a	  social	  constructionist	  perspective	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  in	  
that	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  space	  that	  is	  produced	  in	  and	  through	  the	  
social	  relationships	  that	  occur	  across	  the	  border	  (Massey,	  2005;	  Soguk,	  2007;	  Staeheli,	  1994).This	  
concept	  of	  a	  ‘borderlands’	  allows	  me	  to	  map	  the	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  a	  broader	  space	  
that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  border	  as	  purely	  delineating	  two	  
distinct	  autonomous	  spaces.	  This	  interchange	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  sociality	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  a	  territorial	  domain.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  interchange	  is	  broadly	  mapped	  through	  
the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  and	  manifests	  as	  a	  point	  of	  
tension	  between	  attempts	  by	  the	  nation-­‐state	  to	  create	  a	  homogenised	  space	  delineated	  by	  the	  
border	  and	  the	  intersecting	  social	  relations	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  that	  tend	  to	  map	  more	  fluid	  
activities	  across	  the	  border.	  
Secondly,	  this	  definition	  of	  borderlands	  allows	  me	  to	  retain	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  geographical	  
place	  that	  plays	  an	  integral	  part	  in	  the	  shape	  these	  social	  relationships	  take.	  While	  I	  will	  speak	  of	  
places	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  such	  as	  Mae	  Sot,	  Mae	  La	  refugee	  camp,	  or	  the	  strip	  of	  ‘no-­‐man’s	  
land’	  that	  sits	  between	  the	  two	  nation-­‐states,	  this	  is	  a	  process	  of	  orientating	  the	  reader	  in	  terms	  of	  
geographic	  location	  that	  is	  treated	  by	  locals	  and	  others	  as	  distinct	  from	  other	  places.	  In	  this	  
definition,	  the	  borderlands	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  which	  is	  used	  here	  to	  describe	  
the	  national	  boundary,	  as	  marked	  on	  a	  map,	  that	  separates	  Burma	  and	  Thailand,	  and	  which	  is	  an	  
outward	  manifestation	  of	  the	  political	  power	  and	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  adjoining	  states	  
(Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999;	  Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998).	  The	  border	  is	  part	  of	  the	  borderlands	  and	  as	  a	  
manifestation	  of	  state	  power,	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  should	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  spatial	  social	  
construct	  (Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998),	  though	  encompassing	  a	  more	  homogenised	  sense	  of	  space	  
than	  applies	  to	  the	  borderlands.	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Within	  this	  definitional	  framework,	  the	  term	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  used	  as	  an	  analytical	  device	  to	  
account	  for	  the	  social	  relationships	  that	  occur	  across	  the	  geographical	  boundary	  that	  is	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  border	  and	  that	  can	  also	  account	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  contested	  social	  interaction	  that	  
occurs	  in	  the	  space.	  Most	  of	  the	  social	  interaction	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  observed	  from	  the	  Thai	  
side	  of	  the	  border,	  but	  the	  content	  of	  these	  social	  interactions	  is	  also	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  
relationships	  and	  activities	  that	  occur	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  These	  cross-­‐border	  
interactions	  have	  ramifications	  at	  both	  a	  global	  and	  a	  local	  level,	  but	  their	  origins	  lie	  in	  the	  very	  real	  
connections	  established	  between	  forces	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  In	  other	  words,	  
one	  needs	  to	  understand	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  
inter-­‐connection	  to	  what	  occurs	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  This	  position	  draws	  on	  Baud	  and	  
Van	  Schendel’s	  argument	  that	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border	  be	  treated	  as	  one	  unit	  of	  analysis	  (1997,	  p.	  
216).	  It	  also	  relates	  directly	  to	  the	  spatial	  arguments	  made	  in	  this	  thesis:	  that	  the	  borderlands	  exist	  
at	  the	  nexus	  of	  tension	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors;	  it	  has	  both	  geographical	  and	  
conceptual	  qualities,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  often	  highly	  contested;	  and	  it	  is	  often	  a	  site	  of	  discursive	  
contestation	  and	  struggle,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  is	  conducive	  to	  a	  process	  of	  formulating	  new	  identities.	  
It	  should	  be	  said	  that	  borderlands	  practices	  are	  just	  one	  set	  of	  practices	  out	  of	  many	  in	  that	  space,	  
and	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  monopoly	  over	  the	  space	  in	  question.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  are	  not	  for	  
everyone	  at	  all	  times.	  This	  thesis,	  at	  various	  points,	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  view	  the	  borderlands	  from	  
an	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  political	  perspective,	  a	  refugee	  perspective,	  a	  state	  perspective	  and	  an	  activist	  
perspective.	  You	  can	  make	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space	  from	  these	  and	  
many	  other	  subjective	  positions,	  some	  contradictory	  and	  at	  times	  both	  restraining	  and	  
emancipating.	  It	  is	  this	  contested	  nature	  and	  the	  opportunity	  for	  multiple	  articulations	  of	  the	  space	  
that	  guides	  my	  use	  of	  the	  plural	  ‘borderlands’	  so	  as	  to	  carry	  the	  sense	  of	  diversity	  and	  plurality	  
(including	  the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  life	  is	  lived	  in	  the	  borderlands	  that	  exist	  beyond	  the	  themes	  
investigated	  in	  this	  thesis).	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  not	  mentioned	  on	  any	  map.	  It	  is	  not	  
a	  fixed	  place,	  although	  it	  has	  loosely	  collated	  geographical	  boundaries	  associated	  with	  close	  
proximity	  to	  the	  international	  boundary	  between	  Thailand	  and	  Burma.	  By	  this	  definition	  I	  would	  
not,	  for	  example,	  classify	  a	  Karen	  person	  living	  in	  Bangkok	  as	  living	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  
although	  they	  may	  be	  connected	  into	  the	  borderlands	  through	  the	  social	  and	  political	  networks	  
that	  emanate	  from	  global	  flows	  of	  information	  and	  communications	  technology.	  It	  is	  also	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  not	  a	  term	  commonly	  used	  by	  the	  Karen	  themselves.	  A	  
Karen	  person	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  space	  they	  currently	  inhabit	  in	  more	  conventional	  terms	  
relating	  to	  their	  physical	  location,	  such	  as	  they	  live	  in	  a	  refugee	  camp	  such	  as	  Mae	  La	  or	  in	  a	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township	  such	  as	  Mae	  Sot.	  Others	  may	  refer	  to	  their	  spatial	  circumstances	  in	  more	  abstract	  terms	  
such	  as	  that	  they	  live	  as	  a	  refugee.	  	  
While	  it	  may	  not	  enjoy	  currency	  in	  the	  everyday	  vernacular,	  this	  thesis	  demonstrates	  how	  as	  an	  
analytical	  tool	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  helps	  illuminate	  some	  of	  the	  key	  claims	  of	  this	  
research,	  namely	  the	  interconnection	  between	  space	  and	  identity	  formation.	  This	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
allows	  me	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  complexities	  of	  space,	  contestation	  and	  identity	  formation	  in	  ways	  that	  
a	  more	  homogenised	  notion	  of	  the	  space	  does	  not	  allow.	  Not	  least	  of	  which	  is	  its	  capacity	  to	  open	  
up	  the	  discussion	  to	  one	  of	  flows	  across	  space.	  This	  makes	  the	  concept	  integral	  to	  this	  thesis,	  but	  
also	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  larger	  debates	  around	  sociality	  and	  spatiality.	  
AIMS	  OF	  THE	  THESIS	  
While	  the	  genesis	  of	  this	  research	  lay	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐two	  prison	  porters	  mentioned	  
at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  its	  development	  into	  a	  thesis	  was	  an	  intellectual	  journey	  both	  
challenging	  and	  invaluable.	  What	  one	  begins	  with	  is	  rarely	  what	  one	  ends	  up	  with,	  and	  that	  is	  
certainly	  true	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  original	  premise	  was	  to	  explore	  practices	  of	  cultural	  expression	  as	  
a	  form	  of	  resistance,	  to	  look	  at	  the	  act	  itself	  as	  a	  means	  of	  articulating	  opposition	  to	  the	  political	  
forces	  responsible	  for	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  in	  Burma.	  And	  of	  course	  to	  look	  at	  these	  acts	  
of	  cultural	  expression	  from	  a	  specific	  ethnic	  group	  from	  Burma,	  the	  Karen,	  and	  in	  a	  particular	  
location,	  from	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  where	  many	  had	  been	  displaced	  to	  because	  
of	  conflict	  inside	  Burma.	  The	  acts	  of	  cultural	  expression	  I	  initially	  explored	  were	  in	  their	  nature	  
public,	  intended,	  political	  acts	  of	  resistance,	  or	  so	  I	  intended	  to	  argue.	  But	  the	  longer	  I	  stayed	  on	  
the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  the	  more	  I	  spoke	  with	  Karen	  about	  the	  motivations	  and	  meanings	  
behind	  their	  actions,	  this	  premise	  seemed	  an	  inadequate	  account	  of	  what	  was	  occurring.	  
Instead,	  what	  became	  quickly	  apparent	  was	  that	  the	  act	  of	  cultural	  expression	  was	  an	  outcome	  of	  
a	  larger	  political	  struggle	  that	  was	  being	  uniquely	  articulated	  from	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  act	  could	  
only	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  space	  from	  which	  it	  was	  being	  projected	  and	  the	  political	  
influences	  that	  shaped	  its	  content.	  The	  collective	  weight	  of	  these	  acts	  of	  cultural	  expression	  also	  
suggested	  they	  were	  being	  used	  as	  a	  way	  to	  explore	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  
identity	  that	  was	  shaped	  both	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  in	  Burma	  as	  well	  
as	  emplacement	  in	  a	  new	  location	  in	  Thailand.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  expressive	  act	  was	  a	  conduit	  to	  
what	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  which	  I	  contend	  is	  made	  up	  of	  
multiple,	  concentrated	  socio-­‐political	  activities	  that	  challenge	  typical	  state-­‐centric	  notions	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  Its	  multiplicity	  heightens	  its	  contestability,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  idea	  of	  contestation	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that	  develops	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  as	  a	  spatial	  form,	  and	  as	  a	  site	  for	  
the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  
Background	  to	  the	  study	  
On	  reaching	  this	  conclusion,	  I	  proposed	  a	  study	  that	  could	  draw	  together	  the	  place	  (the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  border),	  the	  political	  act	  (narratives	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  resistance),	  and	  the	  background	  
of	  the	  struggle	  (conflict,	  displacement	  and	  persecution),	  through	  a	  framework	  of	  identity	  formation	  
that	  occurs	  in	  and	  through	  a	  borderlands	  space.	  For	  the	  following	  reasons	  it	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  study	  
that	  was	  long	  overdue.	  Most	  existing	  studies	  of	  the	  Karen	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  contain	  
theoretical	  constraints	  that	  limit	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Karen	  as	  
politically	  active	  subjects	  and	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  spatial	  entity.	  This	  linkage	  is	  important,	  firstly	  
because	  it	  more	  adequately	  captures	  the	  nature	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  activity	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  and	  
secondly	  and	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  sense,	  because	  it	  sheds	  much	  needed	  insight	  on	  the	  borderlands	  
as	  a	  social	  construct,	  shaped	  by	  the	  social	  relationships	  that	  occur	  there,	  and	  an	  important	  conduit	  
for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  In	  discussing	  some	  of	  the	  key	  existing	  literature	  below,	  it	  is	  
this	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  I	  intend	  to	  fill.	  
There	  is	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  Karen,	  and	  while	  I	  describe	  some	  of	  the	  key	  
texts	  here,	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  examination	  of	  the	  literature	  is	  evident	  across	  the	  entirety	  of	  
the	  thesis.	  This	  thesis	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  themes	  where	  the	  literature	  can	  be	  
grouped	  into	  three	  broad	  categories.	  The	  first	  constitutes	  literature	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  political	  
and	  ethnic	  resistance	  movement,	  largely	  dominated	  by	  the	  practices	  and	  doctrine	  of	  the	  KNU	  and	  
its	  previous	  incarnations	  (KNU,	  1991;	  M.	  Smith,	  1999;	  Thawnghmung,	  2008).	  There	  has	  also	  been	  
some	  literature	  on	  the	  identity-­‐making	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation,	  in	  particular	  literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  
the	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  political	  movement	  (Rajah,	  2002),	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
Karen	  identity	  (Gravers,	  2007;	  Horstmann,	  2011)	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  
(Cheesman,	  2002;	  South,	  2007).	  
A	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  political	  and	  ethnic	  resistance	  movement	  literature	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  intra-­‐
state	  relations	  that	  privilege	  a	  state-­‐centric	  understanding	  of	  Burma	  and	  the	  Karen.	  While	  relevant,	  
I	  want	  to	  push	  beyond	  the	  limitations	  I	  see	  in	  a	  state-­‐centric	  discourse.	  Firstly,	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  are	  forcibly	  displaced	  from	  Burma	  and	  are	  stateless	  in	  Thailand.	  In	  many	  respects,	  
state	  operations	  and	  the	  state	  discourse	  attempt	  to	  exclude	  displaced	  Karen	  from	  the	  political	  
domain,	  and	  so	  an	  approach	  that	  can	  account	  for	  this	  marginalisation	  is	  required.	  Secondly,	  a	  
state-­‐centric	  approach	  privileges	  a	  state	  articulation	  of	  place	  and	  this	  fails	  to	  adequately	  account	  
for	  differing	  articulations,	  particularly	  those	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  displaced	  Karen.	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The	  second	  category	  into	  which	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  falls	  is	  that	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  large	  
refugee	  population	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  This	  literature	  places	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
implementation	  and	  impact	  of	  refugee	  policy	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  (Banki	  &	  Lang,	  2007;	  
Bowles,	  1998),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  documentation	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  inside	  Burma,	  which	  tends	  to	  
follow	  a	  human	  rights	  discourse.10	  While	  some	  of	  this	  writing	  explores	  the	  political	  agency	  of	  
refugees	  (Dudley,	  2010;	  Lang,	  1999),	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  refugees	  and	  human	  
rights	  tends	  to	  leave	  aside	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  Karen	  as	  
politically	  active	  participants	  in	  their	  own	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  living,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  flexibility	  to	  account	  for	  
what	  is	  essentially	  a	  complex	  and	  opaque	  set	  of	  categories	  into	  which	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  fall,	  
particularly	  for	  those	  who	  do	  not	  consider	  themselves	  a	  refugee	  and	  who	  live	  outside	  of	  the	  
refugee	  camps.	  
The	  last	  key	  area	  of	  literature	  is	  that	  which	  falls	  under	  historical	  ethnographic	  studies,	  particularly	  
focusing	  on	  the	  documentation	  of	  Karen	  culture	  and	  ethnicity.	  These	  tend	  to	  be	  fairly	  orthodox	  
accounts	  written	  by	  colonial	  administrators	  and	  missionaries	  (Marshall,	  1922;	  J.	  G.	  Scott;	  Smeaton,	  
1920)	  or	  early	  Karen	  historians	  (Hla,	  1939;	  Po,	  2001).	  While	  I	  draw	  on	  ethnographic	  accounts	  at	  
various	  junctures	  in	  this	  thesis,	  as	  well	  as	  engage	  in	  ethnographic	  methods,	  this	  study	  differs	  by	  
seeking	  to	  lift	  the	  discussions	  of	  culture,	  identity	  and	  sociality	  into	  a	  broader	  socio-­‐political	  
framework	  that	  moves	  beyond	  a	  sole	  concentration	  on	  the	  immediacy	  of	  interaction.	  	  
Each	  of	  these	  areas	  has	  made	  important	  contributions	  to	  debates	  focusing	  on	  the	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  and	  in	  a	  sense	  I	  draw	  on	  all	  three	  and	  also	  build	  upon	  them.	  But	  this	  thesis	  differs	  in	  a	  
key	  conceptual	  way	  as	  it	  argues	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  within	  a	  conceptual	  
framework	  of	  a	  ‘borderlands’	  that	  emphasises	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  space	  and	  the	  spatial	  
aspects	  of	  identity.	  
A	  number	  of	  academics	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  borderlands	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  border,	  but	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  contributions	  this	  thesis	  can	  make	  to	  this	  existing	  
literature.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  define	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘borderlands’	  space.	  To	  date,	  the	  term	  
‘borderlands’	  is	  predominantly	  used	  in	  a	  geo-­‐political	  sense;	  describing	  zones	  that	  straddle	  nation-­‐
state	  boundaries.	  Political	  geographer	  Carl	  Grundy-­‐Warr	  talks	  of	  the	  borderlands	  from	  this	  
perspective;	  he	  refers	  to	  shared	  cross-­‐border	  activity	  (focusing	  on	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  
activity)	  and	  firmly	  ties	  it	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  nation-­‐states	  and	  “...	  territories	  flanking	  and	  straddling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  As	  an	  example,	  there	  are	  many	  reports	  documenting	  human	  rights	  abuses	  put	  out	  by	  the	  Burma	  Ethnic	  
Research	  Group	  (BERG),	  the	  Karen	  Human	  Rights	  Group	  (KHRG)	  and	  Amnesty	  International.	  There	  are	  also	  
studies	  available	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  refugee	  policy	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  particularly	  put	  out	  by	  
the	  Thai	  Burma	  Border	  Consortium	  (TBBC)	  and	  UNHCR.	  For	  further	  discussion	  on	  refugee	  policy	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  also	  see	  the	  April	  2008	  edition	  of	  the	  Forced	  Migration	  Review.	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international	  land	  boundaries”	  (1993,	  p.	  45).	  Grundy-­‐Warr	  acknowledges	  that	  borderlands	  are	  sites	  
of	  “contact	  and	  interaction	  between	  neighbouring	  peoples”	  (1993,	  p.	  55),	  but	  stops	  short	  of	  
examining	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  this	  particular	  notion	  of	  a	  borderlands.	  Anthropologist	  
Ananda	  Rajah	  refers	  to	  “borders”	  and	  “frontiers”	  with	  obvious	  geo-­‐political	  intent,	  arguing	  they	  are	  
often	  areas	  of	  dispute	  and	  symbols	  of	  state	  power	  and	  control.	  He	  places	  this	  territorial	  dispute	  
and	  struggle	  for	  power	  clearly	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border	  and	  suggests	  that	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  it	  would	  be	  truer	  to	  claim	  a	  “Thai	  border	  and	  a	  Burmese-­‐Karen	  
frontier	  region”	  (Rajah,	  1990,	  p.	  123),	  a	  strong	  statement	  on	  state	  control	  over	  territory.	  
These	  are	  important	  studies	  that	  begin	  to	  articulate	  the	  nature	  of	  constructs	  that	  occur	  across	  a	  
borderlands	  space.	  My	  interest	  lies	  is	  in	  a	  more	  specific	  take	  on	  this	  spatial	  configuration	  however,	  
namely	  the	  impact	  of	  cross-­‐border	  activities	  and	  their	  inter-­‐related	  nature,	  moving	  the	  debate	  
beyond	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  autonomous	  state	  spaces	  to	  one	  of	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  
the	  national	  border.	  There	  remains	  in	  the	  literature	  a	  significant	  lack	  of	  examination	  of	  the	  political	  
and	  cultural	  constructs	  that	  occur	  across	  the	  nation-­‐state	  boundary	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  nature	  as	  
a	  changeable	  spatial	  entity.	  Two	  academics,	  Alexander	  Horstmann	  (2004)	  and	  Decha	  Tangseefa	  
(2006),	  have	  started	  to	  move	  the	  debate	  in	  this	  direction,	  developing	  studies	  that	  look	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  borderlands	  as	  a	  microcosm	  of	  human	  society,	  and	  as	  a	  conceptual	  space.	  Both	  have	  called	  
for	  a	  greater	  study	  of	  the	  border	  and	  its	  conceptual	  impact	  and	  suggest	  that	  borderlands	  are	  
symbols	  and	  spaces	  of	  political	  and	  cultural	  change	  that	  can	  challenge	  the	  national	  narrative	  and	  
hegemony	  of	  the	  state.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  Horstmann’s	  contention	  that	  the	  
borderlands	  is	  not	  only	  a	  symbol	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  change,	  but	  also	  their	  agent	  (2004,	  p.	  6).	  
This	  is	  certainly	  a	  position	  that	  develops	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis,	  that	  the	  borderlands	  critically	  
inform	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  identity	  constructions	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  the	  borderlands	  being	  
both	  symbol	  and	  agent	  in	  these	  interactions.	  However,	  the	  tendency	  remains	  amongst	  most	  of	  the	  
literature,	  to	  see	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  as	  strictly	  geographical	  in	  form,	  as	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  
political	  and	  economic	  activity,	  or	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  inter-­‐	  and	  even	  intra-­‐state	  relations.	  What	  
is	  missing	  from	  the	  literature	  is	  a	  more	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  conceptual	  
space	  that	  can	  span	  the	  geographical	  dimension.	  
The	  second	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  to	  relate	  the	  space	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  identity.	  There	  is	  an	  
exceptional	  amount	  of	  quality	  literature	  that	  has	  explored	  Karen	  identity	  from	  historical,	  
mythological,	  political	  and	  cultural	  perspectives	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explain	  my	  own	  arguments	  
within	  this	  larger	  context.	  Many	  of	  the	  early	  colonial-­‐missionary	  texts	  explored	  Karen	  identity	  in	  
the	  more	  conventional	  terms	  of	  ethnic	  identifiers,	  mythologies	  and	  origin	  myths	  (Cross,	  1854;	  
Marshall,	  1922;	  Smeaton,	  1920).	  A	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  explored	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  pre-­‐
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colonial-­‐missionary	  period,	  in	  particular	  anthropologists	  who	  have	  drawn	  on	  Animist	  and	  
Millenarian	  traditions	  (Stern,	  1968)	  and	  placed	  these	  within	  the	  modern	  adaptation	  and	  
construction	  of	  Karen	  identity	  (Hinton,	  1983;	  Keyes,	  1979).	  In	  modern	  times	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  idea	  
of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  enter	  this	  discourse.	  Many	  academics	  have	  explored	  Karen	  identity	  as	  it	  is	  
constructed	  though	  nationalist	  and	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  frames,	  and	  as	  such	  have	  questioned	  the	  
authenticity	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  (Hinton,	  1983;	  Rajah,	  2002).	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  missionary	  
influence	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  Karen	  nationalist	  identity	  and	  that	  this	  forms	  
the	  basis	  of	  the	  present-­‐day	  nationalist	  discourse	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  KNU	  (Gravers,	  2007;	  
Horstmann,	  2011;	  Rajah,	  1990).	  Academics	  such	  as	  Mikael	  Gravers	  and	  Ashley	  South	  have	  taken	  a	  
decidedly	  constructionist	  approach,	  exploring	  the	  idea	  of	  Karen	  identity	  through	  both	  modern	  and	  
traditional	  components	  of	  a	  Karen	  ethnie,	  suggesting	  there	  is	  no	  legitimacy	  to	  distinctions	  between	  
‘real’	  or	  ‘invented’	  categories	  of	  identification	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  both	  constitute	  the	  active	  
practice	  of	  identity	  (Gravers,	  1998;	  South,	  2007).	  
What	  this	  body	  of	  work	  shows	  is	  that	  Karen	  identity	  draws	  complex	  responses	  that	  highlight	  the	  
intricate	  array	  of	  social,	  cultural	  and	  political	  adaptations	  and	  constructs	  under	  which	  it	  is	  
constituted.	  This	  represents	  what	  I	  believe	  is	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  lived	  Karen	  identity,	  particularly	  as	  it	  is	  
constructed	  and	  projected	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  As	  this	  thesis	  will	  show,	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  drawing	  on	  this	  range	  of	  historical	  and	  modern-­‐day	  
acquisitions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  literature	  mentioned	  above	  makes	  an	  integral	  contribution	  to	  the	  
arguments	  around	  Karen	  identity	  that	  this	  thesis	  makes.	  But	  as	  yet,	  there	  is	  limited	  discussion	  
around	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  This	  is	  a	  particular	  construct	  of	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  
geographical	  location,	  including	  associated	  mechanisms	  that	  facilitate	  the	  projection	  of	  Karen	  
identity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  that	  most	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  share.	  What	  this	  thesis	  proposes	  is	  that	  a	  nationalist	  Karen	  identity,	  constituting	  both	  
historical	  and	  recently-­‐acquired	  elements,	  is	  largely	  perpetuated	  in	  support	  of	  a	  narrative	  of	  
common	  suffering,	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  construction	  
and	  projection	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  a	  position	  I	  elaborate	  upon	  in	  Chapter	  Eight.	  
From	  the	  literary	  context	  discussed	  here,	  this	  thesis	  proposes	  an	  approach	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  
geo-­‐political	  and	  the	  conceptual	  qualities	  of	  the	  space	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  construction	  and	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity,	  making	  an	  argument	  that	  is	  framed	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  
‘borderlands’,	  in	  part	  by	  engaging	  with	  material	  in	  an	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  manner.	  Rather	  than	  
employing	  a	  narrow	  geo-­‐political	  definition	  of	  borders	  and	  borderlands	  as	  respectively	  
representing	  an	  outward	  manifestation	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  as	  grey	  areas	  of	  control,	  my	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approach	  to	  borderlands	  draws	  benefit	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines,	  including	  social	  theory	  across	  
international	  and	  cultural	  studies,	  nationalism	  and	  refugee	  studies,	  political	  geography,	  and	  
anthropology.	  By	  blurring	  genre	  boundaries	  we	  can	  move	  beyond	  the	  limitations	  in	  the	  narrower	  
disciplinary	  approaches	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  and	  develop	  a	  more	  critical	  apparatus	  that	  
demonstrates	  the	  complexity	  needed	  in	  understanding	  the	  space.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  genre	  
crossing	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  loosely	  bounded	  geographical	  place	  
associated	  with	  a	  nation-­‐state	  boundary,	  and	  a	  conceptual	  space	  whose	  boundaries	  are	  associated	  
with	  subjectivity,	  mobility	  and	  self-­‐identification.	  At	  times,	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  space	  in	  which	  
alternatives	  to	  the	  state	  discourse	  are	  practiced,	  and	  creative	  cultural	  production	  created.	  At	  other	  
times	  it	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  site	  of	  marginalisation	  and	  unequal	  power	  distribution.	  The	  key	  to	  
understanding	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  not	  to	  restrict	  the	  view	  of	  it	  from	  a	  singular	  
disciplinary	  perspective	  but	  rather	  to	  see	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  spatial	  entity	  that	  is	  the	  
accumulation	  and	  product	  of	  these	  inter-­‐relationships.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  
can	  bring	  to	  this	  thesis	  and	  to	  studies	  of	  the	  Karen.	  
THESIS	  STRUCTURE	  
Given	  these	  first	  examinations	  of	  the	  terms	  and	  literature	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  worth	  reiterating	  the	  
main	  contentions	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  the	  structure	  in	  which	  it	  is	  presented.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  
the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space	  becomes	  the	  setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  
inform	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  The	  thesis	  is	  thematically	  organised	  around	  three	  
subsidiary	  arguments	  that	  support	  this	  main	  thesis	  argument.	  
Firstly,	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  distinct	  space	  framed	  by	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  modern	  
territorial	  domain,	  characterised	  by	  the	  modern	  demarcation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  the	  
consolidation	  of	  state	  control	  over	  it,	  and	  the	  intersection	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations,	  
characterised	  by	  a	  fluidity	  of	  movement	  (of	  information,	  resources,	  ideas,	  culture,	  identity)	  that	  
intensifies	  the	  possibilities	  available	  to	  displaced	  Karen,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  agency	  and	  
mobilisation.	  
Secondly,	  these	  social	  relations	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  
border.	  This	  interchange	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  sociality	  (flows	  of	  people,	  ideas	  and	  resources	  
as	  well	  as	  connections	  to	  family,	  culture	  and	  identity)	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  territorial	  domain	  (the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  border),	  and	  is	  framed	  by	  three	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  which	  I	  lay	  out	  below.	  While	  
modes	  of	  social	  practice	  constitute	  a	  larger	  theoretical	  domain	  than	  I	  cover	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  
phrase	  is	  used	  here	  as	  a	  means	  of	  collectively	  describing	  key	  patterns	  of	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  
in	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  As	  such	  they	  are	  examples	  of	  modes	  of	  practice	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis	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rather	  than	  definitive	  categories.	  These	  three	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  are,	  (1)	  patterns	  of	  activism	  
that	  strengthen	  Karen	  agency	  and	  challenge	  institutional	  forms	  of	  governance;	  (2)	  networks	  of	  
solidarity,	  developed	  through	  international	  networking,	  new	  technologies	  and	  political	  
consciousness;	  and	  (3)	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery,	  constituting	  a	  public	  projection	  of	  
‘remembered	  places’,	  cultural	  reification	  and	  imagining	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future.	  
The	  third	  subsidiary	  argument	  is	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  formed	  through	  a	  
complex	  process	  of	  identity-­‐making	  that	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  present,	  specifically	  influenced	  by	  the	  
experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  displacement	  and	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  
rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  constituting	  both	  real	  and	  imagined	  cultural	  identifiers	  and	  mythologies.	  
This	  thesis	  is	  therefore	  organised	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  Chapter	  One	  introduces	  the	  thesis	  and	  
defines	  the	  theoretical	  parameters	  of	  the	  research.	  Chapter	  Two	  makes	  an	  argument	  for	  a	  
methodology	  of	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations’	  which	  captures	  the	  multiple	  trajectories	  along	  
which	  social	  relationships	  form	  and	  transform	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  methodological	  
framework	  is	  then	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  research	  location,	  participant	  group	  and	  the	  methods	  used	  
to	  gather	  the	  data	  for	  this	  thesis.	  
Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  develop	  the	  underpinning	  ideas	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  Chapter	  Three	  
develops	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  in	  relation	  to	  larger	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  
developments	  of	  borders	  and	  borderlands.	  It	  firstly	  argues	  for	  a	  new	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  borderlands	  as	  a	  political	  space,	  a	  spatial	  re-­‐imagining	  that	  establishes	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘borderlands’	  as	  a	  social	  construct	  characterised	  by	  contested	  social	  relations.	  This	  concept	  of	  a	  
‘borderlands’	  allows	  me	  to	  map	  the	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  a	  broader	  space	  that	  is	  
informed	  by	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  border	  as	  purely	  delineating	  two	  
distinct	  autonomous	  spaces.	  The	  chapter	  goes	  on	  to	  propose	  that	  this	  interchange	  must	  be	  
understood	  in	  relation	  to	  three	  significant	  processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  
have	  spatial	  impact	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  These	  processes	  are	  the	  advent	  of	  mapping	  
the	  body	  politic,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  population	  and	  
cultural	  movement	  across	  borders.	  This	  chapter	  provides	  important	  background	  information	  on	  
the	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  development	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
modern	  demarcation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  
Chapter	  Four	  develops	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  laid	  out	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  by	  applying	  it	  to	  the	  
modern	  configuration	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands;	  to	  establish	  the	  contemporary	  context	  of	  
the	  borderlands	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  an	  intensification	  of	  control	  by	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  The	  increased	  
penetration	  of	  both	  the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  nation-­‐state’s	  to	  consolidate	  control	  over	  the	  border	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has	  intensified	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  an	  uneven	  
process	  of	  increased	  militarisation	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border	  and	  increased	  regulation	  on	  
the	  Thai	  side.	  
The	  political	  features	  discussed	  across	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  borderlands	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  which	  are	  defined	  
by	  a	  political	  authority	  attached	  to	  the	  modern	  territorial	  domain.	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven	  are	  
a	  pivotal	  point	  in	  the	  thesis.	  They	  build	  upon	  the	  argument	  developed	  over	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  
to	  argue	  that,	  in	  sharp	  distinction	  to	  this,	  displaced	  Karen	  create	  a	  borderlands	  space	  based	  on	  an	  
interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  which	  in	  this	  particular	  context,	  is	  framed	  by	  
fluid	  and	  contested	  social	  relations.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  group	  these	  social	  relations	  
into	  three	  dominant	  modes	  of	  social	  practice,	  patterns	  of	  activism	  (covered	  in	  Chapter	  Five),	  
networks	  of	  solidarity	  (covered	  in	  Chapter	  Six)	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  (covered	  in	  
Chapter	  Seven).	  This	  tension	  between	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  constitutes	  the	  first	  subsidiary	  argument	  this	  thesis	  makes,	  that	  the	  borderlands	  is	  
a	  distinct	  space	  characterised	  by	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain	  and	  the	  
intersection	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations.	  
Chapter	  Five	  argues	  that	  patterns	  of	  activism	  emerge	  from	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  operations	  of	  
institutional	  governance	  and	  a	  more	  informal	  political	  power	  that	  develops	  through	  the	  contested	  
social	  relations	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  namely	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  contest	  these	  institutional	  forms	  of	  
governance	  because	  they	  do	  not	  adequately	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  political	  self.	  Instead	  they	  
pursue	  forms	  of	  activism	  and	  subvert	  institutional	  norms	  of	  political	  belonging,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  
develop	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  that	  strengthens	  Karen	  agency	  and	  mobilisation.	  
Chapter	  Six	  argues	  that	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  are	  formed	  through	  activism	  that	  is	  framed	  by	  
shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  Further	  to	  this,	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  these	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  are	  formed	  and	  strengthened	  where	  activist	  practices	  
intersect	  with	  particular	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  power,	  in	  this	  thesis	  categorised	  as	  international	  
networking,	  new	  technologies	  and	  political	  consciousness.	  These	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  also	  
become	  a	  key	  conduit	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  narrative	  based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  
of	  persecution,	  thus	  becoming	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  Karen	  identity	  
in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Chapter	  Seven	  argues	  that	  the	  borderlands	  facilitates	  the	  recovery	  of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  
which	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  projected	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  cultural	  identity	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  
selective	  recovery	  of	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths	  that	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation,	  and	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are	  framed	  through	  a	  lens	  of	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  This	  cultural	  
recovery	  takes	  place	  through	  three	  key	  processes	  relative	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space:	  a	  public	  
projection	  of	  ‘remembered	  places’,	  cultural	  reification	  and	  imagining	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future.	  
Together,	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven	  develop	  my	  second	  subsidiary	  argument,	  namely	  that	  these	  
three	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  
border,	  and	  which	  ultimately	  sit	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  
Finally,	  Chapter	  Eight	  argues	  that	  these	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  inform	  the	  construction	  and	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  identity	  commonly	  manifests	  in	  two	  ways:	  firstly	  through	  a	  
narrative	  of	  shared	  persecution	  and	  displacement,	  and	  secondly	  as	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  based	  on	  a	  
narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen.	  While	  both	  forms	  play	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  the	  projection	  
of	  Karen	  identity	  from	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  
displacement	  more	  readily	  lends	  itself	  as	  a	  unifying	  force	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  
identify	  and	  mobilise.	  This	  chapter	  develops	  my	  third	  subsidiary	  argument	  by	  establishing	  that	  
Karen	  identity	  is	  formed	  through	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  identity-­‐making	  that	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  
being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  constituting	  both	  real	  and	  imagined	  cultural	  identifiers	  and	  mythologies,	  
and	  shaped	  by	  the	  present,	  specifically	  influenced	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  the	  
consequences	  of	  displacement.	  
While	  I	  have	  begun	  this	  thesis	  with	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  act	  of	  a	  poem	  being	  read,	  it	  serves	  a	  
metaphorical	  purpose	  for	  introducing	  the	  broader	  cultural	  and	  political	  narratives	  that	  are	  evident	  
in	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  comprised	  of	  complex	  layers	  of	  socio-­‐political	  
relations	  that,	  with	  closer	  scrutiny,	  shed	  insight	  into	  why	  and	  how	  a	  displaced	  person	  from	  Burma	  
residing	  in	  the	  borderlands	  can	  construct	  and	  project	  a	  poem	  about	  persecution.	  This	  piece	  of	  
activism	  is	  particular	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  encompasses	  many	  of	  the	  arguments	  I	  make	  in	  
this	  thesis.	  The	  porters	  spoke	  this	  poem	  from	  the	  relative	  safety	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  We	  know	  
about	  it	  because	  the	  porters	  were	  able	  to	  speak	  it,	  but	  also	  because	  a	  group	  of	  Karen	  activists	  were	  
able	  to	  access	  it,	  translate	  it	  into	  English	  and	  further	  disseminate	  it	  through	  global	  networks.	  This	  
process	  both	  utilised	  and	  was	  a	  beneficiary	  of	  new	  technologies	  and	  networks	  that	  enable	  larger	  
connections	  around	  human	  rights	  material.	  In	  voicing	  their	  poem,	  the	  porters	  are	  contributing	  to	  a	  
rich	  contextual	  canvas	  that	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  complexities	  of	  a	  modern	  spatial	  identity;	  
particularly	  one	  that	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  have	  the	  
political	  self	  recognised.	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  acts,	  and	  the	  form	  they	  take,	  can	  only	  occur	  because	  of	  
a	  range	  of	  factors	  that	  make	  up	  the	  space	  in	  which	  they	  are	  constructed	  and	  projected,	  illustrates	  





On	  the	  first	  of	  October	  we	  met	  with	  a	  girl	  from	  Australia	  
She	  wanted	  to	  know	  about	  our	  Karen	  culture	  and	  tradition	  
We	  sat	  together	  and	  discussed	  Karen	  hta	  
We	  recorded	  the	  hta	  on	  tape	  and	  video	  
We	  laughed	  
It	  is	  very	  difficult	  for	  me	  and	  Tham	  La	  
To	  explain	  our	  traditions	  and	  hta	  
Because	  you	  really	  want	  to	  know	  
I	  will	  try	  my	  best	  to	  explain	  to	  you	  
Hta11	  created	  by	  U	  Kyi	  during	  fieldwork	  with	  the	  author,	  October	  2005	  
In	  October	  2005	  I	  travelled	  by	  song	  tiaew	  through	  the	  early	  morning	  mist	  and	  was	  deposited	  in	  
front	  of	  a	  bamboo	  gate	  flanked	  by	  a	  razor	  wire	  fence.	  Strangers	  emerged	  to	  meet	  me.	  We	  walked	  
the	  ‘highway’12	  of	  the	  refugee	  camp,	  passing	  bamboo	  houses	  and	  shops,	  herds	  of	  goats,	  and	  
groups	  of	  chatting	  villagers.	  We	  traversed	  hard-­‐baked	  earth,	  running	  rivulets	  of	  water,	  bamboo	  
bridges	  and	  forests	  of	  exposed	  tree	  roots.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  uneven	  path,	  at	  the	  base	  of	  tall	  white	  
cliffs,	  and	  in	  the	  shade	  of	  a	  canopy	  of	  trees,	  we	  reached	  our	  destination,	  a	  Karen	  friend’s	  wedding,	  
a	  refugee	  camp	  wedding.	  
I	  mention	  this	  wedding	  because	  it	  represents	  how	  confusing	  and	  ambiguous	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  can	  be	  for	  an	  outsider.	  The	  wedding	  was	  held	  in	  a	  refugee	  camp.	  Special	  arrangements	  
ensured	  I	  could	  get	  in	  to	  the	  camp	  and	  attend	  the	  wedding.	  The	  groom	  was	  Sgaw	  Karen,	  the	  bride	  
Pwo	  Karen,	  he	  is	  Christian	  and	  she	  is	  Buddhist.	  Traditional	  protocol	  suggests	  they	  should	  never	  
have	  met,	  let	  alone	  marry.	  A	  KNU	  leader	  cum	  Christian	  pastor	  presided,	  and	  the	  ceremony	  
included	  Animist	  and	  Buddhist	  traditions	  despite	  its	  Christian	  direction.	  
The	  speeches	  were	  in	  many	  ways	  familiar:	  respect	  the	  sanctity	  of	  marriage,	  work	  on	  the	  
partnership,	  be	  prepared	  to	  compromise,	  do	  not	  go	  to	  bed	  angry.	  The	  bridesmaids	  wore	  the	  
traditional	  hse	  (Karen	  dress)	  and	  hko	  peu	  (head	  scarf).	  A	  young	  Karen	  man	  dressed	  in	  jeans	  and	  
with	  a	  rock	  star	  mop	  of	  hair	  brought	  out	  a	  guitar	  and	  amplifier	  and	  sang	  a	  Karen	  rock	  song	  so	  
loudly	  the	  veins	  protruded	  in	  his	  neck.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Hta	  is	  the	  Karen	  word	  for	  a	  form	  of	  oral	  poetry	  that	  is	  used	  for	  storytelling	  and	  to	  pass	  on	  knowledge	  from	  
one	  generation	  to	  the	  next.	  
12	  Refugees	  in	  Mae	  La	  camp	  often	  refer	  to	  the	  main	  thoroughfare	  through	  the	  camp	  as	  the	  ‘highway’.	  It	  is	  the	  
largest	  path	  through	  the	  camp	  and	  connects	  the	  various	  zones.	  It	  experiences	  heavy	  foot-­‐traffic	  and	  could	  
sustain	  a	  small	  vehicle.	  However,	  the	  word	  is	  used	  in	  some	  jest	  as	  it	  is	  also	  an	  uneven	  dirt	  path	  prone	  to	  
bogs,	  running	  water	  and	  deep	  crevices.	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The	  groom	  told	  me	  he	  drank	  ‘five	  fingers’	  of	  whisky	  to	  calm	  himself.	  The	  bride’s	  family	  paid	  ‘bribe’	  
money	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  travel	  from	  a	  different	  refugee	  camp	  to	  attend	  the	  ceremony.	  Afterwards	  
the	  wedding	  party	  ate	  the	  meat	  of	  three	  slaughtered	  pigs,	  as	  well	  as	  goat,	  ribs,	  and	  curries,	  all	  
washed	  down	  with	  beer	  and	  whisky.	  It	  was	  10am	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  when	  you	  looked	  around	  you	  
could	  see	  people	  from	  different	  countries,	  religions	  and	  languages,	  laughing,	  talking	  and	  eating.	  
In	  married	  life	  the	  couple	  spend	  their	  time	  between	  a	  house	  in	  the	  camp	  where	  they	  raise	  their	  
pigs,	  and	  a	  share	  house	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  where	  they	  document	  human	  rights	  abuses	  against	  Karen	  
people	  back	  inside	  Burma.	  To	  contact	  them	  in	  the	  camp	  you	  ring	  a	  communal	  number,	  leave	  a	  
message,	  and	  an	  hour	  to	  a	  few	  days	  later	  they	  call	  you	  back.	  In	  Mae	  Sot	  they	  have	  mobile	  phones	  
and	  the	  internet.	  They	  communicate	  through	  discussion	  forums	  and	  online	  chats,	  talking	  with	  
people	  from	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  world	  who	  they	  have	  never	  met.	  
This	  wedding	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  type	  of	  social	  relationships	  that	  I	  explore	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  
thesis.	  Social	  settings	  such	  as	  this	  one	  represent	  a	  point	  of	  intersection,	  where	  at	  times	  complex	  
and	  seemingly	  contradictory	  activities	  and	  messages	  develop	  the	  fabric	  of	  social	  relationships	  
particular	  to	  the	  place	  in	  which	  they	  are	  occurring.	  In	  the	  example	  mentioned	  above	  these	  social	  
relationships	  are	  numerous:	  inter-­‐ethnic,	  familial,	  political,	  cultural,	  gendered,	  inter-­‐religious,	  and	  
communal,	  and	  enabled	  by	  technology,	  shared	  languages	  and	  historical	  ties.	  The	  wedding	  mirrors	  
the	  complex	  contributions	  both	  individuals	  bring	  to	  the	  relationship,	  differing	  religious	  
orientations,	  gender	  roles	  and	  ethnic	  traditions,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  
takes	  place,	  the	  restrictions	  of	  a	  refugee	  camp,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  western	  culture	  and	  technology,	  
the	  ability	  to	  move	  around	  freely.	  My	  point	  of	  interest	  is	  not	  that	  these	  relationships	  occur,	  for	  
they	  are	  replicated	  in	  some	  way	  across	  the	  world	  every	  day,	  but	  rather	  that	  at	  their	  point	  of	  
intersection	  we	  get	  an	  analytical	  account	  of	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  is	  occurring.	  As	  a	  researcher,	  a	  
key	  concern	  is	  how	  best	  to	  capture	  and	  present	  this	  dynamic	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  academic	  argument.	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  methodology	  that	  looks	  at	  my	  research	  area	  as	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  
social	  relations’.	  This	  provides	  a	  methodological	  framework	  to	  explore	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  
relations	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  interchange	  across	  sites.	  It	  is	  an	  important	  analytical	  tool	  
that	  connects	  the	  primary	  content	  of	  this	  thesis	  (the	  nature	  of	  social	  relations	  in	  a	  borderlands	  
space)	  with	  the	  methodological	  framework	  used	  to	  gather	  the	  material	  for	  the	  research.	  In	  this	  
respect	  it	  has	  both	  conceptual	  and	  practical	  components	  to	  it;	  but	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  
explore	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations’	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relevance	  as	  a	  methodology.	  
The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  I	  first	  examine	  the	  conceptual	  parameters	  of	  ‘sites	  
of	  intersecting	  relations’	  and	  apply	  this	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  I	  then	  go	  on	  
24 
 
to	  lay	  out	  some	  of	  the	  key	  determinants	  in	  conducting	  the	  research.	  Firstly,	  I	  define	  the	  location	  of	  
my	  fieldwork	  in	  and	  around	  Mae	  Sot	  on	  Thailand’s	  western	  border.	  Mae	  Sot	  is	  used	  as	  a	  location	  
that	  can	  represent	  a	  point	  of	  intersection	  of	  social	  relationships	  that	  comes	  to	  identify	  a	  
community	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  Secondly,	  I	  define	  the	  community	  
and	  my	  participant	  group	  who	  provide	  the	  key	  empirical	  data	  for	  the	  arguments	  made	  throughout	  
this	  thesis.	  This	  group	  of	  people	  were	  chosen	  because	  they	  have	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  conflict	  
and	  displacement	  which	  serves	  to	  deliver	  a	  unique	  articulation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  
Finally,	  I	  lay	  out	  the	  key	  methods	  used	  to	  gather	  evidence	  needed	  to	  write	  this	  thesis:	  informal	  
interviews,	  participant	  observation,	  analysis	  of	  cultural	  expression	  and	  archival	  research	  and	  
literary	  analysis.	  
By	  using	  methods	  such	  as	  informal	  interviews	  and	  observation,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  examine	  patterns	  of	  
cultural	  and	  political	  behaviour,	  noting	  their	  relationship	  to	  what	  quickly	  emerged	  as	  a	  key	  focus	  –	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  was	  occurring.	  A	  key	  characteristic	  of	  this	  space	  is	  a	  set	  of	  social	  
relations	  that	  form	  an	  interchange	  across	  the	  national	  border.	  In	  setting	  up	  a	  methodology	  that	  
examines	  social	  relations	  across	  sites,	  I	  am	  also	  able	  to	  develop	  my	  main	  thesis	  argument	  that	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  becomes	  the	  setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  
connect	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  the	  social	  practices	  that	  occur	  there,	  and	  the	  projection	  of	  identity	  
that	  emerges	  from	  it.	  
A	  final	  note	  of	  clarification	  is	  required.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
methodology,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  
is	  developed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  understand	  a	  process	  of	  interchange	  that	  
occurs	  across	  a	  broader	  space	  that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  This	  connection	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  methodological	  and	  theoretical	  is	  intended;	  it	  strongly	  aligns	  the	  dual	  
preoccupations	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  research,	  an	  analytical	  argument	  and	  the	  methods	  by	  which	  it	  was	  
obtained,	  and	  this	  brings	  continuity	  to	  the	  arguments	  made	  across	  this	  thesis.	  
25 
 
TOWARDS	  A	  METHODOLOGY	  OF	  ‘SITES	  OF	  INTERSECTING	  SOCIAL	  RELATIONS’13	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  talk	  about	  Mae	  Sot	  as	  a	  study	  site	  specific	  to	  a	  geographic	  
location,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  an	  ethnographic	  study	  of	  a	  distinct	  community	  treated	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  world.	  Mae	  Sot	  is	  the	  physical	  location	  from	  which	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  undertaken,	  but	  
the	  arguments	  in	  this	  thesis	  draw	  across	  a	  much	  broader	  borderlands	  domain	  that	  must	  account	  
for	  the	  social	  relationships	  that	  develop	  beyond	  specific	  geographic	  locations.	  From	  this	  position,	  
the	  thesis	  argues	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  multiple	  sites	  that	  are	  interconnected	  by	  a	  set	  of	  social	  
relationships	  (Massey,	  2005;	  Gille,	  2001).	  This	  moves	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  ethnographic	  practice	  
of	  studying	  a	  self-­‐contained	  community	  with	  an	  essential	  identity,	  to	  a	  community	  identified	  by	  the	  
point	  of	  intersection	  of	  social	  relationships,	  relationships	  that	  occur	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  global	  
level,	  and	  certainly	  across	  the	  borderlands	  domain.	  In	  this	  approach,	  social	  relationships	  can	  be	  
influenced	  by	  their	  locality	  but	  are	  not	  solely	  defined	  by	  it.	  This	  is	  integral	  to	  my	  thesis	  argument	  
because	  this	  methodological	  approach	  establishes	  a	  theoretical	  context	  to	  my	  formulation	  of	  a	  
borderlands	  space,	  linking	  a	  geographically	  defined	  place	  to	  broader	  patterns	  of	  social	  relations	  
that	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  in	  a	  different	  way	  about	  the	  connections	  between	  sociality,	  spatiality	  and	  
identity.	  
There	  is	  some	  need	  to	  justify	  this	  methodological	  focus	  on	  social	  relationships	  and	  its	  connection	  
to	  the	  larger	  thesis	  structure.	  To	  make	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  constitutes	  
both	  geographical	  locations	  and	  is	  a	  locus	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relationships	  has	  considerable	  
academic	  support.	  In	  particular,	  I	  draw	  heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Doreen	  Massey	  and	  Zsuzsa	  Gille.	  
Massey’s	  book	  ‘For	  Space’	  poses	  three	  propositions	  in	  regards	  to	  spatial	  understanding:	  that	  space	  
is	  the	  product	  of	  inter-­‐relations,	  that	  space	  is	  a	  sphere	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  multiplicity,	  and	  that	  
space	  is	  always	  under	  construction	  (Massey,	  2005,	  pp.	  9-­‐10).	  Similarly	  to	  Massey,	  sociologist	  Zsuzsa	  
Gille	  in	  her	  essay	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  ethnography	  in	  the	  time	  of	  globalisation	  argues	  for	  a	  concept	  
of	  place	  that	  is	  a	  “locus	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations”	  (2001,	  p.	  327).	  Anthropologists	  such	  as	  
Anna	  Tsing	  (1993)	  and	  Akhil	  Gupta	  and	  James	  Ferguson	  (1992)	  have	  argued	  for	  a	  spatial	  
imagination	  that	  accounts	  for	  connections	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  locality.	  These	  authors	  
contribute	  to	  a	  rich	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  argues	  for	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  place	  and	  space	  as	  
mutually	  constituted,	  and	  socially	  constructed.	  As	  such,	  their	  writing	  has	  helped	  form	  my	  own	  
arguments	  around	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  While	  neither	  use	  the	  exact	  terminology	  of	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations’,	  this	  concept	  comes	  
directly	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Doreen	  Massey	  and	  Zsuzsa	  Gille.	  Gille	  talks	  of	  the	  “locus	  of	  social	  relations”	  and	  
“sites	  of	  lived	  social	  relations”	  (2001).	  Massey	  talks	  of	  “space	  as	  the	  product	  of	  interrelations:	  as	  constituted	  
through	  interactions”	  (2005).	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  much	  more	  fluid	  notion	  of	  the	  role	  social	  
relations	  play	  in	  identifying,	  articulating	  and	  transforming	  sites.	  My	  use	  of	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  
relations’	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  bring	  both	  their	  work	  together	  in	  a	  concept	  that	  makes	  sense	  to	  my	  research.	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In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  illustration	  of	  this	  argument	  I	  borrow	  a	  technique	  used	  by	  Zsuzsa	  Gille	  
in	  her	  2001	  essay	  mentioned	  above.	  Researching	  a	  proposed	  waste	  incinerator	  in	  Hungary,	  Gille	  
argued	  that	  by	  studying	  the	  paths	  of	  social	  relationships	  among	  her	  sites	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  she	  
was	  able	  to	  see	  profound	  transformations	  in	  the	  sites	  themselves,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
inter-­‐dependence	  (Gille,	  2001).	  She	  developed	  a	  thread	  that	  could	  explain	  the	  study	  of	  sites	  “along	  
the	  social	  relationships	  that	  develop...”	  (Gille,	  2001,	  p.	  324),	  rather	  than	  the	  study	  of	  a	  particular	  
site/s.	  This	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  framing	  the	  practices	  and	  articulations	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  
Let	  me	  try	  and	  develop	  a	  similar	  thread	  to	  illustrate	  the	  social	  relationships	  that	  define	  the	  
spatiality	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  
One	  possible	  thread	  would	  be	  to	  follow	  the	  burgeoning	  relationship	  between	  the	  refugees	  and	  a	  
number	  of	  border	  towns.	  This	  thread	  largely	  underpins	  my	  arguments	  around	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  
borderlands	  space	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four.	  As	  a	  geo-­‐political	  location,	  the	  area	  I	  
discuss	  in	  this	  thesis	  changed	  significantly	  following	  the	  influx	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  Karen	  refugees	  
into	  Thailand	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Over	  time,	  towns	  such	  as	  Mae	  Sot,	  Mae	  Sariang	  and	  Mae	  Hong	  
Son,	  all	  located	  on	  Thailand’s	  western	  border,	  have	  become	  synonymous	  with	  the	  refugees.	  Mae	  
Sot,	  due	  to	  its	  close	  proximity	  to	  Mae	  La	  refugee	  camp,	  has	  a	  symbiotic	  connection	  to	  the	  camp	  
and	  this	  has	  manifested	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  movement	  between	  the	  two	  sites,	  divided	  living	  
arrangements,	  an	  increased	  military	  presence,	  and	  community-­‐based	  organisations	  working	  
between	  the	  two	  sites	  on	  social	  issues,	  including	  health	  and	  education,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  The	  refugee	  
camps	  have	  also	  brought	  a	  large	  number	  of	  aid	  agencies,	  journalists,	  religious	  organisations,	  
academics	  and	  students	  to	  the	  area,	  which	  predominantly	  base	  themselves	  in	  Mae	  Sot.	  This	  has	  
introduced	  Western	  influences	  to	  Karen	  culture	  and	  identity.	  It	  has	  also	  broadened	  the	  nature	  and	  
reach	  of	  the	  refugee	  situation	  and	  the	  larger	  Karen	  political	  struggle.	  	  
Working	  parallel	  to	  this	  is	  the	  path	  of	  political	  intervention,	  where	  events	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  
and	  1990s	  changed	  the	  character	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  As	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  
the	  borderlands	  was	  more	  heavily	  policed	  than	  before,	  migration	  and	  customs	  more	  heavily	  
regulated,	  and	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  border	  posts	  dependent	  upon	  the	  political	  manoeuvrings	  of	  
bureaucrats	  in	  the	  state	  capitals.	  At	  certain	  times	  in	  the	  past,	  Mae	  Sot	  has	  been	  a	  sleepy	  border	  
post,	  and	  the	  borderlands	  an	  innocuous	  space	  of	  economic	  and	  familial	  exchange.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  an	  
adequate	  representation	  of	  the	  borderlands	  today.	  The	  relationship	  between	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  
the	  locality	  has	  transformed	  the	  space,	  the	  two	  becoming	  more	  conjoined	  in	  the	  constructions	  
they	  create.	  
The	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  dynamic	  of	  this	  relationship	  between	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  is	  to	  look	  at	  its	  inter-­‐connectedness.	  These	  relationships	  have	  changed	  the	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nature	  of	  Mae	  Sot	  and	  other	  towns	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  they	  changed	  
the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	  responded	  to	  these	  locations.	  They	  also	  help	  develop	  the	  story	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  They	  are	  not	  static	  events	  isolated	  from	  history	  and	  circumstance,	  but	  
constantly	  evolving	  connections	  developed	  along	  pathways	  of	  social	  relationships	  that	  
interconnect	  multiple	  sites	  over	  time.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  we	  can	  comprehend	  the	  influence	  of	  
Western	  rock	  music	  at	  the	  traditional	  Karen	  wedding	  mentioned	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Or	  
that	  the	  practices	  of	  Animism,	  Buddhism	  and	  Christianity	  might	  coexist	  in	  a	  wedding	  ceremony.	  Or	  
even	  that	  such	  a	  public	  display	  of	  Karen	  ethnicity	  can	  occur	  without	  discriminatory	  retaliation.	  The	  
many	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  the	  wedding	  I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
chapter	  are	  the	  same	  sets	  of	  connections	  and	  relationships	  that	  in	  their	  identification	  led	  me	  to	  
develop	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  borderlands,	  that	  is	  a	  space	  made	  up	  of	  an	  interchange	  characterised	  by	  
contested	  social	  relations.	  
To	  understand	  these	  influences	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  displaced	  Karen	  living	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  it	  is	  
necessary	  to	  follow	  the	  various	  paths	  that	  connect	  these	  events	  and	  the	  relationships	  that	  bind	  
them.	  As	  these	  paths	  are	  followed	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  and	  through	  changing	  political	  and	  social	  
circumstance,	  these	  social	  relationships	  and	  connections	  inevitably	  change.	  As	  these	  paths	  
intersect	  with	  Mae	  Sot,	  or	  in	  fact	  any	  geographical	  location	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  they	  add	  new	  layers	  
to	  what	  constitutes	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  What	  becomes	  of	  interest	  to	  this	  research	  is	  not	  the	  
town,	  or	  the	  refugee,	  but	  the	  social	  relationships	  that	  develop	  between	  them,	  because	  it	  is	  this	  
constant	  production	  that	  transforms	  the	  site.	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  argument	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  constitutes	  sites	  of	  social	  
relationships,	  I	  must	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  study	  of	  these	  relationships	  requires	  a	  study	  of	  the	  
practices,	  meanings	  and	  products	  of	  those	  who	  live	  and	  narrate	  them,	  in	  this	  case	  displaced	  Karen	  
in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  contribution	  of	  anthropology,	  ethnography	  and	  sociology	  
already	  mentioned,	  this	  is	  where	  I	  have	  relied	  on	  elements	  of	  cultural	  studies	  and	  feminist	  studies	  
to	  frame	  the	  collection	  and	  analysis	  of	  data	  (Reinharz	  &	  Davidman,	  1992).	  These	  fields	  are	  
incredibly	  diverse	  and	  constitute	  larger	  theoretical	  discoveries	  than	  I	  do	  justice	  to	  here.	  However,	  
there	  are	  key	  elements	  I	  have	  extracted	  for	  use	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  and	  while	  briefly	  discussed	  
here	  their	  contribution	  to	  the	  thesis	  appears	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  coming	  chapters.	  
The	  influence	  of	  these	  two	  disciplines	  largely	  encompasses	  the	  source	  of	  narratives	  and	  the	  
insights	  they	  provide,	  although	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  limited	  to	  this,	  and	  in	  turn	  directs	  the	  methods	  
chosen	  to	  collect	  the	  data	  for	  this	  thesis.	  There	  are	  three	  areas	  in	  particular	  where	  these	  two	  
disciplines	  inform	  my	  methodology.	  The	  first	  area	  is	  where	  I	  draw	  on	  a	  key	  feminist	  understanding	  
of	  different	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (Haraway,	  1988;	  Lal,	  1999),	  to	  account	  for	  the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	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develop	  non-­‐hegemonic	  stories	  of	  their	  displacement	  and	  identity	  that	  differ	  from	  the	  dominant	  or	  
patriarchal	  perspective.	  In	  this	  sense	  knowledge	  does	  not	  follow	  binary	  trajectories	  but	  rather	  
develops	  a	  reality	  based	  on	  plurality	  and	  social	  construction.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  second	  area	  of	  
influence,	  and	  particularly	  pertinent	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  this	  approach	  allows	  for	  the	  production	  of	  
knowledge	  based	  on	  contesting	  dominant	  norms	  (Behrendt,	  1993;	  hooks,	  1984).	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  
the	  narratives	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  where	  contested	  narratives,	  which	  occur	  at	  both	  the	  intra	  and	  
inter-­‐level,	  can	  produce	  different	  types	  of	  knowledge	  that	  have	  traditionally	  been	  unaccounted	  for,	  
for	  example	  how	  Karen	  identify	  themselves	  or	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  refugee.	  And	  thirdly,	  I	  have	  
employed	  a	  method	  of	  content	  analysis	  which	  draws	  on	  feminist	  and	  cultural	  anthropological	  
approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  text	  and	  cultural	  products	  as	  a	  legitimate	  and	  insightful	  source	  of	  
knowledge	  (Geertz,	  1976;	  Tsing,	  1993).	  In	  particular,	  these	  studies	  helped	  me	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  
examining	  narratives	  and	  messages	  in	  relation	  to	  power	  structures,	  cultural	  practice,	  nationality	  
and	  ethnicity.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  inclusion	  to	  the	  thesis	  as	  cultural	  and	  artistic	  products	  were	  
integral	  to	  the	  narratives	  provided	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  research	  and	  as	  such	  
are	  an	  important	  analytical	  tool	  of	  Karen	  life	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Participant-­‐researcher	  relationship	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  social	  relationships	  that	  develop	  along	  paths	  between	  research	  sites,	  there	  is	  a	  
further	  relationship	  that	  needs	  clarification	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  the	  parameters	  of	  my	  
methodology;	  this	  is	  the	  participant-­‐researcher	  relationship.	  As	  a	  researcher	  I	  also	  occupy	  multiple	  
locations	  –	  as	  academic,	  activist,	  observer,	  participant,	  outsider,	  and	  insider	  –	  and	  my	  methodology	  
needs	  to	  account	  for	  a	  reflexive	  approach	  to	  the	  participant-­‐researcher	  dynamic.	  As	  the	  
interchange	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  I	  was	  not	  only	  researching	  elements	  of	  Karen	  
culture	  and	  tradition,	  I	  was	  also	  at	  times	  incorporated	  into	  their	  cultural	  production,	  often	  moving	  
with	  some	  fluidity	  between	  those	  roles.	  
From	  the	  outset,	  I	  chose	  research	  practices	  that	  were	  embedded	  in	  traditional	  ethnography,	  and	  I	  
perceived	  myself	  as	  embodying	  many	  of	  the	  dualisms	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  this	  approach.	  I	  was	  
an	  outsider	  observing	  the	  insider,	  I	  was	  taking	  an	  objective	  view	  on	  the	  subjective,	  I	  was	  the	  self	  
attempting	  to	  articulate	  the	  other.	  But	  my	  reality	  soon	  challenged	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  dualisms.	  
My	  objective	  position	  seemed	  unreasonable;	  who	  can	  be	  truly	  free	  of	  subjective	  prejudices	  and	  
assumptions?	  The	  idea	  of	  insider/outsider	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  be	  a	  shifting	  dynamic,	  relying	  on	  time,	  
location	  and	  circumstance	  to	  determine	  who	  occupies	  these	  positions	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  and	  
certainly	  not	  embodying	  any	  notion	  of	  being	  fixed	  or	  predetermined,	  for	  me	  or	  for	  my	  participants.	  
It	  also	  seemed	  to	  me	  that	  I	  was	  in	  danger	  of	  “fetishising	  the	  other”(	  Haraway,	  1988).	  I	  turned	  to	  the	  
work	  of	  Anna	  Tsing	  (1993)	  and	  Jayati	  Lal	  (1999)	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  ‘other’	  works	  to	  
29 
 
reinforce	  the	  position	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  study	  as	  being	  outside	  the	  norm,	  a	  position	  that	  
could	  only	  further	  marginalise	  my	  participants,	  while	  privileging	  myself	  as	  an	  “elite	  observer”	  
representing	  Western	  academic	  ideals	  (Tsing,	  1993,	  p.	  22).	  This	  preoccupation	  with	  ‘other’	  seemed	  
to	  me	  to	  obscure	  the	  “nuances	  of	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  relationship”	  (Tsing,	  1993,	  p.	  22)	  that	  can	  
develop	  between	  the	  participant	  and	  researcher.	  
While	  struggling	  with	  these	  dualisms	  of	  ethnographic	  research,	  my	  intent	  was	  not	  to	  discount	  
classical	  ethnographic	  methods,	  for	  many	  of	  its	  conventional	  principles	  underpin	  the	  work	  
undertaken	  as	  part	  of	  this	  thesis,	  but	  rather	  to	  find	  new	  interpretations	  that	  could	  account	  for	  the	  
realities	  of	  my	  fieldwork.	  In	  developing	  a	  methodology	  of	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relationships’,	  
I	  have	  also	  found	  Lal’s	  work	  on	  “situated	  locations”	  (Lal,	  1999)	  a	  useful	  tool.	  This	  is	  a	  methodology	  
that	  attempts	  to	  break	  down	  the	  divisions	  between	  subject-­‐object,	  self-­‐other,	  researcher-­‐
participant,	  by	  recognising	  that	  most	  people	  “occupy	  multiple	  and	  fluid	  locations”	  (Lal,	  1999,	  p.	  79)	  
that	  challenge	  the	  assumption	  of	  an	  ‘objective	  outsider’	  or	  an	  ‘authentic	  insider’.	  In	  many	  of	  the	  
examples	  I	  use	  throughout	  this	  chapter	  I	  occupy	  an	  unfamiliar	  location;	  I	  am	  an	  obvious	  outsider.	  
But	  it	  was	  surprising	  to	  me	  to	  realise	  how	  many	  of	  my	  participants	  occupied	  that	  space	  with	  me	  (as	  
an	  outsider	  in	  Thailand),	  or	  how	  our	  roles	  were	  often	  reversed	  (for	  example	  at	  a	  Thai	  military	  
checkpoint),	  or	  in	  many	  cases	  variable	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances	  (as	  I	  became	  more	  familiar	  
with	  and	  in	  the	  space).	  The	  ambiguity	  and	  fluidity	  evident	  in	  these	  positions	  helped	  break	  down	  
some	  of	  the	  more	  traditional	  assumptions	  and	  divisions	  around	  researcher-­‐participant	  roles.	  
Those	  distinctions	  between	  insider-­‐outsider,	  researcher-­‐participant,	  known-­‐unknown,	  occupy	  a	  far	  
greyer	  area	  then	  the	  hyphen	  implies,	  and	  ultimately	  were	  not	  a	  productive	  discourse	  in	  which	  I	  
could	  understand	  how	  knowledge	  was	  generated	  and	  presented	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  
My	  hope	  therefore,	  is	  that	  this	  thesis	  makes	  some	  small	  contribution	  to	  ‘new	  ways	  of	  seeing’	  that	  
can	  lead	  to	  a	  “transformation	  of	  systems	  of	  knowledge”	  (Haraway,	  1988).	  This	  contribution	  is	  
found	  not	  only	  in	  the	  way	  this	  study	  is	  carried	  out,	  but	  is	  also	  reinforced	  in	  the	  arguments	  I	  make	  
across	  the	  coming	  chapters	  for	  an	  alternative	  understanding	  of	  the	  construction	  and	  presentation	  
of	  spatial	  power	  as	  developed	  through	  a	  framework	  of	  a	  borderlands	  space.	  
PARTICIPANT	  GROUP	  
Given	  that	  a	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  a	  complex	  spatial	  entity,	  made	  up	  of	  a	  fluid,	  highly	  plural	  body	  of	  
social	  relations	  that	  stretch	  across	  the	  space,	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  researcher	  is	  how	  to	  describe	  this	  
domain	  and	  from	  what	  perspective.	  The	  borderlands	  comprises	  members	  of	  the	  student	  
democracy	  movement,	  the	  ethnic	  nationality	  political	  movement,	  exiled	  parliamentarians,	  ethnic	  
civilians	  fleeing	  conflict,	  armed	  combatants	  and	  ex-­‐combatants,	  refugees,	  migrant	  workers,	  civil	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society	  organisations,	  visitors,	  and	  those	  temporarily	  seeking	  health	  or	  education	  services.	  Even	  
then,	  these	  categories	  are	  simplified	  expressions	  of	  a	  far	  more	  complex	  reality:	  people	  occupy	  
different	  categories	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  move	  across	  categories,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  move	  between	  
being	  self-­‐designated	  and	  being	  designated	  by	  others.	  Therefore,	  some	  clarification	  is	  needed	  on	  
who	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  research	  are,	  and	  why,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  arguments	  of	  this	  thesis,	  they	  
have	  become	  the	  focus	  over	  others.	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  I	  interviewed	  more	  than	  twenty	  displaced	  Karen	  living	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  This	  included	  a	  number	  of	  Karen	  leaders	  who	  articulated	  a	  broader	  socio-­‐cultural	  
picture	  of	  the	  Karen	  within	  a	  historical	  context	  as	  well	  as	  Karen	  working	  in	  organised	  political	  
settings	  such	  as	  NGOs	  and	  civil	  society	  groups.	  But	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  participants	  interviewed	  for	  
this	  thesis	  were	  Karen	  people	  who	  shared	  a	  common	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution,	  
and	  an	  everyday	  engagement	  with	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  principle	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  my	  work	  
was	  that	  the	  participants	  self-­‐designated	  as	  Karen,	  although	  other	  forms	  of	  identification	  used	  
included	  being	  artists	  and	  activists,	  refugees	  and	  migrant	  workers.	  These	  were	  people	  who	  lived	  in	  
the	  borderlands	  out	  of	  necessity,	  and	  who	  had	  developed,	  over	  time,	  a	  unique	  articulation	  of	  its	  
connection	  to	  their	  daily	  lives	  and	  to	  their	  political	  status.	  This	  group	  of	  people	  mostly	  derive	  from	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  populations	  in	  and	  around	  Mae	  Sot:	  villagers	  who	  have	  fled	  the	  conflict	  
inside	  Burma	  and	  sought	  refuge	  in	  Thailand.	  
Many	  of	  my	  participants	  had	  been	  housed	  in	  one	  of	  the	  nine	  Thai	  Government-­‐recognised	  refugee	  
camps,	  currently	  catering	  to	  over	  140,000	  refugees.14	  But	  there	  are	  also	  estimates	  of	  around	  one	  
million	  Externally	  Displaced	  People	  now	  in	  Thailand.15	  This	  particular	  population	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  
had	  at	  least	  one	  thing	  in	  common;	  they	  have	  all	  been	  displaced	  from	  Burma.	  For	  one	  participant	  in	  
the	  research,	  displacement	  had	  occurred	  27	  years	  before;	  for	  another	  it	  was	  only	  10	  months	  prior	  
to	  our	  meeting.	  While	  some	  could	  not	  remember	  the	  circumstances	  of	  their	  displacement,	  instead	  
relying	  on	  the	  stories	  of	  older	  relatives,	  all	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  flee	  their	  homes	  due	  to	  Burmese	  
military	  offenses,	  or	  intense	  and	  unwanted	  military	  attention	  and	  persecution.	  Most	  are,	  or	  had	  
been,	  considered	  a	  refugee	  at	  some	  point	  in	  their	  lives,	  and	  many	  had	  spent	  some	  time	  in	  one	  of	  
the	  various	  refugee	  camps	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  Of	  the	  participants	  from	  Burma,	  all	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  figure	  supplied	  by	  the	  Thailand	  Burma	  Border	  Consortium,	  Bangkok,	  as	  of	  April	  2012	  is	  140,	  356.	  TBBC	  
is	  responsible	  for	  providing	  food,	  shelter	  and	  non-­‐food	  items	  to	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border.	  They	  compile	  monthly	  statistics	  of	  the	  camp	  populations.	  
15	  An	  accurate	  figure	  for	  externally	  displaced	  persons	  is	  hard	  to	  determine	  given	  that	  this	  population	  can	  be	  
quite	  transitory	  and	  due	  to	  their	  illegal	  status	  many	  prefer	  not	  to	  be	  accounted	  for.	  Credible	  figures	  come	  
from	  TBBC	  who	  quoted	  1.2	  million	  illegal	  migrant	  workers	  registered	  in	  2004.	  This	  would	  not	  include	  
numbers	  of	  people	  who	  are	  living	  but	  not	  working	  in	  Thailand.	  The	  Situation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Myanmar,	  
presented	  by	  Special	  Rapporteur	  to	  Myanmar,	  Paulo	  Sergio	  Pinheiro,	  to	  the	  62nd	  Session	  of	  the	  General	  
Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  quoted	  an	  estimated	  1	  million	  EDP	  in	  Thailand.	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Karen	  and	  all	  were	  Christian.	  All	  but	  two	  participants	  lived	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  illegally,	  meaning	  they	  had	  
no	  nationality,	  no	  Thai	  ID,	  no	  formal	  access	  to	  health	  or	  education	  services,	  and	  were	  constantly	  
threatened	  by	  the	  possibility	  of	  deportation	  or	  imprisonment	  if	  they	  were	  caught.	  Over	  half	  the	  
participants	  had	  lived	  and	  been	  educated	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps;	  although	  all	  but	  one	  now	  lived	  
primarily	  outside	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  Many	  of	  my	  participants	  also	  had	  links	  to	  the	  KNLA.	  Some	  
were	  former	  members	  of	  the	  KNLA	  and	  others	  had	  siblings	  or	  parents	  who	  were	  members.	  Many	  
expressed	  a	  political	  affiliation	  to	  the	  KNU,	  although	  their	  allegiances	  in	  a	  practical	  sense	  were	  
much	  more	  complex,	  and	  included	  local	  community	  identification,	  pro-­‐democracy	  identification,	  
and	  affiliations	  with	  socio-­‐political	  movements	  such	  as	  globalisation,	  anti-­‐capitalism,	  and	  
environmentalism.	  This	  thesis	  could	  have	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  narrative	  articulated	  by	  the	  Karen	  
leadership	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  its	  political	  movement,	  the	  KNU.	  Instead,	  this	  thesis	  seeks	  an	  
approach	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  informal,	  everyday	  acts	  of	  resistance	  rather	  than	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  
political	  elite.	  
LOCATION	  OF	  THEFIELDWORK	  
The	  location	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  shape	  and	  direction	  this	  thesis	  takes.	  It	  was	  chosen	  
for	  the	  political,	  metaphorical	  and	  relational	  qualities	  it	  brings	  to	  discussions	  of	  borderlands	  as	  
spatial	  entities.	  These	  qualities	  are	  drawn	  through	  the	  arguments	  made	  in	  this	  chapter.	  While	  the	  
thesis	  explores	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  relations	  across	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  ‘borderlands’,	  my	  fieldwork	  
explored	  these	  social	  relations	  in	  a	  particular	  site	  within	  that	  domain,	  in	  and	  around	  the	  Thai	  town	  
of	  Mae	  Sot.	  This	  thesis	  makes	  no	  attempt	  to	  generalise	  Mae	  Sot	  as	  representing	  the	  borderlands,	  
however	  as	  will	  become	  apparent	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter,	  Mae	  Sot	  was	  chosen	  because	  it	  
encapsulates	  the	  different	  political	  and	  cultural	  dynamics	  from	  which	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  a	  
borderlands	  can	  be	  drawn.	  
The	  location	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  broadly	  associated	  with	  the	  section	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  border	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  Moei	  River.	  The	  Moei	  is	  327	  kilometres	  long	  and	  runs	  from	  
Mae	  Sot	  district	  in	  the	  south	  to	  Tha	  Song	  Yang	  district	  in	  the	  north.	  The	  Moei	  forms	  a	  natural	  
contour	  and	  political	  barrier	  between	  the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  states	  and	  it	  is	  this	  section	  of	  the	  
border	  that	  experiences	  some	  of	  the	  greatest	  flows	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  seeking	  refuge	  in	  Thailand.	  
Burma	  ends	  on	  the	  Moei’s	  west	  bank,	  Thailand	  begins	  on	  its	  east	  bank.	  Four	  kilometres	  inland	  from	  
the	  Moei	  is	  the	  Thai	  town	  of	  Mae	  Sot.	  It	  is	  geographically	  and	  administratively	  within	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Thai	  Government;	  it	  is	  also,	  unofficially,	  a	  hub	  of	  Burma’s	  political	  opposition	  
movements	  and	  the	  international	  aid	  apparatus	  that	  administers	  the	  border’s	  many	  refugee	  
camps.	  Mae	  Sot	  is	  a	  centrepiece	  of	  this	  thesis.	  It	  is	  where	  most	  of	  my	  interviews	  took	  place	  and	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where	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  thesis,	  after	  their	  initial	  crossing	  in	  to	  Thailand,	  have	  
subsequently	  settled.	  It	  was	  chosen	  because	  of	  its	  strong	  association	  with	  displaced	  Karen	  
communities	  but	  also	  because	  of	  its	  links	  to	  the	  Karen	  resistance	  movement	  and	  broader	  political	  
opposition	  movements,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  perception	  as	  a	  frontier	  town	  with	  the	  geographical,	  
metaphorical	  and	  spatial	  characteristics	  associated	  with	  a	  borderlands.	  
It	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  place	  Mae	  Sot’s	  national	  orientation	  and	  this	  contributes	  to	  its	  perception	  as	  a	  
‘frontier	  town’,	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  beyond	  state	  affiliation,	  and	  home	  to	  a	  diverse	  sociality.	  An	  
everyday	  and	  tangible	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  diversity	  in	  dress.	  Longyi’s	  (a	  wrap-­‐around	  cloth	  worn	  
by	  men)	  mingle	  with	  Burmese	  thanaka	  (a	  ground-­‐bark	  paste	  often	  used	  as	  a	  cosmetic),	  western	  
clothing	  and	  the	  Muslim	  taqiyah	  (cap).	  There	  is	  a	  mosque,	  a	  number	  of	  Christian	  churches	  and	  
numerous	  Buddhist	  temples	  which	  are	  the	  focus	  point	  of	  religious,	  cultural	  and	  music	  festivals.	  The	  
highway	  that	  skirts	  the	  town	  and	  runs	  down	  to	  the	  border	  is	  dotted	  with	  western	  pizza	  and	  pasta	  
bars	  while	  the	  night	  market	  and	  the	  main	  streets	  teem	  with	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  curries,	  noodles	  and	  
rice	  dishes.	  Signs	  are	  in	  Burmese	  as	  well	  as	  Thai,	  and	  languages	  spoken	  in	  the	  street	  range	  from	  
Burmese	  and	  Thai	  to	  English,	  French	  and	  a	  multitude	  of	  ethnic	  minority	  languages	  like	  Sgaw	  and	  
Pwo	  Karen	  and	  Hmong.	  
The	  ever-­‐expanding	  aid	  contingency	  that	  bases	  itself	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  large	  four-­‐wheel	  
drives	  that	  negotiate	  its	  tiny	  chaotic	  streets.	  Aid	  and	  development	  agencies	  have	  brought	  
considerable	  Western	  influences	  to	  the	  border,	  which	  are	  now	  evident	  in	  dress,	  language,	  food,	  
technology	  and	  culture.	  The	  morning	  market	  is	  full	  of	  cheap	  merchandise	  brought	  across	  from	  
Burma.	  It	  caters	  to	  Mae	  Sot’s	  ever	  expanding	  Burmese	  population	  but	  also	  to	  Thai	  locals	  and	  
foreigners.	  Mae	  Sot	  is	  a	  significant	  border	  crossing	  between	  Burma	  and	  Thailand,	  sustaining	  not	  
only	  official	  trade	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  but	  also	  an	  extensive	  black-­‐market	  trade	  in	  gems,	  
drugs,	  teak,	  sex	  work	  and	  human	  trafficking.	  Understandably,	  this	  and	  the	  high	  presence	  of	  
refugees,	  displaced	  persons	  and	  migrant	  workers,	  ensures	  a	  large	  contingency	  of	  Thai	  military	  
personnel	  and	  police	  in	  and	  around	  Mae	  Sot.	  The	  police	  are	  dogged	  by	  a	  widely	  accepted	  
perception	  of	  corruption	  and	  this	  is	  associated	  with	  varying	  levels	  of	  risk	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  
Mae	  Sot	  (inclusive	  of	  the	  surrounding	  municipalities	  of	  Mae	  Sot,	  Mae	  Ku	  and	  Tha	  Sai	  Luad)	  has	  a	  
population	  of	  about	  46,650	  people.	  When	  taking	  in	  outlying	  tambons	  (sub-­‐districts)	  the	  number	  is	  
closer	  to	  118,000.16	  Both	  numbers	  can	  fluctuate	  widely	  depending	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  journalists,	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researchers,	  aid	  workers,	  missionaries,	  academics	  and	  migrant	  workers.	  This	  varied	  population	  
includes	  Burmese,	  Thai,	  Karen,	  Hmong,	  Thai-­‐Karen	  and	  Chinese,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  nationalities	  
from	  western	  countries.	  While	  a	  perfunctory	  summary,	  Mae	  Sot	  defies	  such	  easy	  descriptions.	  Its	  
influences	  are	  many,	  its	  constituents	  diverse	  and	  its	  political	  alliances	  complex.	  In	  theory	  it	  has	  a	  
clear	  administrative	  power,	  but	  in	  practice	  authority	  is	  dispersed	  through	  practices	  linked	  to	  local	  
alliances	  and	  corruption.	  
These	  diverse	  and	  often	  contradictory	  elements	  of	  Mae	  Sot	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  greater	  tensions	  
between	  state	  bureaucracy	  and	  localised	  activity	  that	  has	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  borderlands.	  Mae	  
Sot	  is	  a	  central	  focus	  point	  for	  the	  Karen	  in	  Thailand,	  a	  key	  geographical	  centre	  for	  state	  operations	  
on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  and	  has	  a	  capacity	  to	  attract	  and	  sustain	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  
activity.	  As	  a	  result	  Mae	  Sot	  epitomises	  the	  diverse	  social	  relationships	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  
nature	  of	  a	  borderlands	  space	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  social	  interactions	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  their	  
construction	  and	  projection	  of	  identity.	  
METHODS	  
Given	  the	  complex	  mix	  of	  agents	  and	  relations	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  negotiating	  a	  method	  
of	  data	  collection	  was	  a	  key	  preoccupation	  of	  this	  research.	  The	  information	  gathered	  played	  an	  
integral	  part	  in	  the	  thesis	  structure,	  but	  also,	  through	  analysis,	  to	  the	  larger	  theoretical	  frames	  of	  
the	  thesis,	  including	  the	  key	  conceptual	  positioning	  of	  a	  borderlands	  space.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  lay	  out	  
the	  techniques	  I	  used	  to	  gather	  this	  information.	  By	  using	  a	  combination	  of	  ethnographic	  methods	  
and	  content	  analysis,	  I	  garnered	  considerable	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  relationships	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  as	  well	  as	  finding	  ways	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  key	  concerns	  I	  had	  with	  undertaking	  
fieldwork,	  such	  as	  disparities	  in	  researcher-­‐participant	  power	  balances,	  subjective-­‐objective	  
interpretation,	  different	  ways	  of	  knowing	  and	  understanding,	  and	  translation	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  
A	  large	  part	  of	  my	  information	  gathering	  was	  conducted	  through	  traditional	  ethnographic	  practices	  
of	  interviewing	  and	  participant	  observation,	  though	  this	  does	  not	  make	  it	  a	  piece	  of	  
anthropological	  or	  even	  ethnographic	  research	  due	  to	  the	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  approach	  to	  
methodology	  that	  this	  thesis	  takes.	  The	  thesis	  equally	  draws	  on	  document	  analysis,	  both	  historical	  
and	  contemporary	  forms,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  examination	  of	  cultural	  expression.	  I	  elaborate	  on	  these	  
processes	  below.	  	  
Ethnographic	  techniques	  primarily	  helped	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  patterns	  of	  social	  relations	  and	  
identity	  formation	  that	  occur	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  They	  also	  complemented	  knowledge	  
gained	  from	  other	  methods	  such	  as	  archival	  research	  and	  literary	  analysis.	  By	  analysing	  the	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literature	  and	  archival	  information	  I	  was	  able	  to	  put	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  into	  an	  
historical	  context	  and	  tease	  out	  the	  complexities	  and	  the	  contradictions.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  
methods	  mentioned	  above,	  I	  also	  analysed	  cultural	  expression.	  This	  technique	  provided	  integral	  
support	  material	  to	  my	  interviews	  and	  observations	  but	  also	  provided	  rare	  academic	  insights	  in	  
their	  own	  right.	  The	  analysis	  of	  cultural	  expression	  is	  a	  much	  under-­‐utilised	  area	  of	  study	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  the	  Karen	  and	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  Together,	  these	  methods	  helped	  me	  gain	  the	  
material	  needed	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  borderlands	  informs	  
particular	  tendencies	  that	  occur	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  
An	  additional	  point	  around	  the	  analysis	  of	  cultural	  expression	  is	  needed.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  
thesis	  I	  have	  treated	  the	  poems	  and	  songs	  of	  participants	  on	  their	  own	  terms,	  as	  projections	  of	  
identity.	  Another	  piece	  of	  research	  may	  have	  deconstructed	  this	  cultural	  expression,	  examining	  the	  
works	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  hidden	  meanings	  or	  providing	  analytical	  insight	  into	  their	  purpose	  as	  pieces	  
of	  cultural	  production.	  My	  interest	  however,	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  projection	  of	  Karen	  identity	  as	  it	  
relates	  to	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  I	  therefore	  take	  this	  
cultural	  expression	  in	  a	  more	  literal	  sense,	  as	  what	  it	  is	  projected	  to	  mean.	  	  
Non-­‐formal	  interviews	  
Early	  on	  in	  my	  fieldwork	  I	  was	  in	  Mae	  La	  refugee	  camp	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  Through	  an	  
interpreter	  I	  asked	  an	  older	  Karen	  woman	  if	  she	  liked	  to	  weave.	  She	  replied	  “I	  don’t	  like	  it,	  but	  I	  
don’t	  not	  like	  it”.	  The	  ambiguity	  and	  brevity	  of	  the	  answer	  points	  to	  a	  crucial	  point	  of	  
communication	  in	  Karen	  culture.	  Communication	  is	  communal,	  non-­‐direct	  and	  informal.17	  It	  
requires	  personal	  interaction,	  a	  familiar	  setting,	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  participant’s	  broader	  stories,	  and	  
subtle	  probing.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  type	  of	  setting	  that	  productive	  discussions	  can	  occur.	  When	  a	  Karen	  
friend	  joined	  the	  group	  of	  women	  and	  they	  began	  weaving	  together	  I	  learnt	  a	  lot	  more	  from	  their	  
informal	  chatting.	  I	  learnt	  that	  the	  men	  often	  left	  the	  camp	  to	  find	  work,	  but	  that	  the	  women	  could	  
not	  because	  of	  their	  family	  commitments.	  Weaving	  alleviated	  their	  boredom.	  It	  also	  provided	  them	  
with	  an	  income	  for	  their	  children’s	  schooling,	  clothes	  and	  food.	  The	  problem	  with	  my	  question	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Violet	  Cho	  is	  a	  Karen	  journalist	  and	  refugee	  who	  is	  one	  of	  the	  only	  people	  I	  know	  to	  try	  and	  give	  some	  
academic	  form	  to	  this	  type	  of	  Karen	  communication.	  She	  does	  this	  by	  articulating	  a	  research	  methodology	  
based	  on	  the	  Sgaw	  Karen	  word,	  Tapotaethakot.	  According	  to	  Cho	  the	  closest	  English	  translation	  for	  
Tapotaethakot	  would	  be	  ‘chatting’	  but	  this	  does	  not	  entirely	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  word.	  Cho’s	  work	  is	  a	  
useful	  step	  towards	  a	  better	  articulation	  of	  Karen	  communication	  patterns	  and	  associated	  methodologies.	  
Cho	  sets	  out	  seven	  principles	  for	  Tapotaethakot,	  which	  I	  summarise	  here:	  1.Respect	  participants	  and	  treat	  
them	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  kinship;	  2.Meet	  informally	  and	  have	  conversations	  (including	  sharing	  food)	  
rather	  than	  having	  formal	  interviews;	  3.Be	  open,	  direct	  and	  upfront	  about	  the	  research	  and	  its	  purposes;	  
4.Be	  a	  community	  member,	  involved	  in	  and	  supporting	  community	  initiatives;	  5.Recognise	  and	  value	  
people’s	  experience	  and	  experiential	  knowledge;	  6.Recognise	  and	  make	  use	  of	  oral	  tradition	  and	  storytelling	  
as	  legitimate	  forms	  of	  knowledge;	  7.Recruit	  research	  participants	  through	  personal	  and	  family	  relations,	  and	  
through	  community	  leaders	  in	  an	  informal	  way	  (Cho,	  2011).	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that	  it	  was	  framed	  in	  terms	  that	  were	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  women’s	  lives.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  question	  of	  
liking	  or	  not	  liking	  weaving,	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  practicality	  and	  necessity	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  living	  in	  a	  
refugee	  camp.	  
Over	  the	  period	  of	  2005	  to	  2010,	  I	  conducted	  three	  field	  trips	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  The	  initial	  
trip	  lasted	  five	  months;	  two	  return	  trips	  took	  place	  over	  two	  to	  three	  weeks.	  My	  knowledge	  of	  and	  
connection	  to	  the	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  must	  also	  be	  taken	  in	  light	  of	  my	  ongoing	  professional	  
engagement	  with	  the	  border	  area,	  reaching	  back	  to	  2002	  and	  sustained	  by	  repeated	  return	  trips	  to	  
the	  border	  area	  every	  12	  to	  18	  months.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  trips	  I	  conducted	  informal	  
in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  Karen	  refugees,	  displaced	  persons	  and	  leaders	  that	  ranged	  from	  one	  to	  
two	  hours.	  Many	  included	  multiple	  return	  sittings	  which	  allowed	  me	  to	  follow	  up	  ideas	  and	  
ultimately	  engage	  at	  a	  deeper	  level	  with	  the	  material.	  They	  were	  explicitly	  designed	  as	  a	  limited	  
sample	  of	  quality	  interview	  material	  that	  helped	  shape	  the	  arguments	  made	  in	  this	  thesis.	  In	  
addition	  to	  these	  interviews,	  I	  also	  spoke	  informally	  with	  many	  other	  community	  members	  
throughout	  the	  course	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  and	  these	  interactions	  played	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  my	  arguments.	  A	  key	  element	  of	  these	  interviews	  and	  observations	  was	  that	  they	  
gave	  me	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  the	  borderlands	  was	  ‘lived	  in’,	  moving	  me	  out	  of	  the	  theoretical	  realm	  
to	  provide	  real	  experiences	  and	  real	  situations.	  Direct	  quotes	  from	  these	  interviews	  can	  be	  found	  
throughout	  the	  thesis,	  providing	  a	  rich	  context	  to	  my	  own	  observations	  and	  arguments.	  But	  these	  
interviews	  can	  be	  found	  in	  more	  subtle	  ways	  across	  the	  thesis	  too.	  The	  larger	  thesis	  structure	  and	  
arguments	  draw	  heavily	  on	  the	  subjective	  responses	  of	  the	  participants,	  and	  in	  particular	  helped	  
form	  the	  thematic	  structure	  of	  Chapters	  Five	  through	  to	  Seven.	  As	  a	  key	  source	  of	  empirical	  data	  
they	  also	  guided	  the	  direction	  of	  further	  enquiries	  through	  literature	  and	  other	  content	  analysis.	  
In	  many	  cases	  the	  circumstances	  of	  these	  interviews	  were	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Karen	  
woman	  mentioned	  above.	  What	  I	  learnt	  very	  quickly	  was	  that	  all	  those	  intricately	  planned	  
interview	  questions	  and	  techniques	  devised	  in	  my	  academic	  world	  in	  Australia	  were	  to	  change	  
dramatically	  once	  I	  engaged	  with	  people	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  What	  emerged	  instead	  
was	  an	  interview	  style	  more	  in	  keeping	  with	  Fontana	  and	  Frey’s	  idea	  of	  “negotiated	  
accomplishments”	  (Fontana	  &	  Frey,	  2000,	  p.	  63).	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  interview	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  
context	  and	  situation	  in	  which	  it	  takes	  place	  and	  the	  interviewer	  becomes	  an	  active	  participant	  
through	  their	  interaction	  with	  the	  interviewee	  (Fontana	  &	  Frey,	  2000).	  Rather	  than	  the	  semi-­‐rigid	  
question	  structure	  I	  had	  intended,	  a	  more	  flexible,	  informal	  discussion	  occurred.	  With	  this	  
realisation,	  my	  position	  in	  the	  research	  began	  to	  change	  and	  I	  became	  a	  much	  more	  active	  
participant	  in	  the	  narration	  of	  participant’s	  stories.	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These	  informal	  discussions	  often	  began	  with	  the	  participants’	  piece	  of	  cultural	  expression	  –	  a	  
poem,	  artwork	  or	  song,	  and	  were	  mostly	  directed	  by	  the	  participant	  themselves.	  I	  gave	  facilitating	  
probes	  where	  I	  thought	  more	  information	  was	  needed	  for	  my	  own	  understanding.	  My	  opinions	  
and	  explanations	  became	  interspersed	  with	  those	  of	  the	  participant.	  Instead	  of	  a	  set	  interview,	  we	  
often	  had	  a	  dialogue.	  If	  I	  had	  a	  point	  I	  thought	  important	  to	  get	  across	  I	  would	  find	  suitable	  
examples.	  If	  the	  direction	  of	  my	  probes	  lacked	  comprehension	  I	  also	  used	  examples.	  If	  my	  probes	  
were	  treated	  nonchalantly	  I	  noted	  the	  direction	  the	  discussion	  then	  took.	  For	  every	  question	  that	  
lacked	  clarity	  or	  simplicity	  there	  was	  a	  new	  train	  of	  thought	  that	  emerged,	  meaning	  that	  no	  part	  of	  
this	  dialogue	  felt	  wasted	  or	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  research.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  interaction	  between	  myself	  
as	  the	  researcher,	  and	  the	  participant,	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  environment	  where	  both	  of	  us	  were	  
active	  participants	  in	  the	  narrative.	  
As	  with	  any	  cross	  cultural	  piece	  of	  research,	  language	  is	  a	  key	  factor.	  Whether	  communicating	  in	  
our	  interviews,	  translating	  artistic	  expression,	  or	  negotiating	  cultural	  norms	  at	  events,	  my	  inability	  
to	  speak	  proficient	  Sgaw	  and	  Pwo	  Karen,	  or	  Burmese,	  left	  me	  reliant	  on	  interpreters.	  All	  the	  
participants	  in	  my	  interviews	  were	  native	  speakers	  of	  Sgaw18	  Karen	  while	  a	  few	  had	  a	  speaking	  
knowledge	  of	  Pwo	  Karen.	  The	  remaining	  participants	  were	  either	  Thai	  or	  Burmese	  with	  proficiency	  
in	  English.	  Most	  participants	  in	  this	  research	  spoke	  adequate,	  even	  fluent	  levels	  of	  English	  due	  to	  
their	  education	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  and	  their	  ongoing	  participation	  in	  activist	  and	  democracy	  
circles	  where	  they	  advocated	  to	  an	  international	  audience.	  The	  majority	  of	  interviews	  included	  in	  
this	  thesis	  were	  therefore	  conducted	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  Just	  three	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  
in	  Sgaw	  Karen	  with	  an	  interpreter.	  Having	  worked	  extensively	  with	  Burmese	  and	  Karen	  
organisations	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  for	  the	  last	  eight	  years,	  I	  have	  a	  pool	  of	  interpreters	  I	  
have	  used	  and	  they	  conducted	  the	  core	  of	  the	  translation	  work	  that	  occurred	  in	  this	  study.	  
Working	  across	  languages	  requires	  more	  than	  just	  direct	  translation.	  Speaking	  a	  non-­‐native	  
language	  often	  gives	  rise	  to	  inconsistencies	  in	  communicating	  and	  understanding.	  Participants	  
often	  relied	  on	  pauses,	  mumbling	  and	  prolonged	  searches	  when	  they	  could	  not	  find	  the	  word	  they	  
were	  looking	  for.	  For	  the	  clarity	  of	  the	  reader,	  I	  have	  removed	  these	  utterances	  from	  the	  
transcribed	  interviews;	  otherwise	  the	  interviews	  remain	  as	  the	  participants	  spoke	  them.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  Karen	  language	  has	  three	  main	  dialects:	  Sgaw,	  Pwo	  and	  Bwe.	  Sgaw	  Karen	  is	  mostly	  associated	  with	  
educated	  Christian	  Karen,	  while	  Pwo	  is	  common	  among	  Animist	  and	  Buddhist	  Karen.	  The	  Sgaw	  Karen	  script	  
was	  created	  by	  an	  American	  Baptist	  missionary,	  Jonathan	  Wade,	  in	  the	  1830s,	  primarily	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  
the	  Bible.	  It	  is	  closely	  based	  on	  the	  Burmese	  script,	  as	  is	  the	  Pwo	  Karen	  script	  which	  was	  adapted	  from	  the	  
Sgaw	  script	  some	  time	  after.	  It	  is	  often	  cited	  that	  the	  Karen	  had	  an	  ancient,	  now	  lost	  script	  (Falla,	  1991,	  p.	  
220),	  possibly	  called	  Leit-­‐Hsan-­‐Wait,	  which	  due	  to	  the	  strange	  shape	  of	  the	  alphabet	  markings	  is	  often	  
referred	  to	  as	  looking	  like	  chicken	  scratchings.	  Today,	  Sgaw	  Karen	  remains	  the	  most	  visible	  Karen	  language,	  
mainly	  due	  to	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  missionaries	  and	  their	  domination	  over	  the	  production	  of	  written	  




Challenges	  also	  existed	  in	  translation.	  Initially,	  interpreters	  tended	  to	  summarise	  the	  participants’	  
words	  and	  it	  required	  constant	  vigilance	  to	  ensure	  a	  full	  translation	  was	  given.	  The	  interpreters’	  
words	  often	  became	  intermingled	  with	  the	  participants	  as	  they	  sought	  the	  best	  means	  by	  which	  to	  
describe	  their	  stories.	  As	  an	  ‘outsider’	  I	  had	  to	  become	  attuned	  to	  the	  nuances	  of	  Karen	  
communication,	  to	  know	  when	  to	  push	  for	  a	  truer	  interpretation	  and	  to	  recognise	  whose	  words	  I	  
was	  in	  fact	  hearing.	  But	  even	  so,	  much	  is	  lost	  in	  the	  act	  of	  translation	  let	  alone	  the	  nuances	  of	  
cross-­‐cultural	  communication.	  I	  found	  that	  the	  best	  response	  to	  this	  challenge	  was	  to	  work	  closely	  
with	  the	  author	  of	  the	  work	  to	  establish	  the	  best	  possible	  translation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  
words.	  One	  further	  challenging	  point	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  Many	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  
research	  actively	  encouraged	  me	  to	  ‘clean	  up’	  their	  spoken	  English,	  not	  wanting	  to	  sound	  
uneducated	  or	  unclear	  in	  what	  they	  were	  saying.	  Given	  my	  ongoing	  connection	  with	  my	  
participants	  and	  my	  work	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  more	  generally,	  there	  is	  a	  real	  need	  to	  
respect	  and	  try	  to	  accommodate	  these	  wishes.	  While	  I	  have	  not	  ‘cleaned	  up’	  the	  interviews	  in	  this	  
thesis,	  I	  believe	  they	  are	  clear	  accounts	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  this	  request	  has	  implications	  for	  any	  
future	  research	  work	  and	  is	  worthy	  of	  further	  examination.	  
Participant	  observation	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  informal	  interviews	  I	  produced	  extensive	  notes	  based	  on	  what	  I	  was	  seeing	  in	  
the	  borderlands.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  seemingly	  objective	  documentation	  of	  culture,	  events,	  dress,	  
activities	  or	  social	  structure,	  these	  notes	  served	  a	  participatory,	  analytical	  purpose.	  They	  became	  a	  
useful	  tool	  for	  deepening	  my	  understanding	  of	  what	  I	  was	  observing.	  These	  notes	  included	  
observations	  of	  cultural	  activities,	  insights	  into	  the	  interview	  and	  research	  process,	  daily	  
documentation	  of	  living	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  post-­‐interview	  analysis.	  I	  was	  as	  much	  a	  
part	  of	  these	  notes	  as	  the	  Karen	  I	  was	  ‘learning	  to	  know’	  were.	  For	  me,	  this	  observation	  element	  
served	  two	  purposes.	  Firstly	  it	  was	  observation	  of	  my	  field	  of	  study,	  the	  ethnographic	  recording	  of	  
the	  daily	  lives	  of	  the	  people	  I	  was	  working	  with.	  This	  element	  of	  observation	  was	  incredibly	  
important	  in	  validating	  what	  I	  was	  being	  told	  by	  participants	  in	  our	  interviews	  and	  through	  their	  
artistic	  expression.	  It	  also	  filled	  in	  the	  gaps	  that	  weren’t	  covered	  in	  the	  interviews,	  giving	  me	  a	  
more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  the	  space	  I	  was	  studying.	  At	  times	  in	  the	  thesis	  I	  refer	  to	  these	  
notes	  directly,	  at	  other	  times	  they	  take	  a	  more	  complementary,	  less	  visible	  role	  in	  that	  they	  add	  
another	  layer	  to	  my	  understanding	  of	  what	  was	  occurring	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Atkinson	  and	  Hammersley	  argue	  that	  “we	  cannot	  study	  the	  social	  world	  without	  being	  part	  of	  it”,	  
meaning	  participant	  observation	  is	  not	  a	  research	  technique	  but	  rather	  a	  way	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world	  
of	  those	  you	  are	  studying	  (1998,	  p.	  11).	  ‘Being	  in	  the	  world’	  allowed	  me	  to	  interact	  with	  my	  
participants	  in	  a	  non-­‐formal	  setting.	  I	  attended	  the	  wedding	  of	  the	  Karen	  friend	  mentioned	  at	  the	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beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  socialised	  with	  participants	  around	  cooking	  and	  drinking,	  I	  attended	  a	  
relative’s	  wake	  and	  I	  visited	  participant’s	  homes	  and	  met	  their	  friends	  and	  families.	  This	  type	  of	  
interaction	  gave	  me	  the	  opportunity	  to	  see	  participant’s	  lives	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  research	  setting	  
and	  it	  broadened	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  complexities	  and	  multiplicities	  in	  their	  lives.	  ‘Being	  in	  
the	  world’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  external	  force	  observing	  the	  world,	  allows	  the	  researcher	  to	  be	  part	  
of,	  and	  open	  to,	  the	  many	  forces	  and	  dialogues	  that	  constitute	  the	  fabric	  of	  that	  world.	  
The	  second	  element	  of	  observation	  was	  self-­‐reflexive,	  observing	  my	  own	  role	  and	  technique	  in	  the	  
research	  process.	  I	  was	  a	  vehicle	  for	  participants’	  expression,	  a	  recorder,	  a	  contributor,	  a	  learner	  
but	  also	  a	  speaker.	  I	  was	  therefore	  a	  participant	  in	  the	  research,	  and	  as	  open	  to	  rigorous	  
observation	  and	  analysis	  as	  any	  other	  participant.	  My	  extensive	  field	  notes	  were	  my	  opportunity	  to	  
have	  a	  dialogue	  about	  my	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities;	  they	  were	  also	  an	  opportunity	  for	  debriefing.	  They	  
were	  a	  means	  for	  me	  to	  observe	  what	  had	  happened	  during	  the	  day	  and	  critique	  my	  technique,	  
looking	  for	  changes	  or	  improvements	  that	  could	  benefit	  the	  research	  process.	  An	  analysis	  of	  my	  
first	  recorded	  interview	  taught	  me	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  microphone	  that	  picked	  up	  the	  squawks	  of	  
chickens	  and	  dogs	  in	  the	  background.	  Observations	  on	  the	  frustrations	  and	  challenges	  of	  failed	  
meetings,	  access	  to	  participants	  and	  refugee	  camps,	  and	  the	  seemingly	  insurmountable	  cultural	  
differences,	  are	  all	  present	  in	  this	  thesis	  because	  of	  their	  contribution	  to	  defining	  the	  parameters	  in	  
which	  the	  research	  occurred.	  Post-­‐analysis	  of	  each	  interview	  helped	  refine	  the	  interview	  process	  to	  
cater	  to	  Karen	  communication	  patterns;	  the	  interviews	  became	  more	  informal	  and	  I	  became	  less	  
direct	  in	  my	  questioning	  and	  more	  conversational	  in	  tone.	  These	  were	  not	  the	  observations	  of	  an	  
objective	  researcher,	  but	  rather	  the	  observations	  of	  someone	  participating	  in	  the	  process.	  This	  was	  
an	  important	  personal	  and	  professional	  realisation	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	  insight	  into	  the	  practice	  
of	  culture	  and	  identity	  construction	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Cultural	  expression	  
Throughout	  this	  thesis	  there	  are	  references	  to	  stories	  of	  people	  and	  events,	  drawings,	  cartoons,	  
songs	  and	  poems.	  These	  were	  initially	  unexpected	  contributions	  to	  the	  thesis,	  but	  they	  have	  since	  
brought	  a	  crucial	  element	  to	  the	  thesis	  arguments.	  More	  than	  twenty	  pieces	  of	  artwork	  were	  
contributed	  by	  participants	  and	  form	  the	  core	  of	  this	  artistic	  expression.	  They	  are	  included	  for	  a	  
number	  of	  reasons.	  The	  artistic	  expression	  formed	  a	  complementary	  source	  to	  participant’s	  
personal	  narratives	  and	  became	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  analysis	  to	  more	  conventional	  sourcing	  of	  
information	  such	  as	  interviews,	  participant	  observation	  and	  reviewing	  existing	  literature.	  
I	  quickly	  realised	  that	  the	  production	  of	  artistic	  expression	  was	  a	  living	  contribution	  to	  an	  ongoing	  
dialogue	  around	  political	  and	  cultural	  construction.	  A	  thought,	  feeling	  or	  experience	  embalmed	  in	  a	  
39 
 
piece	  of	  artistic	  expression	  provides	  a	  powerful	  insight	  into	  the	  author’s	  thematic	  construction	  in	  a	  
given	  time	  and	  place	  and	  can	  tell	  us	  much	  about	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  environment	  in	  which	  it	  
was	  created.	  More	  than	  that,	  if	  artistic	  expression	  embodies	  shared	  cultural	  symbols	  (Geertz,	  
1976),	  then	  it	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  product	  of	  collective	  experiences	  that	  contribute	  to	  cultural	  
transformation.	  Geertz	  draws	  this	  connection	  between	  art	  and	  culture	  when	  he	  states:	  
The	  capacity,	  variable	  among	  peoples	  as	  it	  is	  among	  individuals,	  to	  perceive	  meaning	  in	  
pictures	  (or	  poems,	  melodies,	  buildings,	  pots,	  dramas,	  statues)	  is,	  like	  all	  other	  fully	  human	  
capacities,	  a	  product	  of	  collective	  experience	  which	  far	  transcends	  it,	  as	  is	  the	  far	  rarer	  
capacity	  to	  put	  it	  there	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  is	  out	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  general	  system	  of	  
symbolic	  forms	  we	  call	  culture	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  particular	  we	  call	  art,	  which	  is	  in	  
fact	  but	  a	  sector	  of	  it,	  is	  possible	  (1976,	  p.	  1488).	  
Anna	  Tsing	  states	  that	  the	  stories	  inherent	  in	  these	  types	  of	  production	  show	  “sites	  of	  discursive	  
contestation”	  (1993,	  p.	  8).	  In	  other	  words	  they	  are	  comments	  on	  the	  meaning	  and	  practices	  of	  
social	  transformation,	  particularly	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  power.	  The	  pieces	  of	  artistic	  
expression	  included	  in	  this	  thesis	  not	  only	  document	  Karen	  identity,	  culture	  and	  life,	  they	  also	  
contribute	  to	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  construction	  specific	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  space.	  
As	  both	  Tsing	  and	  Geertz	  recognise,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  artistic	  expression	  provides	  a	  rich	  context	  to	  
understandings	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  formation.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  artistic	  expression	  in	  this	  thesis	  
serves	  two	  purposes.	  Firstly,	  it	  visually	  represents	  an	  individual’s	  construction	  of	  a	  theme	  at	  a	  given	  
moment,	  building	  the	  individual	  into	  a	  collective	  narrative	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  Secondly,	  it	  provides	  
an	  object	  with	  meaning	  because	  of	  the	  symbolic	  forms	  that	  are	  familiar	  to	  the	  collective	  who	  
experience	  it.	  This	  meaning	  is	  subjected	  to	  collective	  experiences,	  creating	  symbols	  that	  are	  
familiar	  to	  the	  communal	  fabric	  and	  therefore	  explicit	  to	  cultural	  construction.	  Through	  cultural	  
symbols	  we	  can	  understand	  art	  and	  through	  art	  we	  can	  see	  a	  practicing	  culture.	  A	  piece	  of	  art	  is	  
therefore	  a	  legitimate	  source	  of	  knowledge	  for	  understanding	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  
constructions	  that	  represent	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  portrayals	  of	  culture.	  
Archival	  research/Literary	  analysis	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  ethnographic	  methods	  I	  also	  conducted	  archival	  research	  and	  literary	  analysis.	  
I	  used	  this	  method	  to	  put	  my	  research	  and	  my	  arguments	  into	  an	  historical	  context,	  to	  enrich	  them	  
with	  the	  insight	  that	  had	  gone	  before	  me,	  and	  to	  challenge	  the	  assumptions	  made	  and	  the	  political	  
positions	  argued.	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While	  the	  impact	  of	  archival	  research	  and	  literary	  analysis	  can	  be	  felt	  across	  the	  entire	  thesis	  there	  
are	  some	  points	  worth	  bringing	  to	  the	  fore.	  I	  researched	  newspaper	  archives	  to	  collate	  an	  historical	  
account	  of	  significant	  cultural	  and	  political	  changes	  that	  occurred	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  in	  
the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  a	  time	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  this	  thesis	  due	  to	  the	  large	  influx	  of	  refugees	  
and	  the	  corresponding	  state	  response.	  These	  provided	  much	  needed	  factual	  evidence	  for	  the	  
argument	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  saw	  an	  intensification	  of	  political	  interest	  by	  both	  the	  
Thai	  and	  Burmese	  states	  following	  these	  large	  refugee	  influxes.	  The	  use	  of	  these	  archives	  is	  
particularly	  evident	  in	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four.	  	  
Texts	  pertinent	  to	  Burma’s	  political	  and	  ethnic	  history	  have	  also	  provided	  important	  historical	  
context	  to	  the	  themes	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  While	  too	  many	  to	  mention	  here,	  they	  are	  
referenced	  in	  Chapter	  1	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  places	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  The	  influence	  of	  these	  
texts	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  Chapters	  Three,	  Four	  and	  Seven.	  I	  studied	  a	  number	  of	  missionary	  
and	  historical	  texts	  for	  their	  early	  ethnographic	  accounts	  of	  Karen	  culture	  and	  identity	  (Hla,	  1939;	  
Marshall,	  1922;	  Po,	  2001).	  These	  texts	  are	  seminal	  accounts	  of	  Karen	  identity	  and	  are	  arguably	  the	  
foundations	  of	  a	  nationalist	  Karen	  culture	  and	  identity	  as	  it	  is	  projected	  from	  the	  borderlands	  
today.	  They	  provide	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  nature	  and	  motivation	  of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  
and	  their	  influence	  can	  be	  found	  at	  various	  junctures	  across	  the	  thesis,	  particularly	  in	  Chapters	  
Seven	  and	  Eight.	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  my	  study	  area	  be	  viewed	  as	  ‘sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations’,	  
and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  methodological	  approach	  for	  understanding	  a	  concept	  of	  
borderlands	  that	  is	  made	  up	  of	  geographic	  locations	  and	  intersecting	  social	  relationships,	  the	  
benchmarks	  of	  my	  larger	  thesis	  arguments	  around	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  spatial	  entity.	  
As	  sites	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  documenting	  and	  understanding	  
the	  complex	  sets	  of	  social	  interactions	  that	  occur	  between	  people	  and	  spatiality,	  and	  which	  
inevitably	  provide	  a	  story	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  take	  place.	  
As	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  social	  construct,	  the	  relationships	  and	  the	  paths	  along	  which	  
these	  connections	  develop	  are	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  study	  material.	  Ethnographic	  methods	  of	  
interviewing	  and	  participant	  observation	  were	  chosen	  because	  they	  could	  provide	  the	  perspective	  
of	  the	  people	  tied	  up	  in	  living	  and	  articulating	  the	  space	  they	  inhabit,	  and	  the	  projection	  of	  identity	  
that	  emanates	  from	  that	  particular	  space.	  Archival	  research	  and	  analysing	  cultural	  expression	  
provided	  important	  supplementary	  material	  that	  enriched	  the	  findings	  that	  came	  from	  the	  
interviews	  and	  observations.	  The	  emphasis	  in	  choosing	  ethnographic	  methods	  was	  to	  provide	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“flesh	  and	  bone”	  to	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  (Gille,	  2001,	  p.	  321);	  How	  do	  people	  live	  in	  the	  borderlands?	  
How	  do	  relationships	  form?	  And	  what	  significance	  does	  this	  have	  to	  the	  narration	  of	  identity?	  
This	  chapter	  has	  outlined	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  how	  the	  research	  was	  conducted	  and	  the	  
methods	  or	  techniques	  used	  to	  gather	  the	  study	  material.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  continue	  to	  build	  
this	  framework,	  but	  now	  focusing	  on	  developing	  a	  broad	  theoretical	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  Thai-­‐
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ESTABLISHING	  A	  CONCEPTUAL	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  THE	  THAI-­‐BURMA	  BORDERLANDS	  
The	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  is	  characterised	  by	  what	  I	  don’t	  see	  	  
It’s	  an	  endless,	  invisible	  line	  with	  barely	  a	  physical	  marking	  
Confronted	  by	  this	  invisible	  line,	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  cross	  relies	  on	  an	  implicit	  understanding	  
A	  socio-­‐political	  contract	  between	  an	  individual	  and	  the	  state;	  a	  contract	  broken	  daily	  
This	  tenuous	  sense	  of	  power	  makes	  the	  border	  porous	  
Like	  a	  thinly	  stretched	  membrane,	  pockets	  of	  people	  push	  their	  way	  through	  
Crossing	  the	  border	  to	  sell	  goods,	  live	  illegally,	  visit	  family	  or	  flee	  internal	  conflict	  
This	  contentious	  position	  highlights	  the	  salience	  of	  borders	  in	  our	  contemporary	  world	  
What	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  border	  
For	  the	  individuals	  who	  peer	  across	  it	  daily	  
And	  the	  nation-­‐states	  who	  claim	  control	  over	  it	  
Author’s	  field	  notes,	  December	  2008	  
This	  chapter	  establishes	  the	  key	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis.	  It	  develops	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  by	  looking	  at	  key	  literature	  that	  relates	  to	  larger	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  
developments	  of	  borders	  and	  borderlands.	  Setting	  up	  this	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  supports	  my	  main	  thesis	  argument	  by	  allowing	  me	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  borderlands	  space	  
as	  it	  relates	  to	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  identity,	  which	  together	  form	  the	  central	  themes	  of	  
this	  thesis.	  
The	  chapter	  first	  argues	  for	  a	  new	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  as	  a	  political	  
space,	  a	  spatial	  re-­‐imagining	  that	  establishes	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  social	  construct	  characterised	  by	  
contested	  social	  relations.	  This	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘borderlands’	  allows	  me	  to	  map	  the	  interchange	  that	  
occurs	  across	  a	  broader	  space	  that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  
border	  as	  purely	  delineating	  two	  distinct	  autonomous	  spaces.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  this	  
interchange	  is	  broadly	  mapped	  through	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  
displaced	  Karen,	  both	  key	  agents	  in	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
The	  chapter	  goes	  on	  to	  propose	  that	  this	  interchange	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  three	  
significant	  processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  have	  spatial	  impact	  on	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  These	  three	  processes	  are	  the	  advent	  of	  mapping	  the	  body	  
politic,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  population	  and	  cultural	  
movement	  across	  borders.	  I	  contend	  that	  these	  three	  processes	  develop	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  as	  
a	  geo-­‐political	  marker,	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  form	  to	  the	  type	  and	  nature	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  occur	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  ‘Fences	  and	  neighbours’	  is	  a	  phrase	  used	  by	  David	  Newman	  and	  Anssi	  Paasi	  in	  their	  article,	  ‘Fences	  and	  
neighbours	  in	  the	  postmodern	  world:	  boundary	  narratives	  in	  political	  geography’	  (1998).	  It	  aptly	  captures	  
notions	  of	  separation	  and	  connection	  for	  people	  who	  live	  side	  by	  side,	  particularly	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  topics	  
that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  such	  as	  politics,	  geography,	  identity	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  boundaries.	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across	  the	  national	  border.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  these	  claims,	  I	  use	  key	  concepts	  in	  social	  science	  
theory,	  such	  as	  processes	  of	  globalisation	  and	  state-­‐making,	  to	  draw	  on	  broader	  trends	  that	  can	  
account	  for	  the	  development	  of	  these	  processes	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  key	  agents	  and	  themes	  of	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  These	  concepts	  are	  worthy	  of	  a	  thesis	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  however	  I	  use	  
them	  here	  as	  a	  way	  to	  understand	  contemporary	  debates	  of	  borders	  and	  borderlands,	  and	  in	  
particular	  as	  a	  way	  to	  theoretically	  navigate	  the	  very	  specific	  questions	  this	  thesis	  is	  preoccupied	  
with	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  Namely,	  
how	  global	  processes	  enable	  an	  exchange	  of	  information,	  ideas	  and	  resources,	  how	  ‘practices	  of	  
statecraft’	  impact	  mobility	  and	  notions	  of	  citizenship,	  and	  how	  social	  practices	  shape	  the	  construct	  
of	  cultural	  and	  national	  identities.	  
This	  chapter	  is	  important	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  develops	  the	  historical	  and	  
theoretical	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  borderlands	  space	  can	  be	  understood,	  and	  to	  which	  the	  modes	  of	  
social	  practice	  and	  identity	  constructs	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  be	  mapped.	  A	  more	  analytical	  
presentation	  of	  these	  social	  practices	  and	  how	  they	  pertain	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  
and	  a	  Karen	  identity	  is	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
This	  chapter	  is	  also	  important	  to	  the	  overall	  thesis	  structure,	  for	  it	  begins	  the	  process	  of	  defining	  
the	  first	  subsidiary	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis.	  This	  is	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  distinct	  
space	  framed	  by	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain,	  characterised	  by	  the	  modern	  
demarcation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  state	  control	  over	  it,	  and	  the	  
intersection	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations,	  characterised	  by	  a	  fluidity	  of	  movement	  (of	  
information,	  resources,	  ideas,	  culture,	  identity)	  that	  intensifies	  the	  possibilities	  available	  to	  
displaced	  Karen,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  agency	  and	  mobilisation.	  Drawing	  out	  the	  various	  
components	  of	  this	  tension	  gives	  definition	  to	  the	  practices	  of	  Karen	  who	  have	  been	  displaced	  to	  
the	  borderlands,	  but	  more	  broadly	  it	  provides	  insight	  into	  how	  displaced	  populations	  politically	  
engage	  with	  the	  state	  in	  ambiguous	  cultural-­‐political	  spaces	  –	  providing	  clearer	  definition	  to	  the	  
political	  nature	  and	  possibilities	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
As	  such	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  set	  up	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  by	  outlining	  the	  
modern	  territorial	  domain	  and	  the	  increased	  penetration	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  to	  apply	  a	  
homogenised	  political	  authority	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven	  lay	  out	  key	  
modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  which,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  modern	  territorial	  domain,	  
bring	  a	  fluidity	  and	  contestability	  to	  the	  space.	  As	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  tension	  evolves	  over	  the	  
coming	  chapters	  it	  will	  become	  evident	  that	  this	  tension	  underpins	  both	  Karen	  activism	  and	  the	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	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THE	  BORDERLANDS:	  RE-­‐IMAGINING	  POLITICAL	  SPACE	  
The	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’,	  like	  borders,	  is	  used	  in	  different	  ways	  across	  a	  range	  of	  academic	  
discourses.	  It	  is	  used	  conceptually	  to	  elucidate	  the	  multidimensional	  aspects	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  
practice	  and	  identification	  (Alvarez,	  1995;	  Rosaldo,	  1993).	  It	  is	  used	  in	  a	  geo-­‐political	  sense	  to	  
describe	  the	  frontiers	  of	  nations	  and	  states	  (Grundy-­‐Warr,	  1993;	  Prescott,	  1987).	  And	  it	  is	  used	  
metaphorically	  as	  a	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  socio-­‐spatial	  identities	  (Anzaldua,	  2007;	  Bhabha,	  1990)	  such	  
as	  sexuality,	  gender,	  ethnicity	  and	  class.	  
To	  date,	  most	  academic	  approaches	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  have	  conceived	  the	  national	  
boundary	  in	  terms	  of	  it	  being	  a	  line	  that	  separates	  two	  mutually	  exclusive	  territories	  (Grundy-­‐Warr,	  
1993;	  Rajah,	  2002;	  Wijeyewardene,	  2002).	  This	  is	  largely	  true	  even	  in	  the	  discourses	  put	  forward	  in	  
the	  section	  on	  border	  crossing	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  where	  even	  in	  speaking	  of	  fluidity,	  mobility	  and	  
the	  potential	  collapsing	  of	  borders,	  the	  boundary	  remains	  the	  focal	  point.	  
My	  intent	  here	  and	  across	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  articulate	  a	  different	  way	  of	  conceiving	  the	  borderlands	  
space,	  one	  that	  doesn’t	  so	  neatly	  compartmentalise	  discontinuous	  spaces	  –	  as	  in	  those	  divided	  by	  a	  
border	  –	  but	  rather	  can	  account	  for	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  space.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  
concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  one	  that	  can	  map	  this	  interchange,	  rather	  than	  conforming	  to	  the	  
notion	  of	  two	  separate	  borderlands	  attached	  to	  either	  side	  of	  the	  national	  border	  (Baud	  &	  
Schendel,	  1997).	  This	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  integral	  to	  this	  thesis	  because	  it	  acknowledges	  
that	  cultural	  and	  political	  activity	  does	  not	  necessarily	  stop	  at	  the	  border,	  but	  rather	  that	  there	  is	  
considerable	  status	  and	  meaning	  acquired	  in	  the	  cross-­‐border	  engagement,	  while	  still	  allowing	  that	  
this	  interaction	  can	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  national	  border.20	  
If	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  allows	  me	  to	  map	  an	  interchange	  across	  the	  nation-­‐state	  border,	  
what	  then	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  interchange?	  Broadly	  speaking,	  it	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  three	  significant	  
processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  These	  processes	  lay	  
out	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  borderlands	  but	  they	  also	  help	  define	  how	  everyday	  
interactions	  across	  the	  borderlands	  space	  are	  carried	  out.	  While	  these	  processes	  of	  organisation	  
have	  developed	  across	  a	  vast	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  social	  relationships	  inherent	  in	  them	  have	  
established	  the	  borderlands	  space	  as	  we	  know	  it	  today;	  as	  a	  site	  of	  intense	  interaction	  that	  is	  
informed	  by	  the	  national	  border	  and	  where	  multiple,	  contested	  articulations	  of	  the	  space	  occur.	  
This	  position	  provides	  a	  more	  adequate	  representation	  of	  how	  social	  relations	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  This	  idea	  around	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  the	  mapped	  border	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  
relationships	  that	  occur	  across	  it,	  and	  at	  times	  in	  defiance	  of	  it,	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Sankaran	  Krishna	  
(1996)	  who	  in	  her	  writing	  cautions	  against	  the	  over	  emphasis	  on	  cartographic	  or	  state	  sovereignty	  discourses	  
which	  she	  sees	  as	  potentially	  abstracting	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  people	  who	  are	  impacted	  by	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  
border	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	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relate	  to	  and	  contest	  both	  the	  material	  and	  abstract	  presence	  of	  the	  border.	  Below,	  I	  outline	  some	  
of	  the	  key	  theory	  that	  informs	  my	  use	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  and	  then	  apply	  this	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  
As	  already	  stated	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  is	  used	  to	  define	  a	  space	  that	  is	  
produced	  in	  and	  through	  contested	  social	  relations	  that	  sit	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  loosely	  bounded	  
geographical	  place.	  In	  this	  thesis	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  spatial	  entity,	  with	  place	  a	  
political-­‐geographical	  dimension	  ascribed	  to	  that	  space.	  There	  are	  particular	  reasons	  for	  taking	  this	  
approach.	  As	  a	  space,	  the	  borderlands	  is	  made	  up	  of	  more	  abstract	  notions	  around	  discourse	  and	  
identity,	  but	  also	  characterised	  by	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  distinguish	  this	  particular	  space	  from	  
others.	  Space	  is	  used	  to	  encompass	  the	  interactions	  and	  constructions	  that	  occur	  in	  a	  relationship	  
of	  people	  and	  discourse	  and	  defined	  by	  a	  more	  abstract	  notion	  of	  multiple	  simultaneous	  stories	  
(Massey,	  2005).	  Such	  a	  definition	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  contested	  social	  constructions	  that	  
produce	  potentially	  dissonant	  narratives	  of	  the	  space,	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
‘borderlands’	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
My	  use	  of	  the	  term	  space	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  largely	  based	  on	  definitional	  work	  conducted	  by	  Doreen	  
Massey.	  In	  her	  book,	  ‘For	  Space’	  (2005),	  Massey	  outlines	  her	  definition	  of	  space	  through	  three	  
propositions	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  arguments	  I	  make	  around	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  
Massey‘s	  first	  proposition	  is	  that	  space	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  product	  of	  inter-­‐relations,	  constituted	  
through	  interactions	  from	  the	  local	  through	  to	  the	  global.	  This	  understanding	  of	  space	  means	  that	  
identity	  is	  constructed	  in	  relational	  terms	  rather	  than	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  unchanging	  identity.	  Thus	  a	  
Karen	  identity,	  rather	  than	  being	  seen	  as	  authentic,	  essential,	  already	  constituted,	  is	  in	  fact	  co-­‐
constitutive	  or	  relational	  to	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  is	  constructed.	  
Massey’s	  second	  proposition	  is	  that	  space	  is	  a	  sphere	  of	  multiplicity	  and	  therefore	  plurality.	  If	  we	  
follow	  this	  argument	  then	  space	  exists	  because	  of	  the	  sphere	  of	  multiplicity,	  and	  multiplicity	  allows	  
for	  the	  possibility	  of	  heterogeneity,	  or	  differences.	  It	  puts	  forward	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  simultaneous	  
coexistence	  of	  other	  stories	  and	  histories	  that	  transverse	  a	  space.	  This	  point	  is	  essential	  as	  it	  
represents	  the	  nature	  of	  both	  the	  stories	  and	  the	  identity	  formations	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  particularly	  as	  they	  sit	  in	  tension	  with	  more	  conventional	  articulations	  of	  the	  space.	  
Massey’s	  final	  proposition	  is	  that	  space	  is	  always	  under	  construction.	  This	  means	  nothing	  is	  ever	  
perfectly	  formed	  and	  in	  situ	  to	  everything	  else.	  The	  stories	  and	  arguments	  I	  relate	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  
one	  characteristic	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  That	  space	  is	  open,	  changing,	  and	  always	  developing	  
new	  relationships	  and	  linkages,	  constantly	  under	  construction	  and	  open	  to	  different	  
interpretations	  and	  articulations.	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In	  addition	  to	  these	  propositions	  around	  space,	  I	  also	  consider	  the	  borderlands	  to	  constitute	  
elements	  more	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  place.	  This	  includes	  a	  geographical	  
element,	  in	  that	  the	  borderlands	  contains	  places	  with	  established	  boundaries	  that	  are	  most	  readily	  
represented	  in	  maps,	  treaties,	  administrative	  rules	  and	  legislation;	  the	  tools	  necessary	  to	  
differentiate	  spatial	  order	  and	  distinguish	  one	  fixed	  geographical	  location	  from	  another	  (Prescott,	  
1987).	  In	  this	  context	  I	  talk	  of	  Mae	  Sot,	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  checkpoint	  or	  the	  market,	  as	  places	  
in	  the	  borderlands.	  This	  sense	  of	  place	  is	  animated	  by	  the	  practices	  of	  human	  settlement	  that	  make	  
the	  place	  ‘meaningful,	  lived,	  and	  part	  of	  the	  everyday’	  (Massey,	  2005).	  Michel	  de	  Certeau	  refers	  to	  
this	  as	  the	  order	  in	  which	  elements	  are	  distributed	  in	  relationships	  of	  coexistence	  (1988),	  or	  put	  
more	  simply	  how	  our	  lives	  relate	  to	  our	  surrounds.	  Place	  often	  implies	  a	  stable	  configuration	  (de	  
Certeau,	  1988)	  and	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  a	  place	  is	  most	  commonly	  understood	  through	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  paradigm	  of	  boundaries	  that	  contain	  human	  settlement.	  
But	  like	  space,	  place	  is	  also	  a	  social	  construct	  (Massey,	  2005;	  Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998;	  Staeheli,	  
1994).	  A	  place	  must	  necessarily	  encompass	  the	  negotiations	  of	  humans,	  and	  this	  requires	  flexibility	  
and	  adaptability.	  Places	  are	  subject	  to	  great	  historical	  shifts	  at	  both	  the	  local	  and	  global	  level,	  
meaning	  places	  are	  able	  to	  be	  reconceptualised.	  Boundaries	  change,	  as	  does	  the	  natural	  
environment21	  –	  rivers	  dry	  up,	  rock	  formations	  collapse	  and	  agriculture	  practices	  can	  change	  the	  
very	  nature	  of	  the	  landscape	  and	  therefore	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  place.	  The	  demographic	  of	  a	  
population	  of	  a	  place	  also	  changes	  as	  do	  the	  political	  structures	  and	  decision-­‐making	  apparatuses	  
that	  administer	  and	  control	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  place.	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  places	  are	  
embedded	  with	  rich,	  complex	  layers	  that	  intersect	  and	  relate	  to	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  locale	  
in	  which	  they	  operate,	  but	  which	  also	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  contested	  space	  ‘out	  there’	  
that	  attempts	  to	  reformulate	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  place.	  Put	  simply,	  even	  today’s	  most	  hard	  won	  
place	  may	  not	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  place	  in	  the	  future.	  
Up	  until	  this	  point	  I	  have	  provided	  the	  definitional	  understanding	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  used	  in	  this	  
thesis,	  and	  introduced	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  attributes	  of	  both	  space	  and	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
borderlands.	  Let	  me	  now	  apply	  this	  conceptual	  framework	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  One	  subsidiary	  argument	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  
characterised	  by	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain	  and	  the	  intersection	  of	  a	  
particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations,	  a	  tension	  that	  underpins	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  identity	  
constructions	  that	  form	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument.	  This	  tension	  derives	  from	  two	  differing	  
articulations	  of	  the	  space.	  One	  articulation	  comes	  from,	  to	  borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  political	  scientist	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  argument	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  strongly	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Nevzat	  Soguk,	  the	  ‘practices	  of	  statecraft’	  (1999),	  or	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  that	  
attempt	  to	  create	  a	  homogenised	  space	  delineated	  by	  a	  border	  that	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  political	  
authority.	  This	  is	  dominated	  by	  a	  modern	  nationalist	  discourse	  that	  differentiates	  their	  space	  (the	  
nation-­‐state)	  from	  others	  that	  lay	  outside	  their	  border.	  The	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  
particularly	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  borderlands,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  national	  
space,	  but	  also	  who	  articulates	  that	  national	  space	  and	  how.	  This	  articulation	  of	  space	  associates	  
territorial	  boundaries	  with	  a	  national	  identity,	  or	  in	  other	  words	  identities	  formed	  between	  people	  
and	  the	  state.	  In	  a	  perfunctory	  manner,	  this	  represents	  the	  state’s	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  the	  
parameters	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
Another	  form	  of	  articulation	  comes	  from	  the	  narratives	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  interpret	  the	  
borderlands	  through	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relations	  that	  are	  mapped	  across	  the	  
national	  border.	  These	  relations	  are	  framed	  by	  a	  fluidity	  of	  movement	  –	  of	  information,	  resources,	  
ideas,	  culture	  and	  identity	  that	  intensifies	  the	  possibilities	  available	  to	  displaced	  Karen,	  particularly	  
in	  terms	  of	  political	  agency	  and	  mobilisation.	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  tension,	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  relationships	  and	  activities	  that	  occur	  in	  
and	  through	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  we	  need	  to	  examine	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  borderlands	  from	  a	  
different	  spatial	  perspective.	  This	  is	  a	  perspective	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  ‘practices	  of	  statecraft’,	  
but	  also	  a	  more	  dynamic	  and	  fractured	  notion	  of	  the	  space	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  contested	  
social	  relations	  that	  occur	  across	  the	  borderlands	  domain.	  These	  social	  relations	  are	  addressed	  in	  
key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven,	  but	  as	  an	  example,	  they	  
include	  engagement	  with	  other	  people	  and	  ideas	  through	  global	  flows	  of	  information	  and	  
technology,	  displacement	  from	  but	  continued	  connection	  to	  a	  homeland	  (both	  physical	  and	  
psychological),	  processes	  of	  reconstitution	  of	  Karen	  culture	  and	  identity,	  both	  acceptance	  and	  
resistance	  to	  institutional	  governance,	  and	  political	  agency	  that	  develops	  through	  particular	  forms	  
of	  Karen	  activism.	  The	  co-­‐existence	  of	  many	  of	  these	  relations	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  contestability	  
of	  the	  space.	  These	  relations	  also	  often	  occur	  across	  national	  spaces.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  borderlands	  is	  
a	  space	  that	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  sitting	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  state,	  both	  embracing	  and	  
resisting	  systems	  of	  belonging,	  and	  as	  unquestionably	  shaped	  by	  its	  uneasy	  association	  with	  the	  
geographical	  proximity	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  
The	  presence	  of	  these	  particular	  features	  and	  the	  form	  they	  take,	  are	  in	  part	  related	  to	  three	  
significant	  processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  have	  spatial	  impact	  on	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  These	  processes	  give	  both	  a	  historical	  and	  conceptual	  context	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  As	  such,	  understanding	  these	  processes	  and	  the	  
contributions	  they	  make	  to	  spatial	  organisation	  and	  identity	  is	  integral	  to	  understanding	  the	  nature	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of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  use	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  analysis	  to	  draw	  
on	  broader	  trends	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  development	  of	  these	  three	  processes	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  
the	  key	  agents	  and	  themes	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  While	  these	  broader	  trends	  constitute	  
the	  larger	  theoretical	  domains	  of	  nation	  and	  state-­‐building	  and	  globalisation,	  they	  are	  examined	  
over	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  because	  they	  provide	  a	  clear	  framework	  for	  the	  way	  displaced	  
Karen	  live	  in	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
MAPPING	  BORDERS:	  THE	  BODY	  POLITIC	  
This	  section	  examines	  the	  first	  significant	  process	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  
has	  spatial	  impact	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  the	  mapping	  of	  the	  body	  politic.	  I	  argue	  that	  
during	  the	  period	  of	  colonisation	  Burma	  moved	  from	  a	  political	  system	  based	  on	  relatively	  
autonomous	  regions	  characterised	  by	  changeable	  local	  political	  allegiances,	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
bounded	  territorial	  sovereignty	  with	  a	  central	  system	  of	  governance	  and	  characterised	  by	  a	  
collective	  national	  identity.	  This	  shift	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  because	  the	  
advent	  of	  the	  map	  was	  instrumental	  in	  developing	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  the	  body	  politic	  
and	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  national	  identity	  based	  on	  allegiances	  to	  a	  bounded	  territory.	  This	  
set	  up	  the	  dominant	  modern	  day	  framework	  for	  how	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  would	  be	  
identified.	  
In	  the	  late	  1800s	  the	  leaders	  of	  Burma	  and	  Siam	  began	  to	  first	  conceive	  of	  boundaries	  as	  
continuous	  lines	  on	  a	  map,	  “as	  demarcating	  an	  exclusive	  sovereignty	  wedged	  between	  other	  
sovereignties”	  (Anderson,	  1991,	  p.	  172).	  Geographical	  Burma	  as	  we	  know	  it	  today	  is	  largely	  defined	  
by	  the	  policies	  of	  its	  colonial	  administrator,	  Great	  Britain,	  although	  the	  modern-­‐political	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  border	  emerged	  from	  diplomatic	  negotiations	  between	  the	  governments	  of	  Great	  Britain	  
and	  Siam	  that	  occurred	  over	  a	  period	  of	  sixty	  years	  in	  the	  mid-­‐late	  1800s	  (Prescott,	  1987;	  
Winichakul,	  1997).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  changes	  and	  subsequent	  negotiated	  border	  treaties,	  
Burma	  as	  a	  bounded	  nation	  was	  formed.	  
In	  Burma’s	  instance,	  colonialism	  is	  largely	  responsible	  for	  replacing	  the	  customary	  polity	  with	  an	  
entity	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  bounded	  nation.	  Prior	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  modern-­‐political	  map,	  pre-­‐
colonial	  Burma	  consisted	  of	  a	  number	  of	  semi-­‐autonomous	  regions	  which	  were	  defined	  by	  
“regional	  and	  dynastic	  conflicts”	  (Lieberman,	  1978,	  p.	  458).	  Lieberman	  refers	  to	  this	  power	  
dynamic	  as	  “satellite	  centers”	  which	  orbit	  the	  “galatic	  polity”	  (1978,	  p.	  461);	  where	  satellite	  centers	  
constitute	  regional	  leaders	  at	  the	  periphery	  who	  maintain	  their	  autonomy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  central	  
power,	  usually	  the	  monarchy	  but	  otherwise	  a	  customary	  leader	  rather	  than	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  nation.	  
Population	  movement	  between	  geographical	  places	  was	  determined	  by	  allegiances	  to	  patrons,	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rather	  than	  a	  central	  government	  (Lieberman,	  1978,	  p.	  459)	  and	  power	  comprised	  of	  control	  of	  
people	  rather	  than	  control	  of	  territory	  (Steinberg,	  1987,	  p.	  30).	  
Burma’s	  pre-­‐colonial	  period	  is	  noted	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  central	  power	  (the	  monarchy)	  to	  control	  
the	  regional	  commanders	  at	  the	  peripheries	  (Adas,	  1981,	  p.	  221).	  The	  further	  from	  the	  centre	  the	  
more	  diminished	  state	  power	  became	  and	  this	  was	  further	  consolidated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  “the	  
administrative	  system	  to	  penetrate	  the	  village	  level”	  (Adas,	  1981,	  p.	  222).	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  British	  rule	  little	  of	  these	  power	  dynamics	  changed,	  the	  colonial	  administration	  
merely	  replaced	  the	  role	  previously	  played	  by	  the	  monarchy,	  although	  with	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  
controlling	  all	  its	  political	  subjects	  under	  a	  central	  power.	  What	  colonial	  rule	  did	  instigate	  was	  a	  
bureaucracy	  that	  eventually	  attempted	  to	  control	  the	  outer	  areas	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  create	  a	  more	  
geographically	  structured	  mapping	  of	  Burma	  as	  a	  nation.22	  
In	  this	  modern	  setting,	  the	  map	  changed	  the	  way	  territory	  was	  conceived	  and	  presented.	  It	  took	  a	  
three-­‐dimensional	  understanding	  of	  territory	  based	  in	  localised	  knowing	  and	  claimed	  a	  different	  
spatial	  reality	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two-­‐dimensional	  graphics	  (Winichakul,	  1997),	  comprised	  of	  
symbolic	  shapes,	  colours	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  accompanying	  words.	  But	  more	  than	  that,	  border	  lines	  
delineated	  a	  nation’s	  political	  sovereignty,	  providing	  an	  outline	  in	  which	  the	  nation	  as	  an	  entity	  and	  
in	  its	  entirety	  could	  be	  visualised.	  Mapping	  allowed	  a	  birds-­‐eye-­‐view	  of	  a	  nation’s	  territory,	  and	  
eventually	  placed	  the	  nation-­‐state	  in	  a	  larger	  geographical	  context	  on	  the	  world	  map	  (Anderson,	  
1991).	  Traditional	  understandings	  of	  space,	  territory	  and	  nation	  were	  replaced	  by	  the	  map,	  which	  
created	  what	  Winichakul	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “scientific	  abstraction	  of	  reality”	  (1997,	  p.	  130),	  in	  other	  
words	  the	  map	  was	  meant	  to	  represent	  something	  that	  already	  existed.	  
To	  illustrate	  this	  broader	  concept,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  Thongchai	  Winichakul’s	  seminal	  study	  ‘Siam	  
Mapped’	  which	  reversed	  these	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  maps	  objectively	  representing	  
something	  which	  already	  exists.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  mapping	  of	  the	  “geo-­‐body	  of	  a	  nation”	  is	  
synonymous	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  nation-­‐hood	  (Winichakul,	  1997).	  He	  claimed	  that	  nations	  could	  be	  
constructed	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  map.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  mapping	  of	  a	  nation’s	  
boundaries	  held	  more	  ambitious	  intentions	  than	  merely	  representing	  a	  geographical	  location;	  the	  
map	  was	  intended	  to	  personify	  the	  nation	  itself.	  
In	  the	  history	  of	  the	  geo-­‐body,	  this	  relationship	  was	  reversed.	  A	  map	  anticipated	  a	  spatial	  
reality,	  not	  vice	  versa.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  map	  was	  a	  model	  for,	  rather	  than	  a	  model	  of,	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  The	  culmination	  of	  this	  on	  Burma’s	  eastern	  flank	  was	  the	  exchanging	  of	  maps	  in	  1894	  between	  Great	  
Britain	  and	  Siam	  (Thailand)	  which	  demarcated	  the	  area	  from	  what	  is	  now	  Karen	  State	  up	  to	  Shan	  State	  (Lang,	  
1999,	  p.	  149).	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it	  purported	  to	  represent.	  A	  map	  was	  not	  a	  transparent	  medium	  between	  human	  beings	  
and	  space.	  It	  was	  an	  active	  mediator	  (1997,	  p.	  130).	  
Underlying	  much	  of	  Winichakul’s	  argument	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  nation	  is	  created	  to	  give	  substance	  to	  
the	  matter	  enclosed	  by	  its	  boundaries.	  If	  we	  take	  Winichakul’s	  argument	  through	  to	  its	  conclusion	  
then	  Siamese	  rulers	  mapped	  out	  a	  territory	  they	  called	  Siam.	  They	  then	  began	  the	  task	  of	  
constructing	  a	  nation	  and	  identity	  which	  could	  inhabit	  that	  space.	  It	  is	  an	  important	  point	  of	  
analysis,	  for	  if	  it	  is	  possible,	  as	  Winichakul	  suggests	  it	  is,	  that	  the	  map	  precedes	  the	  nation	  (1997,	  p.	  
130),	  then	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  object	  (the	  map)	  and	  its	  intended	  purpose	  can,	  at	  the	  very	  
least,	  be	  politically	  ambiguous.	  It	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  subjective	  construct	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  
space	  projected	  as	  an	  objective	  delineation	  of	  existing	  space.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  unique	  argument	  but	  it	  is	  
worth	  reiterating:	  the	  narrative	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state	  and	  its	  associated	  national	  borders	  is	  as	  much	  a	  
social	  construct	  of	  a	  particular	  space	  as	  that	  of	  the	  social	  relationships	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  that	  I	  
argue	  for	  in	  later	  chapters.	  
The	  emphasis	  mapping	  placed	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  nation	  and	  its	  borders	  is	  associated	  
with	  an	  analytical	  placement	  of	  the	  border	  as	  central	  to	  nation-­‐state	  control.	  Borders	  became	  sites	  
and	  symbols	  of	  power	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999)	  which	  represented	  the	  spatial	  limits	  of	  state	  
power	  and	  the	  manifestation	  of	  political	  control.	  In	  an	  extension	  of	  their	  geographical	  mapping	  of	  
nations	  boundaries,	  political	  geographers	  began	  to	  treat	  the	  territorial	  line	  (border)	  as	  an	  objective	  
fact,	  a	  manifestation	  of	  territoriality	  and	  sovereignty	  that	  is	  fixed	  to	  the	  form	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  
(Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999;	  Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998).	  This	  view	  has	  run	  parallel	  with	  the	  global	  trend	  
that	  prioritised	  a	  nation-­‐state’s	  political	  authority	  over	  a	  specified	  bounded	  space,	  and	  the	  
inhabitants	  who	  lived	  within	  it.	  According	  to	  this	  discourse	  boundaries	  may	  separate	  individuals	  
and	  communities	  at	  a	  local	  level	  by	  determining	  gender	  roles,	  economic	  distribution	  or	  unique	  
cultural	  practices,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  international	  boundary	  that	  represents	  the	  symbol	  of	  a	  collective	  
identity.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  would	  identify	  ourselves	  as	  Australian	  or	  Thai	  –	  a	  collective	  
identity	  based	  on	  our	  nation-­‐state,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  feminist,	  Muslim	  or	  ethnic-­‐Karen	  –	  self-­‐
identified	  groupings	  based	  on	  socio-­‐political	  belonging.	  The	  emphasis	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  
boundaries	  lies	  in	  its	  alignment	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  self-­‐contained	  national	  identity	  that	  supersedes	  
other	  forms	  of	  identification,	  a	  point	  to	  which	  the	  next	  section	  turns.	  This	  position	  not	  only	  impacts	  
the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  it	  also	  develops	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  
establishes	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  constructed	  and	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This	  section	  examines	  the	  second	  significant	  process	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  
has	  spatial	  impact	  on	  the	  borderlands,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  national	  identity.	  The	  creation	  of	  nation-­‐state	  borders	  coincided	  with	  an	  associated	  political	  
authority	  over	  the	  operations	  and	  relationships	  that	  occur	  within	  those	  borders.	  This	  resulted	  in	  
the	  borders	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  being	  closely	  aligned	  with	  a	  national	  identity	  that	  reinforced	  a	  
system	  of	  belonging	  and	  excluding.	  This	  is	  significant	  for	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  on	  two	  levels.	  It	  
introduces	  a	  key	  modern	  spatial	  unit,	  the	  national	  territorial	  domain,	  which	  is	  a	  central	  component	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  And	  it	  establishes	  the	  dominant	  practice	  of	  political	  
organisation	  and	  identity	  which	  in	  later	  chapters	  I	  argue	  sits	  in	  tension	  with	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  
practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  This	  section	  is	  structured	  by	  first	  looking	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  nation-­‐
state’s	  political	  authority	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  power	  is	  enacted,	  and	  secondly	  looking	  at	  how	  
identity	  and	  belonging	  is	  formed	  within	  these	  structures	  and	  what	  role	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  
plays	  in	  this	  formation.	  
The	  terms	  nation,	  nation-­‐state	  and	  nationalism	  are	  commonly	  used	  across	  this	  thesis.	  These	  terms	  
constitute	  complex	  studies	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  and	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  intense	  scrutiny	  by	  
scholars	  (Anthony	  Smith(1986,	  1995),	  Benedict	  Anderson	  (1991),	  Ernest	  Gellner	  (1983),	  Eric	  
Hobsbawm	  (1991),	  to	  name	  a	  few).	  My	  intent	  is	  not	  to	  debate	  their	  validity	  nor	  construe	  a	  new	  
definition,	  but	  rather	  to	  use	  them	  in	  a	  very	  narrow	  application	  by	  focusing	  on	  their	  relationship	  to	  
theories	  of	  borders	  and	  borderlands.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  terms	  are	  used	  across	  this	  thesis	  in	  the	  
following	  way.	  
Definitions	  of	  a	  nation	  attract	  a	  variety	  of	  sometimes	  contentious	  views	  (for	  example	  see	  Gellner,	  
1983;	  Smith,	  1995).	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  a	  common	  definition	  of	  nation	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  shared	  
culture,	  typically	  embodying	  historical	  myths	  and	  symbols,	  language	  and	  popular	  identification	  
(Smith,	  1995).	  In	  addition	  a	  nation	  can	  also	  include	  economic	  unity	  and	  equal	  rights	  and	  duties	  for	  
all	  members	  (Tønnesson	  &	  Antlöv,	  1998),	  a	  pre-­‐eminent	  political	  goal	  of	  attaining	  some	  sort	  of	  
autonomy	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999),	  and	  a	  mass	  public	  culture	  and	  a	  designated	  homeland23	  
(Smith,	  1995,	  pp.	  56-­‐57).	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  nation-­‐state	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  abstract	  administrative	  body	  characterised	  by	  legal	  
structures	  such	  as	  a	  judiciary	  and	  political	  authority	  as	  implemented	  through	  some	  sort	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Incidentally,	  another	  point	  of	  difference	  in	  Smith’s	  definition	  is	  his	  linking	  of	  the	  modern	  nation	  to	  pre-­‐
existing	  ethnic	  ties	  or	  ethnies.	  His	  argument	  is	  that	  some	  ethnic	  ties	  have	  survived	  into	  the	  modern	  era	  and	  
that	  these	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  modern	  nations	  and	  nationalist	  movements	  (Smith,	  1986).	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  
distinction	  between	  Smith	  and	  many	  other	  authors	  writing	  in	  this	  area,	  and	  while	  an	  insight	  worthy	  of	  
further	  debate,	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  draw	  this	  argument	  out.	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governance.	  Most	  literature	  accepts	  that	  the	  nation-­‐state	  consists	  of	  a	  number	  of	  the	  following	  
aspects:	  citizenship,	  representative	  institutions,	  bounded	  territory,	  legal	  codes	  and	  a	  national	  
culture	  or	  identity	  (Anderson,	  1991;	  Smith,	  1986;	  Tønnesson	  &	  Antlöv,	  1998).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
differentiate	  between	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  for	  while	  they	  are	  often	  used	  
interchangeably,	  the	  differences	  place	  members	  of	  a	  nation	  and	  citizens	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state	  in	  
significantly	  different	  political	  circumstances.	  
A	  working	  definition	  of	  nationalism	  has	  evoked	  hotly	  contested	  sentiments	  among	  scholars.	  These	  
have	  ranged	  from	  early	  work	  by	  Ernest	  Gellner	  that	  claimed	  nationalism	  invented	  “nations	  where	  
they	  do	  not	  exist”	  (1964,	  p.	  168)	  to	  Anthony	  Smith’s	  elaboration	  on	  nationalism	  as	  an	  ideological	  
movement	  for	  “attaining	  and	  maintaining	  identity,	  unity	  and	  autonomy	  of	  a	  social	  group	  some	  of	  
whose	  members	  deem	  it	  to	  constitute	  an	  actual	  or	  potential	  nation”	  (A.	  D.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  18).	  
There	  are	  many	  other	  variants	  to	  these	  definitions,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  underlying	  sentiments	  of	  
representation	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  national	  that	  are	  of	  most	  interest	  to	  this	  thesis.	  While	  
nationalist	  ideology	  is	  often	  a	  manifestation	  of	  this	  sentiment,	  for	  my	  own	  purposes,	  I	  take	  a	  broad	  
approach	  to	  nationalism	  and	  see	  it	  as	  the	  sentiment	  that	  feeds	  an	  often	  primordial-­‐like	  devotion	  
and	  sacrifice	  to	  a	  particular	  nation	  and	  national	  identity.	  
One	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  nation-­‐state	  is	  as	  a	  system	  of	  organisation	  and	  governance	  based	  on	  
geo-­‐political	  principles,	  namely	  that	  the	  border	  constitutes	  a	  distinct	  line	  that	  separates	  sovereign	  
states	  (Newman,	  2001).	  This	  creates	  a	  world	  compartmentalised	  into	  discrete	  spatial	  partitions;	  a	  
process	  that	  anthropologist	  Liisa	  Malkki	  says	  is	  to	  be	  “territorialized	  in	  the	  segmentary	  fashion	  of	  
the	  multicoloured	  school	  atlas”	  (1992,	  p.	  26).	  Discontinuous	  lines	  delimit	  one	  nation-­‐state	  from	  the	  
other	  and	  as	  happens	  when	  you	  view	  the	  coloured	  map	  of	  which	  Malkki	  speaks,	  the	  division	  at	  this	  
superficial	  level	  is	  blatantly	  clear.	  Of	  course,	  beneath	  these	  lines	  exist	  the	  social	  and	  political	  
processes	  which	  are	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state;	  manifestations	  of	  which	  come	  to	  mean	  
much	  more	  than	  what	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  these	  visual	  lines.	  Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  
nation-­‐state	  also	  considers	  that	  line	  a	  demarcation	  of	  political	  authority	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999;	  
Newman,	  2001;	  Smith,	  1986).	  This	  approach	  places	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  self-­‐
contained	  nation-­‐state	  whose	  political	  life	  consists	  of	  a	  contract	  between	  a	  nation-­‐state’s	  
population	  and	  authorities,	  a	  contract	  that	  regulates	  how	  a	  system	  of	  social	  organisation	  is	  to	  be	  
carried	  out	  (Brown,	  2001;	  Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998).	  This	  approach	  is	  largely	  based	  on	  a	  position	  of	  
sovereign-­‐territoriality,	  meaning	  a	  nation’s	  geographic	  boundaries	  directly	  impact	  the	  political	  
construction	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  including	  regulating	  political	  authority,	  and	  in	  turn	  come	  to	  be	  the	  
most	  visible	  representation	  of	  that	  nation-­‐state’s	  identity.	  The	  international	  borders	  then	  become	  
a	  filter	  through	  which	  the	  structures	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  can	  be	  accepted	  and	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understood,	  both	  by	  its	  citizens	  and	  the	  citizens	  of	  other	  nation-­‐states,	  therefore	  making	  the	  
border	  both	  symbolic	  and	  material	  (Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998).	  
While	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  talks	  more	  broadly	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  border	  crossing	  
movements	  such	  as	  the	  mobility	  of	  people,	  culture,	  trade	  and	  technology,	  it	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  
here	  how	  some	  of	  these	  counter-­‐movements	  relate	  specifically	  to	  a	  nation-­‐state’s	  political	  
authority	  over	  territory	  and	  a	  national	  identity.	  This	  begins	  to	  get	  at	  the	  tension	  that	  emerges	  
when	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  contest	  the	  seeming	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  territorial	  
domain.	  
The	  borders	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  and	  its	  associated	  operations,	  are	  of	  course	  not	  as	  rigid	  as	  the	  map	  
makes	  them	  out	  to	  be.	  Borders	  are	  often	  blurred	  by	  cross-­‐border	  movements	  like	  migration	  and	  
tourism,	  and	  membership	  of	  a	  particular	  nation-­‐state	  can	  be	  ambiguous,	  particularly	  in	  the	  ways	  
the	  nation-­‐state	  can	  accommodate	  non-­‐citizens	  such	  as	  international	  students,	  spousal	  visas	  or	  
refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers,	  where	  some	  rules	  of	  membership	  apply	  but	  others	  do	  not.	  To	  
accommodate	  these	  deviations	  leaders	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  adapt	  the	  membership	  rules,	  
disaggregating	  levels	  of	  entitlement	  and	  protection	  for	  those	  who	  reside	  within	  its	  borders.	  The	  
nation-­‐state	  response	  to	  such	  cases	  recognises	  that	  in	  its	  operation	  a	  totalising	  approach	  to	  
borders	  as	  associated	  with	  national	  identity	  and	  political	  authority	  can	  be	  problematic,	  and	  in	  its	  
operation	  require	  alternative	  methods	  of	  control.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  in	  these	  circumstances	  
while	  pragmatic	  adjustments	  may	  occur,	  the	  assumption	  of	  political	  authority	  continues	  to	  lie	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  
Challenges	  to	  nation-­‐state	  authority	  can	  produce	  a	  sense	  of	  disruption	  or	  contradiction,	  and	  I	  
argue	  this	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space.	  In	  contemporary	  Burma,	  the	  
territorial	  boundary	  has	  been	  treated	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  political	  authority.	  The	  boundary	  
represents	  the	  parameters	  of	  power	  and	  as	  such	  embodies	  a	  system	  of	  power	  relations.	  However,	  
in	  practice	  this	  political	  authority	  is	  often	  distributed	  unevenly,	  particularly	  at	  the	  peripheries	  of	  
the	  nation-­‐state	  which	  are	  the	  point	  of	  interest	  for	  this	  thesis.	  In	  Burma,	  the	  state’s	  power	  has	  
typically	  lain	  at	  its	  centre;	  the	  further	  from	  the	  centre	  the	  weaker	  that	  power	  has	  tended	  to	  be.	  
One	  ramification	  of	  this	  has	  been	  a	  state	  tendency	  to	  heavily	  militarise	  border	  areas	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  contain	  and	  control	  dissidents	  and	  the	  disaffected	  who	  naturally	  reside	  or	  are	  drawn	  to	  these	  
areas.	  This	  process	  has	  tended	  to	  “produce	  and	  invent”	  a	  population	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  (Horstmann,	  2004,	  p.	  3),	  which	  is	  often	  isolated	  from	  political	  power	  (Conversi,	  1999).	  This	  
assertion	  can	  certainly	  be	  made	  of	  the	  Karen	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  but	  also	  for	  many	  other	  
ethnic	  groups	  that	  occupy	  Burma’s	  border	  areas	  and	  struggle	  to	  have	  their	  political	  demands	  met,	  
such	  as	  the	  Naga,	  Karenni,	  Shan	  and	  Rohingya.	  It	  is	  a	  reasonable	  affirmation	  that	  Burma’s	  
54 
 
territorial	  edges	  are	  inhabited	  by	  those	  disenfranchised	  by	  the	  centre’s	  power;	  those	  that	  have	  
been	  pushed	  there	  by	  their	  failure	  to	  conform	  to	  centrist	  demands	  for	  belonging	  to	  a	  national	  
identity,	  or	  those	  who	  inhabit	  the	  periphery	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  evade	  state	  control,	  described	  by	  
James	  C	  Scott	  as	  those	  that	  seek	  to	  “evade	  both	  state	  capture	  and	  state	  formation”	  (2009,	  p.	  9).	  
Given	  that	  the	  Karen	  I	  talk	  of	  in	  this	  thesis	  inhabit	  these	  political	  and	  metaphorical	  margins,	  I	  
propose	  to	  look	  at	  the	  borderlands	  not	  from	  the	  centre,	  but	  from	  the	  margins	  itself.24	  I	  contend	  
that	  by	  viewing	  the	  space	  from	  the	  margins,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  examine	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  site	  of	  
empowerment,	  not	  just	  marginalisation.	  In	  moving	  beyond	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘view	  from	  the	  
centre’,	  this	  approach	  offers	  insight	  into	  not	  only	  how	  those	  inhabiting	  the	  margins	  interact	  with	  
the	  state,	  but	  how	  they	  construct	  relationships	  and	  identities	  that	  test	  nation-­‐state	  boundaries	  and	  
disrupt	  this	  form	  of	  political	  control.	  Thongchai	  Winichakul	  has	  attempted	  to	  advance	  this	  view	  by	  
calling	  on	  the	  writing	  of	  a	  history	  at	  the	  interstices,	  “the	  history	  of	  the	  locations	  and	  moments	  
between	  being	  and	  not	  being	  a	  nation,	  becoming	  and	  not	  becoming	  a	  nation”	  (2003).	  In	  such	  a	  
statement	  Thongchai	  acknowledges	  the	  existence	  of	  histories	  that	  can	  contribute	  to	  our	  
understanding	  of	  how	  national	  identities	  and	  nation-­‐formation	  occurs.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  
thesis	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  location	  where	  such	  a	  dynamic	  operates,	  
where	  subjects	  at	  Burma’s	  peripheries	  construct	  identity/ies	  that	  are	  contingent	  upon	  but	  also	  
mindful	  of	  the	  uneven	  power	  relationships	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  
How	  identity	  and	  belonging	  is	  formed	  within	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  what	  role	  
nationalist	  sentiment	  plays	  in	  this,	  is	  another	  key	  focus	  of	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter.	  For	  at	  least	  
the	  last	  century,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  has	  been	  integral	  to	  discourses	  around	  how	  identity	  is	  
formed	  and	  practiced.	  In	  its	  very	  simplest	  form,	  the	  nation-­‐state	  approach	  to	  borders	  uses	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  boundary	  as	  a	  means	  to	  determine	  who	  belongs	  –	  in	  a	  crude	  sense,	  us	  and	  them	  
(Conversi,	  1999;	  Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998;	  Soguk,	  1996).	  Those	  inside	  the	  boundary	  –	  us	  –	  are	  
entitled	  to	  certain	  rights	  and	  protections	  based	  on	  membership	  to	  a	  particular	  national	  identity.	  
Those	  outside	  the	  boundary	  –	  them	  –	  are	  not.	  The	  key	  question	  is	  how	  the	  criteria	  for	  membership	  
of	  the	  group	  is	  determined.	  Us	  and	  them	  categories	  are	  a	  means	  of	  maintaining	  differences.	  Key	  
elements	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  –	  citizenship,	  national	  security,	  codified	  rights	  –	  are	  both	  a	  means	  of	  
protecting	  and	  enhancing	  the	  chosen	  population	  as	  well	  as	  rebuffing	  those	  who	  are	  different	  or	  do	  
not	  belong.	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  nation	  and	  a	  national	  identity	  relies	  heavily	  on	  producing	  a	  system	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  By	  ‘view	  from	  the	  margins’	  I	  mean	  to	  look	  at	  the	  margins	  as	  sites	  of	  political	  and	  cultural	  production	  in	  
their	  own	  right,	  and	  as	  such	  as	  a	  worthy	  centrepiece	  for	  research.	  My	  motivation	  for	  establishing	  this	  
conceptualisation	  is	  that	  a	  view	  from	  the	  margins	  offers	  new	  forms	  of	  knowledge,	  in	  that	  it	  takes	  the	  debate	  
away	  from	  the	  urban	  centre	  where	  it	  has	  traditionally	  been	  focused.	  My	  conceptualisation	  of	  a	  view	  from	  the	  
margins	  draws	  heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Hastings	  Donnan	  and	  Thomas	  Wilson	  (1999),	  Anna	  Tsing	  (1993),	  James	  
C	  Scott	  (2009)	  and	  Thongchai	  Winichakul	  (2003).	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social	  classification	  which	  is	  universally	  understood	  and	  distinguishes	  members.	  In	  turn	  the	  claim	  of	  
statehood	  is	  legitimised	  (Lamont	  &	  Molnár,	  2002)	  because	  it	  is	  accepted	  and	  recognised.	  By	  nature	  
the	  border	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  is	  therefore	  a	  means	  of	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion,	  or	  in	  other	  words	  a	  
check-­‐list	  for	  belonging.	  
Belonging	  is	  central	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state	  and	  is	  often	  equated	  with	  nationalistic	  
sentiment;	  the	  feeling	  of	  belonging	  to	  and	  identification	  with	  a	  national	  identity	  or	  history	  (A.	  D.	  
Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  30).	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  also	  act	  as	  a	  point	  of	  
reference	  for	  codes	  of	  behaviour	  regarding	  national	  identity.	  For	  example,	  the	  state	  serves	  up	  
strength,	  stability	  and	  unity	  which	  become	  more	  important	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  replace	  customary	  
ties	  such	  as	  those	  associated	  with	  family	  or	  community	  (A.	  D.	  Smith,	  1999).	  By	  accepting	  this	  
privileging	  of	  national	  authority,	  citizens	  are	  expected	  to	  act	  accordingly,	  for	  example	  accepting	  
that	  they	  will	  work,	  live	  and	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  national	  allegiance,	  rather	  than	  cultural	  ties	  or	  
historical	  lineage.	  But	  this	  sense	  of	  national	  identity	  is	  a	  relatively	  modern	  construct	  (Gellner	  and	  
Hobsbawm	  in	  A.	  D.	  Smith,	  1999)	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Burma	  it	  is	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  
traditional	  allegiances	  which	  characterised	  Burma’s	  semi-­‐autonomous	  authority	  structures	  of	  the	  
past.	  
For	  most	  Karen,	  ethnic	  and	  community	  ties	  remain	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  identification	  and	  the	  
concept	  of	  a	  national	  Burmese	  identity,	  enabled	  by	  a	  strong	  Burmese	  state,	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  
position	  pushed	  by	  an	  elite	  few	  in	  authority.	  But	  even	  so,	  these	  modern	  versus	  customary	  notions	  
of	  identity	  formation	  are	  not	  so	  easily	  delineated.	  The	  Karen	  do	  not	  monopolise	  customary	  forms	  
of	  identification	  any	  more	  than	  the	  nation-­‐state	  embodies	  a	  strict	  hold	  over	  representations	  of	  
national	  identity.	  In	  many	  cases	  these	  forms	  of	  identification	  overlap	  and	  both	  certainly	  
incorporate	  some	  sense	  of	  fluidity	  and	  contestability	  in	  the	  way	  they	  are	  applied.	  In	  this	  respect	  I	  
am	  not	  arguing	  that	  the	  Karen	  maintain	  their	  customary	  form	  of	  identity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Burmese	  
state’s	  attempts	  to	  establish	  a	  national	  one.	  The	  dynamic	  is	  far	  more	  nuanced	  than	  that.	  Rather,	  I	  
am	  arguing	  we	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  accommodating	  the	  reality	  already	  evident	  in	  the	  
relationships	  on	  the	  ground	  –	  a	  duality,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  customary	  identity	  and	  a	  national	  
identity	  co-­‐existing	  in	  a	  state	  of	  complex	  tension.	  One	  does	  not	  secede	  to	  the	  other,	  but	  rather	  
should	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  in	  a	  state	  of	  tension	  that	  is	  perpetuated	  by	  their	  ongoing	  interaction.	  This	  
dynamic	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  for	  it	  is	  replicated	  in	  the	  ‘borders’	  of	  many	  
nation-­‐states	  around	  the	  world,	  it	  does	  however	  allow	  me	  to	  reiterate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  space	  
the	  Karen	  inhabit.	  In	  the	  borderlands	  the	  Karen	  negotiate	  a	  tension	  that	  frames	  a	  key	  subsidiary	  
argument	  of	  this	  thesis,	  a	  tension	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  ongoing	  interaction	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  the	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nation-­‐state	  and	  associated	  codes	  of	  behaviour	  regarding	  national	  identity	  with	  the	  Karen’s	  own	  
social	  relationships	  which	  are	  dominated	  by	  cultural,	  historical	  and	  ethnic	  ties.	  
Up	  until	  this	  point	  I	  have	  proposed	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Burma,	  the	  political	  authority	  of	  the	  
nation-­‐state	  has	  come	  to	  replace	  what	  had	  traditionally	  been	  semi-­‐autonomous	  regional	  alliances.	  
The	  attempt	  to	  establish	  a	  national	  boundary	  was	  prioritised	  over	  local	  affiliations	  and	  ethnicity	  as	  
the	  primary	  point	  of	  identification.	  This	  was	  achieved	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  political	  
authority	  over	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  bounded	  territory.	  Easily	  recognisable	  and	  understood	  
parameters	  of	  belonging	  such	  as	  citizenship,	  a	  national	  narrative	  and	  a	  shared	  history	  were	  
developed,	  and	  a	  corresponding	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  that	  supported	  a	  sense	  of	  inclusion	  and	  
exclusion,	  or	  an	  identity	  of	  belonging	  was	  encouraged.	  Without	  negating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  in	  identity	  formation,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  identities,	  including	  national	  identities	  are	  formed	  
through	  complex	  processes	  of	  social,	  cultural	  and	  political	  interaction,	  some	  of	  which	  fall	  outside	  of	  
the	  typical	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  Most	  notable,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  thesis,	  is	  the	  
increasingly	  relevant	  concept	  of	  border	  crossing,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  population	  movements,	  as	  well	  
as	  global	  flows	  of	  information,	  trade	  and	  cultural	  identity.	  Here,	  the	  mobility	  of	  populations	  and	  
global	  trends	  challenge	  the	  association	  of	  a	  fixed	  border	  with	  identity	  formation.	  It	  is	  to	  this	  spatial	  
configuration	  that	  I	  now	  turn.	  
BORDER	  CROSSING:	  GLOBAL	  MOBILITY,	  POPULATION	  AND	  CULTURAL	  MOVEMENT	  
This	  section	  examines	  the	  third	  significant	  process	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  
has	  spatial	  impact	  on	  the	  borderlands,	  global	  mobility	  and	  population	  and	  cultural	  movement	  
across	  national	  borders.	  I	  argue	  that	  border	  crossing,	  shaped	  by	  global	  flows	  of	  technology,	  trade	  
and	  information	  as	  well	  as	  population	  and	  cultural	  movement,	  constitute	  global	  processes	  that	  
mark	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  nation-­‐state	  borders.	  While	  the	  previous	  two	  processes	  of	  
social	  organisations	  and	  transformation	  have	  established	  the	  influence	  and	  consolidation	  of	  the	  
nation-­‐state	  and	  its	  associated	  political	  authority,	  this	  section	  moves	  in	  a	  significantly	  different	  
direction.	  It	  examines	  a	  process	  of	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  brings	  a	  sense	  of	  fluidity	  
to	  established	  borders	  and	  identities	  that	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  nation-­‐states	  attempts	  at	  
consolidation	  and	  control	  over	  that	  space.	  This	  introduces	  a	  key	  conceptual	  underpinning	  of	  my	  
larger	  thesis	  argument,	  that	  the	  borderlands	  constitutes	  an	  interchange	  across	  the	  national	  border	  
which	  frames	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  critically	  informs	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  
identity.	  
Throughout	  this	  section	  I	  draw	  on	  broader	  trends	  within	  global	  processes	  to	  show	  how	  they	  relate	  
to	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Most	  significantly,	  I	  show	  how	  these	  processes	  have	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exposed	  the	  Karen	  to	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  not	  only	  around	  their	  political	  struggle	  but	  also	  around	  
conceptions	  of	  identity	  and	  social	  organisation.	  These	  processes	  have	  also	  provided	  the	  Karen	  with	  
a	  range	  of	  mechanisms	  (international	  networking,	  advocacy,	  and	  new	  technologies)	  to	  both	  
support	  and	  project	  their	  political	  claims	  to	  a	  wider	  audience	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  retain	  a	  
connection	  to	  their	  culture	  and	  identity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  immense	  upheaval	  and	  displacement.	  I	  also	  
contend	  that	  global	  processes	  have	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  projection	  of	  Karen	  
identity,	  bringing	  a	  more	  fluid	  and	  accessible	  component	  to	  the	  identity.	  This	  larger	  process	  of	  
global	  mobility	  and	  population	  and	  cultural	  movement	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  
because	  in	  capturing	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  nation-­‐state	  borders,	  it	  can	  
better	  account	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  
Large	  population	  movements	  have	  occurred	  for	  centuries;	  the	  more	  notable	  contemporaneous	  
include	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Arab	  migrations	  in	  the	  15th	  to	  the	  19th	  Century’s	  (Anderson,	  1991)	  and	  the	  
imperialist	  conquests	  of	  the	  18th	  Century	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999),	  of	  which	  Australia	  and	  the	  
Americas	  are	  obvious	  examples.	  While	  the	  notion	  of	  movement	  across	  borders	  is	  clearly	  not	  
exclusive	  to	  the	  modern	  era,	  there	  are	  particular	  features	  that	  distinguish	  the	  contemporary	  period	  
that	  is	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  The	  most	  visible	  feature	  is	  the	  pockets	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  
groupings	  which	  are	  scattered	  across	  the	  global	  community,	  as	  opposed	  to	  living	  as	  a	  single	  group	  
in	  a	  particular	  nation-­‐state.	  Homi	  Bhabha	  calls	  this	  mass	  movement	  of	  people	  across	  international	  
borders	  and	  outside	  the	  containment	  of	  a	  national	  culture,	  the	  “wandering	  peoples”	  (1990,	  p.	  
315).	  Some	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  this	  mass	  movement	  of	  peoples	  include	  major	  global	  conflicts	  of	  this	  
century,	  in	  particular	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  increasing	  displacement	  caused	  by	  internal	  
nation-­‐state	  conflicts	  throughout	  the	  world.	  Other	  reasons	  for	  population	  movement	  include	  
economic	  and	  social	  considerations	  that	  enable	  migration	  cached	  in	  the	  search	  for	  a	  better	  life	  and	  
labour	  needs	  which	  facilitate	  the	  push	  and	  pull	  factors	  of	  migration	  for	  employment	  opportunities.	  
For	  many	  of	  the	  people	  who	  undertook	  these	  early	  journeys,	  a	  return	  to	  their	  place	  of	  birth	  was	  
not	  a	  viable	  option.	  For	  those	  who	  fled	  because	  of	  civil	  unrest	  or	  persecution,	  returning	  was	  never	  
an	  option,	  and	  for	  those	  who	  left	  in	  search	  of	  a	  better	  life,	  utopia	  would	  never	  be	  forsaken	  for	  a	  
return	  to	  ‘just	  getting	  by’.	  In	  many	  instances	  what	  occurred	  was	  a	  form	  of	  assimilation	  which	  saw	  
many	  of	  these	  particular	  populations	  assume	  the	  traits	  of	  the	  new	  cultures	  they	  were	  entering.	  
Benedict	  Anderson	  argues	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  Americas	  that	  population	  
movement	  acquired	  a	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  which	  allowed	  mobile	  populations	  to	  resist	  
assimilation	  (Anderson,	  1991,	  p.	  189).	  With	  it	  came	  realisation,	  and	  slowly	  acceptance	  that	  you	  did	  
not	  have	  to	  give	  up	  one	  identity	  for	  another.	  Such	  a	  position	  has	  tended	  to	  characterise	  migration	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in	  the	  20th	  Century,	  where	  there	  is	  either	  a	  hope	  of	  return	  to	  the	  ‘homeland’,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  
knowledge	  that	  such	  an	  avenue	  is	  available.	  
One	  consequence	  of	  this	  difference	  is	  that	  migratory	  lives	  now	  frequently	  span	  countries	  
and	  even	  continents,	  so	  that	  the	  border	  is	  not	  something	  to	  be	  crossed	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  
but	  something	  to	  be	  crossed	  and	  re-­‐crossed,	  in	  the	  imagination	  if	  not	  always	  in	  reality.	  As	  a	  
result,	  lives	  are	  lived	  in	  more	  than	  one	  location,	  generating	  fragmentary	  and	  fugitive	  
biographies	  that	  defy	  fixity	  in	  politically	  delineated	  space	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999,	  p.	  109).	  
What	  Donnan	  and	  Wilson	  identify	  is	  a	  key	  development	  in	  migration	  theory:	  that	  border	  crossing	  
didn’t	  need	  to	  consist	  of	  the	  finality	  that	  typically	  defined	  pre-­‐19th	  Century	  population	  movement.	  
Even	  if	  physical	  return	  proves	  improbable	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  maintain	  a	  connection	  to	  the	  
homeland	  which	  defy	  fixed	  spatial	  delineation.	  Donnan	  and	  Wilson	  develop	  this	  concept	  even	  
further	  to	  explore	  living	  “in	  more	  than	  one	  location”	  by	  taking	  the	  specific	  example	  of	  
undocumented	  migrant	  labour.	  They	  relay	  Arnold	  van	  Gennep	  and	  Victor	  Turner’s	  three-­‐phase	  
model	  of	  how	  individuals	  move	  from	  one	  group	  to	  another.	  The	  three	  phases	  are:	  separation	  –	  the	  
erasure	  of	  one’s	  existing	  status;	  transition	  –	  where	  status	  is	  neither	  or;	  and	  incorporation	  –	  
successful	  transition	  to	  a	  new	  group.	  Donnan	  and	  Wilson	  suggest	  that	  for	  many	  undocumented	  
migrants	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  ‘incorporation’	  is	  never	  reached.	  Due	  to	  their	  illegal	  status	  they	  are	  
trapped	  in	  the	  liminal	  phase	  of	  the	  second	  stage,	  perpetually	  in	  transition	  because	  they	  are	  never	  
able	  to	  become	  legally	  incorporated	  into	  the	  new	  group	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999,	  p.	  110).	  Their	  
interpretation	  of	  this	  model	  provides	  a	  useful	  understanding	  of	  movement	  between	  groups.	  It	  has	  
some	  relevance	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Karen	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  in	  that	  many	  
displaced	  Karen	  inhabit	  a	  trajectory	  that	  incorporates	  the	  first	  two	  phases	  of	  this	  model:	  erasure	  of	  
the	  existence	  they	  had	  known	  in	  Burma	  and	  living	  in	  a	  current	  state	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  
characterises	  the	  second	  ‘transition’	  stage.	  I	  would	  add	  a	  further	  observation	  to	  Donnan	  and	  
Wilson’s	  model,	  the	  relevance	  of	  which	  will	  unfold	  as	  this	  thesis	  progresses.	  This	  is	  that	  the	  
undocumented	  individual,	  in	  this	  case	  displaced	  Karen,	  can	  make	  a	  conscious	  decision	  not	  to	  move	  
into	  the	  third	  stage.	  In	  fact,	  rather	  than	  being	  ‘trapped’	  in	  the	  second	  stage,	  many	  Karen	  make	  a	  
choice	  not	  to	  assimilate	  or	  become	  incorporated	  into	  Thai	  society.	  Instead	  they	  choose	  to	  remain	  
distinct	  so	  they	  can	  continue	  to	  be	  politically	  active	  in	  their	  struggle	  to	  return	  to	  their	  homeland.	  
For	  many	  Karen,	  remaining	  in	  this	  second	  stage	  of	  transition	  is	  more	  conducive	  to	  that	  return.	  
These	  more	  general	  statements	  around	  the	  nature	  of	  flows	  across	  national	  borders	  highlights	  
several	  broader	  trends	  that	  assist	  in	  understanding	  the	  situation	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  borderlands.	  In	  particular,	  how	  greater	  global	  mobility	  of	  information,	  peoples	  and	  
technology	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  re-­‐imagined	  political	  space	  of	  the	  borderlands,	  and	  how	  it	  has	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facilitated	  an	  interchange	  across	  the	  national	  border	  that	  has	  helped	  develop	  the	  capacity	  for	  
Karen	  agency	  and	  mobilisation.	  
The	  flow	  of	  information,	  technology,	  money	  and	  culture	  across	  international	  boundaries	  is	  utilised	  
by	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  ways	  that	  challenge	  the	  spatial	  constraints	  of	  the	  state.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  Burma’s	  informal	  money	  lending	  system.	  Burma’s	  diaspora	  is	  spread	  widely,	  some	  
living	  thousands	  of	  kilometres	  from	  their	  former	  homeland.	  Many	  migrants	  send	  money	  back	  to	  
Burma	  to	  support	  family	  and	  friends	  through	  a	  system	  called	  hundi.	  In	  the	  Sanskrit	  language	  this	  
means	  ‘to	  collect’	  but	  is	  generally	  understood	  to	  mean	  migrant	  remittances.	  The	  system	  operates	  
through	  informal	  networks	  where	  the	  money	  given	  to	  a	  hundi	  broker	  in	  one	  country	  turns	  up	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  recipient	  in	  Burma.	  It	  bypasses	  official	  banking	  and	  import	  regulations	  and	  ensures	  
the	  money	  goes	  directly	  to	  the	  family	  member,	  not	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  Based	  on	  a	  study	  carried	  
out	  in	  2002-­‐2003,	  Sean	  Turnell,	  an	  economics	  academic	  and	  Burma	  specialist,	  claims	  the	  hundi	  
system	  makes	  up	  approximately	  five	  per	  cent	  of	  Burma’s	  GDP	  (Turnell,	  Vicary,	  &	  Bradford,	  2008).	  
While	  admitting	  the	  numbers	  are	  ‘rough’,	  25	  he	  estimated	  that	  in	  2002-­‐2003	  more	  than	  US$300	  
million,	  or	  ninety-­‐four	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  remittances,	  were	  sent	  back	  to	  Burma	  via	  informal	  funds	  
transfer	  schemes.26	  The	  other	  six	  per	  cent	  were	  conducted	  through	  formal	  schemes	  such	  as	  banks.	  
Of	  course	  a	  hundi-­‐type	  remittance	  system	  has	  existed	  in	  Burma	  for	  centuries	  but	  its	  form	  in	  the	  
modern	  era	  is	  particularly	  salient	  when	  taken	  in	  the	  context	  of	  border	  crossing	  mechanisms	  that	  
challenge	  the	  primacy	  of	  state	  regulation.	  While	  the	  hundi	  system	  of	  money	  lending	  is	  unlikely	  to	  
turn	  around	  Burma’s	  financial	  problems,	  and	  indeed	  may	  pose	  a	  long-­‐term	  challenge	  for	  any	  
economic	  reform,	  it	  does	  have	  considerable	  impact	  through	  its	  ability	  to	  exist	  outside	  the	  
restrictions	  of	  state	  regulation.	  
Another	  way	  border	  crossing	  is	  utilised	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  informal	  networks	  migrant	  
communities	  use	  to	  stay	  connected	  to	  home.	  Modern	  technology	  such	  as	  communication	  and	  
information	  flows	  as	  well	  as	  transport	  and	  labour	  migration	  have	  tended	  to	  dramatically	  reduce	  
the	  disconnection	  associated	  with	  vast	  geographical	  distances.	  In	  many	  cases	  migration	  no	  longer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  There	  is	  very	  little	  documentation	  or	  data	  regarding	  informal	  money	  transfer	  schemes	  in	  Burma.	  Turnell’s	  
study	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  detail	  the	  logistics	  and	  amounts	  associated	  with	  the	  hundi	  system	  in	  Burma	  and	  
while	  it	  is	  preliminary	  in	  nature,	  it	  currently	  stands	  alone	  is	  terms	  of	  reference	  material.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  the	  
study’s	  analysis	  was	  a	  survey	  of	  around	  1000	  Burmese	  migrant	  workers	  and	  refugees	  residing	  in	  Thailand.	  
Turnell	  calls	  the	  numbers	  ‘rough’	  because	  he	  is	  estimating	  remittances	  from	  the	  general	  Burmese	  migrant	  
population	  based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  survey	  of	  1000	  he	  conducted	  in	  2002-­‐2003.	  For	  further	  analysis	  of	  
the	  study’s	  methodology	  and	  findings	  see	  ‘Migrant	  Worker	  Remittances	  and	  Burma:	  An	  economic	  analysis	  of	  
survey	  results’	  by	  Sean	  Turnell,	  Alison	  Vicary	  and	  Wylie	  Bradford	  (Turnell,	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
26	  The	  Informal	  Funds	  Transfer	  Schemes	  (IFTS)	  set	  out	  by	  Turnell	  et	  al,	  include	  the	  hundi	  system,	  family,	  
carrier	  or	  merchant,	  or	  in	  person.	  According	  to	  Turnell’s	  study,	  remittances	  were	  predominantly	  used	  for	  
survival	  (96	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed),	  followed	  by	  the	  purchase	  or	  development	  of	  farmland,	  establishing	  a	  




means	  intermittent	  contact,	  verbal	  or	  physical,	  with	  family	  that	  remain	  in	  the	  homeland,	  instead	  
far	  more	  sustained	  levels	  of	  interaction	  are	  available	  to	  many.	  Modes	  of	  technological	  
communication	  such	  as	  the	  telephone,	  email	  and	  the	  internet	  help	  reduce	  the	  subjective	  sense	  of	  
distance	  and	  enable	  communication	  to	  occur	  across	  borders	  and	  between	  places	  (Clifford,	  1994).	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Karen,	  and	  the	  exiled	  Burmese	  community	  more	  generally,	  this	  process	  of	  
connection	  also	  moves	  beyond	  immediate	  familial	  ties;	  this	  is	  commonly	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  the	  
greater	  Karen	  diaspora	  mobilise	  around	  websites,	  chat	  forums	  and	  global	  activist	  networks.	  For	  
example,	  community	  groups	  who	  maintain	  contact	  with	  partners	  in	  their	  ‘home’	  country	  are	  
enabled	  and	  strengthened	  by	  the	  structures	  of	  their	  ‘host’	  country.	  In	  Australia	  network	  groups	  
such	  as	  the	  Burma	  Campaign	  Australia	  straddle	  both	  worlds;	  connecting	  the	  information	  flows	  
between	  other	  activist	  groups	  around	  the	  world,	  the	  Australian	  political	  scene,	  and	  individuals	  
inside	  Burma.	  The	  group	  would	  not	  function	  without	  the	  resources	  and	  infrastructure	  available	  
within	  the	  ‘host’	  country	  (Australia),	  or	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  its	  partners	  in	  the	  ‘home’	  
country	  (Burma).	  
In	  many	  senses	  this	  process	  of	  connection	  and	  networking	  represents	  a	  paradoxical	  shrinking	  of	  
the	  world	  (S.	  D.	  Brunn	  &	  Leinbach,	  1991;	  Janelle,	  1991).	  Paradoxical	  because	  a	  subjective	  shrinking	  
of	  geographical	  space	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  expansion	  in	  consciousness	  related	  to	  ideas,	  knowledge	  
and	  accessibility	  to	  the	  greater	  world	  (Newman	  &	  Paasi,	  1998).	  The	  world	  is	  simultaneously	  smaller	  
and	  larger;	  smaller	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  ability	  to	  connect	  with	  people	  and	  places,	  and	  larger	  in	  terms	  of	  
what	  we	  can	  know	  and	  access	  because	  of	  these	  connections.	  The	  result	  of	  such	  connections	  is	  the	  
capacity	  to	  mobilise	  large	  or	  small	  groups	  of	  people	  across	  vast	  geographical	  distances	  around	  
what	  are	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  global	  issues	  –	  the	  environment,	  human	  rights,	  poverty,	  the	  food	  
crisis,	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  weapons	  proliferation,	  security	  and	  trade	  are	  just	  some	  of	  these	  
global	  issues.	  This	  vastly	  more	  connected	  spatial	  condition	  that	  can	  be	  paradoxically	  both	  smaller	  
and	  larger,	  reminds	  us	  that	  within	  global	  processes,	  distance	  and	  time	  constitute	  new	  meanings(S.	  
D.	  Brunn	  &	  Leinbach,	  1991;	  Rodgers,	  2003).	  Traditional	  concepts	  of	  communities	  based	  on	  
individuals	  in	  close	  spatial	  proximity	  who	  share	  religious,	  cultural	  and	  social	  values	  (Janelle,	  1991)	  is	  
replaced	  with	  transnational	  communities	  whose	  membership	  can	  be	  as	  geographically	  broad	  as	  it	  
is	  narrowed	  by	  advances	  in	  communications	  technology.	  
These	  advances	  in	  communications	  technology	  enable	  the	  emergence	  of	  global	  networks,	  resulting	  
in	  the	  capacity	  of	  dispersed	  communities	  to	  mobilise	  along	  cultural	  and	  political	  lines	  that	  are	  
unbound	  by	  distance	  or	  nation-­‐state	  borders.	  In	  such	  cases,	  a	  Karen	  person	  can	  sit	  illegally	  in	  
Thailand	  and	  access	  information	  via	  the	  web	  they	  could	  not	  obtain	  if	  they	  were	  inside	  Burma.	  They	  
can	  share	  this	  information	  with	  the	  Karen	  community	  dispersed	  throughout	  Europe,	  America	  or	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Australia,	  and	  using	  alternative	  methods,	  they	  can	  even	  share	  this	  information	  with	  Karen	  still	  
inside	  Burma.	  They	  can	  further	  compile	  information	  gained	  from	  this	  dispersed	  community	  and	  
submit	  reports	  to	  a	  UN	  Committee	  in	  Geneva	  or	  a	  foreign	  government	  which	  could	  apply	  pressure	  
to	  Burma’s	  military	  government	  to	  cease	  its	  oppressive	  practices.	  In	  the	  end,	  this	  information	  will	  
have	  traversed	  countless	  national	  borders	  and	  political	  systems,	  without	  facing	  nation-­‐state	  border	  
restrictions,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  a	  localised	  predicament.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  are	  now	  
encountering	  a	  system	  that	  challenges	  nation-­‐state	  boundaries	  on	  a	  fundamental	  level;	  a	  system	  
that	  is	  reconstituting	  our	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  geographic	  distance	  and	  spatial	  control	  
(Sassen,	  2006b;	  Soguk	  &	  Whitehall,	  1999).	  
While	  border	  crossing	  is	  an	  important	  concept	  to	  this	  thesis	  and	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  it	  would	  
be	  a	  mistake	  to	  view	  these	  networks	  and	  connections	  as	  unbounded	  by	  territory	  entirely.	  While	  
there	  are	  certainly	  elements	  of	  the	  globalisation	  literature	  that	  advocate	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state,	  or	  a	  ‘world	  without	  borders’	  (S.	  Brunn,	  Jones,	  &	  Purcell,	  1994;	  Ohmae,	  1995),	  others	  present	  
a	  more	  nuanced	  argument	  that	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  sentiment	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  convey	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
This	  includes	  an	  approach	  to	  territory	  that	  contemplates	  a	  reconfigured	  spatial	  order	  rather	  than	  a	  
demise	  (Appadurai,	  2005;	  Newman,	  2001;	  Sassen,	  2006b).	  Arjun	  Appadurai	  clearly	  elucidates	  this	  
when	  he	  suggests	  that	  “people,	  machinery,	  money,	  images	  and	  ideas	  now	  follow	  increasingly	  
nonisomorphic	  paths…”(2005,	  p.	  37).	  To	  the	  point	  where	  global	  flows	  have	  created	  fundamental	  
disjunctures	  that	  require	  new	  ways	  of	  reasoning	  and	  theorising.	  Nevzat	  Soguk	  ties	  the	  
deterritorialising	  aspects	  of	  these	  global	  flows	  to	  the	  narrative	  of	  statism.	  
Deterritorialising	  mobility	  of	  peoples,	  ideas,	  and	  images	  plays	  against	  the	  laborious	  moves	  
of	  statism	  to	  project	  an	  image	  of	  the	  world	  divided	  along	  territorially	  discontinuous	  
(separated)	  sovereign	  spaces,	  each	  supposedly	  with	  homogenous	  cultures	  and	  impervious	  
essences	  (Soguk,	  1996,	  p.	  285).	  
These	  positions	  suggest	  that	  forms	  of	  deterritorialisation	  are	  a	  condition	  of	  the	  modern	  world	  
(Appadurai,	  2005,	  p.	  37).	  They	  are	  forces	  that	  must	  be	  contended	  with,	  but	  while	  they	  may	  
challenge	  the	  spatial	  narrative	  of	  statism	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  suggest	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  state	  
altogether.	  Instead,	  these	  arguments	  take	  the	  view	  of	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  spatial	  reality,	  where	  
elements	  of	  global	  processes	  force	  us	  to	  rethink	  the	  space	  in	  deeper,	  more	  nuanced	  terms.	  This	  is	  
where	  the	  complexities	  of	  this	  debate	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  displaced	  Karen.	  While	  the	  Karen	  
challenge	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  territorialised	  sovereign	  spaces,	  they	  are	  not	  suggesting	  that	  a	  
deterritorialised	  world	  sans	  the	  nation-­‐state	  replace	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  do	  utilise	  the	  
deterritorialising	  mobility	  of	  ideas,	  images,	  trade,	  money	  and	  machinery	  as	  a	  resource	  and	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  construct	  an	  alternative	  representation	  of	  the	  space.	  The	  principal	  position	  of	  territory	  is	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therefore	  neither	  a	  given	  nor	  an	  aberration,	  but	  rather	  constantly	  evaluated	  for	  political	  purpose,	  
including	  adopting	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  both	  resistant	  and	  accommodating	  of	  various	  
practices	  of	  the	  territorial	  state.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  Guardian	  newspaper,	  social	  scientist	  
Saskia	  Sassen	  suggests	  a	  way	  of	  approaching	  this	  dynamic,	  also	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state	  in	  
transformation	  rather	  than	  decline.	  
I	  see,	  rather,	  a	  multiplication	  of	  what	  is	  beginning	  to	  happen	  today:	  the	  formation	  of	  
partial,	  often	  very	  specialised,	  assemblages	  of	  bits	  and	  pieces	  of	  territory,	  of	  authority,	  of	  
rights,	  that	  used	  to	  be	  lodged	  in	  national	  states.	  Some	  of	  these	  assemblages	  will	  be	  private,	  
some	  public,	  some	  will	  continue	  to	  inhabit	  national	  spaces	  but	  be	  actually	  denationalised,	  
others	  will	  be	  global	  (Sassen,	  2006a).	  
Sassen	  expands	  on	  this	  point	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  her	  work,	  articulating	  a	  form	  of	  disaggregation	  of	  the	  
unity	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  leading	  to	  elements	  of	  denationalisation,	  renationalisation	  and	  the	  
formation	  of	  novel	  global	  entities,	  but	  with	  the	  nation-­‐state	  remaining	  the	  normative	  reference	  
point	  (Sassen,	  2006b).	  This	  argument	  of	  Sassen’s	  poses	  one	  way	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  particular	  
dynamic	  between	  global	  processes	  and	  territoriality	  that	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  This	  dynamic	  consists	  of	  the	  coexistence	  of	  a	  nationalisation	  of	  Karen	  identity	  and	  a	  
denationalisation	  of	  cultural	  systems	  and	  collective	  narratives;	  a	  deterritorialisation	  of	  information,	  
ideas	  and	  images	  and	  a	  reterritorialisation	  of	  a	  Karen	  state	  inserted	  into	  the	  territorial	  exclusivity	  
of	  the	  Burmese	  nation-­‐state;	  and	  self-­‐defined	  global	  formations	  such	  as	  environmental	  activism	  or	  
non-­‐state	  money	  lending	  systems.	  
Sassen’s	  position	  points	  to	  the	  complexities	  and	  nuances	  of	  the	  relationships	  under	  discussion,	  and	  
the	  risk	  of	  applying	  too	  casual	  an	  understanding	  to	  them.	  As	  a	  way	  of	  working	  through	  the	  
somewhat	  ‘messy’	  application	  of	  global	  processes	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  I	  therefore	  
propose	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  use	  various	  mechanisms	  of	  global	  processes	  (international	  
networking,	  global	  and	  local	  solidarities,	  advocacy,	  information	  technologies)	  to	  support	  their	  
claims	  for	  a	  political	  self	  and	  to	  retain	  their	  connection	  to	  culture	  and	  identity.	  This	  represents	  a	  
deterritorialising	  of	  capital,	  information,	  ideas	  and	  images.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  a	  claim	  to	  
territory	  (not	  deterritorialisation)	  that	  defines	  the	  nationalist	  Karen	  struggle,	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  
territorial	  sovereignty	  that	  limit	  (not	  restrict)	  their	  movement	  across	  the	  international	  boundary	  
and	  beyond	  the	  immediacy	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  Rather	  than	  the	  deterritorialisation	  of	  
people,	  we	  are	  in	  fact	  seeing	  some	  instances	  of	  heightened	  prominence	  of	  territory	  and	  nationality	  
and	  some	  instances	  of	  its	  decline.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  territorial	  authority	  remain	  key	  
elements	  of	  the	  debate,	  not	  removed	  from	  it	  entirely.	  This	  dynamic	  represents	  a	  key	  component	  of	  
the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  the	  larger	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  gets	  to	  the	  core	  of	  the	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relationship	  between	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  They	  are	  inter-­‐
connected,	  sometimes	  in	  contestation	  and	  sometimes	  in	  conformity,	  but	  in	  either	  case	  they	  are	  in	  
a	  state	  of	  dependency	  and	  tension.	  
As	  outlined	  above	  this	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  second	  point	  I	  want	  to	  make	  in	  this	  section,	  namely	  the	  
impact	  this	  greater	  sense	  of	  global	  mobility	  has	  on	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Again,	  I	  want	  
to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  somewhat	  uneasy	  relationship	  between	  territory	  and	  globalisation	  and	  
the	  tensions	  and	  contradictions	  this	  brings	  to	  the	  complex	  identities	  that	  form.	  While	  the	  territorial	  
boundary	  is	  often	  present	  in	  the	  practices	  of	  these	  global	  and	  mobile	  networks,	  it	  is	  not	  integral	  to	  
their	  actual	  formation.	  Governments-­‐in-­‐exile	  are	  a	  striking	  example	  of	  assumed	  political	  authority	  
with	  no	  territorial	  sovereignty.	  Such	  an	  environment	  allows	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  homes	  and	  
homelands	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	  national	  territorial	  base.	  A	  sovereign	  territory	  of	  their	  
own	  may	  be	  an	  aim,	  particularly	  for	  diaspora	  or	  exiled	  communities,	  but	  a	  homeland	  and	  a	  national	  
identity	  can	  be	  formed	  and	  practiced	  without	  it.	  This	  absence	  of	  territory	  can	  motivate	  the	  mobile	  
to	  invent	  a	  home	  “through	  memories	  of,	  and	  claims	  on,	  places	  that	  they	  can	  or	  will	  no	  longer	  
corporeally	  inhabit”	  (Malkki,	  1992,	  p.	  24).	  Here	  Malkki	  is	  suggesting	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  home	  
manifests	  itself	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  genealogical	  or	  metaphysical	  sense	  rather	  than	  the	  physical-­‐ness	  of	  
a	  discontinuous	  line.	  Benedict	  Anderson	  argues	  a	  similar	  sentiment	  by	  suggesting	  that	  through	  
global	  processes	  a	  type	  of	  community	  can	  form	  with	  no	  shared	  territorial	  or	  physical	  presence	  
needed	  at	  all.	  
It	  became	  conceivable	  to	  dwell	  on	  the	  Peruvian	  altiplano,	  on	  the	  pampas	  of	  Argentina,	  or	  
by	  the	  harbours	  of	  ‘New	  England’,	  and	  yet	  feel	  connected	  to	  certain	  regions	  or	  
communities,	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away,	  in	  England	  or	  the	  Iberian	  peninsula.	  One	  could	  be	  
fully	  aware	  of	  sharing	  a	  language	  and	  a	  religious	  faith	  (to	  varying	  degrees),	  customs	  and	  
traditions,	  without	  any	  great	  expectation	  of	  ever	  meeting	  one’s	  partners	  (Anderson,	  1991,	  
p.	  188).	  
Such	  commentary	  by	  Malkki	  and	  Anderson	  suggest	  that	  identity	  can	  form	  without	  the	  physical	  
presence	  of	  territory.	  Malkki	  in	  particular	  suggests	  that	  one	  can	  identify	  with	  people	  and	  practices	  
in	  which	  you	  currently	  share	  no	  common	  territorial	  boundary,	  and	  maintain	  allegiances	  and	  
identify	  with	  a	  homeland,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  residing,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  assimilating,	  into	  a	  
new	  country	  (Malkki,	  1992).	  In	  essence,	  both	  Malkki	  and	  Anderson	  are	  suggesting	  that	  one	  can	  
share	  in	  a	  community	  that	  has	  no	  great	  expectation	  of	  ever	  meeting	  face-­‐to-­‐face,	  yet	  which	  shares	  
a	  common	  identity,	  culture	  and	  national	  narrative.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  early	  migration	  patterns	  
mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section,	  migrants	  and	  refugee	  communities,	  who	  are	  the	  main	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proponents	  of	  contemporary	  population	  movements,	  are	  increasingly	  able	  to	  maintain	  the	  cultural	  
ties	  they	  identify	  with	  despite	  entering	  new	  cultural	  zones	  (Malkki,	  1992;	  Rosaldo,	  1993).	  
This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  where	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  
a	  familiar	  but	  slightly	  contradictory	  pattern	  emerging.	  Despite	  displacement	  to	  Thailand,	  the	  Karen	  
maintain	  strong	  cultural	  ties	  to	  their	  Karen	  identity,	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  even	  a	  heightened	  
connection	  to	  it;	  an	  internalisation	  of	  identity	  if	  you	  like	  (as	  I	  explore	  in	  Chapters	  Seven	  and	  Eight).	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  this	  identity	  is	  undergoing	  transformations	  related	  to	  outward	  looking	  or	  external	  
forces,	  partly	  because	  of	  exposure	  to	  ideas	  and	  influences	  associated	  with	  access	  to	  global	  
networks	  and	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  trauma	  and	  displacement	  which	  has	  
framed	  the	  experiences	  of	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  (as	  I	  explore	  in	  Chapters	  Five	  and	  Six).	  Identity	  
is	  therefore	  embedded	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  home	  (which	  is	  no	  longer	  physically	  inhabited	  but	  certainly	  
part	  of	  a	  political	  imagining)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  transformations	  occurring	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
borderlands.	  While	  these	  two	  things	  might	  seem	  to	  sit	  in	  tension	  with	  each	  other,	  for	  displaced	  
Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  co-­‐existent.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  for	  it	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  contested	  social	  relations	  that	  are	  present	  in	  how	  
Karen	  construct	  and	  project	  their	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  a	  point	  I	  make	  more	  thoroughly	  in	  
Chapter	  Eight.	  
Liisa	  Malkki	  conceptualises	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  relevance	  to	  the	  arguments	  made	  in	  
this	  thesis.	  Malkki	  suggests	  border	  crossers	  are	  active	  agents	  in	  transforming	  the	  political	  and	  
cultural	  systems	  they	  inhabit.	  Rather	  than	  the	  loss	  of	  identity	  and	  agency	  often	  associated	  with	  
displacement,	  Malkki	  argues	  that	  territorial	  displacement	  effects	  a	  transformation	  in	  culture	  and	  
identity	  consciousness	  (Malkki,	  1995,	  p.	  208),	  a	  view	  also	  adopted	  by	  Donnan	  &	  Wilson	  when	  they	  
say:	  
Culture	  and	  identity,	  like	  class-­‐consciousness	  and	  class	  relations,	  do	  not	  disappear	  among	  
the	  people	  who	  make	  the	  crossing.	  They	  simply	  change:	  they	  change	  within	  their	  home	  
communities	  because	  of	  the	  loss	  entailed	  in	  their	  going	  as	  well	  as	  within	  the	  new	  political	  
and	  economic	  context	  in	  which	  they	  find	  themselves,	  and	  they	  change	  in	  the	  communities	  
who	  are	  now	  host	  to	  the	  border	  crossers	  (1999).	  
The	  importance	  of	  Donnan	  and	  Wilson’s	  position	  is	  that	  by	  arguing	  for	  a	  process	  of	  change	  or	  
transformation,	  they	  acknowledge	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  ‘old’	  country	  with	  
the	  influences	  of	  the	  ‘new’	  community.	  This	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  refugees	  in	  
camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  maintain	  a	  close	  geographic	  proximity	  to	  ‘home’	  they	  are	  also	  
subjected	  to	  legal	  and	  political	  regulation	  which	  limits	  assimilation	  into	  Thailand,	  if	  this	  were	  to	  be	  
65 
 
considered.	  Both	  the	  ‘old’	  and	  the	  ‘new’	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  
refugee	  experience.	  
For	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  identity	  is	  formed	  through	  a	  complex	  
process	  of	  non-­‐isomorphic	  projections	  that	  traverse	  fixed	  national	  boundaries.	  This	  is	  partially	  a	  
result	  of	  their	  displacement	  outside	  of	  their	  national	  borders	  and	  partially	  a	  result	  of	  long-­‐standing	  
political	  disengagement	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  Global	  flows	  of	  information,	  trade	  and	  
culture,	  characterised	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  transcend	  national	  boundaries	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  the	  
borderlands	  is	  constructed,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  way	  it	  operates.	  These	  global	  flows	  undoubtedly	  
influence	  the	  way	  identity	  is	  formed	  and	  projected.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  identity	  formation	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  defies	  “modernity’s	  dominant	  spatial	  stories”	  (Soguk	  &	  Whitehall,	  1999,	  p.	  689)	  of	  a	  
fixed,	  cohesive	  national	  identity.	  A	  national	  identity,	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  symbolic	  of	  those	  who	  
belong	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not,	  will	  only	  ever	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  people	  who	  
actually	  reside	  within	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  boundaries,	  and	  it	  will	  almost	  always	  fail	  the	  needs	  of	  
those	  who	  look	  at	  the	  borderlands	  from	  a	  different	  spatial	  perspective.	  
At	  this	  point	  it	  seems	  relevant	  to	  relate	  these	  three	  processes	  back	  to	  the	  chapter	  and	  larger	  thesis	  
arguments.	  This	  chapter	  has	  drawn	  on	  a	  large	  body	  of	  social	  science	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  engage	  with	  
the	  space.	  While	  these	  larger	  theoretical	  domains	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  in	  a	  somewhat	  perfunctory	  
manner	  in	  this	  chapter,	  their	  relevance	  is	  evident	  across	  the	  remaining	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis,	  
where	  they	  are	  drawn	  through	  discussions	  on	  the	  intensification	  of	  state	  control	  over	  the	  
borderlands	  (Chapter	  4),	  patterns	  of	  activism	  (Chapter	  5),	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  (Chapter	  6)	  and	  
processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  (Chapter	  7).	  
Returning	  to	  this	  chapter,	  this	  large	  body	  of	  social	  science	  theory	  helps	  frame	  the	  impact	  the	  three	  
processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  have	  had	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  Each	  of	  these	  processes	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border	  as	  a	  geo-­‐political	  marker,	  and	  together	  they	  encompass	  the	  key	  cultural	  and	  political	  
interactions	  that	  inform	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border.	  As	  such	  they	  
develop	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  by	  developing	  the	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  contexts	  in	  which	  
the	  borderlands	  space	  can	  be	  understood,	  and	  by	  outlining	  the	  type	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  
relations	  that	  characterise	  that	  space.	  In	  particular,	  the	  advent	  of	  mapping	  introduced	  our	  current	  
understanding	  of	  the	  body	  politic	  and	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  national	  identity	  based	  on	  
allegiances	  to	  a	  bounded	  territory.	  It	  set	  up	  the	  modern	  day	  framework	  for	  how	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  
the	  borderlands	  would	  be	  identified.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  political	  authority	  
introduced	  a	  key	  modern	  spatial	  unit,	  the	  national	  territorial	  domain,	  and	  closely	  aligned	  a	  nation’s	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borders	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  national	  identity.	  This	  established	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
political	  organisation	  and	  identity	  that	  sits	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  
displaced	  Karen.	  The	  greater	  global	  mobility	  of	  people,	  culture,	  technology	  and	  ideas	  constitute	  a	  
form	  of	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  national	  borders.	  This	  has	  brought	  a	  sense	  of	  fluidity	  and	  
multiplicity	  to	  established	  borders	  and	  identities	  that	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  
attempts	  at	  consolidation	  and	  control	  over	  that	  space.	  
While	  the	  dominance	  of	  these	  three	  processes	  of	  organisation	  can	  be	  related	  to	  particular	  
historical	  transitions,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  following	  a	  linear	  or	  chronological	  order.	  
Rather,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  they	  co-­‐exist	  as	  contested,	  intersecting	  elements	  that	  help	  
characterise	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  Together,	  they	  provide	  definition	  and	  context	  to	  
some	  of	  the	  borderlands	  key	  spatial	  elements;	  its	  preoccupation	  with	  territoriality	  and	  mobility,	  
rigidity	  and	  fluidity,	  connections	  and	  disjunctures,	  dominant	  and	  alternative	  discourses,	  and	  over-­‐
arching	  all	  this,	  contestability.	  Together,	  these	  three	  processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  
transformation	  give	  historical	  context	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  developing	  
the	  notion	  of	  space	  that	  constitutes	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border	  but	  that	  
is	  also	  informed	  by	  the	  national	  border.	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  key	  conceptual	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  can	  be	  understood	  is	  through	  a	  spatial	  re-­‐imagining	  that	  maps	  an	  interchange,	  based	  
on	  contested	  social	  relations,	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border.	  This	  interchange	  must	  be	  
understood	  within	  the	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  the	  borderlands	  has	  developed,	  specifically	  
through	  three	  significant	  processes	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  transformation	  that	  have	  spatial	  
impact	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  space.	  These	  include	  the	  advent	  of	  mapping	  the	  body	  politic,	  the	  rise	  
of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  population	  and	  cultural	  movement	  
across	  borders.	  While	  each	  makes	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  border	  as	  a	  geo-­‐
political	  marker,	  together,	  they	  encompass	  the	  key	  cultural	  and	  political	  interactions	  that	  make	  up	  
the	  type	  of	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  particularly	  as	  that	  interchange	  
relates	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  
This	  concept	  of	  the	  borderlands	  is	  important	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  
theoretical	  and	  historical	  framework	  for	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  
concept	  of	  ‘borderlands’	  as	  it	  is	  applied	  across	  this	  thesis,	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  better	  clarify	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  displaced	  Karen,	  and	  the	  political	  space	  both,	  in	  
their	  differing	  ways,	  attempt	  to	  narrate.	  This	  forms	  a	  key	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  the	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borderlands	  and	  allows	  me	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  space	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  
identity,	  two	  key	  themes	  that	  are	  developed	  over	  the	  later	  parts	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	  which	  form	  the	  
central	  components	  of	  my	  main	  thesis	  argument.	  
Together,	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  develop	  the	  underpinning	  ideas	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  
chapter	  has	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  in	  relation	  to	  larger	  historical	  
and	  theoretical	  developments	  of	  borders	  and	  borderlands.	  Chapter	  Four	  will	  develop	  this	  
conceptual	  framework	  further	  by	  applying	  it	  to	  the	  modern	  configuration	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands;	  to	  establish	  the	  contemporary	  context	  of	  the	  borderlands	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  an	  
intensification	  of	  control	  by	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  This	  spatial	  configuration	  of	  the	  modern	  territorial	  
domain	  has	  seen	  greater	  penetration	  into	  the	  borderlands	  by	  both	  the	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  nation-­‐
states,	  and	  consequently	  an	  intensification	  of	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  This	  
consolidates	  the	  border	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  apparatus,	  representing	  a	  





FROM	  ‘BUFFER	  ZONE’	  TO	  FRIENDSHIP	  BRIDGE	  
THE	  CONTEMPORARYCONTEXT	  OF	  THE	  THAI-­‐BURMA	  BORDERLANDS	  
The	  River	  Moei	  is	  no	  more	  than	  10	  metres	  wide	  under	  the	  bridge.	  
You	  could	  wade	  it.	  Many	  people	  do.	  On	  one	  side	  is	  Myawaddy,	  the	  other	  side	  Mae	  Sot.	  
One	  side	  Burma,	  the	  other	  Thailand.	  Such	  difference	  is	  divided	  by	  only	  a	  small	  stretch	  of	  water.	  
Once	  you’ve	  crossed	  the	  water	  and	  before	  you	  reach	  the	  official	  Thai	  border,	  
There	  is	  a	  vast	  piece	  of	  land,	  no-­‐man’s	  land.	  
There	  was	  once	  talk	  of	  building	  a	  casino	  on	  it	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part	  it	  remains	  overgrown:	  dirt	  and	  high	  grass.	  
In	  this	  no-­‐man’s	  land	  is	  a	  group	  of	  people	  from	  Burma.	  They	  live	  under	  the	  bridge	  on	  bamboo-­‐woven	  mats.	  
They	  have	  no	  roof	  covering	  save	  for	  the	  under	  carriage	  of	  the	  bridge,	  25	  metres	  above	  them.	  
They	  look	  as	  if	  they	  are	  ready	  to	  move,	  to	  run,	  at	  the	  slightest	  hint	  of	  a	  soldier.	  From	  either	  side.	  
Three	  bridge	  pillions	  separate	  them	  from	  a	  lone	  Burmese	  soldier	  
He	  sits	  under	  the	  bridge	  on	  a	  deck	  chair,	  his	  rifle	  propped	  by	  his	  side.	  
I	  wonder	  at	  the	  position	  these	  Burmese	  have	  placed	  themselves	  in.	  
They	  are	  closer	  to	  Thailand	  than	  they	  are	  to	  Burma.	  
They	  have	  wedged	  themselves	  against	  a	  pillion,	  blocking	  themselves	  from	  the	  soldiers	  view	  and	  his	  gun.	  
He	  must	  know	  they’re	  there.	  They	  certainly	  know	  he	  is	  there.	  
They	  live	  in	  no-­‐man’s	  land.	  They	  have	  no	  country,	  no	  papers.	  
They	  live	  on	  the	  periphery;	  hope	  and	  a	  future	  in	  their	  sight	  yet	  so	  far	  from	  reach.	  
They	  could	  lean	  across	  and	  touch	  Thailand	  but	  they	  cannot	  go	  there	  freely.	  
To	  go	  back	  they	  must	  face	  the	  soldier’s	  gun.	  
On	  their	  left	  is	  the	  checkpoint	  barring	  them	  from	  Thailand,	  
On	  their	  right	  a	  machine	  gun	  barring	  them	  from	  Burma.	  
Authors	  field	  notes,	  2	  October	  2005	  
The	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  is	  over	  2,400	  kilometres	  long.	  It	  has,	  since	  demarcation	  of	  the	  modern	  
border	  in	  1868,	  been	  an	  internationally	  recognised,	  geographically	  mapped	  boundary.27	  Yet	  large	  
tracts	  of	  this	  boundary	  remain	  indistinguishable	  to	  those	  on	  the	  ground;	  vast	  stretches	  of	  
mountainous	  terrain	  and	  variegated	  waters	  blur	  the	  boundary	  of	  one	  country	  from	  the	  other.	  A	  
history	  of	  relatively	  free	  movement	  and,	  at	  times	  the	  porous	  nature	  of	  the	  border,	  typify	  the	  
characteristically	  pragmatic,	  non-­‐institutionalised	  approach	  to	  this	  international	  boundary	  by	  many	  
of	  the	  Karen,	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  who	  engage	  with	  it	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  This	  has	  begun	  to	  
change	  in	  recent	  decades.	  A	  series	  of	  events	  beginning	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  has	  had	  a	  significant	  
impact	  upon	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  those	  on	  the	  ground	  engage	  with	  the	  border.	  Over	  this	  period,	  
operations	  undertaken	  by	  the	  two	  nation-­‐state’s	  abutting	  the	  border	  were	  increasingly	  restrictive,	  
with	  efforts	  to	  control	  movement	  and	  trade	  as	  well	  as	  curtail	  political	  activism.	  The	  increased	  
interest	  of	  both	  the	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  states	  in	  how	  the	  border	  operated	  brought	  with	  it	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  While	  officially	  demarcated	  in	  1868	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  modern	  demarcation	  of	  the	  border	  is	  a	  
result	  of	  agreements	  undertaken	  between	  the	  governments	  of	  Siam	  and	  Great	  Britain	  over	  a	  period	  of	  
decades	  in	  the	  late	  18th	  Century.	  As	  such,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  comprehensive,	  formal	  border	  demarcation	  
between	  the	  governments	  of	  Burma	  and	  Thailand,	  leading	  some	  researchers	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  has	  led	  to	  
the	  continuing	  ‘flashpoints’	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  over	  border	  demarcation,	  particularly	  in	  areas	  
around	  the	  Three	  Pagodas	  Pass	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999).	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corresponding	  political	  weight	  which	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  form	  of	  politicisation	  that	  occurred	  
along	  the	  border	  since	  the	  early	  1980s.	  
This	  chapter	  further	  develops	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  by	  
applying	  it	  to	  the	  modern	  configuration	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  It	  examines	  the	  formation	  
of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  intensification	  of	  control	  by	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  It	  argues	  
that	  the	  increased	  penetration	  of	  both	  the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  nation-­‐state’s	  to	  consolidate	  control	  
over	  the	  border	  has	  intensified	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  can	  be	  
characterised	  as	  an	  uneven	  process	  of	  increased	  militarisation	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border	  
and	  increased	  regulation	  on	  the	  Thai	  side.	  This	  penetration	  into	  the	  space	  is	  based	  on	  both	  self-­‐
serving	  motivations	  and,	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  political	  instability	  and	  threat	  to	  
nation-­‐state	  authority	  that	  comes	  from	  the	  arrival	  of	  vast	  numbers	  of	  refugees.	  	  
To	  make	  this	  argument,	  the	  chapter	  is	  structured	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  It	  first	  looks	  at	  the	  changing	  
political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  through	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  events	  and	  policy	  shifts	  that	  
provide	  contemporary	  context	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  border	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state’s	  political	  authority	  and	  control.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  events	  was	  the	  arrival	  of	  significant	  
numbers	  of	  Karen	  refugees	  to	  the	  border	  in	  1984,	  seeking	  a	  place	  of	  refuge	  from	  Burma’s	  internal	  
conflict.	  This	  was	  the	  catalyst	  for	  a	  heightened	  political	  attention	  that	  came	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  
border.	  This	  influx	  of	  refugees	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  events	  that	  further	  intensified	  the	  
political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  These	  include	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  Burmese	  state	  from	  27	  
years	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  isolation,	  the	  growing	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  the	  Thai	  and	  
Burmese	  governments,	  and	  the	  deteriorating	  security	  situation	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Finally,	  this	  
chapter	  also	  examines	  how	  the	  humanitarian	  aid	  apparatus	  has	  become	  entrenched	  in	  the	  political	  
structure	  of	  the	  borderlands,	  bringing	  a	  further	  complexity	  to	  the	  political	  dynamic	  that	  
characterises	  the	  space.	  
Building	  upon	  the	  historical	  processes	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  in	  particular	  mapping	  the	  body	  
politic	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  political	  authority,	  this	  chapter	  develops	  a	  
key	  contemporary	  influence	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  namely	  a	  consolidation	  in	  
the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  which	  are	  defined	  by	  a	  political	  authority	  attached	  to	  the	  
modern	  territorial	  domain.	  These	  operations	  of	  the	  state	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  homogenised	  space	  
that	  is	  delineated	  by	  the	  border.	  In	  the	  coming	  chapters	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  operations	  sit	  in	  tension	  
with	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  that	  tend	  to	  map	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  
across	  the	  nation-­‐state	  border,	  and	  that	  this	  tension	  both	  defines	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  
space	  and	  the	  activism	  that	  occurs	  there.	  Laying	  out	  the	  borderlands	  framework	  in	  this	  way	  allows	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me	  to	  develop	  two	  key	  themes	  later	  in	  the	  thesis,	  namely	  how	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  
identity	  relate	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
REFUGE	  
The	  arrival	  of	  significant	  numbers	  of	  refugees	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  
significantly	  changed	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  This	  is	  shown	  by	  a	  shift	  in	  border	  
politics,	  moving	  away	  from	  fairly	  localised	  systems	  of	  authority	  in	  dealing	  with	  earlier,	  sporadic	  
refugee	  arrivals,	  towards	  a	  more	  formal	  refugee	  policy	  that	  became	  entrenched	  in	  the	  operations	  
of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  This	  shift	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  initial	  Thai	  Government	  responses	  to	  the	  first	  
refugee	  arrivals	  compared	  to	  the	  political	  position	  that	  has	  come	  to	  define	  the	  current	  institutional	  
policy	  towards	  refugee	  populations.	  Although	  quickly	  and	  heavily	  politicised,	  the	  border	  began,	  at	  
least	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  Karen	  engagement	  with	  it,	  as	  a	  place	  of	  refuge.	  
In	  January	  1984	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  took	  on	  particular	  significance	  to	  Karen	  living	  in	  the	  
mountainous	  regions	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  To	  cross	  this	  international	  border	  meant	  
relief	  from	  Burmese	  military	  attacks	  on	  their	  villages.	  In	  the	  many	  interviews	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	  
this	  research	  few	  spoke	  of	  crossing	  the	  international	  border	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  jurisdictions.	  Some	  
participants	  had	  crossed	  the	  border	  more	  than	  twenty	  years	  before,	  others	  less	  than	  a	  year,	  but	  
most	  told	  the	  same	  story:	  they	  were	  driven	  by	  fear,	  and	  the	  hope	  of	  safety	  and	  refuge.	  That	  these	  
things	  resided	  across	  an	  international	  boundary	  in	  Thailand	  were	  consequently	  significant,	  but	  
incidental	  to	  their	  flight.	  For	  many,	  the	  aim	  was	  not	  to	  seek	  asylum	  in	  a	  third	  country	  but	  rather	  to	  
find	  relief	  from	  encroaching	  Burmese	  military	  attacks,	  short-­‐term	  relief	  and	  then	  to	  return.	  
The	  arrival	  of	  displaced	  persons	  to	  the	  Thai	  border	  was	  not	  a	  sudden	  phenomenon.	  Evidence	  
shows	  that	  smaller	  numbers	  of	  Karen	  had	  fled	  into	  Thailand	  following	  persecution	  prior	  to	  1984,	  
settling	  unofficially	  in	  Thai	  villages	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  often	  moving	  back	  and	  forth	  as	  fighting	  
permitted.28	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  Karen	  were	  mostly	  accepted	  in	  to	  Thai	  communities	  with	  an	  informal	  
hospitality	  and	  little	  disruption	  to	  their	  existing	  structures	  (Lang,	  1999,	  p.	  90),	  a	  process	  made	  
easier	  by	  a	  history	  of	  trade	  relations,	  familial	  connections	  and	  similar	  economic	  conditions	  across	  
the	  border	  regions.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  territory	  straddling	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  was	  politically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  In	  1974	  General	  Ne	  Win	  began	  his	  official	  ‘Four	  Cuts	  Policy’	  (cutting	  off	  Karen	  soldiers	  from	  crucial	  links	  to	  
food,	  finances,	  communication	  and	  recruits)	  in	  Karen	  State.	  This	  led	  to	  mass	  displacement	  of	  Karen	  villagers.	  
In	  1974	  a	  group	  of	  8,000	  Karen	  crossed	  the	  Salween	  River	  to	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  Over	  the	  next	  four	  
years	  some	  returned	  to	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border,	  or	  back	  to	  their	  villages.	  It	  was	  a	  pattern	  repeated	  
throughout	  Karen	  State’s	  northern	  districts	  (see	  (BERG,	  1998,	  p.	  27).	  One	  participant	  in	  this	  research,	  Loo	  Ne,	  
also	  talked	  of	  a	  group	  of	  refugees	  fleeing	  Nyuanglebin	  District	  in	  1976	  because	  of	  a	  Burmese	  military	  
offensive	  and	  settling	  in	  a	  Karen	  village	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  (Loo	  Ne,	  Interview,	  2007).	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remote	  from	  Bangkok	  and	  the	  Thai	  Government	  showed	  limited	  interest	  in	  the	  movement	  of	  
displaced	  populations	  that	  was	  occurring	  there.	  
However,	  the	  dry	  season	  offensives	  of	  1983-­‐84	  were	  distinct	  in	  their	  intensity,	  requiring	  new	  more	  
attentive	  responses	  from	  the	  Thai	  Government.	  The	  Burmese	  military	  attacks	  on	  areas	  of	  Pa’an	  
District,	  adjacent	  to	  the	  Thai	  border,	  were	  an	  attempt	  to	  take	  control	  of	  territory	  dominated	  by	  the	  
KNU	  and	  consolidate	  a	  permanent	  presence	  for	  the	  Burmese	  military	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  attacks	  about	  10,000	  Karen	  fled	  across	  the	  border	  just	  north	  of	  Mae	  Sot	  in	  late	  
January.	  The	  sheer	  size	  of	  refugee	  numbers	  looking	  for	  relief	  in	  Thai	  communities	  forced	  the	  Thai	  
Government	  to	  respond.	  Thailand’s	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  (MOI)	  initially	  asked	  the	  Coordinating	  
Committee	  for	  Services	  to	  Displaced	  Persons	  in	  Thailand	  (CCSDPT),	  an	  umbrella	  group	  already	  
working	  with	  Indochina	  refugees	  on	  Thailand’s	  northern	  border,	  to	  provide	  basic	  support	  to	  the	  
Karen	  refugees.	  Reports	  at	  the	  time	  suggested	  the	  Thai	  Government	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  the	  
international	  attention	  which	  would	  follow	  a	  call	  for	  assistance	  from	  the	  UNHCR.	  They	  were	  eager	  
to	  deter	  any	  pull	  factor	  that	  would	  bring	  more	  refugees	  to	  the	  border,	  or	  set	  up	  system	  that	  would	  
encourage	  those	  already	  along	  the	  border	  to	  stay.	  The	  Thai	  Government	  was	  also	  reluctant	  to	  get	  
involved	  in	  another	  large-­‐scale	  assistance	  program	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  they	  had	  encountered	  with	  
the	  Indochinese	  refugees	  (BERG,	  1998,	  p.	  52;	  Dunford,	  1993,	  p.	  10).	  As	  a	  result	  initial	  support	  was	  
provided	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  NGOs,	  called	  the	  Burmese	  Border	  Consortium	  (BBC)29	  which	  operated	  
under	  CCSDPT.	  
Accounts	  of	  this	  time	  suggest	  that	  these	  newly	  arrived	  Karen	  refugees	  were	  quick	  to	  organise	  
themselves	  in	  a	  pro-­‐active	  and	  self-­‐reliant	  manner	  (BBC,	  2004;	  Lang,	  1999).	  Many	  Karen	  were	  
initially	  accommodated	  in	  local	  monasteries	  or	  rented	  houses	  in	  villages	  around	  Mae	  Sot.	  Most	  
expressed	  the	  view	  that	  the	  fighting	  would	  be	  short-­‐lived	  and	  they	  would	  soon	  be	  able	  to	  return	  
home.	  In	  one	  instance,	  a	  Karen	  person	  I	  interviewed	  told	  me	  that	  Karen	  villager’s	  negotiated	  with	  
Thai	  authorities	  to	  secure	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  at	  Huay	  Kaloke,	  just	  north	  of	  Mae	  Sot,	  on	  which	  they	  
could	  build	  temporary	  shelters.	  In	  an	  interview,	  he	  described	  his	  early	  days	  on	  the	  border.	  
When	  I	  first	  arrived	  to	  the	  border	  we	  stayed	  in	  the	  wat	  [temple]	  at	  Huay	  Kaloke.	  Then	  we	  
moved	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  houses	  of	  Thai	  villagers,	  and	  later	  still	  we	  rented	  a	  house	  in	  Mae	  Sot.	  I	  
think	  we	  stayed	  like	  this	  because	  most	  of	  us	  thought	  the	  fighting	  would	  end	  and	  we	  could	  
return	  home.	  But	  then	  it	  dragged	  on	  and	  we	  needed	  a	  more	  permanent	  solution	  so	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  In	  2004	  BBC	  became	  a	  registered	  charity	  and	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  the	  Thailand	  Burma	  Border	  Consortium	  
(TBBC).	  The	  acronym	  BBC	  will	  be	  used	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  organisation	  pre-­‐2004,	  on	  all	  other	  occasions	  it	  
will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  TBBC.	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organised	  with	  the	  Thai	  people	  to	  provide	  some	  land	  for	  us	  at	  Huay	  Kaloke	  and	  that’s	  when	  
the	  refugee	  camp	  was	  set	  up	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  9	  December	  2008).	  
By	  the	  time	  a	  small	  contingent	  of	  NGOs	  arrived	  on	  the	  border	  in	  March	  they	  were	  able	  to	  describe	  
a	  “village-­‐like”	  atmosphere,	  highly	  organised	  with	  rudimentary	  housing,	  schools	  and	  other	  
structures,	  and	  an	  administration	  system	  already	  in	  place	  (Jack	  Dunford,	  personal	  communication,	  
18	  December	  2008).	  Interviewed	  for	  a	  BBC	  publication	  on	  twenty	  years	  of	  working	  along	  the	  
border,	  Jack	  Dunford,	  a	  member	  of	  one	  of	  the	  first	  delegations	  to	  assess	  the	  border	  and	  later	  the	  
director	  of	  TBBC	  recalls	  the	  logic	  behind	  their	  decision	  to	  support	  a	  coordinated	  approach	  to	  aid	  
provision	  in	  the	  camps.	  
We	  had	  found	  something	  on	  the	  border	  that	  was	  quite	  different	  to	  other	  refugee	  
situations	  we	  had	  seen,	  in	  which	  whole	  societies	  had	  been	  torn	  apart.	  Although	  the	  Karen	  
had	  already	  been	  struggling	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  their	  communities	  had	  remained	  intact,	  and	  
their	  own	  social	  and	  governing	  structures	  were	  still	  in	  place.	  It	  made	  sense	  to	  support	  and	  
recognise	  the	  Karen	  Refugee	  Committee	  …	  (BBC,	  2004).	  
The	  Karen	  Refugee	  Committee	  administered	  the	  various	  camps	  while	  BBC	  initially	  committed	  to	  
supporting	  fifty	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  rice	  needs	  (Jack	  Dunford,	  personal	  communication,	  18	  December	  
2008).	  At	  this	  stage	  Karen	  continued	  to	  plant	  rice	  crops	  back	  over	  the	  border	  in	  Burma	  to	  feed	  their	  
families,	  while	  others	  worked	  for	  local	  Thai	  farmers	  to	  gain	  an	  income	  and	  supplement	  the	  food	  
support	  they	  received	  from	  the	  BBC.	  The	  system	  required	  little	  intervention	  and	  minimal	  support	  in	  
the	  beginning	  and	  the	  Karen	  were	  left	  to	  largely	  manage	  it	  themselves.	  Over	  the	  next	  four	  years	  
the	  BBC	  continued	  to	  consolidate	  a	  refugee	  support	  system	  that	  had	  a	  coordinated	  approach	  based	  
on	  self-­‐reliance,	  a	  system	  generally	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  successful	  one	  (BERG,	  1998).	  
The	  system	  allowed	  the	  Karen	  to	  replicate	  communal	  and	  administrative	  structures	  not	  dissimilar	  
to	  those	  they	  had	  practiced	  back	  home	  in	  Burma.	  This	  represents	  a	  relatively	  unique	  refugee	  
situation	  for	  it	  extended	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Karen	  communities	  into	  Thailand	  by	  providing	  some	  
continuity	  to	  home	  and	  cultural	  practice.	  It	  gave	  the	  Karen	  an	  opportunity	  to	  continue	  to	  practice	  
their	  culture	  rather	  than	  loose	  it	  through	  assimilation	  into	  Thailand	  or	  becoming	  aid	  dependent	  on	  
foreign	  NGOs.	  These	  issues	  of	  course	  became	  more	  complex	  as	  the	  conflict	  drew	  on	  but	  at	  the	  
beginning	  at	  least	  it	  seemed	  easier	  for	  the	  Karen	  to	  continue	  aspects	  of	  their	  previous	  lives,	  
particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  agrarian-­‐based	  employment	  and	  cultural	  practices.	  
While	  this	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  situation	  that	  reinforced	  a	  level	  of	  political	  autonomy,	  this	  position	  
should	  be	  viewed	  with	  some	  caution.	  The	  Karen	  experienced	  the	  trauma	  and	  disruption	  
commensurable	  to	  any	  situation	  where	  forced	  displacement	  occurs.	  They	  were	  vulnerable	  to	  Thai	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policy	  and	  dependent	  to	  some	  degree	  upon	  NGO	  assistance.	  However	  the	  small	  amount	  of	  political	  
autonomy	  allowed	  them	  through	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  camps	  was	  enough	  to	  maintain,	  and	  for	  
many	  enhance	  their	  commitment	  to	  a	  political	  resolution	  and	  return	  to	  their	  homeland.	  
By	  1988	  it	  became	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	  the	  conflict	  in	  Burma	  was	  not	  dissipating.	  The	  
Burmese	  military	  continued	  their	  drive	  to	  occupy	  KNU	  territory,	  destroying	  Karen	  villages	  as	  they	  
went.	  More	  and	  more	  refugees	  fled	  across	  the	  border	  into	  Thailand.	  By	  1988	  there	  were	  almost	  
20,000	  refugees	  housed	  in	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  (BERG,	  1998,	  p.	  52).	  In	  these	  early	  years	  the	  
Thai	  authorities	  allowed	  the	  Karen	  to	  establish	  camps	  wherever	  they	  entered	  Thailand,	  so	  that	  in	  
1993	  for	  example	  there	  were	  31	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  housing	  people	  from	  the	  Karen,	  
Karenni	  and	  Mon	  ethnic	  groups	  (Dunford,	  1993).	  The	  border	  camps	  became	  a	  refuge	  from	  daily	  
harassment,	  extortion,	  death	  and	  destruction.	  But	  the	  sheer	  size	  of	  the	  problem,	  seemingly	  
without	  end,	  suggested	  that	  low	  profile	  assistance	  to	  refugees	  and	  their	  informal	  administration	  
systems	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  in	  its	  present	  form.	  
While	  the	  initial	  arrival	  of	  refugees	  in	  1984	  was	  greeted	  with	  muted	  hospitality	  and	  a	  humanitarian	  
response,	  the	  unravelling	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem	  suggested	  the	  system	  would	  necessarily	  have	  
to	  change.	  Burma’s	  refugees	  were	  beginning	  to	  become	  an	  uncomfortable	  political	  uncertainty	  for	  
the	  Thai	  Government	  and	  they	  were	  keen	  for	  the	  refugee	  problem	  to	  disappear.	  NGOs	  providing	  
assistance	  to	  the	  camps	  saw	  the	  need	  for	  their	  services	  increasing	  rather	  than	  declining.	  Camp	  
sizes	  and	  locations	  had	  multiplied,	  so	  to	  the	  number	  of	  humanitarian	  organisations	  providing	  
services	  to	  the	  camps,	  putting	  pressure	  on	  capabilities	  to	  maintain	  the	  self-­‐governing	  structures	  of	  
the	  camps.	  The	  temporary	  place	  of	  refuge	  was	  starting	  to	  take	  on	  more	  fixed	  notion	  of	  
permanency,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  indeterminable	  future.	  Underpinning	  all	  this	  was	  the	  continued	  flow	  
of	  Karen	  villager’s	  across	  the	  border	  and	  into	  the	  refugee	  camps	  in	  Thailand.	  There	  was	  also	  by	  the	  
late	  1980s,	  indications	  that	  the	  Thai	  Government	  would	  pursue	  a	  different	  political	  approach	  with	  
their	  neighbour,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  a	  series	  of	  events	  which	  consolidated	  the	  penetration	  of	  both	  the	  
Burmese	  and	  Thai	  nation-­‐state’s	  control	  over	  the	  border.	  It	  is	  to	  these	  events	  that	  the	  chapter	  now	  
turns.	  
POLITICAL	  INTENSIFICATION	  OF	  THE	  BORDER	  
This	  chapter	  began	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  early-­‐1980s	  saw	  an	  intensification	  of	  political	  change	  
in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  While	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  events	  occurring	  since	  the	  early-­‐1980s,	  it	  
should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  has	  a	  fairly	  sustained,	  if	  mixed	  history	  of	  political	  
activity	  over	  many	  decades,	  particularly	  in	  the	  period	  after	  independence.	  The	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  in	  
particular	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  fairly	  formal	  political	  alliances	  in	  opposition	  to	  General	  Ne	  Win’s	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central	  military	  government.30	  Over	  the	  decades	  post-­‐independence,	  the	  remote	  ethnic	  areas	  of	  
the	  country	  attracted	  many	  other	  political	  and	  revolutionary	  parties	  willing	  to	  oppose	  the	  central	  
military	  government,	  all	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  effectiveness	  and	  longevity.31	  These	  alliances,	  and	  
many	  of	  the	  groups	  that	  formed	  them,	  had	  their	  bases	  in	  the	  border	  areas	  adjacent	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  border,	  and	  for	  many,	  Thailand	  provided	  material	  and	  financial	  support	  for	  their	  ongoing	  
activities	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999).	  
There	  were	  however,	  certain	  elements	  missing	  from	  these	  earlier	  periods	  that	  distinguish	  the	  post-­‐
1980	  events	  I	  talk	  about	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Most	  significant	  is	  the	  Thai	  Government’s	  lack	  of	  a	  formal	  
refugee	  approach	  pre-­‐1984	  and	  Burma’s	  political	  and	  economic	  isolation	  under	  Ne	  Win’s	  Burma	  
Socialist	  Program	  Party	  (BSPP)	  –	  a	  position	  that	  was	  largely	  sustained	  until	  1988.	  As	  will	  be	  
discussed	  over	  this	  chapter,	  the	  emergence	  of	  these	  and	  other	  events	  post-­‐1984,	  gave	  the	  
contemporary	  period	  which	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter,	  its	  own	  unique	  political	  qualities	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  
While	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  has	  been	  demarcated	  for	  some	  time,	  the	  early-­‐1980s	  saw	  heightened	  
political	  attention	  given	  to	  securing	  it	  for	  nation-­‐state	  operations.	  This	  changing	  political	  dynamic	  
saw	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  state	  policies	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border;	  in	  Burma	  manifesting	  in	  heavy	  
militarisation	  aimed	  at	  controlling	  the	  border	  areas,	  and	  in	  Thailand	  through	  a	  tightened	  regulatory	  
framework.	  While	  they	  differ	  in	  approach,	  both	  worked	  to	  exclude	  displaced	  Karen	  from	  the	  formal	  
political	  structures	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border.	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  increased	  penetration	  of	  the	  state	  to	  consolidate	  control	  over	  the	  
operations	  of	  the	  border	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  shifts	  in	  the	  political	  landscape:	  the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  Burmese	  state	  from	  27	  years	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  isolation;	  growing	  
bilateral	  relations	  between	  Thailand	  and	  Burma;	  deteriorating	  security	  along	  the	  border,	  including	  
the	  depreciation	  of	  KNU	  military	  power,	  replaced	  by	  a	  far	  more	  powerful	  Tatmadaw;	  and	  a	  larger	  
humanitarian	  aid	  apparatus	  aimed	  at	  servicing	  refugee	  needs.	  Each	  of	  these	  points	  will	  be	  
considered	  in	  turn,	  but	  together	  they	  establish	  how	  the	  changing	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  has	  intensified	  the	  conditions	  conducive	  to	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  operations	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30Some	  examples	  of	  these	  political	  alliances	  include:	  a	  number	  of	  ethnic	  nationality	  groups	  allying	  
themselves	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Burma	  (CPB)	  to	  form	  the	  National	  Democratic	  United	  Front	  (NDUF)	  
(between	  1959-­‐1975)	  and	  in	  1970	  the	  National	  United	  Liberation	  Front	  (NULF)	  was	  formed	  between	  former	  
Prime	  Minister	  U	  Nu’s	  insurgent	  Parliamentary	  Democracy	  Party	  and	  the	  ethnic	  nationality	  groups	  of	  the	  
KNU,	  the	  New	  Mon	  State	  Party	  (NMSP)	  and	  the	  Chin	  Democracy	  Party	  (CDP).	  These	  ethnic	  nationality	  groups	  
broke	  away	  from	  the	  NULF	  in	  1976	  and	  formed	  the	  National	  Democratic	  Front	  (NDF),	  an	  alliance	  that	  is	  still	  
in	  existence	  today.	  
31	  For	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  these	  ethnic	  political	  alliances	  and	  revolutionary	  parties	  see	  Martin	  Smith’s	  
‘Burma:	  insurgency	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  ethnicity’	  (1999).	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the	  state	  and	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  Ultimately,	  this	  tension	  helps	  
develop	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  Burmese	  state	  
As	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  conflict	  drew	  on	  and	  more	  and	  more	  refugees	  arrived	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  
the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  began	  to	  change.	  The	  borderlands	  became	  more	  than	  just	  a	  
place	  of	  refuge.	  It	  was	  increasingly	  a	  site	  of	  political	  struggle,	  defined	  by	  events	  both	  inside	  Burma	  
and	  along	  the	  border	  that	  saw	  an	  increased	  penetration	  of	  the	  state	  into	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
The	  first	  significant	  events	  that	  instigated	  this	  change	  occurred	  in	  1988	  and	  1989.	  Although	  they	  
originated	  far	  from	  the	  border,	  taking	  place	  in	  Burma’s	  capital	  and	  larger	  towns,	  these	  events	  were	  
to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  upon	  the	  practices	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Up	  until	  1988	  Burma	  had	  conducted	  an	  isolationist	  approach,	  both	  politically	  and	  economically,	  
under	  Ne	  Win’s	  ‘Burmese	  Way	  to	  Socialism’.	  Ne	  Win’s	  BSPP	  was	  in	  power	  in	  Burma	  for	  27	  years,	  a	  
time	  characterised	  by	  the	  country’s	  mostly	  sealed,	  enigmatic	  status	  which	  was	  often	  perceived	  as	  
decaying	  and	  romantic	  yet	  prone	  to	  bouts	  of	  brutality	  and	  suppression.	  This	  period	  of	  isolation	  and	  
political	  mismanagement	  took	  the	  country	  from	  one	  of	  South	  East	  Asia’s	  wealthiest	  to	  its	  poorest.	  
As	  a	  result	  and	  in	  protest	  against	  soaring	  prices	  and	  goods	  shortages,	  much	  of	  1988	  was	  dogged	  by	  
protests	  in	  the	  capital	  and	  other	  provincial	  towns,	  culminating	  in	  what	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  ‘88	  
uprising’	  on	  the	  8August	  1988.	  The	  government	  response	  was	  draconian	  and	  brutal.	  The	  death	  toll	  
on	  August	  8	  alone	  is	  commonly	  estimated	  at	  between	  2,000	  to	  3,000	  (Fink,	  2009,	  p.	  56;	  Lintner,	  
1994,	  p.	  344;	  M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  4)	  and	  across	  the	  entire	  year	  more	  than	  10,000	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  
16).32	  Videos	  and	  images	  of	  these	  events	  were	  smuggled	  out	  of	  the	  country,	  many	  survivors	  fled	  to	  
the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  where	  they	  told	  their	  stories	  to	  the	  media.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  more	  than	  
thirty	  years	  the	  international	  community	  caught	  a	  glimpse	  of	  what	  was	  happening	  inside	  this	  
isolated	  country.	  
Under	  this	  cloud	  of	  civil	  protest,	  Ne	  Win	  surprised	  many	  in	  July	  1988	  by	  resigning	  and	  calling	  for	  a	  
multi-­‐party	  political	  system	  and	  elections	  to	  be	  held.	  The	  initial	  response	  from	  the	  BSPP	  was	  to	  
reject	  Ne	  Win’s	  proposal.	  But	  after	  more	  than	  a	  year	  of	  political	  unrest	  elections	  did	  eventually	  
take	  place	  in	  May	  1990.	  The	  result	  was	  spectacularly	  under-­‐estimated	  by	  the	  military	  with	  more	  
than	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  vote	  going	  to	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi’s	  National	  League	  for	  Democracy	  (NLD)	  
party.	  Despite	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  vote,	  it	  immediately	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  Burmese	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Figures	  of	  the	  death	  toll	  for	  the	  uprising	  in	  1988	  are	  contentious	  and	  variable.	  The	  figures	  I	  use	  here	  are	  
widely	  cited	  by	  authors	  with	  extensive	  research	  reputations	  for	  their	  work	  on	  Burma.	  But	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know	  an	  
accurate	  figure	  have	  never	  been	  able	  to	  be	  verified.	  The	  Burmese	  military	  government	  states	  the	  death	  toll	  
was	  less	  than	  100;	  this	  is	  widely	  considered	  a	  gross	  underestimation.	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generals	  were	  not	  about	  to	  relinquish	  power.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  this	  instability	  the	  military	  made	  
another	  surprising	  move,	  hastily	  establishing	  a	  new	  era	  of	  ‘open	  door’	  economic	  policy.	  This	  
strategy	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  Burma’s	  neighbours,	  particularly	  Thailand,	  who	  was	  quick	  to	  
take	  advantage	  of	  this	  new	  position.	  The	  Thai	  army	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  at	  the	  time,	  General	  
Chavalit,	  visited	  Burma	  where	  he	  purchased	  20	  logging	  concessions	  from	  the	  Burmese	  generals,	  16	  
of	  which	  were	  in	  insurgent-­‐held	  areas	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  (Lang,	  
1999).Thailand	  itself	  had	  banned	  logging	  in	  May	  1989	  after	  years	  of	  indiscriminate	  destruction	  of	  
forests	  had	  depleted	  their	  own	  resources.	  It	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  era	  for	  the	  Burmese	  
generals	  who	  were	  attracted	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  capitalist	  economy.	  Coupled	  with	  Thai	  Prime	  
Minister,	  Chatichai	  Choonhaven’s	  foreign	  policy	  directive	  for	  “politics	  [to]	  take	  second	  place	  to	  
economics”,33	  it	  seemed	  an	  ‘open	  door’	  economy	  was	  instrumental	  to	  Burma’s	  re-­‐emergence	  on	  
the	  global	  stage.	  
The	  logging	  concessions	  negotiated	  by	  General	  Chavalit	  and	  the	  Burmese	  generals	  were	  the	  
beginning	  of	  a	  series	  of	  economic	  agreements	  that	  were	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  upon	  Burma’s	  
border	  areas.	  The	  Burmese	  Army	  moved	  into	  areas	  traditionally	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  KNU	  
under	  the	  pretext	  of	  preparing	  for	  and	  protecting	  the	  logging	  agreements	  made	  with	  
Thailand.34Other	  global	  companies	  and	  governments	  also	  entered	  into	  economic	  development	  
agreements	  with	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  Most	  notable	  was	  the	  Unocal-­‐TOTAL	  deal	  to	  extract	  gas	  
from	  the	  Andaman	  Sea,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  a	  pipeline	  which	  runs	  for	  700	  kilometres	  
from	  Nat	  E	  Tong	  in	  Thailand	  to	  Daminseik	  on	  the	  Tenasserim	  coast	  in	  Burma,	  and	  which	  attracted	  
international	  condemnation	  for	  its	  displacement	  of	  thousands	  of	  Karen	  villager’s	  and	  the	  use	  of	  
forced	  labour	  in	  its	  construction.35	  Almost	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  reports	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  
attached	  to	  these	  economic	  projects,	  international	  investment	  in	  Burma	  rose	  exponentially.	  It	  was	  
a	  largely	  untapped	  market	  with	  little	  regulation.	  The	  benefits	  for	  the	  Burmese	  military	  were	  
significant:	  the	  agreements	  gave	  them	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  it	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33Chatichai	  made	  the	  comment	  in	  an	  address	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Correspondents	  Club	  in	  Bangkok	  on	  22	  
December	  1988,	  as	  reported	  by	  Marc	  Innes-­‐Brown	  and	  Mark	  J.	  Valencia(1993).	  
34‘Burmese	  pound	  Karen	  bases	  to	  clear	  log	  routes’	  (1989,	  May	  8).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  
from	  Factiva	  database.	  
35	  Reports	  at	  the	  time	  detailed	  the	  pipeline’s	  construction,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  forced	  labour,	  human	  rights	  
abuses	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  local	  villages	  and	  livelihoods.	  These	  reports	  were	  highly	  attentive	  to	  the	  stories	  
of	  villager’s	  who	  were	  directly	  impacted	  by	  the	  pipelines	  construction.	  See:	  (Earthrights	  International,	  1996)	  
and	  (Earthrights	  International,	  2000).	  In	  2004	  Unocal	  finally	  settled	  with	  14	  villagers	  who	  had	  taken	  them	  to	  
court	  based	  on	  a	  case	  that	  Unocal	  should	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  that	  occurred	  
during	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  gas	  pipeline.	  The	  settlement	  was	  undisclosed	  but	  in	  a	  joint	  statement	  Unocal	  
and	  Earthrights	  International	  (who	  represented	  the	  plaintiffs)	  stated	  it	  would	  “compensate	  plaintiffs	  and	  
provide	  funds	  enabling	  plaintiffs	  and	  their	  representatives	  to	  develop	  programs	  to	  improve	  living	  conditions,	  
health	  care	  and	  education	  and	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  people	  from	  the	  pipeline	  region.”	  See	  Girion,	  L.	  (2004,	  
December	  14).	  ‘Unocal	  to	  settle	  rights	  claims’.	  LA	  Times,	  p.A1.	  
77 
 
provided	  much	  needed	  financial	  resources	  which	  were	  funnelled	  into	  the	  military,	  generally	  
considered	  the	  second	  largest	  Army	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  (Selth,	  2010),	  rather	  than	  developing	  the	  
services	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  country	  (Burma	  is	  now	  listed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  United	  Nation’s	  Least	  
Developed	  Countries).	  
The	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  border	  area	  continued	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  decimating	  the	  
KNUs	  economic	  control	  and	  significantly	  depleting	  their	  control	  over	  territory.	  For	  decades	  the	  
KNU	  had	  controlled	  the	  border	  trade	  by	  controlling	  the	  territory	  and	  resources	  that	  sat	  adjacent	  to	  
the	  border.	  In	  1983	  the	  KNU	  estimated	  income	  of	  500	  million	  kyat	  [A$69m]	  through	  their	  border	  
trade	  posts	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  283).	  While	  rice	  and	  cattle	  was	  traded	  across	  the	  border	  into	  
Thailand,	  radios,	  watches	  and	  other	  manufactured	  goods	  went	  back	  across	  the	  border	  into	  Burma,	  
all	  with	  a	  flat	  five	  per	  cent	  tax	  on	  them	  that	  went	  straight	  into	  KNU	  coffers	  (Bryant,	  1997;	  M.	  Smith,	  
1999,	  p.	  283).	  Further	  income	  came	  from	  timber	  mills	  and	  tin	  mines,	  jointly	  run	  with	  Thai	  
businessmen.	  Up	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  the	  KNU	  was	  able	  to	  fund	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  their	  armed	  
insurgency	  from	  these	  profits.	  However,	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  logging	  concessions	  handed	  to	  
Thailand	  in	  1989	  and	  the	  KNUs	  continued	  deforestation	  for	  their	  own	  revenue	  purposes	  soon	  
depleted	  much	  of	  this	  valuable	  resource.	  The	  KNUs	  revenue	  was	  further	  decimated	  in	  1998	  when	  
the	  Thai-­‐Myanmar	  Friendship	  Bridge	  was	  opened	  between	  Myawaddy	  in	  Burma	  and	  Mae	  Sot	  in	  
Thailand,	  effectively	  moving	  trade	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  this	  official	  checkpoint	  while	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  weakening	  the	  unofficial	  trading	  posts	  under	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  KNU.	  
After	  almost	  three	  decades	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  isolation	  Burma	  emerged	  to	  embrace	  the	  
financial	  benefits	  of	  economic	  engagement,	  quickly	  making	  agreements	  with	  international	  
companies	  to	  develop	  gas,	  oil	  and	  teak	  reserves.	  In	  a	  tactical	  manoeuvre	  the	  Burmese	  military	  had	  
asserted	  their	  right	  to	  negotiate	  economic	  investment	  within	  their	  sovereign	  borders	  with	  two	  
potential	  advantages	  to	  them.	  Firstly,	  they	  strategically	  positioned	  themselves	  to	  gain	  financially	  
from	  foreign	  investment,	  and	  secondly	  they	  were	  able	  to	  move	  in	  and	  significantly	  deplete	  the	  
ethnic	  insurgencies	  that	  had	  traditionally	  controlled	  the	  border	  areas	  rich	  with	  natural	  resources.	  
This	  also	  led	  to	  the	  Burmese	  military’s	  growing	  interest	  and	  presence	  in	  the	  border	  area	  adjacent	  
to	  Thailand.	  The	  Burmese	  military	  gained	  further	  international	  standing	  as	  they	  began	  to	  develop	  a	  
political	  relationship	  with	  their	  neighbour,	  Thailand.	  This	  growing	  inter-­‐state	  relationship	  was	  to	  
have	  a	  significant	  impact	  upon	  Thailand’s	  long-­‐standing	  but	  capricious	  relationship	  with	  the	  Karen,	  




Growing	  inter-­‐state	  relations	  
The	  realities	  around	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  continued	  presence	  of	  refugees	  in	  
Thailand	  became	  a	  significant	  pressure	  on	  Thai	  Government	  responses.	  The	  early	  informal	  
hospitality	  soon	  lost	  its	  lustre.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  changes	  in	  Thai-­‐Burmese	  relations,	  
namely	  the	  increasing	  pressure	  Karen	  refugees	  were	  placing	  on	  Thailand’s	  own	  under-­‐resourced	  
services,	  the	  changing	  economic	  alliances	  from	  local	  to	  government	  level,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  
significantly,	  the	  growing	  bilateral	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  governments.	  The	  
development	  of	  this	  diplomatic	  relationship,	  while	  often	  volatile,	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  
intensification	  of	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  because	  it	  increasingly	  prioritised	  state	  
engagement	  over	  what	  had	  previously	  been	  more	  autonomous	  local	  allegiances.	  This	  allowed	  the	  
state	  to	  consolidate	  control	  over	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  border	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  attempt	  to	  
weaken	  the	  more	  localised	  relationships	  developed	  with	  ethnic	  groups	  like	  the	  Karen.	  
In	  many	  ways,	  as	  Burma	  negotiated	  its	  tumultuous	  independence	  years,	  characterised	  by	  ethnic	  
unrest	  and	  political	  instability,	  Thailand	  developed	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  immediately	  adjacent	  
ethnic	  border	  areas	  that	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  historical	  distrust	  and	  animosity	  between	  
Thailand	  and	  Burma.36	  Thailand	  pursued	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  an	  uneasy	  balance	  between	  practical,	  
local	  level	  support	  of	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  with	  whom	  they	  shared	  a	  border	  and	  a	  more	  tentative,	  at	  
least	  post-­‐1988,	  official	  relationship	  with	  the	  Burmese	  generals.	  This	  ambiguous	  position	  led	  
anthropologist	  Gehan	  Wijeyewardene	  to	  observe:	  “Until	  very	  recently	  one	  could	  say	  that	  though	  
the	  Thai	  have	  not	  satisfied	  any	  of	  the	  parties	  concerned,	  they	  had	  not	  unduly	  offended	  them	  
either”	  (Wijeyewardene,	  2002).	  
However	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  aspects	  of	  contemporary	  border	  politics	  which	  contributed	  to	  a	  
clear	  shift	  in	  Thai	  border	  policy,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  Thailand’s	  treatment	  of	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  
groups	  along	  its	  border.	  By	  the	  late-­‐1980sThailand	  was	  clearly	  re-­‐ordering	  border	  politics	  to	  favour	  
stronger	  relations	  with	  the	  Burmese	  generals,	  a	  position	  that	  was	  obviously	  detrimental	  to	  its	  
traditional	  relations	  with	  localised	  minority	  ethnic	  groups.	  One	  indication	  was	  the	  mounting	  
pressure	  placed	  on	  Thailand	  to	  curb	  the	  activities	  of	  minority	  ethnic	  insurgent	  groups	  and	  political	  
activists	  basing	  themselves	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  constructive	  engagement	  policy	  
Thailand	  was	  pursuing	  with	  the	  Burmese	  generals	  the	  pressure	  was	  immense.	  Burma	  has	  
consistently	  declared	  Thailand	  should	  not	  allow	  its	  territory	  to	  be	  used	  by	  ethnic	  insurgencies	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Elements	  of	  this	  historical	  distrust	  are	  touched	  on	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  in	  Chapter	  Three.	  Some	  
contemporary	  examples	  of	  this	  distrust	  include	  the	  buffer	  zone	  policy	  and	  periodic	  closure	  of	  border	  
checkpoints	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  the	  most	  recent	  of	  which	  was	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  Mae	  Sot-­‐Myawaddy	  
Friendship	  Bridge	  between	  July	  2010	  and	  December	  2011.	  Historical	  examples	  include	  a	  litany	  of	  invasions	  by	  
both	  sides,	  for	  example	  the	  Burmese	  conquest	  of	  Ayuttuyah	  in	  1767.	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springboard	  to	  attack	  its	  neighbours.37	  Thailand	  has	  at	  least	  paid	  lip	  service	  to	  these	  demands	  by	  
making	  declarations	  around	  the	  prioritisation	  of	  their	  friendship	  with	  Burma.	  
These	  calls	  were	  largely	  a	  result	  of	  the	  influx	  of	  15,000	  Burmese	  students	  to	  the	  borderlands,	  most	  
having	  fled	  Burma’s	  major	  cities	  after	  the	  ‘88’	  uprising.	  Many	  of	  these	  students	  found	  protection	  in	  
the	  camps	  of	  the	  Karen	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (KNLA),	  consequently	  forming	  their	  own	  
organisation,	  the	  All	  Burma	  Students	  Democratic	  Front	  (ABSDF),	  and	  later	  basing	  political-­‐
organisations-­‐in-­‐exile	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  and	  other	  towns	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  While	  the	  Karen	  resistance	  
movement	  remained	  a	  predominant	  force	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  post-­‐1990	  saw	  even	  further	  political	  
expansion	  as	  the	  newly-­‐elected	  and	  subsequently	  harassed	  members	  of	  parliament,	  particularly	  
from	  the	  NLD,	  also	  fled	  to	  the	  borderlands	  and	  established	  alternative	  political	  movements	  and	  
resistance	  groups.	  As	  well,	  united	  ethnic	  nationalities	  groups	  based	  themselves	  there	  and	  special	  
interest	  groups	  around	  law,	  trade,	  political	  prisoners	  and	  the	  environment	  were	  established,	  some	  
replicating	  their	  organisations	  from	  inside	  Burma,	  others	  starting	  from	  scratch.	  Most	  significant	  of	  
this	  time	  was	  that	  the	  democratic	  goals	  of	  the	  students	  and	  exiled	  parliamentarians	  came	  into	  
direct	  contact	  with	  the	  political	  claims	  of	  the	  ethnic	  groups.	  
In	  effect,	  over	  a	  period	  of	  less	  than	  a	  decade,	  the	  borderlands	  saw	  the	  arrival	  of	  repeated	  waves	  of	  
political	  agents.	  The	  students,	  exiled	  parliamentarians,	  ethnic	  insurgents	  and	  refugees	  may	  all	  have	  
differing	  experiences	  and	  goals,	  but	  in	  the	  borderlands	  they	  found	  the	  necessary	  space	  to	  
articulate	  an	  alternative	  political	  voice	  and	  find	  an	  audience	  for	  their	  messages.	  Their	  presence	  
contributed	  to	  a	  political	  re-­‐shaping	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  space	  became	  an	  intensified	  political	  
environment,	  and	  this	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  activism	  
and	  strengthen	  their	  own	  political	  voice	  and	  identity.	  The	  actions	  of	  these	  political	  groups	  brought	  
greater	  international	  attention	  to	  the	  political	  and	  humanitarian	  crisis	  along	  the	  border,	  as	  well	  as	  
providing	  skills	  to	  strengthen	  the	  political	  engagement	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  struggle.	  
However,	  Thailand	  was	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  Burmese	  military	  to	  curb	  the	  activities	  
of	  these	  groups.	  Calls	  to	  stop	  the	  ethnic	  insurgents	  entering	  Thailand	  have	  led	  at	  various	  junctures	  
to	  Thailand	  undertaking	  repatriations,	  imprisonment	  and	  intimidation	  of	  Karen,	  Burmese	  and	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Burmese	  Prime	  Minister	  U	  Sein	  Win	  told	  the	  nonaligned	  summit	  in	  1976	  that	  neighbouring	  countries	  
should	  “faithfully	  undertake	  not	  to	  provide	  one’s	  territory	  as	  a	  spring	  board	  of	  attack	  on	  its	  neighbours	  both	  
covert	  and	  overt”	  (Moscotti,	  1978).	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ethnic	  groups	  residing	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border.38	  Under	  pressure	  from	  the	  Burmese	  
Government,	  the	  Thai	  Government	  essentially	  affirmed	  its	  sovereign	  authority	  over	  the	  Karen	  by	  
restricting	  their	  presence	  in	  Thailand.	  However,	  despite	  this	  policy	  shift	  Thailand	  often	  displays	  a	  
lingering	  nostalgia	  for	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  Karen	  and	  at	  various	  times	  has	  employed	  a	  
flexible	  application	  of	  the	  policy	  on	  the	  ground.	  Their	  treatment	  of	  the	  Karen	  is	  rarely	  consistent.	  
At	  times	  it	  suits	  the	  Thai	  authorities	  to	  allow	  the	  Karen	  to	  move	  freely	  and	  act	  as	  a	  buffer	  to	  the	  
ongoing	  distrust	  between	  Thailand	  and	  the	  Burma,	  or	  to	  negotiate	  development	  opportunities.	  At	  
other	  times	  it	  suits	  them	  to	  treat	  the	  Karen	  as	  pariahs	  and	  to	  enforce	  restrictive	  conditions	  upon	  
their	  presence	  in	  Thailand.	  These	  are	  indications	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  
actors	  and	  their	  relationships;	  loyalties	  can	  be	  transient,	  relationships	  continue	  to	  evolve,	  political	  
allegiances	  are	  often	  based	  on	  best	  interests,	  and	  the	  border	  operates	  through	  a	  diverse	  mix	  of	  
economic,	  political	  and	  military	  input.	  It	  is	  these	  types	  of	  scenarios	  that	  indicate	  the	  tensions	  that	  
can	  arise	  when	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  that	  apply	  a	  more	  hardened	  and	  homogenised	  
spatiality	  to	  the	  borderlands,	  intersect	  with	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  a	  range	  of	  agents	  that	  pursue	  a	  
more	  fluid	  and	  contested	  engagement	  with	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
Another	  indication	  of	  a	  changing	  border	  politics	  was	  Thailand’s	  removal	  of	  the	  ‘buffer	  zone’	  policy.	  
Under	  this	  policy	  Thailand	  had	  maintained	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  Karen	  as	  they	  provided	  cross-­‐
border	  intelligence	  on	  Burmese	  politics	  and	  defended	  the	  Thai	  border	  against	  Burmese	  military	  
attacks	  and	  communist	  crossovers.	  This	  was	  particularly	  evident	  at	  the	  height	  of	  communist	  
insurgencies	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  when	  Western	  government’s	  opposed	  the	  expansion	  of	  
communism	  into	  some	  developing	  countries.	  From	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  the	  KNU	  strategically	  positioned	  
themselves	  as	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  group.39	  The	  Karen	  were	  also	  a	  convenient	  black	  market	  trading	  
partner	  in	  arms,	  teak	  and	  other	  natural	  resources	  which	  dominate	  the	  border	  area,	  offering	  
Thailand	  one	  of	  the	  only	  ways	  to	  access	  these	  natural	  resources	  during	  Burma’s	  period	  of	  
economic	  isolation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38For	  example,	  in	  1997	  the	  Thai	  Army’s	  9th	  Division	  was	  accused	  of	  preventing	  refugees	  from	  entering	  
Thailand	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  pushing	  them	  back	  into	  Burma,	  claiming	  there	  was	  no	  fighting.	  After	  a	  number	  of	  
such	  refoulements	  and	  accusations	  of	  harsh	  treatment	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps,	  concerned	  embassies	  set	  up	  a	  
roving	  border	  team	  to	  report	  on	  conditions	  for	  Karen	  along	  the	  border	  (BERG,	  1998).	  A	  further	  example	  
occurred	  in	  2002	  with	  reports	  of	  the	  forcible	  repatriation	  of	  31	  Burmese	  (comprising	  student	  activists	  and	  
exiled	  members	  of	  the	  NLD)	  via	  the	  checkpoint	  at	  Sangklaburi,	  see	  ‘Officials	  send	  back	  activists	  held	  at	  
border’.	  (2002,	  August	  23).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  from	  Factiva	  database.	  
39	  This	  was	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  KNU	  policy.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  there	  had	  been	  increasing	  
tension	  between	  two	  of	  the	  KNUs	  most	  prominent	  leaders,	  Mahn	  Ba	  Zan	  who	  followed	  a	  socialist	  policy	  
based	  on	  Marxist	  objectives	  and	  Bo	  Mya	  who	  pursued	  a	  capitalist	  nationalist	  agenda.	  In	  the	  end	  Mahn	  Ba	  
Zan	  was	  placed	  on	  a	  banning	  order	  by	  the	  Thai	  Army	  for	  his	  “left	  wing	  sympathies”,	  seriously	  restricting	  his	  
movement	  in	  Thailand	  and	  eventually	  forcing	  him	  to	  resign	  as	  KNU	  President.	  Bo	  Mya	  became	  the	  new	  KNU	  
President	  and	  was	  quick	  to	  reinforce	  the	  KNUs	  position	  as	  a	  guard	  to	  prevent	  links	  between	  communist	  
movements	  in	  Burma	  and	  Thailand	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999).	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There	  is	  some	  debate	  about	  when	  this	  buffer	  policy	  first	  emerged.	  Burma	  analyst	  Bertil	  Lintner	  
traces	  it	  back	  to	  a	  relatively	  inconsequential	  event	  in	  1953	  when	  a	  Burmese	  military	  aircraft	  
bombed	  a	  Thai	  village,	  mistaking	  it	  for	  a	  KMT	  base	  (Lintner,	  1992).	  As	  a	  result	  tacit	  negotiations	  
between	  senior	  Thai	  officials	  saw	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  unofficial	  ‘buffer’	  agreement	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
protect	  themselves	  against	  their	  unwieldy	  Burmese	  neighbour.	  By	  the	  1990s	  the	  policy	  had	  largely	  
run	  its	  course,	  mostly	  because	  communist	  insurgencies	  were	  no	  longer	  deemed	  a	  threat	  to	  
Thailand	  and	  the	  ethnic	  insurgencies	  had	  lost	  much	  of	  their	  military	  power	  making	  them	  less	  
effective	  as	  a	  buffer	  and	  therefore	  protector	  of	  Thai	  soil.	  Finally,	  in	  a	  2002	  radio	  address,	  the	  Thai	  
Prime	  Minister	  at	  the	  time,	  Thaksin	  Shinawatra	  became	  the	  first	  Thai	  leader	  to	  acknowledge	  such	  a	  
policy	  had	  existed	  when	  he	  officially	  announced	  that	  Thailand	  would	  stop	  fostering	  the	  buffer	  zone	  
made	  up	  of	  ethnic	  groups	  along	  the	  border.40	  He	  quickly	  denied	  making	  the	  statement	  and	  was	  
accused	  of	  damaging	  the	  already	  fragile	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  was	  
a	  clear	  indication	  that	  Thailand	  was	  turning	  its	  support	  from	  the	  ethnic	  insurgent	  groups	  along	  the	  
border	  so	  as	  it	  could	  foster	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  Burma’s	  central	  governing	  power.	  
The	  growing	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  governments	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
significant	  elements	  in	  the	  border’s	  changing	  political	  dynamic.	  Despite	  the	  often	  temperamental	  
state	  of	  this	  relationship,	  the	  informal,	  long-­‐standing	  relationships	  between	  the	  Thai	  authorities	  
and	  ethnic	  minority	  groups	  were	  seriously	  weakened	  by	  this	  change	  in	  policy.	  This	  posed	  a	  
challenge	  for	  ethnic	  minorities	  living	  in	  Thailand.	  It	  saw	  greater	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  political	  
groups	  and	  local	  NGOs	  who	  suddenly	  found	  their	  presence	  in	  Thailand	  was	  more	  ambiguous	  and	  
less	  welcoming.	  This	  had	  ramifications	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  these	  groups	  to	  conduct	  their	  activities.	  It	  
also	  meant	  the	  Thai	  Government	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  economic	  agreements	  with	  the	  Burmese	  
generals	  rather	  than	  the	  ethnic	  minority	  groups,	  reducing	  income	  generation	  opportunities	  and	  
therefore	  much	  needed	  funding,	  and	  depleting	  the	  power	  of	  the	  insurgencies.	  
A	  border	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  is	  a	  site	  of	  political	  power	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999),	  but	  these	  events	  of	  
the	  late-­‐1980s	  saw	  renewed	  political	  interest	  from	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  that	  shared	  its	  border.	  This	  
penetration	  into	  the	  border,	  by	  both	  the	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  state’s,	  offers	  some	  insight	  into	  how	  
much	  the	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  border	  could	  and	  would	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  burgeoning	  
bilateral	  relationship.	  The	  border	  was	  increasingly	  being	  used	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  by	  both	  
governments,	  complicating	  its	  position	  as	  a	  place	  of	  refuge	  for	  displaced	  Karen.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40See	  ‘Buffer	  state	  policy	  against	  Burma	  to	  end’	  (2002,	  June	  9).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  from	  
Factiva	  database;	  also	  (Kawhtoo,	  September	  2005).	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It	  is	  from	  these	  events	  and	  circumstances	  that	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  extent	  of	  nation-­‐state	  
penetration	  into	  the	  borderlands	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  key	  contemporary	  framework	  for	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  A	  greater	  presence	  and	  interest	  by	  both	  nation-­‐state’s	  over	  the	  operations	  of	  
the	  borderlands,	  brought	  a	  corresponding	  coercive	  regulation	  which	  was	  to	  impact	  the	  social	  
practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  the	  way	  they	  engaged	  with	  the	  space,	  a	  point	  discussed	  further	  in	  
the	  next	  chapter.	  But	  also	  importantly	  for	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument,	  these	  events	  help	  to	  develop	  
the	  conditions	  from	  which	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  identity	  constructs	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  begin	  to	  
emerge.	  As	  a	  key	  agent	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  form	  a	  key	  
influence	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  those	  social	  relations.	  
Deteriorating	  security	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  specifically	  related	  to	  the	  borderlands	  which	  also	  affect	  its	  political	  
status;	  of	  particular	  significance	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  security.	  The	  deteriorating	  security	  
situation,	  particularly	  inside	  Burma,	  has	  changed	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  through	  an	  
increased	  militarisation	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border	  and	  increased	  regulation	  of	  the	  Thai	  side	  
of	  the	  border.	  
In	  1989	  Burma’s	  military	  spokesman,	  Colonel	  Aung	  Thein,	  in	  response	  to	  questions	  about	  
negotiating	  with	  the	  ethnic	  insurgent	  forces	  inside	  Burma	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying,	  “We	  shall	  
continue	  to	  fight	  them	  until	  they	  are	  eliminated”.41	  The	  ensuing	  decade	  shows	  the	  seriousness	  of	  
this	  threat.	  From	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  onwards	  the	  Burmese	  military	  presence	  in	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  border	  
areas	  was	  highly	  visible	  and	  increasingly	  dominant.	  In	  a	  matter	  of	  five	  years,	  the	  Burmese	  military	  
had	  become	  a	  real	  and	  dangerous	  presence	  in	  the	  border	  region,	  particularly	  to	  Karen	  villagers	  and	  
displaced	  persons.	  	  
Such	  a	  change	  in	  status	  suggests	  the	  extent	  of	  political	  manoeuvring	  that	  was	  occurring	  at	  the	  
time,	  but	  it	  also	  characterises	  a	  new	  phenomena	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Prior	  to	  the	  offensives	  of	  the	  
mid-­‐1980s,	  Burma’s	  conflict,	  with	  few	  exceptions,42	  was	  mostly	  contained	  within	  its	  international	  
boundaries.	  The	  increasing	  presence	  of	  the	  Burmese	  military	  in	  the	  previously	  KNU-­‐dominated	  
border	  areas	  was	  a	  sign	  of	  changing	  military	  power.	  The	  way	  it	  often	  spilled	  over	  the	  border	  into	  
Thailand	  also	  meant	  that	  Thailand	  became	  increasingly,	  though	  reluctantly,	  embroiled	  in	  Burma’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41‘Rangoon	  rejects	  offer	  for	  peace	  talks	  with	  rebels’.	  (1989,	  May	  26).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  
from	  Factiva	  database.	  
42	  A	  number	  of	  declarations	  by	  Burmese	  generals	  in	  the	  seventies	  allude	  to	  the	  prevention	  of	  insurgents	  
launching	  subversive	  attacks	  from	  neighbouring	  countries,	  including	  guidelines	  from	  MOI	  aimed	  at	  
preventing	  “refugees	  from	  using	  Thai	  territory	  to	  stage	  hostile	  or	  subversive	  acts	  against	  their	  home	  
countries	  and	  to	  maintain	  good	  relations	  between	  Thailand	  and	  neighbouring	  countries”	  (Moscotti,	  1978,	  p.	  




ethnic	  conflicts,	  at	  times	  proving	  disadvantageous	  to	  Thailand’s	  constructive	  engagement	  policy	  
with	  the	  Burmese	  generals.	  For	  example,	  in	  May	  2002	  Burma	  closed	  its	  entire	  border	  with	  Thailand	  
after	  military	  skirmishes	  between	  Burma’s	  minority	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  Burmese	  soldiers	  spilled	  
over	  into	  Thailand.	  Burma	  accused	  Thailand	  of	  supporting	  the	  Shan	  State	  Army,	  an	  armed	  ethnic	  
group	  from	  Burma,	  who	  were	  fighting	  against	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  Burma	  called	  on	  Thailand	  to	  
take	  a	  clear	  stance	  on	  their	  relationship	  with	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  minority	  armed	  groups.	  The	  border	  
remained	  closed	  for	  five	  months.	  The	  fallout	  included	  a	  serious	  breakdown	  in	  bilateral	  relations,	  
millions	  of	  baht	  lost	  in	  trade	  and	  tourism,	  detention	  of	  soldiers	  and	  villagers	  who	  strayed	  across	  
the	  border	  on	  both	  sides	  and	  the	  resurgence	  of	  decade	  old	  disputes	  over	  land.	  When	  the	  border	  
finally	  reopened	  the	  Thai	  Foreign	  Minister	  Surakiart	  Sathirathai	  commented:	  “The	  Burmese	  
government	  now	  understood	  Thailand's	  policy	  of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  its	  neighbours'	  domestic	  
affairs	  and	  bilateral	  relations	  were	  back	  to	  normal”.43	  
The	  Burmese	  Army’s	  biggest	  military	  achievement	  however	  was	  the	  taking	  of	  the	  KNU	  
Headquarters,	  Manerplaw,	  in	  1995.	  This	  was	  an	  enormous	  physical	  and	  psychological	  blow	  to	  the	  
Karen	  resistance	  movement.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  small	  pockets	  of	  soldiers	  undertaking	  guerrilla	  
tactics,	  the	  KNU	  was	  largely	  forced	  across	  the	  border	  into	  Thailand,	  loosing	  large	  swathes	  of	  
territory	  and	  any	  ability	  they	  may	  have	  had	  to	  protect	  Karen	  villagers.	  The	  extent	  of	  Burmese	  
military	  power	  at	  this	  time	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  reportedly	  able	  to	  cross	  into	  Thailand	  and	  launch	  
offensives	  against	  Karen	  military	  camps	  in	  198944	  and	  against	  the	  refugee	  camps	  between	  1995	  
and	  1998,	  burning	  down	  both	  Huay	  Kaloke	  and	  Don	  Pa	  Kiang	  camps.45	  Some	  reports	  suggested	  the	  
attacks	  from	  Thai	  territory	  were	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  Thai	  authorities.46	  At	  the	  very	  least	  the	  Thai	  
National	  Security	  Council	  chief,	  Gen	  Boonsak	  Kamheangridirong,	  accepted	  Thai	  authorities	  had	  
been	  “inactive”	  and	  that	  “(security)	  should	  have	  been	  stronger,	  particularly	  in	  our	  intelligence	  
gathering”.47	  
One	  Karen	  person	  interviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  lived	  through	  the	  burning	  down	  of	  Huay	  Kaloke	  
refugee	  camp	  and	  spoke	  of	  the	  despair	  he	  felt	  at	  the	  time	  when	  he	  realised	  that	  even	  in	  Thailand,	  
their	  place	  of	  refuge	  they	  were	  not	  safe	  from	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  He	  spoke	  of	  how	  the	  Thai	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43‘Surakiart	  is	  confident	  of	  reopening’.	  (2002,	  August	  26).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  from	  
Factiva	  database.	  
44‘Burmese	  pound	  Karen	  bases	  to	  clear	  log	  routes’	  (1989,	  May	  8).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  
from	  Factiva	  database.	  
45	  See:	  ‘Two	  killed	  as	  Karens	  hit	  refugee	  camp’.	  (1998,	  March	  12).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  
from	  Factiva	  database,	  and	  ‘Renegades	  exchanged	  for	  villagers	  –	  Locals	  say	  officials	  gave	  in	  too	  easily’.	  (1998,	  
March	  17).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  2009,	  from	  Factiva	  database.	  
46See:	  “UNHCR	  slams	  Burma	  over	  raid	  on	  refugee	  camp’.	  (1998,	  March	  13).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  
2009,	  from	  Factiva	  database,	  and‘Internationalization	  of	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  conflict”	  (Lintner,	  1991).	  
47‘NSC	  admits	  security	  lapse	  led	  to	  refugee	  camp	  attach’.	  (1998,	  March	  21).	  Bangkok	  Post.	  Retrieved	  April	  10,	  
2009,	  from	  Factiva	  database.	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military,	  tasked	  with	  protecting	  them,	  had	  failed	  to	  stop	  the	  attack	  (Nyi	  Nyi,	  interview,	  19	  October	  
2005).	  For	  many	  Karen	  who	  cross	  the	  border	  into	  Thailand	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  of	  the	  security	  
that	  is	  denied	  them	  inside	  Burma.	  But	  the	  security	  that	  has	  eluded	  them	  in	  Burma	  will	  often	  elude	  
them	  in	  Thailand	  as	  well,	  though	  it	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  different,	  and	  on	  occasion	  perhaps	  more	  
dangerous	  form.	  For	  in	  Thailand	  Karen	  refugees	  are	  denied	  the	  ability	  to	  choose	  and	  control	  forms	  
of	  protection.	  Inside	  Burma	  they	  employ	  various	  resistance	  strategies	  to	  ensure	  their	  security,	  such	  
as	  hiding	  food	  and	  household	  items	  for	  retrieval	  after	  Burmese	  military	  attacks,	  employing	  evasive	  
techniques	  to	  get	  out	  of	  dangerous	  military	  demands	  such	  as	  portering	  and	  finding	  creative	  
alternatives	  to	  resist	  human	  rights	  abuses	  by	  the	  military.48	  In	  Thailand	  they	  are	  completely	  reliant	  
on	  others	  to	  provide	  their	  security,	  having	  been	  denied	  rights	  and	  choices	  in	  how	  they	  live	  and	  
protect	  themselves.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  very	  circumstances	  that	  were	  creating	  the	  refugee	  exodus	  not	  only	  
continued,	  but	  were	  reaching	  ever	  greater	  proportions.	  Waves	  of	  refugees	  arriving	  in	  Thailand	  
were	  almost	  always	  related	  to	  Burmese	  military	  offensives	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  There	  
was	  an	  influx	  of	  10,000	  refugees	  in	  1995	  after	  Burmese	  military	  offensives	  led	  to	  the	  capturing	  of	  
the	  KNU	  Headquarters	  Manerplaw	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  another	  major	  base	  Kawmoorah.	  Most	  settled	  in	  
the	  Mae	  La	  Oon	  and	  Mae	  Ra	  Ma	  Luang	  camps.	  In	  1997	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  arrived	  from	  the	  
Mergui-­‐Tavoy	  area.	  They	  were	  fleeing	  a	  combination	  of	  Burmese	  military	  offensives	  and	  large-­‐scale	  
international	  development	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Yadana	  Gas	  Pipeline.	  A	  new	  ‘temporary	  site’	  was	  
established	  to	  house	  the	  refugees,	  called	  Tham	  Hin	  refugee	  camp,	  which	  after	  15	  years	  is	  only	  now	  
being	  slowly	  dismantled	  by	  resettling	  the	  refugees	  in	  third	  countries.	  More	  recent	  is	  the	  arrival	  of	  
more	  than	  3,000	  refugees	  as	  a	  result	  of	  military	  attacks	  upon	  the	  IDP	  camp,	  Ler	  Per	  Her49	  and	  
surrounding	  villages.50	  Those	  arriving	  in	  the	  camps	  tell	  a	  range	  of	  devastating	  stories:	  from	  being	  
forced	  to	  porter	  for	  Burmese	  military	  battalions,	  to	  increasing	  militarisation,	  crop	  and	  land	  
destruction	  or	  confiscation,	  extrajudicial	  killings	  and	  torture,	  food	  shortages	  and	  starvation,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48Villagers	  inside	  Burma’s	  conflict	  zones	  have	  employed	  various	  strategies,	  often	  evasive	  and	  almost	  always	  
defensive,	  both	  for	  daily	  survival	  and	  as	  a	  form	  of	  resistance.	  These	  ‘everyday	  forms	  of	  resistance’	  are	  
significant	  indicators	  of	  agency,	  a	  proactive,	  creative	  and	  sometimes	  revolutionary	  way	  to	  subvert	  military	  
and	  political	  power.	  It	  acknowledges	  the	  strategies	  of	  vulnerable	  populations	  to	  be	  active	  rather	  than	  passive	  
in	  their	  marginalisation.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  concept	  of	  everyday	  resistance	  and	  agency	  see	  ‘Weapons	  of	  the	  
Weak’(J.	  C.	  Scott,	  1985),	  ‘Village	  Agency’(KHRG,	  2008)	  and	  ‘Burma:	  Displaced	  Karens.	  Like	  Water	  on	  the	  Khu	  
Leaf’	  (Cusano,	  2001).	  
49Ler	  Per	  Her	  was	  an	  IDP	  camp	  situated	  on	  the	  Burmese	  bank	  of	  the	  Salween	  River.	  Many	  families	  and	  
individuals	  at	  Ler	  Per	  Her	  had	  already	  been	  displaced	  from	  villages	  further	  inside	  Karen	  State.	  Refused	  entry	  
to	  Thailand	  they	  had	  simply	  re-­‐established	  themselves	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Salween.	  In	  
June	  2009	  a	  combination	  attack	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military	  and	  the	  DKBA	  forced	  most	  of	  Ler	  Per	  Her’s	  
inhabitants	  across	  the	  river	  into	  Thai	  communities	  at	  Mae	  U	  Su	  and	  Noh	  Bo,	  causing	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  
refugee	  influxes	  of	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  
50Refugee	  influxes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Burmese	  military	  attacks	  on	  Ler	  Per	  Her	  were	  reported	  extensively.	  For	  
example,	  see	  (Jagan,	  2009)	  and	  (Yeni,	  2009).	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the	  culture	  of	  rape	  among	  military	  personnel.	  The	  Burmese	  Army’s	  militarisation	  of	  its	  border	  
areas	  directly	  contributes	  to	  refugee	  influxes	  and	  causes	  significant	  concerns	  for	  neighbouring	  
Thailand	  who	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  this	  movement.	  
These	  security	  concerns	  aren’t	  confined	  to	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  Reports	  of	  deaths	  of	  
Burmese	  migrant	  workers	  were	  increasingly	  evident	  in	  Thai	  media	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	  These	  
included	  14	  Karen	  found	  drowned	  in	  the	  Moei	  River	  in	  2002,51	  and	  54	  migrant	  workers	  found	  
suffocated	  in	  an	  enclosed	  container	  truck	  that	  was	  transporting	  them	  to	  resort	  locations	  in	  
Thailand’s	  south.52	  In	  both	  instances	  the	  deaths	  were	  reported	  as	  the	  deliberate	  actions	  of	  Thai	  
employers	  or	  people	  smugglers.	  A	  number	  of	  reports	  from	  refugee	  camps	  include	  accusations	  of	  
rape	  by	  Thai	  soldiers	  and	  security	  personnel.	  In	  many	  instances	  these	  rapes	  go	  unreported	  or	  are	  
never	  investigated.53	  In	  2002	  two	  Thai	  school	  children	  were	  killed	  when	  gunmen	  opened	  fire	  on	  a	  
school	  bus	  in	  Ratchaburi	  province.	  Some	  reports	  suggested	  the	  shooting	  was	  a	  result	  of	  a	  business	  
dispute	  between	  the	  bus	  driver	  and	  the	  gunmen,	  others	  that	  it	  was	  the	  work	  of	  the	  KNLA	  or	  the	  
Burmese	  Government.54	  In	  2007	  and	  2008	  even	  the	  KNU	  leadership	  was	  shown	  not	  to	  be	  safe	  in	  
Thailand.	  KNU	  Secretary	  General	  Pado	  Mahn	  Shah	  was	  killed	  in	  his	  home	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  in	  February	  
2008,	  reportedly	  a	  revenge	  attack	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Karen	  Peace	  Council	  (KPC),	  an	  armed	  group	  
who	  broke	  from	  the	  KNU	  in	  2007.	  KPC	  lost	  one	  of	  its	  own	  leaders,	  Saw	  Ler	  Mu	  from	  a	  bomb	  placed	  
under	  the	  hut	  he	  was	  sleeping	  in,	  reportedly	  the	  work	  of	  the	  KNU.55	  Rumours	  abounded	  after	  
Mahn	  Shah’s	  death	  of	  other	  targeted	  attacks	  on	  KNU	  leaders	  which	  caused	  many	  to	  go	  into	  
hiding.56	  These	  attacks,	  while	  not	  a	  complete	  list,	  highlight	  the	  many	  concerns	  Karen	  and	  Burmese	  
in	  the	  borderlands	  have	  for	  their	  security	  in	  Thailand.	  
It	  was	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  that	  the	  chaos	  in	  Burma	  had	  its	  most	  significant	  impact	  upon	  security	  in	  
Thailand	  and	  Burma-­‐Thai	  relations.	  In	  October	  1999	  Burmese	  students	  stormed	  the	  Burmese	  
embassy	  in	  Bangkok	  and	  took	  40	  hostages.	  In	  a	  perhaps	  surprising	  move	  the	  Thai	  Government	  gave	  
the	  students	  a	  helicopter	  ride	  to	  the	  border	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  release	  of	  the	  hostages.	  The	  
Burmese	  Government	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  how	  the	  Thai	  Government	  handled	  the	  situation,	  and	  
this	  almost	  certainly	  had	  some	  impact	  on	  their	  response	  to	  the	  next	  hostage	  drama.	  In	  January	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51‘Karens	  found	  dead	  in	  river’	  (2002,	  February	  9).	  The	  Irrawaddy.	  Retrieved	  August	  6,	  2009,	  from	  
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=2204.	  
52‘Suffocation	  of	  54	  Burmese	  workers	  –	  No	  surprise’.	  (2008,	  April	  11).	  Inter	  Press	  Service.	  Retrieved	  
September	  26,	  2009,	  from	  http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41955.	  
53	  For	  example,	  see	  (“Raped	  by	  soldier,	  no	  investigation”,	  2002)	  and	  (Paung,	  2006).	  
54‘Bus	  attack	  leaves	  many	  questions	  unanswered’	  (2002,	  June	  5).	  The	  Irrawaddy.	  Retrieved	  August	  6,	  2009,	  
from	  http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=2332.	  
55‘Myanmar	  gains	  in	  leader’s	  death’.	  (2008,	  February	  16).	  Online	  Asia	  Times.	  Retrieved	  August	  6,	  2009,	  from	  
http://www.atimes.com/Southeast_Asia/JB16Ae03.html.	  
56‘KNU:	  More	  leaders	  targeted	  for	  assassination’	  (2008,	  February	  16).	  The	  Irrawaddy.	  Retrieved	  August	  6,	  
2009,	  from	  http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10428.	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2000,	  members	  of	  the	  God’s	  Army,	  a	  rebel	  group	  who	  broke	  from	  the	  KNU	  and	  perhaps	  best	  
known	  for	  its	  child	  leaders,	  twin	  brothers	  Johnny	  Htoo	  and	  Luther,	  seized	  a	  hospital	  in	  Ratchaburi	  
Province.	  This	  time	  the	  Thai	  Government	  was	  not	  so	  accommodating,	  the	  siege	  ended	  with	  nine	  of	  
the	  dissidents	  killed.57	  
The	  deteriorating	  security	  situation	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border	  highlights	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  
Burma’s	  internal	  conflict	  and	  the	  limited	  control	  both	  nation-­‐states	  have	  exhibited	  in	  resolving	  the	  
conflict.	  The	  events	  mentioned	  in	  this	  section,	  and	  many	  others	  similar	  to	  them,	  show	  that	  the	  
change	  in	  the	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  borderlands	  had	  done	  little	  to	  improve	  the	  safety	  of	  
displaced	  Karen.	  In	  fact	  the	  greater	  level	  of	  political	  interest	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  its	  operations	  
has	  brought	  many	  restrictions	  that	  reinforce	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  Heavy	  
militarisation	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border	  means	  displaced	  Karen	  continue	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  
Burmese	  Army	  attacks,	  death,	  arbitrary	  arrest,	  rape	  and	  torture.	  Greater	  regulation	  on	  the	  Thai	  
side	  of	  the	  border	  means	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  increasingly	  prone	  to	  exploitation	  and,	  due	  to	  their	  
illegal	  status,	  excluded	  from	  the	  services	  and	  entitlements	  that	  may	  help	  protect	  them.	  The	  actions	  
of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border	  have	  only	  perpetuated	  this	  state	  of	  existence.	  
Further	  contributing	  to	  this	  state	  is	  the	  heavy	  militarisation	  in	  Burma’s	  border	  areas	  combined	  with	  
the	  increasing	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  Burma	  and	  Thailand	  (manifesting	  in	  greater	  
restrictions	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border).	  Together,	  these	  policies	  seem	  to	  have	  increased	  the	  
security	  concerns	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  living	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border.	  While	  this	  lack	  of	  security	  
continues	  to	  manifest	  in	  refugee	  flows,	  cross-­‐border	  skirmishes	  and	  exploitation,	  it	  seems	  political	  
stability	  for	  all	  players	  in	  the	  borderlands	  will	  remain	  elusive.	  It	  is	  this	  state	  of	  ambiguity	  that	  
reinforces	  many	  of	  the	  political	  characteristics	  of	  the	  borderlands	  that	  have	  emerged	  since	  the	  
early-­‐1980s,	  and	  define	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  nation-­‐state	  political	  layer	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
HUMANITARIAN	  AID	  
As	  the	  number	  of	  refugees	  along	  the	  border	  increased	  the	  refugee	  apparatus	  grew	  in	  its	  
complexity,	  bringing	  a	  new	  humanitarian	  political	  dynamic	  to	  the	  border	  as	  well.	  This	  type	  of	  
politicisation	  is	  entrenched	  through	  both	  an	  ideological	  framework	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  
a	  practical	  implementation	  of	  aid	  policies	  and	  activities.	  Over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  the	  
humanitarian	  aid	  program	  has	  become	  entrenched	  in	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  
provides	  a	  vital	  service,	  administering	  the	  needs	  and	  entitlements	  of	  highly	  vulnerable	  populations,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




but	  through	  its	  policies	  and	  activities	  it	  has	  also	  changed	  the	  long-­‐term	  political	  dynamic	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  by	  bringing	  a	  more	  regulated,	  policy-­‐driven	  approach	  to	  the	  space.	  
Humanitarian	  aid	  in	  some	  form	  has	  existed	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  since	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  
first	  official	  refugees	  in	  1984.	  In	  these	  first	  years	  it	  was	  quite	  low	  key	  so	  that	  in	  1988	  only	  three	  
NGOs	  were	  officially	  working	  along	  the	  border	  providing	  relief	  assistance	  to	  the	  Karen.	  These	  NGOs	  
were	  the	  BBC,	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  (MSF)	  and	  the	  Catholic	  Office	  for	  Emergency	  Relief	  and	  
Refugees	  (COERR).	  In	  1991	  an	  agreement	  with	  Thailand’s	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  (MOI)	  allowed	  
these	  NGOs	  to	  increase	  their	  reach	  to	  also	  include	  two	  other	  persecuted	  ethnic	  groups	  who	  were	  
arriving	  on	  the	  border,	  the	  Mon	  and	  Karenni.	  Eventually,	  other	  NGOs	  began	  working	  in	  an	  informal	  
capacity	  until	  a	  further	  agreement	  with	  MOI	  was	  reached	  in	  1994	  which	  formalised	  their	  working	  
arrangements	  and	  established	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  NGOs	  working	  along	  the	  border.	  This	  
agreement	  also	  increased	  the	  aid	  mandate,	  allowing	  NGOs	  to	  provide	  food,	  clothing	  and	  medicine	  
as	  well	  as	  education	  and	  sanitation.58	  
Under	  the	  CCSDPT	  umbrella	  group	  there	  are	  currently	  seventeen	  NGOs	  working	  on	  the	  border	  on	  
issues	  as	  diverse	  as	  education,	  healthcare,	  family	  planning,	  landmines,	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  recovery	  
and	  child	  support.	  This	  does	  not	  include	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  independent	  NGOs	  working	  across	  
migrant,	  refugee,	  environmental	  and	  human	  rights	  documentation	  issues,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  of	  the	  
policy	  areas	  in	  which	  they	  are	  involved.	  As	  many	  of	  these	  NGOs	  work	  in	  an	  informal	  capacity	  (they	  
are	  not	  registered	  with	  the	  Thai	  Government)	  there	  is	  limited	  consistent	  coordination	  or	  regulation	  
of	  their	  work.	  
The	  1991	  and	  1994	  agreements	  had	  profound	  effects	  on	  the	  refugee	  population.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  
it	  increased	  the	  services	  available	  to	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps,	  particularly	  around	  education	  
opportunities	  and	  healthcare	  services.	  But	  coupled	  with	  the	  deteriorating	  security	  situation	  
mentioned	  above,	  it	  also	  introduced	  a	  more	  restrictive	  and	  regulated	  camp	  environment.	  The	  
informal	  camp	  environments	  and	  the	  easy	  hospitality	  that	  first	  greeted	  the	  refugees	  of	  1984	  were	  
gradually	  replaced	  with	  fenced	  enclosures	  and	  highly	  regulated	  conditions	  which,	  despite	  attempts	  
by	  some	  NGOs	  to	  reduce	  aid	  dependency	  and	  maintain	  community	  management,	  weakened	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  NGOs	  sought	  formal	  permission	  from	  MOI	  to	  increase	  their	  assistance	  to	  all	  ethnic	  groups	  along	  the	  border	  
after	  receiving	  requests	  from	  the	  Karenni	  Refugee	  Committee	  (in	  1989)	  and	  the	  Mon	  National	  Relief	  
Committee	  (in	  1990)	  to	  assist	  refugees	  from	  their	  respective	  groups	  who	  were	  also	  arriving	  at	  the	  border.	  On	  
31	  May	  1991	  MOI	  gave	  written	  approval	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  assistance	  to	  all	  ethnic	  groups	  under	  the	  same	  
conditions	  they	  had	  been	  administering	  support	  to	  the	  Karen	  refugees.	  This	  was	  limited	  to	  food,	  clothing	  and	  
medicine.	  By	  1994	  there	  was	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  NGOs	  working	  along	  the	  border	  with	  tacit	  MOI	  
approval	  but	  no	  formal	  mandate.	  An	  agreement	  with	  MOI	  in	  May	  1994	  allowed	  formal	  recognition	  and	  
approval	  of	  the	  services	  and	  programs	  these	  NGOs	  were	  conducting.	  As	  part	  of	  this	  agreement	  MOI	  allowed	  
an	  extension	  of	  current	  NGO	  service	  provision	  to	  include	  education	  and	  sanitation.	  (Jack	  Dunford,	  Personal	  
communication,	  18	  December	  2008);	  also	  see	  (TBBC,	  2008).	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autonomy	  and	  agency	  of	  the	  Karen	  who	  lived	  there.	  One	  participant	  in	  the	  research	  described	  the	  
changes	  he	  saw	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  during	  this	  period.	  
In	  1989	  I	  left	  Huay	  Kaloke	  refugee	  camp	  and	  went	  to	  Manerplaw.	  When	  I	  came	  back	  in	  
1995	  I	  noticed	  that	  many	  things	  in	  the	  camps	  had	  changed.	  The	  camp	  was	  fenced	  and	  Thai	  
military	  police	  guarded	  the	  camps.	  Movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camp	  had	  become	  
seriously	  restricted.	  These	  conditions	  became	  even	  worse	  after	  Huay	  Kaloke	  was	  burnt	  
down	  in	  1997.	  I	  suppose	  there	  were	  more	  Thai	  police	  to	  protect	  us	  but	  as	  more	  Karen	  fled	  
to	  the	  refugee	  camps	  I	  think	  the	  Thai	  authorities	  wanted	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  camps,	  
they	  wanted	  to	  deter	  other	  Karen	  from	  entering	  Thailand	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  9	  December	  
2008).	  
Thai	  authorities	  introduced	  tighter	  controls	  in	  the	  camps;	  camp	  passes	  were	  enforced	  which	  
restricted	  NGO	  and	  refugee	  movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camps,	  and	  NGOs	  were	  now	  required	  to	  
submit	  formal	  project	  proposals	  to	  MOI	  for	  approval	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  quarterly	  program	  reports	  
to	  district	  authorities	  (Jack	  Dunford,	  personal	  communication,	  18	  Dec	  2008).	  The	  increased	  number	  
of	  NGOs	  brought	  with	  them	  an	  accompanying	  humanitarian	  apparatus.	  Staff,	  both	  local	  and	  
international,	  an	  increased	  injection	  of	  capital,	  financial	  and	  material,	  international	  exposure	  to	  the	  
plight	  of	  the	  Karen	  and	  Burma	  generally,	  and	  a	  bureaucracy	  which	  increased	  regulated	  service	  
provision	  and	  introduced	  new	  political	  terminology	  to	  describe	  the	  border’s	  humanitarian	  
situation.	  This	  terminology	  has	  been	  both	  enabling	  and	  limiting	  in	  its	  application,	  a	  point	  I	  discuss	  
in	  some	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
The	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  humanitarian	  status	  is	  somewhat	  unusual	  for	  an	  international	  refugee	  
situation.	  This	  is	  mostly	  due	  to	  the	  combination	  of	  Thai	  government	  and	  NGO	  roles	  in	  providing	  
humanitarian	  assistance,	  rather	  than	  through	  UN	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  UNHCR.	  In	  terms	  of	  
minimising	  the	  effects	  of	  displacement	  and	  maintaining	  the	  autonomy	  of	  refugee	  populations	  this	  
relative	  uniqueness	  has	  provided	  strengths	  to	  the	  program.	  CCSDPT	  for	  example	  have	  consistently	  
called	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  sustainable	  livelihood	  initiatives	  and	  income	  generation	  opportunities.	  
They	  have	  long	  suggested	  moving	  humanitarian	  assistance	  from	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  relief	  to	  
one	  based	  on	  development	  (CCSDPT	  &	  UNHCR,	  2011).	  CCSDPT	  and	  UNHCR	  have	  put	  together	  a	  
number	  of	  joint	  plans	  and	  strategies	  over	  the	  period	  2005-­‐201159	  which	  would	  allow	  refugees	  
increased	  self-­‐reliance,	  including	  skills	  training	  and	  higher	  education	  opportunities,	  participation	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Comprehensive	  plans	  were	  made	  in	  2005	  and	  2006	  and	  presented	  to	  the	  Thai	  Government	  and	  donors.	  
These	  plans	  were	  updated	  in	  2007	  with	  the	  production	  of	  the	  ‘UNHCR/CCSDPT	  Comprehensive	  Plan	  2007/08’	  
(CCSDPT	  &	  UNHCR,	  2007).	  In	  2009	  UNHCR	  and	  CCSDPT	  put	  together	  a	  five	  year	  strategic	  plan	  and	  revised	  the	  
plan	  in	  2011	  to	  produce	  the	  ‘Strategic	  Framework	  For	  Durable	  Solutions’	  (2011).	  These	  plans	  are	  designed	  to	  
provide	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Thai	  Government	  around	  how	  to	  best	  implement	  a	  solutions-­‐based,	  
development	  approach	  to	  the	  protracted	  refugee	  situation	  along	  the	  border.	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income	  generation	  projects	  and	  employment	  opportunities.	  These	  plans	  have	  been	  designed	  as	  a	  
dialogue	  with	  the	  Thai	  Government,	  whose	  support	  will	  be	  a	  necessary	  component	  for	  the	  plans	  
feasibility.	  But	  while	  the	  response	  from	  the	  Thai	  Government	  has	  been	  encouraging	  and	  small-­‐
scale	  projects	  have	  been	  introduced,	  particularly	  around	  developing	  livelihoods,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  
no	  substantive	  practical	  application	  of	  the	  larger	  strategic	  plan.	  
In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  refugee	  arrivals	  at	  the	  border,	  the	  lack	  of	  formal	  structure	  and	  regulation	  
around	  receiving	  refugees	  certainly	  helped	  the	  Karen.	  Had	  UNHCR	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  refugee	  
response	  from	  its	  earliest	  inception	  it	  is	  doubtful	  they	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  achieve	  this	  
community	  management	  of	  the	  camps.	  However,	  given	  rising	  concerns	  around	  protection,	  
particularly	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  onwards,	  there	  is	  some	  value	  in	  the	  argument	  that	  UNHCR	  
involvement	  might	  have	  ensured	  greater	  and	  earlier	  protection	  of	  refugee	  populations.	  UNHCR	  has	  
both	  the	  capacity	  and	  mandate	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  populations,	  where	  NGOs	  could	  not.	  
Regardless,	  this	  absence	  of	  UNHCR	  involvement	  in	  those	  early	  years	  is	  certainly	  one	  of	  the	  more	  
unusual	  aspects	  of	  the	  border’s	  status	  for	  refugee	  asylum.	  UNHCR	  were	  absent	  from	  any	  
meaningful	  participation	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  administration	  of	  the	  refugees	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border	  for	  the	  first	  14	  years,60	  even	  now	  their	  involvement	  is	  mostly	  tasked	  with	  monitoring	  
security	  and	  service	  provision,	  and	  administering	  the	  resettlement	  program.	  This	  absence	  is	  in	  part	  
due	  to	  political	  manoeuvring	  by	  the	  Thai	  Government.	  UNHCR’s	  core	  mandate	  to	  provide	  
protection	  and	  assistance	  to	  refugee	  populations	  is	  reliant	  upon	  requests	  by	  both	  the	  host	  and/or	  
sending	  country	  for	  UNHCR	  involvement,	  something	  both	  Burma	  and	  Thailand	  had	  been	  reluctant,	  
particularly	  at	  the	  beginning,	  to	  provide.	  
Despite	  the	  best	  attempts	  of	  some	  NGO	  providers,	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  Karen	  continue	  to	  hold	  
a	  mostly	  passive-­‐recipient	  position	  in	  the	  humanitarian	  assistance	  apparatus.	  The	  way	  
humanitarian	  aid	  is	  administered	  –	  governed	  by	  centralised	  ideologies	  and	  largely	  reliant	  on	  the	  
directive	  of	  Thai	  Government	  policy	  –	  leaves	  little	  room	  for	  aid	  providers	  to	  explore	  long-­‐term	  
enabling	  and	  empowering	  programs.	  Aid	  providers	  are	  forced	  to	  negotiate	  an	  uneasy	  path	  
between	  assuaging	  Thai	  Government	  concerns	  and	  fulfilling	  their	  own	  mandate	  to	  provide	  
protection	  and	  support	  to	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps,	  and	  for	  some	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  support	  those	  
outside	  the	  camps.	  Aid	  agencies	  have	  been	  in	  the	  borderlands	  for	  more	  than	  two	  decades	  and	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  While	  I	  state	  that	  UNHCR	  has	  not	  had	  a	  meaningful	  involvement	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  administration	  of	  the	  
camps,	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  UNHCR	  has	  not	  had	  a	  long-­‐term	  presence	  along	  the	  border.	  While	  UNHCR	  has	  
had	  an	  office	  in	  Bangkok	  since	  1977,	  they	  took	  no	  formal	  role	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  
refugee	  situation	  until	  1998.	  At	  this	  time,	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Thai	  Government	  allowed	  UNHCR	  a	  limited	  
role	  in	  observing	  and	  monitoring	  refugee	  rights	  and	  protection,	  although	  the	  actual	  carrying	  out	  of	  these	  
tasks	  continued	  to	  lie	  with	  the	  Thai	  Government	  and	  NGOs.	  UNHCR	  took	  on	  a	  more	  substantial	  role	  in	  1999	  
when	  they	  tentatively	  established	  a	  resettlement	  program,	  although	  the	  administration	  of	  this	  program	  
didn’t	  take	  full	  effect	  until	  2004.	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adept	  at	  negotiating	  these	  government	  level	  requirements;	  however	  there	  has	  been	  only	  little	  
success	  during	  that	  period	  to	  generate	  more	  autonomous	  and	  participatory	  programs	  that	  would	  
provide	  displaced	  Karen	  with	  skills	  and	  employment	  opportunities	  outside	  the	  camps	  and	  
empower	  their	  political	  voice	  to	  take	  control	  of	  their	  displacement	  experiences.	  The	  humanitarian	  
aid	  apparatus	  may	  be	  entrenched	  in	  the	  political	  fabric	  of	  the	  borderlands	  but	  I	  argue	  over	  the	  
coming	  chapter	  that	  in	  being	  so	  it	  has	  contributed	  to	  an	  apolitical	  passive-­‐recipient	  picture	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Challenging	  this	  state	  of	  apolitical	  passivity	  underlies	  Karen	  
practices	  of	  agency	  and	  activism,	  an	  argument	  that	  is	  developed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
CONCLUSION	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  examined	  the	  modern	  formation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  intensification	  of	  control	  by	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  
series	  of	  events	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  represent	  what	  I	  argue	  has	  been	  the	  increased	  
penetration	  of	  the	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  state’s	  into	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  borderlands,	  marking	  some	  
of	  the	  most	  significant	  shifts	  in	  the	  borderlands	  political	  make-­‐up.	  This	  state	  penetration	  has	  
brought	  intensified	  attention,	  regulation	  and	  militarisation	  to	  the	  space.	  This	  includes	  a	  growing	  
assertion	  by	  both	  Burma	  and	  Thailand	  of	  their	  state	  authority,	  and	  the	  move	  to	  use	  the	  border	  as	  
an	  expression	  of	  political	  power	  through	  operations	  aimed	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  it.	  This	  is	  
evidenced	  by	  Burma’s	  emergence	  from	  political	  and	  economic	  isolation,	  the	  state’s	  increased	  
interest	  in	  investment	  and	  trade,	  and	  the	  growing	  bilateral	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Burmese	  and	  
Thai	  governments.	  There	  has	  also	  been	  an	  intensified	  militarisation	  on	  Burma’s	  side	  of	  the	  border	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  ethnic	  insurgent	  areas,	  and	  this	  has	  led	  to	  increased	  levels	  of	  
displacement,	  refugee	  influx	  and	  deteriorating	  security	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  All	  these	  elements	  
contribute	  to	  a	  political	  intensification	  of	  the	  borderlands,	  where	  the	  state	  has	  both	  pursued	  self-­‐
serving	  operations	  and	  responded	  to	  the	  perceived	  threat	  to	  their	  political	  authority.	  This	  paints	  a	  
picture	  of	  the	  borderlands	  that	  conforms	  to	  many	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  principles	  and	  practices	  set	  
out	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
In	  developing	  the	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  in	  Chapter	  
Three,	  and	  now	  applying	  this	  framework	  to	  the	  contemporary	  context	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  
Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  develop	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  by	  establishing	  the	  underpinning	  ideas	  
of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  In	  establishing	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  space,	  I	  am	  then	  able	  to	  discuss	  its	  
relationship	  to	  the	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  identity	  constructs	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  which	  are	  
developed	  over	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  This	  relationship	  is	  framed	  by	  a	  tension	  that	  occurs	  
where	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  discussed	  over	  the	  last	  two	  chapters,	  interact	  with	  key	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modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  practices	  which	  are	  examined	  in	  detail	  over	  Chapters	  
Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven.	  
At	  this	  point	  in	  the	  argument	  however,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  reiterate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
state,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  fundamental	  component	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  I	  articulate	  across	  
this	  thesis,	  but	  the	  activities	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  intrinsically	  tied	  to	  these	  state	  operations.	  Over	  
the	  coming	  chapters	  I	  juxtapose	  these	  state	  operations	  with	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  
displaced	  Karen.	  Through	  these	  practices,	  the	  Karen	  develop	  a	  more	  informal	  political	  power	  based	  
on	  contested	  social	  relations,	  and	  this	  informal	  power	  sits	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  aspirations	  of	  state	  




BY	  THE	  SHADE	  OF	  A	  TREE	  
PATTERNS	  OF	  ACTIVISM	  
Why	  do	  we	  Karen	  people	  have	  to	  suffer	  from	  our	  grandparents	  through	  to	  now.	  
I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  with	  this.	  We	  want	  to	  have	  our	  dignity.	  
If	  people	  ask	  us	  the	  population	  of	  the	  Karen	  we	  can	  tell	  them	  
but	  if	  people	  ask	  about	  our	  education	  we	  can	  only	  say	  ‘we	  have	  none’.	  
Looking	  back	  I	  would	  say	  my	  life	  is	  like	  this.	  
I	  would	  go	  and	  stand	  in	  the	  shade	  of	  a	  tree	  near	  my	  home	  that	  I	  left	  in	  Burma.	  
This	  tree,	  the	  insects	  had	  eaten	  the	  inside	  of	  it	  out	  and	  worms	  gorged	  themselves	  on	  the	  leaves.	  
If	  I	  stay	  under	  this	  tree	  then	  the	  shit	  of	  the	  worms	  would	  drop	  on	  me	  
and	  eventually	  the	  branches	  will	  fall	  off	  and	  hit	  me.	  
So	  I	  have	  to	  leave	  the	  shade	  of	  this	  tree.	  
If	  I	  go	  back	  I	  want	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  shade	  of	  a	  tree	  
that	  provides	  coolness	  and	  it	  should	  be	  a	  tree	  that	  we	  plant	  ourselves.	  
Moo,	  interview,	  15	  September	  2005	  
Maw	  Bweh	  began	  ‘visiting’	  Thailand	  in	  the	  1960s.	  He	  now	  resides	  there	  permanently	  and	  instead,	  
has	  become	  a	  frequent	  ‘visitor’	  back	  to	  Burma.	  He	  can	  describe	  in	  great	  detail	  his	  experience	  of	  
stepping	  back	  onto	  Karen	  territory	  in	  Burma.	  He	  uses	  words	  like	  happy	  and	  comfortable,	  and	  
describes	  the	  easy	  hospitality	  of	  his	  people	  and	  the	  feeling	  of	  not	  having	  to	  be	  afraid	  of	  the	  Thai	  
police.	  While	  there	  is	  certainly	  a	  measure	  of	  romanticism	  in	  the	  picture	  he	  paints,	  what	  is	  less	  
evident	  in	  his	  story	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  national	  boundary	  he	  has	  often	  crossed.	  Maw	  Bweh	  
doesn’t	  talk	  of	  checkpoints	  or	  passports,	  negotiating	  different	  languages	  and	  signs,	  or	  different	  
customs,	  currencies	  or	  food.	  For	  Maw	  Bweh,	  the	  border	  represents	  a	  point	  where	  he	  either	  feels	  
at	  home	  in	  his	  homeland	  or	  feels	  uncomfortable	  in	  a	  foreign	  land.	  He	  is	  identifying	  a	  difference	  
that	  exists	  in	  his	  heart,	  rather	  than	  a	  difference	  determined	  by	  state	  regulations.	  This	  is	  his	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  national	  border,	  and	  it	  indicates	  a	  very	  different	  view	  on	  what	  most	  would	  
consider	  an	  established,	  institutionalised	  spatial	  identity.	  
This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  patterns	  of	  activism	  emerge	  from	  a	  tension	  between	  forms	  of	  institutional	  
governance	  and	  a	  more	  informal	  political	  power	  that	  develops	  through	  the	  contested	  social	  
relations	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  to	  first	  examine	  forms	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  through	  two	  broad	  authorities:	  the	  state	  (predominantly	  the	  Thai	  Government)	  and	  
the	  humanitarian	  aid	  apparatus.	  These	  bodies	  exercise	  political	  authority	  over	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  through	  two	  key	  operational	  elements	  of	  coercive	  regulation.	  Firstly,	  operations	  of	  
governance	  establish	  a	  series	  of	  controls	  over	  space	  and	  movement	  that	  aim	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  
refugee	  and	  displaced	  populations.	  Secondly,	  a	  system	  of	  administrative	  categorisation	  that	  works	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to	  identify	  and	  regulate	  displaced	  populations	  is	  primarily	  used	  as	  a	  way	  to	  control	  the	  movement	  
and	  rights	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  patterns	  of	  activism	  that	  emerge	  when	  displaced	  
Karen	  contest	  these	  particular	  forms	  of	  institutional	  governance	  because	  they	  do	  not	  adequately	  
capture	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  political	  self.	  This	  contestation	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	  
move	  illegally	  across	  the	  national	  boundary	  and	  the	  way	  they	  choose	  to	  live	  outside	  administrative	  
containment	  lines.	  By	  employing	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  activism	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  political	  
being	  rather	  than	  an	  act	  of	  protest,	  I	  contend	  that	  through	  these	  patterns	  of	  activism,	  the	  Karen	  
develop	  a	  political	  self	  that	  aims	  to	  advance	  their	  political	  claims	  and	  subvert	  institutional	  norms	  of	  
political	  belonging	  by	  negotiating	  their	  own	  place	  in	  the	  political	  domain.	  In	  doing	  this	  the	  Karen	  
develop	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  that	  strengthens	  Karen	  political	  agency	  and	  challenges	  forms	  
of	  governance	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  structuring	  the	  chapter	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  allows	  me	  to	  first	  
examine	  operations	  of	  coercive	  regulation	  over	  displaced	  persons	  lives	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  then	  
map	  this	  against	  how	  it	  is	  lived	  by	  those	  displaced	  persons	  themselves.	  
This	  chapter	  is	  at	  a	  pivotal	  point	  in	  the	  thesis	  for	  it	  moves	  away	  from	  state	  operations	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  borderlands	  to	  examine	  displaced	  Karen	  responses	  to	  forms	  of	  governance	  and	  regulation.	  
It	  does	  this	  by	  building	  upon	  the	  argument	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  two	  chapters,	  that	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  attempts	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  the	  borderlands	  space	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  political	  authority	  
attached	  to	  the	  modern	  territorial	  border,	  to	  develop	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  Karen,	  in	  sharp	  
distinction	  to	  this,	  create	  a	  borderlands	  space	  based	  on	  an	  interchange	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  
which	  in	  this	  particular	  context,	  is	  framed	  by	  social	  relations	  associated	  with	  fluidity	  and	  
contestability.	  While	  the	  activities	  inherent	  in	  this	  interchange	  occur	  largely	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  
border,	  as	  I	  show	  over	  the	  coming	  chapters,	  practices	  of	  activism,	  solidarity	  and	  identity	  are	  
intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  relationships	  and	  activities	  that	  occur	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  
This	  constitutes	  a	  key	  conceptual	  framing	  of	  my	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘borderlands’.	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  
understand	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  one	  must	  see	  them	  as	  inter-­‐
connection	  to	  what	  occurs	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  	  
This	  interchange	  across	  the	  national	  border	  is	  framed	  by	  three	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  
are	  integral	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument,	  in	  that	  they	  are	  evidence	  of	  a	  set	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  
can	  be	  mapped	  across	  the	  borderlands	  domain	  and	  which	  critically	  inform	  the	  construction	  and	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  particular	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  These	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  
can	  be	  characterised	  as	  patterns	  of	  activism	  (covered	  in	  this	  chapter),	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  
(covered	  in	  Chapter	  Six)	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  (covered	  in	  Chapter	  Seven).	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While	  this	  chapter	  is	  largely	  preoccupied	  with	  patterns	  of	  activism	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  social	  practice,	  it	  
also	  begins	  to	  develop	  a	  parallel	  thread	  around	  another	  key	  theme	  of	  this	  thesis,	  a	  Karen	  identity	  
specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  While	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  developed	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  
national	  identity	  attached	  to	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain,	  this	  chapter	  moves	  the	  debate	  beyond	  a	  
singular	  preoccupation	  with	  territory	  as	  an	  understanding	  of	  spatial	  identity	  to	  explore	  how	  
human	  activity	  can	  make	  space	  meaningful	  and	  foster	  complex	  spatial	  identities.	  While	  this	  point	  
is	  developed	  over	  the	  remaining	  chapters,	  this	  thread	  culminates	  in	  Chapter	  8	  where	  I	  argue	  these	  
modes	  of	  social	  practice	  develop	  a	  performative	  dimension	  of	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  formed	  
through	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  identity-­‐making	  that	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past	  as	  
well	  as	  being	  shaped	  by	  the	  present	  circumstances	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  
INSTITUTIONAL	  GOVERNANCE	  IN	  THE	  BORDERLANDS	  
Displaced	  Karen	  experience	  a	  precarious	  existence	  in	  Thailand,	  and	  this	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  system	  
of	  institutional	  governance	  under	  which	  they	  must	  operate.	  Most	  displaced	  Karen	  living	  in	  Thailand	  
are	  effectively	  stateless;	  having	  no	  citizen’s	  rights	  in	  Thailand	  and	  unable	  to	  return	  to	  Burma.	  As	  a	  
result	  their	  options	  for	  legal	  status	  and	  access	  to	  essential	  services	  are	  limited.	  They	  face	  threats	  of	  
deportation	  back	  to	  Burma	  and	  are	  often	  vulnerable	  to	  crime	  and	  discrimination.	  They	  are	  
considered	  a	  burden	  on	  Thai	  state	  resources	  and	  a	  strain	  on	  the	  diplomatic	  relationship	  between	  
the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  governments.	  In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  ‘undesirables’	  
(Agier,	  2011)	  status	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  form	  of	  governance	  that	  has	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  borderlands	  
space.	  This	  system	  attempts	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  a	  type	  of	  “territorial	  
quarantine”	  (Agier,	  2011,	  p.	  24),	  where	  they	  are	  both	  highly	  stigmatised	  and	  largely	  ignored	  (or	  at	  
least	  that	  is	  the	  intent).	  
To	  talk	  of	  governance	  is	  to	  talk	  of	  a	  vast	  and	  highly	  contested	  field	  of	  academic	  study.	  While	  
acknowledging	  these	  inherent	  complexities,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  take	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  
governance	  as	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority,	  with	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  its	  relationship	  to	  
structures	  of	  control	  (Agier,	  2011;	  Papadopoulos,	  Stephenson,	  &	  Tsianos,	  2008;	  Wilson	  &	  Donnan,	  
1998).	  This	  broad	  position	  allows	  me	  to	  integrate	  a	  range	  of	  agents	  of	  power	  into	  the	  discussion	  –	  
governments,	  institutions,	  humanitarian	  organisations,	  leaders,	  civil	  society,	  individuals	  and	  the	  
grassroots.	  While	  I	  talk	  of	  particular	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (MOI)	  or	  UNHCR,	  
my	  intent	  is	  to	  keep	  the	  discussion	  of	  institutional	  governance	  at	  a	  broader	  level	  of	  government	  
and	  humanitarian	  operations	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  a	  particular	  organisation.	  This	  
allows	  me	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority	  over	  displaced	  Karen	  regardless	  of	  its	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source,	  and	  draw	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  particular	  institutions	  as	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  points	  I	  
make.	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  key	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority	  occurs	  in	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  fixed	  national	  territorial	  boundary	  as	  an	  
expression	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  control	  (Donnan	  &	  Wilson,	  1999;	  Newman,	  2001;	  Smith,	  
1986),	  a	  point	  generally	  accepted	  or	  observed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  within	  the	  national	  
borders	  who	  are	  considered	  members	  of	  this	  political	  community	  (Gellner,	  1983,	  p.	  7).	  From	  this	  
perspective	  control	  over	  space	  and	  movement	  within	  that	  territory	  becomes	  the	  right	  of	  the	  
governing	  authority,	  and	  is	  implemented	  by	  established	  institutions	  that	  ensure	  its	  surveillance	  and	  
enforcement.	  This	  is	  often	  described	  as	  the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  state’s	  right	  to	  determine	  who	  can	  
enter	  and	  stay	  in	  their	  country,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions.	  This	  type	  of	  governance	  is	  commonly	  
representative	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  who	  pursues	  policies	  that	  reinforce	  their	  territorial	  and	  political	  
authority.	  
The	  second	  way	  in	  which	  political	  authority	  is	  expressed	  is	  through	  a	  process	  of	  administrative	  
categorisation.	  This	  is	  where	  authority	  is	  exerted	  through	  a	  series	  of	  labels	  used	  to	  determine	  a	  
person’s	  position	  and	  associated	  treatment,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  clear	  identification	  to	  assist	  
bureaucratic	  classification	  and	  resource	  allocation	  (Wood,	  1985,	  p.	  9;	  Zetter,	  1991,	  p.	  44).	  This	  is	  
most	  visible	  in	  the	  humanitarian	  aid	  apparatus,	  though	  not	  singularly	  attributable	  to	  it,	  which	  
works	  within	  a	  system	  focused	  on	  managing	  the	  numbers	  of	  displaced	  persons;	  identifying	  them	  
(through	  administrative	  categorisation)	  for	  resource	  allocation	  purposes,	  and	  so	  that	  displaced	  
persons	  can	  ultimately	  be	  either	  expelled	  or	  resettled.	  This	  is	  framed	  by	  a	  process	  of	  justification	  of	  
status	  (proving	  you	  are	  refugee	  –	  persecuted,	  a	  victim)	  rather	  than	  recognising	  a	  person’s	  rights	  as	  
a	  citizen	  or	  political	  being.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  dominant	  practice	  is	  now	  one	  of	  control,	  deeply	  
embedded	  in	  the	  system	  of	  governance,	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  traditional	  notion	  associated	  with	  
refugees,	  that	  of	  protection	  or	  humanitarian	  goodwill.	  
But	  there	  is	  also	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  this	  system	  of	  governance,	  a	  type	  of	  challenge	  that	  emerges	  
when	  the	  Karen	  engage	  with	  the	  limitations	  it	  places	  on	  them.	  This	  manifests	  as	  a	  resistance	  to	  a	  
process	  that	  inadequately	  captures	  the	  Karen	  political	  self	  and	  is	  strongly	  aligned	  to	  the	  spatial	  
attributes	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  For	  example,	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  that	  reinforces	  ‘not	  belonging’	  
gives	  displaced	  Karen	  the	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  and	  articulate	  their	  own	  identity	  and	  what	  their	  
political	  and	  social	  needs	  are.	  A	  system	  of	  governance	  that	  seeks	  to	  control	  necessarily	  creates	  the	  
conditions	  for	  contestation	  and	  resistance.	  Where	  citizenship	  is	  not	  a	  given,	  one	  is	  not	  constrained	  
by	  the	  obligations	  that	  go	  with	  it.	  This	  link	  between	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  political	  self	  and	  the	  
attributes	  of	  the	  space	  suggests	  an	  experience	  of	  both	  marginalisation	  and	  agency.	  But	  this	  should	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not	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  either-­‐or	  dynamic.	  In	  the	  borderlands,	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  to	  both	  use	  and	  
resist	  the	  structures	  designed	  to	  govern	  the	  displaced	  population.	  
Through	  her	  research	  on	  the	  Meratus	  in	  Indonesia,	  anthropologist	  Anna	  Tsing	  suggests	  a	  useful	  
way	  of	  understanding	  this	  dynamic	  which	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  Karen:	  that	  one	  
can	  be	  “simultaneously	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  state”.	  
Marginals	  stand	  outside	  the	  state	  by	  tying	  themselves	  to	  it;	  they	  constitute	  the	  state	  
locally	  by	  fleeing	  from	  it.	  As	  culturally	  “different”	  subjects	  they	  can	  never	  be	  citizens;	  as	  
culturally	  different	  “subjects”,	  they	  can	  never	  escape	  citizenship	  (Tsing,	  1993,	  p.	  26).	  
It	  is	  a	  point	  that	  has	  particular	  resonance	  with	  the	  sometimes	  contradictory	  behaviours	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  the	  nexus	  of	  controlled-­‐contested	  space	  tensions	  (in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  a	  contradiction	  between	  the	  modern	  territorial	  domain	  and	  
the	  social	  relations	  of	  displaced	  Karen),	  the	  Karen	  often	  question	  the	  system	  of	  governance	  while	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  tying	  themselves	  to	  its	  structures.	  For	  example,	  a	  displaced	  Karen	  person	  in	  
Thailand	  may	  not	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  Thai	  citizen	  or	  benefit	  from	  citizenship	  in	  Burma,	  yet	  their	  
struggle	  is	  to	  gain	  such	  recognition	  for	  their	  own	  grouping,	  not	  to	  disrupt	  and	  replace	  the	  system	  
completely.	  What	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  paradoxical	  dilemma	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  sanctioning	  
these	  governance	  structures	  nor	  be	  seen	  as	  confusion	  around	  Karen	  roles	  and	  motivations.	  Many	  
displaced	  Karen	  walk	  a	  fine	  line	  between	  accommodation	  of	  state	  policy	  and	  resistance	  to	  it,	  and	  
this	  is	  partially	  how	  they	  negotiate	  their	  own	  place	  in	  the	  political	  domain.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  across	  
the	  coming	  chapters,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  creative	  resistances,	  only	  possible	  when	  there	  is	  some	  
accommodation	  to	  begin	  with,	  that	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  can	  produce	  some	  of	  their	  greatest	  
scenes	  of	  agency.	  This	  process	  of	  accommodation	  and	  resistance	  is	  perhaps	  most	  evident	  in	  the	  
way	  some	  displaced	  Karen	  question	  the	  limitations	  placed	  on	  them	  by	  the	  refugee	  label	  because	  it	  
suppresses	  their	  political	  agency,	  but	  also	  embrace	  the	  term	  for	  the	  benefits	  it	  brings	  them	  in	  
terms	  of	  food,	  shelter	  and	  other	  services.	  It	  is	  this	  tension	  that	  characterises	  many	  of	  the	  activities	  
of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  and	  underpins	  a	  key	  point	  of	  this	  chapter,	  namely	  that	  the	  
borderlands	  constitutes	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  where	  Karen	  agency	  is	  strengthened	  through	  
patterns	  of	  activism	  that	  challenge	  the	  structures	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  prevailing	  system	  of	  
governance.	  
Consolidating	  place:	  controlling	  movement	  
This	  section	  argues	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  institutional	  governance	  establish	  a	  series	  of	  controls	  
over	  space	  and	  movement	  that	  aim	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  refugee	  and	  displaced	  populations.	  
Many	  displaced	  Karen	  counter	  this	  institutionalised	  power	  by	  living	  in	  ways	  that	  contest	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institutionalised	  control	  of	  the	  space.	  They	  do	  this	  by	  moving	  illegally	  across	  nation-­‐state	  
boundaries	  and	  living	  outside	  administrative	  containment	  lines.	  In	  analysing	  these	  challenges	  to	  
forms	  of	  institutional	  power	  there	  are	  hints	  of	  a	  more	  creative	  use	  of	  the	  space	  than	  traditional	  
nation-­‐state	  ideologies	  allow.	  
The	  most	  obvious	  form	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  the	  exercise	  of	  authority	  by	  the	  nation-­‐
state.	  This	  authority	  constitutes	  typical	  nation-­‐state	  operations	  of	  power	  for	  control	  over	  space	  
and	  movement.	  Devices	  used	  to	  exert	  this	  control	  are	  familiar	  to	  state	  logic:	  checkpoints,	  
detention	  centres,	  prisons,	  local	  bureaucracies,	  border	  control	  and	  other	  features	  typical	  of	  the	  
modern	  socio-­‐political	  landscape	  (Malkki,	  2002).	  For	  displaced	  Karen,	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  have	  largely	  excluded	  them	  from	  being	  politically	  active	  subjects	  of	  Burma,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  
extent	  Thailand.	  This	  exclusion	  is	  managed	  through	  state	  devices	  that	  exert	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  
right,	  and	  power,	  to	  control	  and	  contain	  its	  territory,	  and	  that	  territory’s	  inhabitants.	  This	  
controlled	  space	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  principle	  of	  territorial	  sovereignty	  (Malkki,	  1992;	  Tangseefa,	  
2006).	  
An	  obvious	  example	  of	  this	  controlled	  space	  is	  the	  Thai	  Government’s	  attempts	  to	  contain	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  refugee	  camps	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  essentially	  applying	  fixed	  territorial	  
principles	  to	  their	  containment.	  Here	  we	  have	  delineated	  spaces	  aimed	  at	  segregating	  displaced	  
Karen	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population,	  both	  physically	  and	  psychologically.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  ways.	  The	  camps	  are	  fenced	  and	  patrolled	  by	  the	  Thai	  military	  and	  other	  paramilitary	  
groups61	  used	  by	  MOI	  for	  security	  in	  the	  camps.	  Movement	  of	  people	  and	  goods	  in	  to	  and	  out	  of	  
the	  camp	  is	  regulated	  by	  a	  combination,	  sometimes	  contradictory,	  of	  Thai	  Government	  policy	  and	  
the	  disposition	  of	  local	  authorities.	  The	  institutionalised	  bureaucracy	  attempts	  to	  register	  the	  
camp	  populations	  for	  identification	  purposes	  for	  resource	  allocation	  and	  determining	  
entitlements.	  The	  locations	  of	  the	  camps	  are	  often	  remote	  and	  difficult	  to	  access.	  Camps	  such	  as	  
Mae	  La	  Oon	  and	  Mae	  Surin,62	  both	  close	  to	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  prone	  to	  road	  closures,	  can	  
be	  inaccessible	  during	  the	  rainy	  season.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  camps,	  being	  both	  geographically	  and	  
psychologically	  isolating,	  create	  immense	  distances	  between	  the	  camps	  and	  other	  human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  The	  most	  common	  paramilitary	  group	  is	  the	  Or	  Sor,	  or	  in	  Thai	  the	  Kong	  Asa	  Raksa	  Dindaen,	  translated	  as	  
Volunteer	  Defence	  Forces,	  who	  have	  a	  reputation	  for	  violence	  and	  corruption.	  These	  volunteer	  forces	  are	  
mostly	  found	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  in	  Thailand’s	  southern	  regions,	  both	  areas	  with	  volatile	  
security	  concerns.	  Along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  their	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  manage	  the	  flow	  of	  refugees.	  This	  
includes	  being	  used	  as	  a	  security	  force	  for	  the	  various	  refugee	  camps,	  manning	  camp	  checkpoints	  and	  
monitoring	  refugee	  flows	  across	  the	  border.	  For	  more	  discussion	  of	  the	  Or	  Sor	  and	  other	  militia	  units	  see	  
‘Militia	  Redux’	  by	  Desmond	  Ball	  and	  David	  Scott	  Mathieson	  (2007).	  
62Mae	  La	  Oon	  is	  located	  in	  Mae	  Sariang	  province	  and	  sits	  about	  2km	  from	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  During	  the	  
rainy	  season	  the	  road	  suffers	  from	  erosion	  and	  4WDs	  and	  chains	  are	  required.	  In	  2002	  the	  camp	  experienced	  
a	  flash	  flood	  which	  killed	  26	  refugees	  from	  the	  camp	  population.	  Mae	  Surin	  is	  located	  in	  Mae	  Hong	  Son	  
province	  and	  sits	  about	  3km	  from	  the	  border.	  The	  road	  to	  the	  camp	  is	  also	  prone	  to	  flooding	  from	  local	  rivers	  
which	  tends	  to	  isolate	  the	  camp	  for	  long	  periods.	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populations.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  find	  themselves	  isolated	  in	  camps	  which	  reinforce	  
their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  Thai	  nation-­‐state,	  including	  benefiting	  from	  the	  state’s	  protection,	  as	  was	  
the	  case	  with	  the	  burning	  down	  of	  the	  Huay	  Kaloke	  and	  Don	  Pa	  Kiang	  camps.	  
The	  Thai	  nation-­‐state	  conducts	  other	  operations	  that	  tend	  to	  exclude	  or	  isolate	  displaced	  Karen.	  
These	  policies	  remove	  displaced	  Karen	  –	  those	  living	  in	  Thai	  communities	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  
refugee	  camps	  –	  from	  what	  is	  common	  and	  normalised	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population.	  Thai	  
identification	  cards,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  categorise	  and	  regulate	  citizenship	  and	  therefore	  nation-­‐
state	  membership,	  act	  as	  a	  form	  of	  exclusion	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  are	  denied	  access	  to	  the	  
card.	  Without	  this	  recognised	  identification,	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  also	  excluded	  from	  state	  health	  
and	  education	  services	  as	  well	  as	  secure	  employment	  opportunities.	  Thai	  military	  checkpoints	  
regulate	  the	  movement	  of	  people	  into	  and	  out	  of	  the	  border	  area.	  A	  point	  commonly	  made	  by	  
those	  I	  interviewed	  during	  fieldwork	  was	  that	  failure	  to	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  free	  movement	  (Thai	  
identification	  card	  or	  foreign	  passport)	  meant	  you	  were	  either	  put	  into	  detention	  or	  subject	  to	  
fines.	  Similarly,	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  many	  of	  these	  operations	  act	  to	  instil	  and	  regulate	  fear.	  Fear,	  be	  it	  
for	  survival	  or	  of	  the	  authorities,	  can	  occupy	  much	  of	  the	  daily	  thoughts	  and	  activities	  of	  displaced	  
Karen.	  As	  such,	  fear	  can	  provide	  a	  form	  of	  authority	  as	  it	  underpins	  a	  largely	  self-­‐regulating	  system	  
of	  control.	  Many	  of	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  I	  interviewed	  indicated	  that	  at	  various	  times	  they	  self-­‐
regulated	  their	  movements	  within	  Mae	  Sot	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  being	  picked	  up	  by	  Thai	  police	  checks.	  
For	  some	  this	  self-­‐regulation	  meant	  they	  rarely	  left	  their	  house	  or	  at	  least	  their	  immediate	  
community.	  
Yet	  displaced	  Karen	  undertake	  many	  activities	  that	  challenge	  the	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  them	  by	  
this	  system	  of	  governance,	  and	  it	  is	  here	  that	  we	  see	  the	  strongest	  evidence	  of	  Karen	  activism	  and	  
political	  agency.	  One	  such	  example	  is	  the	  way	  refugee’s	  reference	  the	  camp	  attributes	  with	  terms	  
similar	  to	  an	  urban	  town.	  In	  Mae	  La	  refugee	  camp,	  many	  residents	  refer	  to	  the	  main	  thoroughfare	  
through	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  camp	  as	  “the	  highway”,	  a	  familiar	  term	  in	  a	  typical	  urban	  environment.	  
Churches	  and	  schools	  are	  built	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  restore	  some	  form	  of	  normalcy	  to	  social	  and	  
religious	  life.	  Administrative	  structures	  divide	  the	  camp	  into	  localised	  sections	  with	  accompanying	  
leaders	  and	  mini-­‐bureaucracies,	  similar	  to	  the	  village	  structures	  left	  behind	  in	  Burma.	  Some	  
refugees	  set	  up	  small	  shops	  to	  sell	  fish	  sauce,	  rice	  and	  other	  commodities	  to	  the	  camp	  residents.	  
Mobile	  phones,	  motorbikes	  and	  the	  internet	  have	  slowly	  filtered	  in,	  connecting	  Mae	  La	  to	  the	  
outside	  world	  and	  introducing	  elements	  of	  a	  modern	  socio-­‐political	  landscape.	  Such	  scenes	  are	  
familiar	  in	  many	  of	  the	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  and	  show	  that	  while	  the	  nation-­‐state	  
manages	  the	  refugee	  camps	  as	  spaces	  of	  exception	  –	  characterised	  by	  mechanisms	  that	  segregate,	  
exclude	  and	  control	  –	  residents	  create	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  space	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  strikingly	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familiar	  to	  normal	  village	  life.	  But	  more	  than	  this,	  residents	  are	  challenging	  typical	  understandings	  
of	  what	  camps	  should	  look	  like	  and	  how	  a	  refugee	  should	  act;	  in	  doing	  so	  they	  disrupt	  the	  
accepted	  realities	  so	  often	  associated	  with	  institutional	  categories.	  
These	  conditions	  can	  of	  course	  be	  deceptive.	  Using	  an	  intellectual	  exchange	  between	  Michel	  
Agier,	  Liisa	  Malkki	  and	  Zygmunt	  Bauman	  that	  discusses	  the	  notion	  of	  refugee	  camps	  as	  
comparable	  to	  urban	  cities	  (2002),	  I	  want	  to	  both	  deepen	  and	  complicate	  my	  argument	  by	  stating	  
that	  while	  Mae	  La	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  attributes	  similar	  to	  any	  other	  town,	  in	  reality	  such	  an	  urban	  
space	  is	  largely	  beyond	  the	  camp	  resident’s	  reach.	  Thai	  security	  personnel	  are	  known	  to	  conduct	  
raids	  and	  confiscate	  people’s	  motorbikes.	  The	  remoteness	  of	  some	  of	  the	  camps	  means	  that	  while	  
mobile	  phones	  are	  present	  in	  the	  camps,	  coverage	  is	  often	  restricted.	  Many	  refugees	  illegally	  leave	  
the	  camps,	  but	  many	  more	  are	  confined	  within	  its	  perimeter.	  An	  urban	  centre	  also	  brings	  with	  it	  
an	  expectation	  of	  service	  provision	  by	  the	  state	  –	  public	  transport,	  roads	  or	  sanitation	  –	  and	  more	  
broadly	  citizenship	  (Holston	  &	  Appadurai,	  1996),	  but	  these	  are	  not	  evident	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  
The	  lack	  of	  services	  reinforce	  that	  Mae	  La	  is	  a	  refugee	  camp;	  people	  are	  not	  free	  to	  leave	  and	  this	  
is	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  that	  isolates	  the	  refugee	  camps	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Thailand’s	  urban	  
centres.	  To	  borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  Liisa	  Malkki,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  the	  camps	  “social	  voids”,	  in	  fact	  
what	  we	  are	  seeing	  is	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  live	  in	  “complex	  systems	  of	  relationship”	  (2002,	  p.	  
359).	  These	  relationships	  position	  the	  Karen	  as	  political,	  social,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  actors	  
(which	  frame	  their	  agency)	  as	  well	  as	  institutionally	  perceived	  refugees	  (victims,	  apolitical).	  The	  
Karen	  live	  this	  tension,	  and	  rather	  than	  being	  victims	  of	  these	  constraints,	  the	  Karen	  immerse	  
themselves	  in	  it,	  utilising	  the	  ambiguities	  to	  create	  their	  own	  place	  in	  the	  political	  domain.	  
So	  how	  do	  these	  complex	  relationships	  manifest?	  How	  do	  some	  of	  these	  challenges	  to	  state	  
control	  over	  space	  occur?	  And	  where	  can	  we	  see	  evidence	  of	  this	  Karen	  activism	  and	  creative	  
resistance?	  I	  have	  indicated	  that	  many	  refugees	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  challenge	  the	  
restrictions	  upon	  their	  movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camps,	  choosing	  to	  move	  across	  the	  
institutionalised	  boundaries	  meant	  to	  contain	  and	  control	  them.	  The	  reasons	  they	  do	  this	  fulfil	  
complex	  needs	  associated	  with	  practical	  survival	  and	  the	  need	  to	  pursue	  political	  activities.	  For	  
example,	  the	  camp	  environment	  inhibits	  practical	  concerns	  around	  providing	  money,	  food	  and	  
other	  material	  for	  friends	  and	  family.	  Aid	  organisations	  provide	  basic	  food	  supplies	  to	  the	  camps,	  
but	  additional	  food	  and	  income	  generation	  projects	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  and	  
refugees	  are	  forced	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  to	  have	  these	  needs	  met.	  As	  a	  result,	  men	  and	  particularly	  
youth,	  move	  outside	  the	  camps	  to	  find	  jobs	  and	  provide	  an	  income.	  There	  are	  other	  reasons	  for	  
leaving	  the	  camps.	  The	  camp	  environment	  is	  spatially	  isolated	  and	  densely	  populated.	  These	  
cramped	  and	  dispiriting	  conditions	  impact	  the	  physical	  and	  emotional	  capacities	  of	  displaced	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Karen	  to	  fight	  immobility	  and	  despair.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  concern	  for	  those	  who	  remain	  inside	  the	  
camps:	  
Now	  I	  live	  in	  Tham	  Hin	  [refugee	  camp]	  and	  I	  have	  no	  happiness	  because	  I	  live	  in	  another	  
country	  and	  I	  cannot	  speak	  their	  language.	  My	  life	  is	  like	  an	  animal.	  I	  can	  only	  eat	  when	  
people	  feed	  me,	  I	  stay	  here,	  I	  sleep	  here,	  I	  go	  to	  the	  toilet	  here,	  it	  is	  like	  we	  are	  a	  herd	  of	  
cattle	  …	  If	  we	  go	  outside	  looking	  for	  vegetables	  we	  are	  afraid	  of	  the	  police.	  We	  don’t	  have	  
space	  to	  grow	  our	  own	  vegetables	  or	  bury	  our	  own	  bodies	  (Moo,	  interview,	  15	  September	  
2005).	  
Moo	  identifies	  a	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  the	  most	  intrinsic	  of	  human	  needs	  –	  that	  of	  living	  and	  dying.	  
More	  than	  humiliating,	  this	  is	  a	  deeply	  dehumanising	  place	  to	  be.	  It	  goes	  beyond	  a	  denial	  of	  basic	  
civil	  and	  political	  rights	  to	  include	  the	  most	  fundamental	  –	  the	  sanctity	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  life.	  
Moo	  also	  highlights	  a	  practical	  concern.	  The	  camp	  is	  a	  place	  of	  idleness	  and	  powerlessness.	  She	  is	  
a	  victim	  of	  rigid	  policy	  that	  restricts	  her	  ability	  to	  grow	  vegetables	  and	  make	  decisions	  over	  food	  
and	  housing.	  Typical	  daily	  activities	  and	  decision-­‐making	  are	  removed	  from	  her	  control.	  A	  
consequence	  is	  a	  permeating	  idleness	  that	  threatens	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  fabric	  of	  camp	  
populations	  –	  the	  most	  visible	  of	  which	  are	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  abuse,	  domestic	  violence	  and	  gang-­‐
related	  incidents	  among	  youth.	  
While	  Moo’s	  story	  is	  a	  common	  one,	  there	  are	  also	  many	  refugees	  who	  challenge	  these	  types	  of	  
restrictions	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  redefine	  how	  the	  space	  is	  controlled.	  One	  refugee	  explained	  to	  me	  
that	  she	  weaves	  clothes	  and	  sells	  them	  to	  foreign	  organisations	  as	  a	  way	  of	  getting	  around	  camp	  
restrictions	  on	  movement	  and	  to	  provide	  an	  income	  for	  her	  family.	  The	  task	  counters	  her	  idleness	  
and	  depletes	  feelings	  of	  uselessness	  and	  despair.	  The	  income	  ensures	  her	  children	  can	  receive	  an	  
education.	  Of	  course,	  in	  this	  instance	  confinement	  to	  the	  camp	  continues,	  and	  there	  is	  some	  
legitimacy	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  she	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  dependency	  upon	  foreign	  organisations	  for	  
income.	  While	  long-­‐term	  income	  generation	  projects	  remain	  elusive	  in	  the	  camps	  these	  
arguments	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  of	  concern.	  However,	  the	  ability	  of	  this	  particular	  woman	  to	  provide	  
an	  income	  for	  her	  family	  has	  a	  considerable	  short-­‐term	  impact	  upon	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  lives.	  She	  is	  
able	  to	  make	  decisions	  over	  her	  daily	  tasks	  and	  where	  the	  money	  is	  spent,	  giving	  her	  some	  control	  
over	  the	  space	  in	  which	  she	  is	  forced	  to	  live.	  
Other	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  refuse	  to	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  refugee	  camps	  for	  socio-­‐
political	  reasons.	  The	  camp	  restrictions	  limit	  their	  capacity	  to	  undertake	  their	  political	  and	  activist	  
activities.	  Instead	  they	  negotiate	  a	  complex	  connection	  with	  the	  camps	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  
move	  between	  the	  camps	  and	  outside	  communities.	  The	  fluidity	  of	  this	  movement	  involves	  many	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factors	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  must	  negotiate.	  Thai-­‐Burma	  government	  relations,	  and	  particularly	  
high-­‐level	  government	  visits	  often	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  at	  checkpoints	  and	  restrictions	  
on	  movement	  throughout	  the	  border	  area.	  This	  often	  results	  in	  lockdowns	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  or	  the	  
refugee	  camps.	  Many	  Karen	  who	  leave	  the	  camps	  develop	  relationships	  with	  the	  Or	  Sor	  or	  camp	  
authorities	  to	  better	  facilitate	  movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camps.	  Maintaining	  this	  freedom	  of	  
movement	  is	  integral	  to	  their	  activities.	  Underpinning	  this	  connection	  is	  the	  premise	  that	  access	  to	  
the	  refugee	  camps	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  Karen	  activism;	  it	  is	  complete	  confinement	  to	  the	  
camps	  that	  many	  activists	  try	  to	  avoid.	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  more	  subtle	  challenge	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  definitive	  modern	  
territorial	  domain	  where	  authorities	  can	  control	  space	  and	  movement.	  This	  occurs	  in	  the	  way	  
many	  displaced	  Karen	  treat	  their	  situation	  as	  temporary	  by	  retaining	  hope	  of	  return	  to	  their	  
homeland.	  Common	  statements	  I	  heard	  during	  my	  work	  along	  the	  border	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  
were,	  ‘We	  are	  only	  here	  until	  things	  get	  better	  in	  Burma’,	  or	  ‘One	  day	  I	  will	  return	  to	  my	  home’.	  
Even	  Karen	  who	  had	  been	  along	  the	  border	  for	  more	  than	  20	  years	  expressed	  this	  sentiment.	  One	  
Karen	  man	  I	  interviewed	  talked	  about	  Thailand	  as	  “a	  temporary	  place”.	  He	  has	  lived	  in	  Thailand	  for	  
over	  twenty	  years,	  spending	  time	  both	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  and	  in	  local	  Thai	  communities,	  but	  he	  
did	  not	  see	  himself	  as	  a	  ‘refugee’	  or	  as	  ‘Thai’.	  He	  saw	  himself	  as	  a	  Karen	  person	  living	  in	  a	  
temporary	  place	  until	  he	  could	  return	  to	  his	  home	  inside	  Burma	  (U	  Kyi,	  2007).	  A	  further	  example	  
of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  song	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’,	  where	  another	  Karen	  participant	  I	  spoke	  with	  in	  
2005	  talks	  of	  his	  wish	  to	  return	  to	  the	  land	  that	  encapsulates	  family,	  home	  and	  spiritual	  
connection,	  an	  excerpt	  of	  which	  is	  below.	  
Oh,	  I	  miss	  the	  place	  where	  I	  was	  born	  
I	  long	  for	  the	  songs	  my	  mum	  sang	  to	  me	  
And	  her	  love	  drags	  me	  to	  recall	  the	  place	  I	  once	  lived	  
Wishing	  to	  be	  back	  there	  before	  the	  end	  of	  my	  days	  
‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’,	  written	  by	  Loo	  Ne	  
The	  sense	  of	  how	  long	  this	  might	  take	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  last	  line,	  suggesting	  the	  struggle	  may	  be	  
long	  but	  that	  the	  current	  predicament	  is	  a	  temporary	  one	  and	  that	  return	  to	  the	  homeland	  is	  the	  
ultimate	  objective.	  The	  sense	  of	  time	  in	  this	  song	  is	  peripheral	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  connection	  to	  land	  
and	  to	  culture	  as	  being	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  Karen	  identity.	  It	  is	  this	  attitude	  which	  maintains	  the	  
Karen	  sense	  of	  temporariness	  in	  Thailand	  and	  is	  a	  sentiment	  also	  echoed	  by	  Moo:	  
Other	  countries	  will	  be	  nice	  for	  a	  while	  but	  later	  we	  will	  get	  thirsty.	  When	  I	  think	  about	  
this	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied.	  Why	  were	  we	  created	  to	  be	  humans?	  But	  I’m	  not	  disappointed,	  I’ve	  
had	  five	  children,	  I	  have	  my	  own	  people.	  Even	  though	  it	  takes	  so	  long	  one	  day	  my	  hopes	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will	  be	  fulfilled.	  If	  not	  fulfilled	  in	  my	  lifetime,	  then	  at	  least	  in	  my	  children’s	  (Moo,	  
interview,	  15	  September	  2005).	  
Moo	  uses	  a	  metaphor	  which	  equates	  her	  experience	  of	  displacement	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  essential	  
human	  requirement:	  speaking	  metaphorically	  she	  says	  that	  without	  liquid	  you	  are	  thirsty,	  without	  
a	  homeland	  you	  are	  empty.	  This	  connection	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  home	  is	  explored	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  
Chapter	  Seven;	  however	  it	  is	  sufficient	  at	  this	  point	  to	  say	  that	  this	  connection	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  
home,	  which	  is	  somewhere	  else,	  remains	  integral	  to	  the	  Karen	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  wellbeing	  in	  
the	  borderlands.	  And	  that	  the	  current	  placement,	  in	  a	  space	  that	  is	  not	  home,	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  
perceived	  as	  a	  temporary	  one,	  and	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  story	  of	  the	  borderlands.	  
These	  references	  to	  temporality,	  like	  those	  of	  the	  political	  and	  social	  injustices	  also	  mentioned,	  
suggest	  actions	  that	  situate	  the	  borderlands	  space	  in	  a	  broader	  historical,	  political	  and	  cultural	  
context.	  These	  stories	  transform	  the	  stable	  configuration	  of	  the	  modern	  territorial	  border	  into	  one	  
animated	  by	  the	  practices	  and	  stories	  that	  characterise	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  The	  operations	  of	  
the	  nation-­‐state	  towards	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  work	  to	  de-­‐historicise	  their	  
experiences	  and	  their	  voices	  by	  extracting	  their	  political	  and	  cultural	  context,	  and	  in	  turn	  
universalising	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  experience.	  This	  tension	  between	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  attempts	  to	  
regulate	  and	  control	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  and	  displaced	  Karen	  contestations	  over	  that	  same	  
space	  are	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  from	  which	  a	  
Karen	  identity	  is	  constructed	  and	  projected.	  
Institutionalised	  labelling:	  controlling	  resources	  
Working	  in	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  with	  this	  control	  over	  movement	  is	  a	  ‘legal	  cocktail’	  (Holston	  &	  
Appadurai,	  1996)	  of	  labels	  that	  reinforce	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  that	  further	  isolates	  displaced	  
Karen.	  This	  system	  of	  administrative	  categorisation	  works	  to	  identify	  and	  regulate	  the	  displaced	  
population	  and	  is	  primarily	  used	  as	  a	  way	  to	  control	  the	  movement	  and	  rights	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  
in	  the	  borderlands.	  This	  control	  is	  established	  through	  a	  number	  of	  means:	  privileging	  certain	  
categories	  of	  people,	  excluding	  categories	  where	  necessary,	  and	  complicating	  membership	  and	  
associated	  rights.	  In	  response,	  displaced	  Karen	  both	  challenge	  and	  utilise	  this	  labelling	  for	  their	  
own	  political	  purposes.	  This	  engagement	  in	  political	  angling	  represents	  a	  key	  form	  of	  Karen	  
activism	  and	  political	  agency.	  
In	  many	  ways	  labelling	  can	  provide	  a	  taxonomic	  listing	  of	  society,	  creating	  a	  logical	  and	  
recognisable	  means	  to	  describe	  and	  allocate	  the	  complexities	  in	  our	  social	  structures	  (Wood,	  
1985,	  p.	  7).	  In	  the	  ‘messy’	  political	  space	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  labels	  fulfil	  a	  need	  for	  
clear	  identification	  pathways	  that	  can	  assist	  bureaucratic	  classification	  and	  resource	  allocation	  in	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relation	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  displaced	  persons	  from	  Burma.	  Labelling	  can	  be	  beneficial,	  for	  
example	  a	  UNHCR	  registered	  refugee	  in	  one	  of	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  has	  access	  
to	  the	  resettlement	  program,	  and	  once	  resettled	  in	  a	  third	  country	  should	  gain	  benefits	  equal	  to	  
the	  citizens	  of	  that	  country.	  In	  this	  instance,	  being	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  refugee	  label	  enables	  access	  
to	  services,	  citizenship,	  education	  and	  a	  life	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  statelessness	  of	  the	  camps.	  
Without	  labels	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  define	  the	  parameters	  in	  which	  such	  a	  complex	  process	  
could	  be	  carried	  out.	  Undoubtedly,	  there	  are	  important	  and	  positive	  outcomes	  that	  emerge	  from	  a	  
system	  of	  labelling,	  but	  in	  the	  interviews	  I	  conducted	  with	  displaced	  Karen	  between	  2005	  and	  
2010,	  people	  spoke	  about	  institutionalised	  labelling	  from	  a	  very	  different	  perspective.	  Common	  
themes	  that	  emerged	  included	  the	  use	  of	  labelling	  as	  a	  means	  of	  control	  and	  restriction,	  
disempowering	  associations	  related	  to	  many	  of	  the	  labels,	  and	  the	  unbalanced	  power	  relations	  
involved	  in	  label	  identification	  and	  resource	  allocation.	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  responses	  to	  
institutionalised	  labelling	  were	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  activism	  exhibited	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  and	  it	  is	  an	  area	  worthy	  of	  further	  analysis.	  
A	  number	  of	  externally-­‐imposed	  labels	  are	  applied	  to	  displaced	  Karen,	  and	  these	  have	  a	  significant	  
impact	  on	  their	  lives.	  In	  most	  cases	  these	  labels	  are	  created	  in	  response	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  political	  
nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  and	  to	  manage	  institutional	  responses	  to	  Karen	  displacement,	  as	  
discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	  most	  obvious	  of	  these	  labels	  are	  the	  range	  used	  by	  the	  Thai	  
Government	  to	  identify	  and	  categorise	  the	  different	  groupings	  of	  Burmese	  in	  Thailand.	  One	  
participant	  spoke	  of	  how	  he	  saw	  this	  identification	  process	  working.	  
They	  use	  refugee	  registration	  just	  to	  find	  out	  who	  is	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  In	  the	  same	  
way	  they	  try	  to	  register	  migrant	  workers	  –	  these	  people	  are	  workers,	  they	  are	  not	  fleeing	  
war.	  They	  are	  just	  trying	  to	  find	  out	  who	  is	  who:	  this	  is	  a	  refugee,	  this	  is	  the	  KNU,	  this	  is	  
the	  migrant	  worker,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  stateless	  person.	  So	  if	  anything	  happens	  in	  Thailand,	  they	  
know	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  it.	  Really	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  separate	  all	  the	  groups	  so	  they	  can	  
identify	  them	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  24	  July	  2007).	  
For	  Loo	  Ne,	  labels	  are	  a	  way	  of	  identifying	  for	  political	  purposes.	  This	  inventory	  –	  refugee,	  migrant	  
worker,	  KNU	  member	  –	  comes	  with	  prescriptive	  methods	  of	  treatment.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  refugee	  
camps	  the	  ‘refugee’	  label	  is	  a	  means	  of	  identifying	  the	  recipients	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  such	  as	  food,	  
education	  and	  healthcare.	  The	  label	  ‘migrant	  worker’	  identifies	  Burmese	  working	  in	  Thailand,	  and	  
while	  this	  label	  should	  ensure	  access	  to	  state-­‐sanctioned	  working	  conditions:	  basic	  wage,	  access	  to	  
healthcare,	  and	  safe	  working	  conditions,	  it	  often	  works	  to	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  The	  Thai	  
Government	  has	  yet	  to	  introduce	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  successful	  registration	  system	  of	  Burmese	  
migrant	  workers	  and	  as	  such	  migrant	  workers	  mostly	  remain	  outside	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  law,	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and	  therefore	  vulnerable	  to	  exploitative	  practices	  and	  abuse	  which	  at	  various	  times	  has	  led	  to	  
deaths.63	  A	  Karen	  person	  working	  with	  a	  local	  NGO	  might	  be	  labelled	  ‘dissident’	  or	  a	  ‘political	  
activist’	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  Thai	  police	  crackdowns.	  
Other	  problems	  relating	  to	  label	  terminology	  exist.	  The	  Thai	  Government	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  as	  ‘refugees’.	  This	  is	  partially	  because	  Thailand	  is	  not	  a	  
signatory	  to	  the	  1951	  UN	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	  and	  therefore	  under	  no	  
legal	  obligation	  to	  recognise	  or	  treat	  the	  Karen	  as	  refugees.	  It	  would	  also	  lead	  to	  overt	  
acknowledgement	  of	  Burma’s	  political	  unrest	  and	  its	  impact	  upon	  the	  region,	  a	  position	  Thailand	  is	  
reluctant	  to	  take.	  Instead,	  the	  Thai	  Government	  labels	  those	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  ‘displaced	  
persons’.	  It	  is	  a	  deliberate	  and	  politically	  motivated	  use	  of	  terminology.	  Prior	  to	  1997,	  Thai	  
Government	  terminology	  for	  Karen	  in	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  was	  bukkhonplad	  tin,	  the	  
Thai	  phrase	  for	  ‘Displaced	  Persons’.	  After	  1997	  this	  term	  acquired	  further	  limiting	  elements	  when	  
Karen	  in	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  were	  categorised	  as	  bukkhonthi	  nee	  jakkarnsurop,	  meaning	  
‘Displaced	  Persons	  Fleeing	  Fighting’64	  and	  the	  camps	  became	  ‘temporary	  shelters’.65	  The	  refining	  
of	  this	  term	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  restrict	  the	  number	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  entering	  the	  camps	  in	  
Thailand.	  It	  also	  provided	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  related	  to	  incarceration	  in	  the	  camps,	  for	  example	  no	  
movement	  outside	  the	  camps	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  basic	  food	  and	  shelter	  being	  contingent	  on	  the	  
assistance	  of	  international	  aid	  agencies.	  
The	  Thai	  Government	  has	  also	  at	  various	  times	  unofficially	  registered,	  and	  therefore	  labelled,	  KNU	  
members.	  This	  type	  of	  member	  card	  entitles	  you	  to	  a	  set	  of	  allowances:	  for	  example	  the	  ability	  to	  
reside	  in	  Thailand,	  some	  protection	  from	  Thai	  police	  and	  safer	  movement	  throughout	  the	  border	  
area.	  It	  is	  also	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	  borderlands	  houses	  ‘political	  dissidents’,	  those	  who	  are	  
working	  within	  exiled	  political	  organisations	  or	  NGOs.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  category	  to	  
differentiate	  because	  depending	  upon	  Thai-­‐Burma	  government	  relations	  this	  particular	  grouping	  is	  
often	  the	  target	  of	  Thai	  Government	  crackdowns.	  Alternatively	  it	  is	  often	  used	  by	  the	  Burmese	  
Government	  as	  an	  example	  of	  Thailand’s	  antagonism	  towards	  them	  by	  allowing	  the	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  For	  further	  evidence	  see	  the	  Amnesty	  International	  report	  (Amnesty	  International,	  2005)	  or	  ‘Migrant	  
Registration	  Process	  Hits	  Snag’	  (2004,	  July	  1).	  The	  Irrawaddy.	  Retrieved	  December	  12,	  2011,	  from	  
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=3602.	  
64	  Technically,	  this	  terminology	  would	  exclude	  IDPs,	  or	  those	  who	  had	  hidden	  in	  the	  jungle	  for	  prolonged	  
periods	  of	  time;	  those	  who	  had	  fled	  due	  to	  economic	  reasons,	  such	  as	  destruction	  of	  their	  paddy	  fields	  and	  
theft	  of	  their	  crops	  and	  animals	  by	  Burmese	  military	  personnel;	  and	  those	  who	  feared	  for	  their	  life	  because	  
of	  affiliation	  to	  an	  ethnic	  armed	  group	  such	  as	  the	  KNLA.	  
65	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  presentation	  at	  the	  2011	  World	  Refugee	  Day	  seminar	  in	  Bangkok,	  Kasem	  
Taweepanyasakul	  from	  the	  Thai	  Government	  National	  Security	  Council	  consistently	  referred	  to	  the	  refugee	  
camps	  as	  ‘temporary	  shelters’	  and	  the	  people	  in	  the	  shelters	  as	  ‘people	  fleeing	  fighting’	  (2011	  World	  Refugee	  
Day	  Public	  Seminar	  Report:	  Situations	  of	  Forced	  Migration,	  Refugees	  and	  Asylum	  Seekers:	  Thailand's	  Role	  and	  
ASEAN	  Mechanisms,	  2011).	  Also	  see	  (Ruttanasatian,	  2004,	  p.	  18)	  for	  further	  discussion	  around	  how	  these	  
terms	  have	  been	  used	  for	  political	  purposes.	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dissidents	  to	  reside	  safely	  in	  Thailand	  and	  undertake	  their	  political	  activities	  against	  the	  Burmese	  
Government.	  
In	  addition	  to	  identifying,	  labels	  are	  also	  used	  as	  a	  means	  for	  allocating	  resources.	  In	  the	  Thai-­‐
Burma	  borderlands	  labels	  are	  used	  most	  visibly	  in	  resource	  allocations	  associated	  with	  the	  
humanitarian	  aid	  industry	  attached	  to	  the	  various	  refugee	  camps.	  The	  international	  community,	  
including	  international	  governments	  and	  humanitarian	  aid	  organisations,	  refer	  to	  those	  in	  the	  
camps	  as	  ‘refugees’.	  UNHCR,	  prior	  to	  a	  formal	  and	  comprehensive	  camp	  registration	  process	  
which	  began	  in	  200466,	  referred	  to	  this	  same	  group	  of	  people	  as	  prima	  facie	  refugees,	  refugees	  
who	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  refugees,	  but	  who	  had	  not	  been	  assessed	  on	  any	  evidence-­‐
based	  criteria.67	  
After	  2004,	  with	  the	  official	  registration	  process	  underway,	  Karen	  in	  the	  camps	  could	  become	  
UNHCR-­‐recognised	  refugees.	  The	  nuances	  in	  this	  type	  of	  terminology	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  upon	  
the	  way	  Karen	  in	  the	  camps	  were	  acknowledged	  and	  treated.	  As	  a	  prima	  facie	  refugee	  there	  is	  the	  
implication	  that	  claims	  of	  persecution	  are	  not	  yet	  legitimate	  or	  proven.	  Such	  a	  categorisation	  also	  
restricts	  entitlements	  to	  refugee	  protection	  and	  resettlement	  in	  third	  countries.	  Both	  legitimacy	  
and	  protection	  are,	  arguably,	  still	  prominent	  concerns	  of	  Karen	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps,	  despite	  
losing	  the	  prima	  facie	  label.	  
Labels	  such	  as	  these	  humanitarian	  ones	  serve	  a	  political	  purpose:	  most	  commonly	  for	  those	  
creating	  or	  allocating	  the	  label,	  not	  those	  who	  are	  the	  recipients	  of	  the	  label.	  In	  his	  article	  
‘Labelling	  in	  Development	  Policy’,	  Refugee	  Studies	  scholar	  Geoff	  Wood	  writes	  that	  labelling	  is	  the:	  
Allocation,	  distribution,	  redistribution,	  the	  management	  of	  access	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
the	  generation	  of	  resources	  through	  organising	  production,	  investment	  and	  fiscal	  activity	  
on	  the	  other	  all	  require	  processes	  of	  authoritative	  classification	  and	  designation(1985,	  p.	  
9).	  
Wood	  argues	  that	  labelling	  is	  an	  authoritative	  way	  to	  manage	  resources	  and	  organise	  production.	  
A	  look	  at	  the	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  sees	  this	  type	  of	  labelling	  in	  action.	  Refugees	  are	  
allocated	  resources	  such	  as	  food,	  shelter	  and	  clothing.	  Access	  to	  these	  resources	  is	  organised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  UNHCR	  began	  camp	  registration	  in	  1999	  but	  only	  limited	  data	  was	  collected	  at	  this	  time.	  A	  more	  formal	  
and	  comprehensive	  registration	  process	  began	  in	  2004.	  
67It	  is	  estimated	  that	  prior	  to	  2004,	  96	  percent	  (Huguet	  &	  Punpuing,	  2005)	  of	  Burma’s	  refugee	  exodus	  to	  
Thailand	  fell	  into	  this	  category	  of	  ‘prima	  facie	  refugees’.	  There	  are	  three	  conditions	  that	  define	  ‘prima	  facie’	  
refugees.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  ‘prima	  facie’	  refugee	  is	  confined	  to	  one	  of	  the	  nine	  officially	  recognised	  refugee	  
camps	  along	  the	  border.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  up	  until	  the	  comprehensive	  UNHCR	  registration	  process	  which	  
began	  in	  2004,	  ‘prima	  facie’	  refugees	  were	  excluded	  from	  obtaining	  UNHCR	  refugee	  status	  and	  therefore	  
third	  country	  resettlement.	  And	  the	  third	  condition	  is	  that	  ‘prima	  facie’	  refugees	  were	  under	  the	  
administrative	  authority	  of	  the	  Thai	  Government.	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through	  investment	  and	  funding	  from	  foreign	  governments	  and	  organisations.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
labelling	  provides	  Karen	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  with	  essential	  needs	  or	  materials.	  
But	  humanitarian	  labelling	  is	  neither	  neutral	  nor	  apolitical	  (Agier,	  2011;	  Zetter,	  1991).	  In	  managing	  
resources	  and	  organising	  production,	  labels	  serve	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  those	  allocating	  the	  label,	  
meaning	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  extract	  the	  political	  motivation	  behind	  labelling	  from	  its	  implementation.	  
This	  causes	  an	  unequal	  power	  balance	  between	  those	  allocating	  the	  label	  and	  those	  who	  are	  the	  
recipients	  of	  it.	  The	  label	  not	  only	  identifies	  a	  person,	  for	  political	  or	  resource	  distribution	  
purposes,	  but	  it	  also	  determines	  treatment	  and	  entitlements,	  giving	  legitimacy	  to	  certain	  resource	  
allocations,	  making	  them	  seem	  objective	  and	  neutral	  in	  their	  designation,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
denying	  legitimacy	  to	  other	  entitlements	  which	  may	  seem	  problematic,	  divisive	  or	  conflictive	  if	  
they	  were	  implemented.	  
There	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  make	  here.	  Where	  the	  allocation	  of	  humanitarian	  labels	  is	  
politically-­‐motivated,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  potential	  to	  de-­‐politicise	  the	  stories	  of	  the	  recipients	  of	  the	  
label.	  This	  works	  through	  a	  process	  of	  prioritising	  the	  humanitarian	  aspects	  of	  the	  case,	  rather	  
than	  the	  political	  aspects,	  creating	  what	  Liisa	  Malkki	  describes	  as	  a	  “humanitarian	  case”	  (Malkki,	  
1997).	  In	  this	  scenario,	  displaced	  Karen	  become	  victims	  of	  violence,	  reliant	  on	  others	  for	  food,	  
education	  and	  health	  services,	  silenced	  subjects,	  and	  therefore	  a	  ‘humanitarian	  case’.	  In	  such	  an	  
instance,	  the	  execution	  of	  power	  inherent	  in	  the	  label	  allocation	  reduces	  the	  political	  potential	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  stories.	  Karen	  claims	  of	  political	  grievances	  of	  ethnic	  persecution,	  human	  rights	  
violations,	  religious	  and	  cultural	  intolerances,	  lose	  their	  political	  potency	  in	  such	  a	  scenario.	  
Further	  complicating	  this	  position	  is	  an	  expectation	  of	  behaviour	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  label.	  
Liisa	  Malkki	  calls	  this	  the	  “performative	  dimension”	  (Malkki,	  1997,	  p.	  231)	  of	  refugee	  status	  where	  
the	  tendency	  is	  to	  identify	  what	  a	  ‘real’	  refugee	  looks	  like	  and	  how	  a	  ‘real’	  refugee	  acts.	  This	  
performative	  dimension	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  borderlands	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  Over	  months	  of	  field	  
work	  in	  2005	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  research	  made	  references	  to	  first	  time	  visitors	  to	  
Mae	  La	  refugee	  camp	  who	  would	  comment	  on	  its	  village-­‐like	  atmosphere,	  or	  compare	  the	  camp’s	  
liveability	  to	  the	  surrounding	  Thai	  villages.	  Many	  of	  the	  people	  I	  interviewed	  told	  stories	  of	  visitors	  
who	  commented	  that	  people	  with	  motorbikes	  and	  mobile	  phones	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  
considered	  a	  refugee,	  and	  that	  people	  who	  leave	  the	  camps	  should	  not	  continue	  to	  receive	  the	  
support	  of	  the	  aid	  agencies.	  The	  implication	  in	  such	  comments	  is	  that	  a	  ‘real’	  refugee	  must	  look	  
and	  live	  a	  certain	  way,	  and	  that	  refugees	  should	  only	  receive	  institutional	  support	  if	  they	  appear	  to	  
be	  helpless	  and	  immobile.	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  this	  performative	  dimension	  appears	  is	  how	  
refugees	  themselves	  often	  use	  the	  label.	  During	  field	  work	  in	  December	  2008	  many	  Karen	  I	  spoke	  
with	  talked	  about	  the	  refugee	  influx	  that	  had	  occurred	  over	  the	  preceding	  months,	  reportedly	  as	  a	  
107 
 
result	  of	  the	  heightened	  resettlement	  process.	  Karen	  who	  had	  been	  in	  the	  camps	  for	  many	  years	  
began	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  new	  arrivals	  as	  the	  ‘new’	  refugees,	  and	  themselves	  as	  the	  ‘real’	  refugees.	  
One	  person	  I	  interviewed	  told	  me	  the	  ‘new’	  arrivals	  were	  coming	  for	  economic	  reasons	  and	  the	  
hope	  of	  being	  resettled	  in	  countries	  like	  the	  US	  or	  Australia.	  She	  talked	  about	  them	  as	  not	  having	  
suffered	  genuine	  persecution	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Burmese	  military,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  taking	  the	  
places	  of	  the	  genuine	  or	  ‘real’	  refugees	  who	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  be	  in	  the	  camps	  (Naw	  Paw,	  
interview,	  9	  December	  2008).	  In	  examples	  like	  this	  one,	  the	  Karen	  themselves	  used	  the	  label	  to	  
differentiate	  who	  should	  have	  access	  to	  entitlements,	  and	  who	  could	  claim	  legitimate	  persecution.	  
The	  use	  of	  the	  refugee	  label	  in	  both	  these	  situations	  suggests	  a	  model	  of	  how	  a	  refugee	  should	  
look	  and	  behave.	  When	  refugee	  behaviour	  no	  longer	  constitutes	  the	  conditions	  prescribed	  by	  the	  
label,	  needs	  and	  entitlements	  change.	  While	  not	  explicitly	  stated,	  behaviours	  which	  reflect	  action	  
taken	  outside	  of	  the	  principal	  label	  –	  behaviour	  that	  is	  not	  passive	  or	  helpless	  –	  constitutes	  other	  
less	  sympathetic	  labels:	  an	  insurgent,	  a	  trouble-­‐maker,	  a	  political	  activist.	  By	  extracting	  the	  
political	  aspect,	  those	  applying	  the	  label	  remove	  a	  very	  important	  outlet	  for	  grief	  and	  justice.	  It	  is	  
this	  failure,	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  the	  humanitarian	  aid	  apparatus	  and	  more	  broadly	  the	  modern	  
nation-­‐state,	  which	  has	  forced	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  a	  space	  in	  which	  their	  
political	  aspirations	  can	  be	  met.	  
Similar	  to	  Karen	  responses	  to	  restrictions	  over	  their	  movements,	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  challenge	  the	  limitations	  inherent	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  these	  labels.	  This	  represents	  an	  
attempt	  to	  move	  outside	  of	  administrative	  containment	  lines	  where	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  negotiate	  
their	  own	  place	  in	  the	  political	  domain.	  One	  Karen	  person	  I	  interviewed	  talked	  about	  this	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  ambiguous	  nature	  of	  entitlements	  that	  go	  with	  the	  refugee	  label.	  He	  spoke	  of	  refugee	  
entitlements	  under	  the	  UN	  Refugee	  Convention	  such	  as	  education	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  national	  
citizens,	  the	  right	  to	  engage	  in	  wage-­‐earning	  employment,	  the	  right	  to	  housing	  equal	  to	  other	  
foreign	  nationals,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  your	  place	  of	  residence	  and	  to	  move	  freely.	  (UNHCR,	  
1951)	  These	  entitlements,	  while	  talked	  about,	  continue	  to	  sit	  outside	  of	  current	  policy	  
implementation	  for	  refugees	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  way	  one	  
participant	  spoke	  of	  his	  refugee	  status.	  
I	  don’t	  really	  call	  myself	  a	  refugee	  because	  if	  I’m	  a	  refugee	  then	  I	  am	  entitled	  to	  rights	  as	  a	  
refugee.	  If	  this	  was	  the	  case	  then	  I	  would	  accept	  it	  but	  people	  who	  register	  under	  UNHCR	  
or	  with	  the	  Thai	  authorities	  they	  are	  not	  really	  refugees.	  According	  to	  the	  declaration	  a	  
refugee	  has	  the	  right	  to	  work,	  the	  right	  to	  study	  or	  have	  an	  education.	  If	  you’re	  born	  in	  
Thailand	  after	  1990	  and	  you’ve	  lived	  here	  for	  more	  than	  seven	  years	  then	  you	  should	  be	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able	  to	  apply	  for	  citizenship.	  We	  don’t	  have	  any	  of	  these	  rights	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  24	  July	  
2007).	  
To	  Loo	  Ne,	  the	  label	  refugee	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  meaningless	  because	  it	  has	  not	  brought	  with	  it	  the	  
associated	  entitlements.	  This	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  him	  to	  accept	  the	  refugee	  label	  or	  see	  a	  benefit	  
to	  himself	  in	  acquiring	  it.	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  also	  an	  argument	  that	  many	  of	  these	  entitlements	  are	  
lacking	  for	  Thai	  citizens	  as	  well.	  For	  example	  poverty,	  access	  to	  education,	  and	  sexual	  or	  religious	  
practices	  exclude	  many	  Thai	  citizens	  from	  benefiting	  as	  members	  of	  the	  state.	  However	  in	  either	  
case,	  where	  the	  nation-­‐state	  has	  failed	  to	  fulfil	  its	  commitments	  to	  its	  people,	  they	  inevitably	  force	  
those	  same	  people	  to	  look	  for	  redress	  elsewhere.	  For	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  this	  dynamic	  drives	  
their	  activism	  and	  informs	  their	  political	  self.	  
For	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  the	  refugee	  label	  also	  carries	  with	  it	  connotations	  that	  do	  not	  
adequately	  address	  the	  realities	  and	  aspirations	  of	  their	  lives.	  According	  to	  the	  UN	  Convention	  
Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees,	  a	  refugee	  is	  defined	  as	  someone	  who:	  
owing	  to	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	  being	  persecuted	  for	  reasons	  of	  race,	  religion,	  nationality,	  
membership	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  or	  political	  opinion,	  is	  outside	  the	  country	  of	  his	  
nationality	  and	  is	  unable	  or,	  owing	  to	  such	  fear,	  is	  unwilling	  to	  avail	  himself	  of	  the	  
protection	  of	  that	  country;	  or	  who,	  not	  having	  a	  nationality	  and	  being	  outside	  the	  country	  
of	  his	  former	  habitual	  residence	  as	  a	  result	  of	  such	  events,	  is	  unable	  or,	  owing	  to	  such	  fear,	  
is	  unwilling	  to	  return	  to	  it	  (UNHCR,	  1951).	  
While	  the	  wording	  of	  this	  definition	  provides	  a	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  the	  Karen	  as	  refugees,	  
what	  it	  doesn’t	  account	  for	  is	  the	  disparities	  inherent	  in	  its	  implementation	  and	  practice.	  This	  
definition	  is	  clinical	  and	  clear	  about	  who	  constitutes	  a	  refugee,	  in	  practice	  the	  refugee	  label	  often	  
comes	  with	  limiting	  interpretations,	  evidence	  of	  which	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  While	  certainly	  not	  characteristic	  of	  all	  displaced	  Karen’s	  position	  on	  being	  a	  refugee,	  
the	  Karen	  I	  spoke	  with	  during	  my	  field	  work	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  spoke	  of	  the	  label	  carrying	  
implications	  of	  helplessness,	  passive	  victimisation	  and	  reliance	  on	  external	  support,	  all	  terms	  they	  
considered	  disempowering	  and	  unrepresentative	  of	  their	  active	  struggles.	  One	  Karen	  person	  
interviewed	  called	  himself	  a	  “human	  rights	  defender”	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  24	  July	  2007),	  while	  
another	  called	  himself	  a	  “community	  worker”	  and	  the	  Karen	  more	  generally	  as	  “political	  asylum	  
seekers”	  (U	  Kyi,	  interview,	  21	  July	  2007).	  
When	  I	  asked	  another	  participant,	  Saw	  Ba	  to	  describe	  himself	  he	  said	  he	  was	  “an	  illegal	  person”	  
because	  although	  he	  is	  registered	  in	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  refugee	  he	  lives	  outside	  the	  camps	  and	  works	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for	  an	  NGO.	  Saw	  Ba	  does	  not	  deny	  being	  a	  refugee	  but	  it’s	  not	  a	  defining	  identity.	  Instead	  he	  
chooses	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  work	  he	  pursues	  to	  find	  a	  resolution	  to	  Burma’s	  conflict.	  
Sometimes	  I	  think	  that	  technically	  I	  am	  a	  refugee	  because	  I	  flee	  from	  my	  country	  because	  
of	  the	  war,	  or	  the	  political	  situation.	  I	  cannot	  stay	  there	  so	  I	  come	  to	  Thailand,	  so	  that	  
makes	  me	  a	  refugee.	  But	  I	  also	  find	  ways	  that	  I	  can	  do	  something.	  It	  is	  a	  big	  problem	  what	  
has	  happened	  in	  Burma	  and	  I	  can	  find	  a	  way	  to	  solve	  this	  problem.	  So	  what	  I	  can	  do	  is	  to	  
find	  a	  way	  to	  do	  something.	  It	  is	  a	  big	  problem	  but	  I	  can	  try	  and	  do	  the	  little	  thing	  and	  
distribute	  what	  I	  have	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  21	  July	  2007).	  
Saw	  Ba,	  like	  many	  others	  who	  participated	  in	  my	  research	  spoke	  of	  their	  work	  in	  terms	  
representative	  of	  their	  active	  struggle.	  For	  Loo	  Ne	  this	  meant	  challenging	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  a	  
victim,	  “…to	  show	  that	  even	  living	  under	  oppression	  we	  are	  not	  victims,	  we	  are	  not	  victims.	  We	  
are	  struggling	  to	  survive,	  we	  are	  survivors	  and	  we	  struggle	  and	  we	  are	  moving	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  
22	  September	  2005).	  
Use	  of	  the	  phrase	  “are	  moving”	  implies	  activity	  which	  defies	  the	  immobilisation	  and	  helplessness	  
associated	  with	  the	  refugee	  label.	  For	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  it	  is	  their	  
participation	  in	  a	  struggle	  for	  political	  survival	  and	  recognition	  which	  defines	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  not	  their	  incarceration	  as	  refugees.	  In	  such	  instances	  disempowering	  concepts	  
associated	  with	  how	  the	  label	  of	  refugee	  is	  implemented	  –	  such	  as	  victim	  or	  aid-­‐dependent	  –	  fail	  
to	  account	  for	  individual	  identities	  and	  capacities	  which	  constantly	  defy	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  
label.	  
My	  argument	  is	  not	  whether	  the	  label	  should	  be	  used	  but	  rather	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  greater	  
analysis	  of	  which	  label	  is	  allocated	  and	  by	  whom,	  and	  what	  implications	  this	  has	  for	  displaced	  or	  
refugee	  populations.	  As	  I	  have	  mentioned	  previously	  in	  this	  chapter,	  Karen	  have	  at	  various	  times	  
used	  the	  label	  ‘refugee’	  or	  ‘migrant	  worker’	  for	  their	  own	  identification	  purposes.	  But	  there	  are	  
often	  disparities	  in	  how	  these	  labels	  are	  used	  and	  distinctions	  between	  the	  various	  labels	  or	  
groups	  can	  be	  ambiguous.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  borderlands	  a	  refugee	  may	  often	  refer	  to	  herself	  as	  
an	  IDP,	  and	  a	  political	  dissident	  may	  live	  at	  various	  points	  in	  a	  refugee	  camp.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  
disparities	  caused	  in	  the	  naming	  process,	  movement	  between	  the	  categories	  is	  also	  common.	  One	  
can	  simultaneously	  be	  a	  refugee	  and	  a	  political	  activist,	  or	  a	  displaced	  person	  and	  a	  migrant	  
worker.	  These	  are	  the	  realities	  and	  complexities	  of	  how	  displaced	  Karen	  live	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Yet	  these	  diverse	  groupings	  with	  their	  complex	  motivations	  and	  needs	  have	  been	  tagged	  with	  
what	  Geoff	  Wood	  calls	  a	  ‘principal	  label’	  (1985,	  p.	  11):	  a	  refugee.	  This	  effectively	  forces	  the	  IDP,	  
the	  displaced	  person,	  the	  activist	  and	  the	  artist,	  with	  all	  their	  associated	  experiences	  and	  stories,	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into	  one	  stereotyped	  group,	  with	  its	  singular	  understanding	  of	  identity.	  Problems	  of	  political	  
identification	  arise	  when	  this	  externally-­‐imposed	  principal	  label	  (refugee)	  takes	  precedence	  over	  
other	  forms	  of	  identification,	  particularly	  self-­‐designated	  ones.	  It	  can	  become	  another	  way	  of	  
silencing	  non-­‐institutionalised	  forms	  of	  identification.	  
Rather	  than	  accepting	  an	  identity	  based	  on	  this	  idea	  of	  an	  undifferentiated	  static	  mass,	  I	  have	  
shown	  that	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  choose	  to	  refer	  to	  themselves	  in	  more	  dynamic	  terms:	  ‘human	  
rights	  defender’,	  ‘activist’	  and	  ‘community	  worker’.	  This	  type	  of	  terminology	  suggests	  action	  based	  
on	  an	  injustice:	  I	  am	  a	  human	  rights	  defender	  because	  my	  human	  rights	  have	  been	  taken	  from	  me.	  
In	  these	  types	  of	  responses	  the	  Karen	  create	  what	  Wood	  calls	  a	  “shift	  in	  power	  to	  deploy	  time	  
[personal	  experience]	  as	  an	  ingredient	  of	  identity”	  (Wood,	  1985,	  p.	  13).	  This	  shift	  is	  examined	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  but	  for	  the	  moment	  is	  suffice	  to	  say	  that	  by	  bringing	  personal	  
experience	  into	  the	  narrative	  of	  political	  identity,	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  responding	  to	  a	  system	  of	  
governance	  that	  too	  often	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  containing	  and	  silencing	  their	  political	  agency.	  
Up	  until	  this	  point	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  operations	  of	  institutional	  governance	  act	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
coercive	  regulation	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  I	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  
contest	  these	  institutional	  forms	  of	  governance	  because	  they	  do	  not	  adequately	  capture	  the	  
nature	  of	  their	  political	  self.	  This	  political	  self	  is	  articulated	  in	  the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	  challenge	  
certain	  forms	  of	  institutional	  labelling	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  political	  narrative	  of	  their	  
persecution,	  or	  how	  they	  defy	  restrictions	  on	  their	  movement	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  socio-­‐political	  
activities.	  In	  this	  next	  section	  I	  move	  into	  defining	  this	  political	  self	  in	  terms	  of	  patterns	  of	  activism	  
that	  have	  emerged	  out	  of	  a	  tension	  between	  institutional	  governance	  and	  a	  more	  informal	  
political	  power	  that	  develops	  out	  of	  the	  contested	  social	  relations	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  These	  
patterns	  of	  activism	  form	  a	  key	  mode	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  and	  they	  are	  integral	  to	  
the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  they	  link	  the	  activities	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  the	  borderlands	  
space	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  In	  other	  words,	  patterns	  of	  activism	  are	  able	  to	  emerge	  because	  of	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  develop	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  
self,	  and	  ultimately	  help	  define	  a	  Karen	  identity	  specific	  to	  the	  space.	  
CONTROLLED-­‐CONTESTED:	  THE	  POLITICAL	  SELF	  
A	  tension	  between	  institutional	  governance	  and	  informal	  political	  power	  that	  develops	  through	  
contested	  social	  relations	  has	  come	  to	  represent	  the	  contemporary	  context	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  On	  one	  side	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  its	  administrative	  apparatus	  are	  increasingly	  
deployed	  to	  control	  areas	  historically	  unfavourable	  to	  state	  authority,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  are	  those	  
who	  live	  or	  transit	  the	  borderlands	  and	  practice	  a	  more	  informal,	  fluid	  and	  contested	  engagement	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with	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  border	  area.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  layer	  of	  political	  activity	  that	  sits	  across,	  
but	  also	  conjunctively	  with	  these	  operations	  of	  governance.	  This	  layer	  of	  political	  activity	  does	  not	  
sit	  separately	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  state,	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  unequivocally	  connected,	  but	  rather	  it	  
develops	  in	  tension	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  institutional	  governance,	  particularly	  as	  implemented	  by	  
the	  state	  and	  the	  humanitarian	  apparatus.	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  contend	  that	  patterns	  of	  activism	  emerge	  from	  this	  tension	  where	  institutional	  
forms	  of	  governance	  have	  failed	  to	  adequately	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  self.	  By	  
political	  self	  I	  mean	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Karen	  pursue	  forms	  of	  activism	  that	  aim	  to	  advance	  
their	  political	  claims	  and	  subvert	  institutional	  norms	  of	  political	  belonging	  by	  negotiating	  their	  own	  
place	  in	  the	  political	  domain	  –	  a	  form	  of	  activism	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  political	  being	  
rather	  than	  an	  act	  of	  protest.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  over	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  this	  form	  of	  
activism	  is	  evident	  in	  Karen	  claims	  for	  political	  autonomy,	  their	  advocacy	  around	  human	  rights	  
abuses	  and	  their	  agitation	  for	  political	  and	  social	  change.	  Through	  these	  forms	  of	  activism,	  the	  
Karen	  develop	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  that	  strengthens	  Karen	  political	  agency	  and	  challenges	  
forms	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  conceptual	  dynamic	  that	  the	  Karen	  are	  
able	  to	  articulate	  their	  political	  self	  and	  produce	  some	  of	  their	  greatest	  scenes	  of	  agency.	  
I	  propose	  to	  explore	  these	  patterns	  of	  activism	  through	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  used	  by	  refugee	  
studies	  scholars,	  Geoff	  Wood	  and	  Roger	  Zetter;	  this	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  re-­‐linking	  the	  case	  to	  the	  story	  
(Wood,	  1985;	  Zetter,	  1991).	  Across	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  labels	  can	  depersonalise	  
individual	  narratives	  and	  place	  them	  into	  a	  singular	  frame	  that	  forces	  thousands	  of	  individual	  
stories	  of	  political	  struggle	  into	  a	  category	  that	  makes	  their	  situation	  the	  ‘same’	  as	  thousands	  of	  
‘other’	  refugees	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  other	  words	  they	  become	  a	  ‘refugee’	  case,	  a	  member	  of	  a	  largely	  
anonymous	  category	  of	  peoples.	  Roger	  Zetter	  and	  Geoff	  Wood,	  both	  of	  whom	  have	  worked	  
extensively	  in	  the	  field	  of	  refugee	  studies,	  put	  forward	  a	  framework	  that	  sheds	  some	  insight	  on	  
this	  phenomenon.	  Wood	  talks	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘case’	  and	  the	  ‘story’	  (Wood,	  1985,	  p.	  13).	  
Roger	  Zetter	  expands	  on	  this	  further	  to	  suggest	  that	  labelling	  is	  a	  process	  of	  stereotyping	  that	  
essentially	  de-­‐links	  the	  story	  from	  the	  case,	  creating	  a	  “stereotyped	  identity	  with	  a	  categorical	  
prescription	  of	  assumed	  needs”	  (Zetter,	  1991,	  p.	  44).	  I	  contend	  that	  this	  stereotyped	  identity	  
(label)	  that	  Zetter	  talks	  about,	  works	  to	  ignore	  the	  political	  activism	  in	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  
engaged:	  the	  experiences	  of,	  and	  resolutions	  to	  prolonged	  injustices.	  By	  extracting	  the	  historical	  
and	  political	  context	  from	  the	  Karen	  situation,	  the	  label	  strips	  bare	  the	  identity	  of	  those	  who	  have	  
experienced	  displacement,	  and	  questions	  their	  authority	  to	  give	  credible	  accounts	  and	  evidence	  of	  
the	  political	  and	  institutional	  conditions	  they	  have	  experienced	  (Malkki,	  1997).	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Seeing	  Karen	  displacement	  as	  a	  ‘case’	  without	  associated	  stories	  and	  political	  failings	  can	  lessen	  
the	  impact	  of	  substantiated	  claims	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  of	  political	  neglect	  and	  persecution	  by	  the	  
Burmese	  state.	  These	  include	  failed	  economic	  policy,	  inadequate	  ethnic	  identification	  and	  
representation,	  social	  fragmentation,	  institutional	  denial	  of	  basic	  education	  and	  health	  rights,	  
nationalist	  and	  racist	  policy,	  and	  challenges	  to	  state	  sovereignty	  –	  all	  social	  and	  political	  factors	  
that	  contribute	  to	  Karen	  displacement	  to	  begin	  with.68	  In	  effect,	  a	  case-­‐based	  approach	  
dehistoricises	  Karen	  experiences	  of	  displacement,	  removing	  the	  outcome	  from	  its	  causes.	  
Becoming	  a	  refugee	  is	  one	  possible	  outcome	  of	  displacement,	  and	  perhaps	  its	  most	  visible	  form.	  
However,	  as	  social	  anthropologist	  Liisa	  Malkki	  points	  out,	  any	  forced	  movement	  resulting	  from	  
displacement	  is	  “only	  one	  aspect	  of	  much	  larger	  constellations	  of	  socio-­‐political	  and	  cultural	  
processes	  and	  practices”	  (Malkki,	  1995,	  p.	  496).	  Displaced	  Karen	  who	  arrive	  at	  the	  border	  are	  the	  
product	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  political	  and	  cultural	  tension.	  Their	  displacement	  has	  deep	  roots	  in	  
historical	  processes	  that	  have	  discriminated	  against	  ethnic	  plurality	  and	  marginalised	  democratic	  
principles.	  The	  current	  manifestation	  of	  such	  policies	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  villages	  and	  
crops,	  extrajudicial	  killings,	  rape	  and	  torture,	  extortion,	  and	  forced	  labour.	  Instead	  of	  addressing	  
the	  political	  problems	  that	  cause	  displacement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  corresponding	  political	  claims	  of	  
those	  experiencing	  the	  displacement,	  current	  institutional	  responses	  –	  such	  as	  labelling,	  
establishing	  refugee	  camps,	  and	  the	  status	  afforded	  displaced	  Karen	  –	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  Karen	  
as	  a	  humanitarian	  case.	  In	  this	  type	  of	  scenario,	  the	  refugee	  label	  is	  used	  to	  project	  an	  image	  
focused	  on	  the	  need	  for	  humanitarian	  assistance	  rather	  than	  enabling	  the	  Karen	  to	  be	  proactive	  
members	  of	  society.	  This	  type	  of	  institutional	  response	  has	  deeply	  dehumanising	  connotations	  
(Malkki,	  1995,	  p.	  518),	  because	  it	  strips	  the	  Karen	  of	  their	  story	  (history,	  agency,	  experience)	  and	  
forces	  them	  to	  become	  simply	  a	  “victim”.	  In	  2007	  I	  interviewed	  a	  Karen	  man	  who	  explained	  to	  me	  
some	  of	  the	  political	  reasons	  behind	  the	  flow	  of	  people	  into	  Thailand’s	  refugee	  camps.	  
One	  thing	  is	  that	  the	  income	  likelihood	  of	  the	  people	  inside	  Burma	  means	  they	  come	  to	  
Thailand.	  Let’s	  say	  this	  is	  the	  economical	  reason.	  People	  want	  to	  come	  to	  Thailand	  to	  
work,	  for	  their	  livelihood,	  to	  get	  money.	  The	  second	  thing	  is	  that	  along	  the	  border	  there	  is	  
conflict,	  there	  is	  fighting.	  People	  who	  stay	  inside	  Burma	  have	  to	  pay	  many	  things,	  like	  
taxes,	  which	  means	  they	  suffer	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  21	  July	  2007).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  I	  have	  attempted	  here	  to	  identify	  and	  summarise	  key	  claims	  made	  against	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  This	  
should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  definitive	  or	  comprehensive	  list.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  where	  some	  of	  these	  larger	  claims	  
are	  made,	  see	  reports	  and	  commentary	  put	  out	  by	  Amnesty	  International,	  the	  Karen	  Human	  Rights	  Group,	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  the	  National	  league	  for	  Democracy	  and	  various	  ethnic	  political	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  
KNU,	  NMSP	  and	  KIO.	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Further	  in	  to	  our	  interview	  he	  told	  me	  that	  many	  Karen	  people	  don’t	  want	  to	  come	  to	  the	  refugee	  
camps.	  They	  would	  prefer	  to	  stay	  with	  their	  homes	  and	  land.	  Only	  when	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  possible,	  
because	  of	  military	  operations,	  do	  they	  resort	  to	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  we	  listen	  to	  
the	  stories	  of	  refugees	  that	  we	  are	  given	  a	  context	  to	  the	  refugee	  ‘case’.	  People	  don’t	  choose	  to	  
flee	  to	  Thailand;	  they	  leave	  because	  of	  larger	  systematic	  socio-­‐political	  problems.	  And	  rather	  than	  
simply	  fleeing	  fighting,	  these	  stories	  provide	  a	  far	  more	  complex	  barometer	  of	  the	  problem.	  Some	  
people	  flee	  because	  their	  crops	  and	  their	  livelihood	  has	  been	  destroyed	  by	  a	  military	  battalion,	  
others	  flee	  because	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  pay	  the	  corrupt	  taxes	  demanded	  of	  them,	  still	  
others	  because	  they	  face	  starvation,	  their	  primary	  provider	  has	  been	  killed	  or	  they	  have	  a	  family	  
member	  in	  the	  armed	  insurgency.	  These	  stories	  alone	  cover	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  political,	  economic	  
and	  social	  reasons	  indicative	  of	  state	  failure	  to	  provide	  protection	  and	  a	  livelihood.	  This	  is	  an	  
important	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  presence	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  refugees	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands	  must	  be	  understood.	  
In	  the	  story	  above,	  and	  the	  many	  others	  recounted	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  we	  are	  exposed	  to	  a	  
range	  of	  insights	  into	  the	  political	  circumstances	  behind	  the	  experiences	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  In	  
Moo’s	  story	  quoted	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  she	  talks	  about	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Karen	  
conflict,	  “Why	  do	  we	  Karen	  people	  have	  to	  suffer	  from	  our	  grandparents	  through	  to	  now”.	  Her	  
story	  also	  tells	  of	  a	  political	  will:	  a	  grassroots	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict,	  and	  to	  return,	  “If	  I	  go	  back	  I	  
want	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  shade	  of	  a	  tree	  that	  provides	  coolness	  and	  it	  should	  be	  a	  tree	  that	  we	  plant	  
ourselves”.	  Another	  participant,	  in	  talking	  about	  his	  refugee	  status,	  recognises	  the	  civil	  and	  
political	  rights	  that	  are	  denied	  him,	  and	  the	  political	  motivations	  he	  perceives	  are	  behind	  this.	  And	  
finally	  in	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’,	  Loo	  Ne	  talks	  about	  missing	  the	  land	  of	  his	  birth	  and	  “wishing	  to	  be	  back	  
there	  before	  the	  end	  of	  my	  days”.	  For	  these	  Karen,	  the	  circumstances	  that	  forced	  them	  to	  leave	  
must	  be	  resolved	  if	  they	  are	  to	  fulfil	  their	  dream	  of	  one	  day	  returning	  to	  Burma.	  
This	  sense	  of	  discrimination	  and	  unresolved	  political	  injustice	  isn’t	  confined	  to	  Burma’s	  political	  
and	  territorial	  structures.	  The	  silencing	  of	  the	  political	  self	  inside	  Burma	  is	  also	  transferred	  to	  the	  
borderlands	  and	  reinforced	  by	  the	  structures	  of	  institutional	  governance	  that	  treat	  the	  Karen	  as	  a	  
‘case’	  and	  apolitical.	  One	  Karen	  man	  I	  interviewed	  in	  2007	  described	  it	  like	  this:	  
Sometimes	  we	  make	  a	  joke	  that	  we	  are	  like	  a	  pig	  in	  the	  garden	  or	  something	  like	  that.	  
People	  come	  and	  feed	  you,	  you	  only	  eat	  and	  sleep	  and	  when	  you	  go	  outside	  the	  garden	  
people	  beat	  you.	  There	  is	  no	  freedom.	  It’s	  not	  like	  you	  are	  human	  ...	  you	  don’t	  have	  any	  
future,	  any	  choice	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  21	  July	  2007).	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Moo	  shared	  a	  similar	  sentiment:	  “My	  life	  is	  like	  an	  animal.	  I	  can	  eat	  only	  when	  people	  feed	  me,	  I	  
stay	  here,	  I	  sleep	  here,	  go	  to	  the	  toilet	  here,	  it	  is	  like	  we	  are	  a	  herd	  of	  cattle”	  (Moo,	  personal	  
communication,	  15	  September	  2005).	  Coincidentally,	  though	  perhaps	  not	  surprisingly,	  both	  
participants	  associate	  their	  treatment	  with	  that	  of	  animals.	  The	  implication	  in	  both	  these	  
comments	  is	  that	  their	  life	  constitutes	  the	  simple	  fact	  of	  living	  associated	  with	  survival	  rather	  than	  
a	  life	  of	  thinking,	  acting	  and	  doing	  –	  a	  ‘political	  self’.	  
Another	  participant	  interviewed	  talked	  specifically	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  resettlement	  program	  
which	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  institutional	  humanitarian	  resolution	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  one.	  
They	  look	  at	  us	  and	  just	  see	  us	  as	  Human	  Beings;	  they	  don’t	  see	  us	  as	  a	  Nation.	  That	  is	  why	  
the	  resettlement	  program	  was	  born	  …	  I	  feel	  like	  the	  ‘Resettlement	  Program’	  is	  taking	  away	  
the	  power	  of	  our	  people	  …	  I	  would	  like	  to	  encourage	  the	  countries	  also	  to	  help	  find	  the	  
solution	  and	  help	  end	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  Burma.	  Let	  us	  work	  together	  to	  remove	  the	  military	  
dictator	  and	  bring	  back	  democracy	  in	  Burma.69	  
To	  this	  participant,	  recognition	  simply	  as	  a	  Human	  Being	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  life	  without	  history,	  
context	  or	  agency.	  In	  contrast,	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  Nation	  incorporates	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  political	  life	  –	  of	  
rights,	  entitlements	  and	  political	  representation	  –	  and	  in	  turn	  recognises	  the	  presence	  of	  and	  
possible	  resolutions	  to	  political	  injustices.	  Given	  that	  the	  resettlement	  program	  has	  targeted	  skilled	  
and	  educated	  Karen,	  decimating	  a	  key	  resource	  of	  the	  Karen	  political	  movement,	  this	  participant	  
makes	  a	  legitimate	  point:	  any	  help	  provided	  by	  the	  international	  community	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  
than	  humanitarian	  alone,	  it	  needs	  to	  address	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  cultural	  causes	  of	  the	  current	  
situation	  and	  their	  impediments	  to	  achieving	  justice	  in	  Burma.	  
Each	  of	  these	  stories	  provide	  context	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  
developing	  complexities	  to	  the	  circumstances	  that	  move	  the	  Karen	  beyond	  being	  seen	  simply	  as	  a	  
refugee	  ‘case’.	  These	  stories	  are	  accounts	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  experiences	  of	  abuse	  and	  
discrimination;	  they	  provide	  historical	  continuity	  to	  Karen	  claims	  of	  prolonged	  political	  neglect,	  
persecution	  and	  displacement.	  They	  are	  integral	  to	  understanding	  the	  deeper	  questions	  around	  
cause	  and	  effect.	  But	  as	  a	  refugee	  ‘case’,	  the	  answers	  to	  some	  very	  basic	  questions	  are	  lost,	  so	  to	  
resolutions	  to	  the	  circumstances	  that	  led	  to	  the	  displacement,	  and	  would	  benefit	  those	  who	  have	  
experienced	  it.	  Why	  are	  the	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands?	  How	  have	  they	  come	  to	  be	  there?	  What	  
grievances	  do	  they	  carry	  with	  them?	  How	  can	  their	  predicament	  be	  resolved?	  Karen	  stories	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Comment	  made	  under	  the	  ‘Hsaw	  Pa	  Kaw’	  entry	  of	  ‘the	  crooked	  line’	  blog,	  
http://thecrookedline.wordpress.com/2007/02/04/8/	  [accessed	  21	  November	  2009]	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provide	  some	  of	  these	  answers;	  at	  the	  very	  least	  they	  provide	  a	  complex	  reality,	  bringing	  context	  
to	  a	  space	  that	  has	  been	  monopolised	  by	  the	  uniformity	  of	  institutional	  responses.	  
The	  stories	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  mentioned	  in	  this	  chapter	  show	  the	  Karen	  narrative	  has	  its	  roots	  
embedded	  in	  historical	  practices	  of	  cultural	  differentiation,	  discrimination,	  displacement	  and	  
exclusion.	  One	  cannot	  understand	  the	  current	  predicament	  of	  the	  Karen	  without	  understanding	  
these	  historical	  and	  political	  factors	  that	  have	  brought	  it	  about.	  The	  danger	  of	  the	  modern	  
institutionalised	  approach	  to	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  its	  propensity	  to	  treat	  the	  Karen	  as	  
ahistorical,	  as	  generalised	  victims	  stripped	  of	  personal	  narratives	  and	  therefore	  denying	  the	  
political	  self.	  It	  is	  this	  condition	  that	  has	  forced	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  to	  look	  
elsewhere	  for	  a	  space	  in	  which	  they	  can	  have	  their	  political	  needs	  met.	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  significant	  
part	  of	  this	  alternative	  political	  space	  is	  the	  attempts	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  privilege	  the	  political	  
voice;	  and	  in	  turn	  re-­‐link	  the	  story/ies	  to	  the	  case.	  
Part	  of	  re-­‐linking	  the	  story	  to	  the	  case	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  that	  Karen	  as	  ‘refugees’,	  ‘displaced	  
persons’	  or	  ‘illegal	  migrants’;	  victims,	  opportunists	  or	  both.	  But	  also	  to	  see	  them	  as	  politically	  and	  
socially	  engaged	  activists,	  or	  a	  community	  with	  history,	  identity,	  rights	  and	  grievances	  able	  to	  be	  
heard.	  Even	  more	  so,	  we	  need	  to	  see	  the	  Karen	  as	  being	  able	  to	  live	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum	  
simultaneously.	  The	  Karen	  are	  refugees	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  are	  activists,	  they	  are	  displaced	  
persons	  that	  continue	  to	  maintain	  strong	  cultural	  and	  historical	  ties	  to	  land	  and	  identity,	  they	  are	  
victims	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  they	  are	  socially	  and	  politically	  engaged	  members	  of	  society.	  
In	  attempting	  to	  accommodate	  this	  dialectic,	  the	  Karen	  use	  the	  borderlands	  as	  an	  alternative	  
political	  space.	  In	  many	  instances,	  informal	  political	  activity	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  is	  
established	  to	  oppose	  persecution	  and	  political	  exclusion.	  Some	  examples	  include	  artists	  and	  
musicians	  who	  create	  works	  that	  document	  their	  culture	  or	  are	  critical	  of	  Burmese	  military	  
persecution;	  environmental	  activists	  who	  campaign	  against	  state	  dam	  proposals;	  mobile	  health	  
teams	  who	  treat	  internally	  displaced	  people,	  soldiers,	  and	  victims	  of	  militarisation;	  women’s	  
organisations	  who	  organise	  collectives	  to	  sell	  their	  produce;	  and	  community	  theatre	  activists	  who	  
stage	  shows	  about	  drug	  use,	  family	  planning	  or	  community	  development	  techniques.	  These	  more	  
informal	  types	  of	  political	  activity	  can	  occur	  because	  they	  sit	  predominantly	  outside	  of	  the	  state-­‐
centric	  discourse.	  They	  are	  conducted	  by	  people	  who	  continue	  to	  go	  unrecognised	  as	  qualified	  
political	  subjects	  (Tangseefa,	  2006)	  by	  either	  Thailand	  or	  Burma.	  Their	  tenuous	  residence	  in	  
Thailand	  means	  they	  are	  not	  beholden	  to	  the	  political	  restrictions	  they	  would	  otherwise	  face	  in	  
Burma.	  Their	  state-­‐less	  position	  in	  Thailand	  gives	  them	  some	  flexibility	  in	  creating	  alternative	  
political	  opportunities	  for	  Burma.	  These	  types	  of	  political	  activity	  may	  lack	  formal	  political	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organisation,	  yet	  they	  fill	  the	  gaps	  left	  by	  the	  political	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  current	  system	  of	  
institutional	  governance;	  they	  make	  a	  statement	  for	  informal,	  participatory	  politics.	  
CONCLUSION	  
Institutional	  failure	  to	  adequately	  address	  long-­‐term	  socio-­‐political	  issues,	  typified	  by	  ongoing	  
displacement	  and	  persecution,	  has	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  alternative	  political	  space	  where	  the	  
Karen	  themselves	  protest,	  construct	  and	  redefine	  the	  parameters	  of	  their	  political	  life.	  In	  doing	  so	  
they	  challenge	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  renegotiate	  the	  administrative	  frameworks	  that	  govern	  their	  
political	  existence	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  	  
This	  alternative	  borderlands	  space	  is	  a	  highly	  political	  one	  and	  is	  enacted	  through	  the	  practices	  of	  
the	  every-­‐day.	  Displaced	  Karen	  take	  on	  the	  role	  of	  advocate	  for	  the	  political	  persecution	  they	  and	  
are	  others	  continue	  to	  experience.	  They	  document	  state	  abuse	  and	  search	  for	  lasting	  solutions.	  
They	  become	  the	  keepers	  of	  cultural	  knowledge	  and	  act	  as	  conduits	  between	  their	  homeland	  and	  
the	  international	  community.	  The	  ‘victim’	  is	  also	  the	  ‘political	  self’	  capable	  and	  able	  to	  speak	  
authoritatively	  on	  the	  political	  elements	  that	  impact	  life	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  doing	  so	  displaced	  
Karen	  have	  created	  a	  space	  that	  is	  partially	  defined	  by	  political	  agency	  and	  evidenced	  through	  
patterns	  of	  activism,	  and	  which	  gives	  meaning	  to	  the	  political	  and	  social	  aspirations	  of	  displaced	  
Karen.	  
This	  chapter	  is	  important	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  these	  patterns	  of	  activism	  are	  one	  
of	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  as	  such	  critically	  inform	  the	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  patterns	  of	  activism	  develop	  the	  notion	  of	  
a	  Karen	  political	  self,	  and	  ultimately	  a	  collective	  political	  identity.	  This	  is	  critical	  to	  how	  a	  Karen	  
identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  manifests	  but	  also	  to	  understanding	  how	  this	  identity	  is	  connected	  to	  
the	  space	  and	  the	  social	  practices	  that	  feed	  it.	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  continue	  to	  develop	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  by	  concentrating	  on	  two	  other	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  are	  
relevant	  to	  the	  space,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery.	  In	  the	  next	  
chapter	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  borderlands	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  which	  are	  
largely	  formed	  through	  activism	  and	  framed	  by	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  
persecution.	  These	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  act	  as	  vehicles	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  It	  is	  





THIS	  STORY	  IS	  NOT	  FOR	  MYSELF	  
NETWORKS	  OF	  SOLIDARITY	  
I	  said	  to	  my	  mom	  not	  to	  worry	  about	  my	  future,	  because	  I	  know	  what	  is	  my	  future	  
My	  future	  is	  not	  property	  and	  not	  living	  in	  good	  conditions	  
My	  future	  is	  to	  be	  against	  any	  injustice	  and	  oppression	  
To	  live	  in	  harmony	  with	  our	  world	  environment	  and	  build	  up	  a	  peaceful	  society	  
(Saw	  Ba,	  personal	  communication,	  25	  June	  2008)	  
For	  many	  Karen	  who	  arrive	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  
and	  displacement.	  The	  journey	  to	  the	  border	  is	  often	  one	  of	  trauma,	  physical	  hardship	  and	  
repeated	  attempts	  to	  evade	  the	  operations	  of	  heavy	  militarisation	  in	  Burma.	  In	  such	  instances	  the	  
Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  place	  of	  safety	  and	  refuge.	  But	  far	  from	  being	  the	  journey’s	  
destination,	  for	  many	  the	  border	  becomes	  a	  sort	  of	  extension	  of	  the	  journey,	  a	  space	  in	  which	  
these	  common	  experiences	  and	  stories	  can	  be	  told	  and	  re-­‐told,	  nurtured,	  refined	  and	  noted	  –	  and	  
at	  times	  also	  concealed	  or	  embellished.	  These	  stories,	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  cyclic	  motion,	  are	  projected	  
outwards	  to	  a	  global	  community	  as	  well	  as	  returning	  in	  a	  much	  changed	  form	  to	  the	  territory	  in	  
which	  they	  were	  born,	  Karen	  State	  in	  Burma.	  The	  opportunity	  for	  this	  process	  to	  occur	  is	  
significantly	  reliant	  upon	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  
the	  national	  border:	  particularly	  non-­‐institutionalised	  physical	  movement	  across	  the	  border,	  global	  
flows	  of	  information,	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  skills	  and	  knowledge.	  These	  processes	  allow	  stories	  to	  be	  
built	  in	  such	  a	  way	  they	  develop	  networks	  of	  solidarity,	  gathering	  momentum	  and	  support	  as	  they	  
are	  further	  disseminated	  in	  both	  local	  and	  global	  settings.	  
This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  are	  formed	  through	  patterns	  of	  activism	  that	  
are	  framed	  by	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  These	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  
are	  formed	  and	  strengthened	  where	  activist	  practices	  intersect	  with	  particular	  mechanisms	  of	  
social	  power,	  in	  this	  thesis	  categorised	  as	  international	  networking,	  new	  technologies	  and	  political	  
consciousness.	  In	  addition,	  these	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  also	  become	  a	  key	  conduit	  for	  the	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  narrative	  based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  of	  persecution	  and	  
displacement,	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  Karen	  identity	  I	  argue	  for	  in	  Chapter	  Eight.	  
While	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  can	  manifest	  through	  a	  range	  of	  socio-­‐political	  processes,	  in	  this	  thesis	  
solidarities	  are	  defined	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  or	  form	  through	  activist	  practices.	  I	  focus	  on	  activist	  
practices	  because	  these	  constitute	  a	  dominant	  form	  of	  political	  activity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  are	  
now	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  space.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  chapter	  is	  structured	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around	  the	  grouping	  of	  these	  solidarities	  in	  to	  three	  key	  practices	  that	  are	  framed	  by	  an	  
overarching	  political	  narrative	  of	  Karen	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  
The	  first	  practice	  is	  access	  to	  international	  networks	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  have	  helped	  displaced	  
Karen	  create	  greater	  awareness	  around	  claims	  of	  persecution	  as	  well	  as	  enhancing	  the	  capacity	  of	  
Karen	  to	  develop	  and	  present	  a	  political	  voice.	  The	  second	  practice	  is	  the	  use	  of	  new	  technologies.	  
Similarly	  to	  engagement	  with	  international	  networks,	  new	  technologies	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
create	  greater	  global	  awareness	  of	  Karen	  persecution,	  but	  in	  addition,	  new	  technologies	  also	  act	  as	  
a	  platform	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  narrative	  of	  persecution.	  New	  technologies	  have	  
also	  created	  opportunities	  for	  greater	  connections	  between	  Karen	  groups	  with	  shared	  interests	  
and	  activities	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  third	  practice	  is	  where	  specific	  activities	  of	  the	  Karen	  are	  
designed	  to	  develop	  a	  level	  of	  political	  consciousness	  and	  critical	  thinking	  that	  helps	  strengthen	  the	  
ability	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  convey	  a	  strong	  political	  message	  around	  the	  ongoing	  persecution	  of	  
Karen	  inside	  Burma.	  This	  political	  consciousness	  fulfils	  a	  larger	  need	  to	  develop	  the	  capacity	  of	  
local	  Karen	  communities	  both	  inside	  Burma	  and	  along	  the	  border.	  
These	  three	  practices	  are	  framed	  by	  an	  over	  overarching	  political	  narrative	  of	  displacement	  and	  
persecution	  which	  begins	  to	  develop	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  projected	  from	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  Combined	  with	  the	  inward	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  characterised	  by	  a	  
selective	  recovery	  of	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths,	  which	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  chapter,	  over	  
the	  coming	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  political	  and	  cultural	  narratives	  are	  critical	  components	  of	  a	  
Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
This	  chapter	  sets	  up	  the	  second	  key	  mode	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  networks	  of	  
solidarity.	  It	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  are	  evidence	  of	  
a	  political	  interchange,	  framed	  by	  activism	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border.	  This	  interchange	  
is	  defined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  sociality	  (the	  flow	  of	  people,	  ideas	  and	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  connections	  
to	  family,	  identity	  and	  culture)	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  territorial	  domain.	  These	  networks	  of	  
solidarity	  not	  only	  constitute	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  they	  give	  
form	  and	  meaning	  to	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  that	  space	  and	  in	  particular	  
to	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  
INTERNATIONAL	  NETWORKS	  
The	  opportunities	  for	  political	  agency	  significantly	  increase	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  once	  they	  reach	  the	  
Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  The	  barriers	  that	  stifle	  political	  agency	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border	  –	  
isolation,	  poverty,	  militarisation,	  political	  homogeneity	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  –	  while	  still	  present	  in	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Thailand	  carry	  less	  urgency	  and	  political	  significance	  for	  displaced	  Karen.	  A	  key	  contemporary	  
element	  of	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  political	  space	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  utilise	  international	  audiences	  and	  
mechanisms	  in	  ways	  not	  available	  to	  Karen	  in	  the	  conflict	  zones	  inside	  Burma,	  particularly	  as	  a	  
platform	  for	  advocacy	  to	  the	  international	  community.	  With	  this,	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  borderlands	  
space	  provides	  displaced	  Karen	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  tap	  into	  global	  networks	  that	  can	  increase	  
awareness	  of	  Karen	  claims	  of	  persecution,	  and	  importantly,	  help	  develop	  solidarities	  around	  these	  
claims.	  This	  interaction	  with	  a	  global	  community	  enhances	  the	  political	  capacity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  
by	  providing	  greater	  opportunities	  to	  develop	  and	  present	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice.	  
This	  exposure	  to	  a	  global	  community	  comes	  from	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  sources	  and	  relationships	  
specific	  to	  the	  space.	  These	  include	  the	  increasing	  tourist	  trade	  along	  the	  border	  and	  a	  mostly	  
sympathetic	  media	  willing	  to	  focus	  on	  instances	  of	  Karen	  persecution,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  
international	  aid	  agencies	  that	  have	  provided	  greater	  exposure	  to	  international	  mechanisms	  and	  
ideas.	  But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  form	  of	  global	  engagement	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  comes	  
through	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  access	  to	  UN	  mechanisms,	  sympathetic	  governments,	  and	  funding	  
sources,	  as	  well	  as	  information	  flows	  and	  political	  platforms.	  Inherent	  in	  this	  access	  is	  a	  heightened	  
form	  of	  advocacy;	  by	  this	  I	  mean	  the	  active	  support	  of	  an	  idea	  or	  argument,	  mostly,	  though	  not	  
always,	  conducted	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  In	  the	  borderlands	  this	  most	  commonly	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  
a	  call	  for	  political	  action	  against	  continuing	  Burmese	  Army	  attacks	  on	  ethnic	  areas,	  or	  a	  plea	  to	  take	  
more	  immediate	  steps	  such	  as	  providing	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  those	  affected	  by	  the	  conflict.	  
Advocacy	  at	  the	  international	  level	  has	  been	  further	  enhanced	  by	  the	  capacity	  of	  emerging	  
technologies	  to	  connect	  the	  borderlands	  with	  the	  greater	  global	  community,	  an	  issue	  discussed	  
later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
For	  many	  Karen,	  their	  former	  lives	  were	  spent	  in	  the	  jungles	  of	  Karen	  State	  or	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  
refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  Their	  emplacement	  in	  the	  borderlands	  offers	  very	  
different	  political	  opportunities,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  agency	  and	  activism	  discussed	  
in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Karen	  activists	  and	  community	  organisations	  have	  increasingly	  engaged	  
with	  international	  bodies	  in	  ways	  that	  have	  developed	  the	  capacity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  present	  
their	  experiences	  and	  link	  them	  to	  political	  injustices,	  as	  well	  as	  bringing	  international	  attention	  to	  
the	  ongoing	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  of	  Karen	  within	  Karen	  State.	  Further	  to	  this,	  these	  
political	  injustices	  act	  as	  platforms	  around	  which	  the	  Karen	  can	  come	  together	  and	  form	  networks	  
of	  solidarity.	  
Some	  of	  these	  methods	  of	  engagement	  include	  submitting	  written	  reports	  to	  regulatory	  bodies	  
and	  submissions	  to	  commissions	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  Committee	  against	  Torture	  and	  the	  Committee	  on	  
the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Commission.	  As	  traditional	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forms	  of	  human	  rights	  documentation	  they	  cater	  to	  a	  mostly	  international	  audience	  in	  need	  of	  
objective	  factual	  information.	  In	  other	  instances	  activists	  have	  travelled	  overseas	  in	  their	  capacity	  
as	  a	  victim	  of	  state	  violence,	  placing	  them	  in	  direct	  contact	  with	  the	  exiled	  community,	  foreign	  
governments	  and	  media	  outlets.	  For	  example,	  Zoya	  Phan,	  a	  Karen	  activist	  and	  daughter	  of	  slain	  
KNU	  leader	  Pado	  Mahn	  Sha,	  met	  the	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  at	  the	  time,	  Gordon	  Brown	  and	  was	  
also	  asked	  to	  address	  the	  British	  Conservative	  Party	  Conference	  in	  2006	  and	  2007.	  On	  both	  
occasions	  she	  was	  able	  to	  convey	  her	  experiences	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  and	  highlight	  
the	  plight	  of	  Karen	  people	  in	  Burma.70	  In	  September	  2006	  Hseng	  Noung,	  a	  Shan	  activist,	  was	  
invited	  to	  talk	  at	  a	  special	  roundtable	  discussion	  convened	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  opening	  of	  61st	  
General	  Assembly	  session	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.71	  She	  spoke	  of	  the	  Burmese	  Army’s	  use	  of	  rape	  
against	  women,	  particularly	  in	  Burma’s	  ethnic	  areas.	  
In	  other	  instances	  various	  government	  delegations	  and	  prominent	  individuals	  have	  visited	  the	  
refugee	  camps	  and	  held	  audiences	  with	  displaced	  Karen,	  hearing	  firsthand	  accounts	  of	  their	  
experiences.	  Some	  examples	  include	  a	  2008	  visit	  by	  the	  US	  First	  Lady	  Laura	  Bush,	  who	  spent	  time	  
at	  Mae	  La	  Refugee	  Camp	  as	  well	  as	  conducting	  discussions	  with	  Burmese	  health	  and	  education	  
groups	  in	  Mae	  Sot.72	  In	  2007	  the	  Nobel	  Women’s	  Initiative	  led	  a	  group	  of	  high	  profile	  women	  to	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  where	  they	  visited	  clinics	  and	  refugee	  camps	  as	  well	  as	  meeting	  with	  
government	  officials	  and	  women’s	  groups.73	  Other	  high	  profile	  people	  such	  as	  Angelina	  Jolie	  in	  her	  
capacity	  as	  a	  Goodwill	  Ambassador	  for	  UNHCR	  have	  visited	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  on	  a	  
number	  of	  occasions,	  meeting	  and	  talking	  with	  refugees.	  The	  results	  of	  such	  visits	  can	  be	  elusive	  in	  
their	  direct	  outcomes	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands;	  they	  do	  however	  attract	  
international	  attention	  to	  the	  unfolding	  crisis	  along	  the	  border	  and	  provide	  some	  opportunity	  for	  
Karen	  voices	  to	  explain	  their	  experiences	  and	  articulate	  their	  socio-­‐political	  needs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  At	  the	  2007	  Conservative	  Party	  Conference	  Zoya	  Phan	  pleaded	  for	  international	  action	  to	  help	  the	  people	  
of	  Burma.	  She	  recounted	  the	  ongoing	  killing	  in	  Karen	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  monks	  
during	  the	  Saffron	  Revolution.	  Zoya	  Phan’s	  speech	  can	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WW4fd8pUblM.	  
71	  For	  coverage	  of	  this	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  session	  see	  a	  posting	  by	  Washington	  File	  United	  Nations	  
Correspondent,	  Judy	  Aita:	  http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-­‐
english/2006/September/20060920144706eaifas0.84219.html	  [Accessed	  23	  September	  2009].	  
72	  Laura	  Bush’s	  trip	  was	  covered	  by	  numerous	  media	  outlets,	  for	  example	  see:	  ‘Laura	  Bush	  visits	  Burmese	  
groups	  in	  Mae	  Sot’	  (2008,	  August	  8).	  Democratic	  Voice	  of	  Burma.	  Retrieved	  March	  28,	  2012,	  from	  
http://www.dvb.no/uncategorized/laura-­‐bush-­‐visits-­‐burmese-­‐groups-­‐in-­‐mae-­‐sot/1307.	  
73	  The	  Nobel	  Women’s	  Initiative	  delegation,	  including	  Nobel	  Laureates	  Jody	  Williams	  and	  Wangari	  Maathai,	  
visited	  Burma	  and	  Darfur	  in	  July	  2008	  on	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  to	  investigate	  the	  status	  of	  women.	  At	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  trip	  a	  major	  report	  was	  released,	  ‘Women	  for	  Peace’	  (Women	  for	  Peace:	  Nobel	  Women's	  
Initiative	  Delegation	  to	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  South	  Sudan,	  Chad-­‐Darfur	  Area,	  2008)	  which	  called	  on	  the	  




Displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  also	  use	  global	  networks	  to	  connect	  with	  other	  ethnic	  groups	  
facing	  persecution	  in	  Burma,	  as	  well	  as	  persecuted	  peoples	  from	  countries	  in	  Asia,	  the	  Pacific	  and	  
other	  conflict	  areas.	  For	  example,	  there	  has	  been	  some	  attempt	  to	  unite	  the	  different	  ethnic	  
groups	  around	  a	  common	  political	  goal.	  The	  most	  prominent	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Ethnic	  
Nationalities	  Council	  (ENC)	  formed	  in	  2001.	  The	  Council’s	  stated	  aim	  was	  to	  create	  unity	  and	  
cooperation	  between	  the	  various	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  act	  as	  a	  united	  force	  for	  tripartite	  dialogue	  
between	  the	  SPDC,	  NLD	  and	  ethnic	  minority	  groups.	  It	  does	  however	  face	  the	  formidable	  task	  of	  
bringing	  together	  ethnically-­‐divided	  and	  diverse	  interests	  behind	  a	  common	  cause.	  There	  are	  also	  
opportunities	  to	  create	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  at	  more	  informal	  levels.	  One	  such	  example	  is	  a	  study	  
tour	  organised	  by	  a	  local	  NGO,	  Burma	  Issues74	  in	  2002	  between	  the	  recipients	  of	  state	  violence	  in	  
West	  Papua	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Karen,	  Karenni	  and	  Shan	  communities	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border.	  The	  meeting	  allowed	  these	  groups	  to	  share	  their	  respective	  struggles,	  but	  also	  provided	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  their	  common	  difficulties	  and	  possible	  solutions.	  Developed	  further,	  
these	  types	  of	  regional	  networking	  can	  strengthen	  a	  sense	  of	  mutual	  sharing	  and	  responsibility,	  
developing	  a	  pool	  of	  resources	  and	  forming	  solidarities	  around	  resolving	  conflicts	  in	  the	  region.	  
It	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  see	  the	  immediate	  benefits	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  international	  community.	  It	  
doesn’t	  often	  bring	  swift	  change	  or	  relief,	  and	  the	  outcomes	  can	  be	  ambiguous	  and	  difficult	  to	  
measure.	  I	  mention	  these	  examples	  however	  to	  show	  the	  benefits	  of	  international	  engagement	  on	  
a	  broader	  platform	  with	  a	  number	  of	  inter-­‐connected	  levels.	  It	  places	  the	  Karen	  conflict	  in	  a	  global	  
framework	  where	  they	  can	  draw	  on	  the	  considerable	  resources	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  
This	  in	  turn	  gives	  displaced	  Karen	  the	  opportunity	  to	  articulate	  their	  experiences	  in	  supported,	  
politically	  recognised	  environments	  such	  as	  a	  forum	  like	  the	  United	  Nations.	  It	  also	  provides	  a	  
platform	  from	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  project	  a	  political	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  political	  
will.	  And	  finally	  it	  exposes	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  diverse	  interests	  and	  ideas	  which	  in	  turn	  help	  to	  
shape	  Karen	  understandings	  of	  their	  own	  conflict	  within	  the	  global	  context.	  
There	  is	  another	  way	  this	  international	  engagement	  impacts	  the	  lives	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  While	  
instrumental	  in	  maintaining	  global	  interest	  in	  what	  is	  essentially	  a	  prolonged	  civil	  war,	  international	  
engagement	  has	  also	  created	  a	  space	  of	  transversal	  trajectories	  which	  connects	  Karen	  political	  
agency	  with	  ideas	  and	  resources.	  As	  a	  result	  there	  are	  many	  more	  grassroots-­‐driven	  activities	  that	  
have	  come	  out	  of	  the	  borderlands	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  One	  prominent	  example	  is	  the	  ‘License	  to	  
Rape’	  report	  released	  by	  the	  Shan	  Women’s	  Action	  Network	  and	  the	  Shan	  Human	  Rights	  
Foundation	  (SWAN	  &	  SHRF,	  2002).	  The	  release	  of	  this	  report	  prompted	  statements	  from	  the	  US	  
Congress	  and	  US	  State	  Department,	  as	  well	  a	  call	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  for	  the	  Government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of	  Myanmar	  to	  cooperate	  with	  a	  UN	  investigation	  into	  charges	  of	  rape	  carried	  out	  by	  members	  of	  
the	  armed	  forces.75	  These	  responses	  were	  instrumental	  in	  forcing	  the	  SPDC	  to	  conduct	  an	  
investigation	  into	  the	  report’s	  claims.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  SPDC	  investigation	  found	  the	  report’s	  
claims	  were	  “false	  and	  fabricated”.76	  The	  ‘License	  to	  Rape’	  report	  instigated	  a	  number	  of	  other	  
reports	  on	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  rape	  by	  the	  Burmese	  Army,	  including	  ‘Shattering	  Silences’	  (KWO,	  
2004)	  which	  documented	  the	  rape	  of	  Karen	  women	  and	  ‘Catwalk	  to	  the	  Barracks’	  (HRFM,	  2005)	  
which	  documented	  instances	  of	  rape	  against	  Mon	  women.	  All	  these	  reports	  relied	  on	  information	  
documented	  and	  collated	  by	  local	  researchers	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  were	  strengthened	  by	  the	  ability	  
of	  these	  researchers	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  report’s	  findings	  in	  international	  forums.	  These	  reports	  were	  
further	  strengthened	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  present	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  rape	  as	  a	  
weapon	  of	  war	  against	  ethnic	  women,	  and	  to	  link	  this	  to	  international	  forums	  already	  working	  on	  
this	  issue.	  These	  and	  other	  similar	  instances	  highlight	  the	  increasing	  reach	  and	  capacity	  of	  the	  
borderlands	  community	  to	  effectively	  utilise	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  
Engagement	  with	  the	  international	  community	  has	  meant	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  have	  learnt	  a	  number	  of	  skills	  which	  will	  serve	  them	  in	  an	  increasingly	  globalised	  
world;	  including	  the	  capacity	  to	  negotiate	  complex	  global	  structures	  and	  the	  skills	  to	  communicate	  
in	  both	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  and	  multi-­‐lingual	  environment.	  Participation	  in	  formal	  structures	  as	  
politically-­‐engaged	  members	  of	  the	  Karen	  community	  –	  for	  example	  references	  to	  Karen	  reports	  
documenting	  the	  displacement	  of	  Karen	  in	  Burma’s	  eastern	  states	  have	  consistently	  appeared	  in	  
UN	  statements	  and	  recommendations	  since	  at	  least	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  –	  has	  also	  strengthened	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  Karen	  activists	  claims	  to	  present	  their	  own	  political	  agency.	  Engagement	  with	  
international	  networks	  has	  provided	  the	  Karen	  with	  an	  outlet	  for	  their	  activism,	  increased	  global	  
awareness	  of	  the	  Karen	  situation,	  and	  developed	  the	  capacity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  present	  their	  
own	  political	  voice.	  A	  considerable	  impact	  upon	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  global	  engagement	  is	  the	  
many	  advances	  in	  communications	  technologies.	  These	  new	  technologies	  have	  not	  only	  
strengthened	  Karen	  connections	  to	  the	  world	  away	  from	  the	  borderlands,	  but	  also	  developed	  the	  
capacity	  of	  grassroots	  Karen	  to	  define	  what	  these	  connections	  and	  messages	  should	  be.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Expressions	  of	  concern	  regarding	  rape	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  sexual	  violence	  consistently	  appear	  in	  the	  
Resolutions	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly.	  In	  2003,	  following	  the	  release	  of	  the	  ‘License	  to	  Rape’	  report,	  the	  
58th	  session	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  specifically	  called	  on	  the	  Government	  of	  Myanmar	  “To	  immediately	  
facilitate	  and	  cooperate	  fully	  with	  the	  proposed	  investigation	  by	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  of	  the	  Commission	  
on	  Human	  Rights	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  Myanmar	  into	  charges	  of	  rape	  and	  other	  abuse	  of	  
civilians	  carried	  out	  by	  members	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  in	  Shan	  and	  other	  states,	  including	  unhindered	  access	  
to	  the	  region,	  and	  to	  guarantee	  the	  safety	  of	  those	  cooperating	  with	  and	  covered	  by	  the	  investigation”.	  The	  
resolution	  can	  be	  accessed	  here:	  http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/509/34/PDF/N0350934.pdf?OpenElement	  [Accessed	  7	  November	  2011].	  
76	  For	  an	  example	  of	  the	  SPDCs	  response	  to	  the	  ‘License	  to	  Rape’	  report,	  view	  the	  official	  government	  




In	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  catalyst	  for	  greater	  and	  more	  effective	  interaction	  with	  the	  international	  
networks	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  new	  technologies	  have	  also	  developed	  the	  capacity	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  to	  produce	  their	  own	  messages	  and	  project	  them	  to	  a	  larger	  audience.	  This	  section	  
contends	  that	  the	  use	  of	  new	  technologies,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  networks	  of	  
solidarity,	  has	  been	  most	  effective	  on	  two	  levels:	  Firstly,	  technologies	  such	  as	  blogs	  and	  websites	  
have	  been	  utilised	  by	  grassroots	  communities	  to	  increase	  global	  awareness	  of	  the	  Karen	  situation	  
inside	  Burma	  and	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  addition,	  they	  act	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  
Karen	  political	  narrative	  of	  persecution.	  Secondly,	  new	  technologies	  have	  created	  opportunities	  for	  
greater	  connections	  between	  Karen	  groups	  with	  shared	  interests	  and	  activities	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  on	  an	  organisational	  level	  aimed	  at	  English-­‐speaking	  audiences,	  
although	  less	  effective	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  reach	  Karen-­‐language	  audiences	  (a	  point	  discussed	  later	  in	  
this	  section).	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  section	  is	  not	  a	  comment	  on	  the	  technology	  per	  se,	  nor	  its	  impact	  
on	  users;	  this	  would	  require	  a	  very	  different	  methodological	  approach.	  Rather,	  my	  interest	  is	  in	  
how	  these	  technologies	  are	  being	  used	  and	  for	  what	  purpose,	  and	  this	  necessitates	  a	  focus	  on	  
content	  rather	  than	  a	  technical	  analysis	  of	  the	  technology.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  my	  research	  
on	  new	  technologies	  was	  largely	  conducted	  between	  the	  years	  2005	  and	  2008.	  The	  actual	  
technologies	  and	  the	  way	  they	  are	  used	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  have	  developed	  significantly	  since	  
then.	  However,	  the	  material	  in	  this	  section	  remains	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  terms	  of	  identifying	  and	  
understanding	  how	  new	  technologies	  have	  helped	  shape	  Karen	  political	  activity	  and	  more	  broadly	  
the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  To	  date,	  what	  little	  that	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  impact	  and	  
use	  of	  technologies	  has	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  diasporic	  communities	  (Cho,	  2011).	  This	  however,	  does	  
not	  contend	  with	  the	  very	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  
particularly	  an	  ongoing	  close	  physical	  connection	  to	  the	  homeland	  and	  inter-­‐connectedness	  to	  
Karen	  still	  inside	  Burma	  which	  is	  evident	  for	  example	  in	  processes	  of	  cultural	  exchange	  and	  the	  
collection	  of	  stories	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  While	  the	  technology	  has,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  
change,	  the	  larger	  arguments	  made	  here	  remain	  relevant.	  Namely	  that	  new	  technologies,	  
whatever	  form	  they	  take,	  constitute	  a	  key	  platform	  from	  which	  a	  Karen	  political	  narrative	  of	  
persecution	  is	  projected,	  and	  that	  new	  technologies	  create	  opportunities	  for	  greater	  inward	  
connection	  between	  the	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  as	  well	  as	  outward	  connection	  to	  a	  global	  
audience.	  The	  material	  I	  use	  here	  is	  worthy	  of	  examination	  in	  this	  respect.	  
Through	  observations	  over	  a	  number	  of	  fieldwork	  stints	  between	  2005	  and	  2008,	  it	  became	  
apparent	  that	  new	  technologies	  were	  initially	  embraced	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  because	  they	  provided	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a	  readily	  accessible	  outlet	  for	  the	  documentation	  of	  Karen	  persecution,	  and	  as	  such	  were	  an	  
effective	  medium	  for	  their	  activism.	  The	  Karen	  I	  talked	  to	  recognised	  that	  these	  technologies	  could	  
potentially	  capture	  larger	  audiences	  and	  garner	  more	  effective	  responses	  to	  the	  conflict	  inside	  
Burma.	  The	  focus	  was	  on	  what	  the	  technology	  could	  convey,	  not	  necessarily	  its	  technical	  
capabilities,	  although	  this	  obviously	  influenced	  its	  projection.	  It	  also	  gave	  many	  Karen	  who	  were	  
concerned	  about	  the	  conflict	  inside	  Burma	  a	  purpose,	  some	  contribution	  they	  could	  make	  to	  in	  
support	  of	  a	  political	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  The	  line	  between	  personal	  and	  professional	  use	  of	  
new	  technologies	  is	  a	  blurry	  one	  in	  a	  messy	  political	  space	  like	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  but	  my	  
sense	  from	  the	  many	  interviews	  and	  observations	  I	  undertook	  at	  that	  time	  was	  that	  the	  use	  of	  new	  
technologies	  served	  a	  political	  purpose;	  they	  were	  used	  to	  collate	  and	  disseminate	  information	  
around	  ongoing	  claims	  of	  persecution,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  it	  reaching	  someone	  who	  could	  do	  
something	  about	  it,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  was	  the	  intent.	  
The	  most	  significant	  of	  these	  new	  technologies	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  impact	  on	  activities	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  has	  been	  the	  internet.	  Over	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  the	  internet	  has	  taken	  a	  central	  role	  in	  
mobilising	  and	  projecting	  alternative	  political,	  social	  and	  cultural	  messages	  from	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  
has	  allowed	  Karen	  activists	  to	  reach	  more	  diverse	  audiences	  with	  their	  messages.	  While	  use	  of	  the	  
internet	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  borderlands	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  find	  statistics	  for	  
internet	  use	  in	  particular	  regional	  areas	  of	  Thailand.	  Anecdotal	  evidence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  field	  
research	  in	  2005	  suggested	  the	  internet	  was	  largely	  used	  by	  exiled	  organisations,	  NGOs	  and	  
Community	  Based	  Organisations	  (CBOs)	  in	  the	  larger	  towns	  of	  Mae	  Sot,	  Mae	  Sariang	  and	  Mae	  
Hong	  Son.	  At	  that	  time,	  personal	  internet	  use	  was	  fairly	  sporadic,	  although	  this	  has	  changed	  
significantly	  over	  the	  last	  five	  years	  as	  personal	  wifi	  devices	  have	  become	  more	  prevalent	  along	  the	  
border.	  However,	  the	  focus	  in	  this	  section	  is	  on	  organisational	  use	  because	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  research,	  this	  is	  where	  most	  activist	  practices	  were	  
largely	  located.	  
The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  internet	  was	  used	  by	  these	  organisations	  was	  fairly	  typical,	  falling	  into	  two	  
broad	  categories.	  The	  first	  was	  as	  an	  information	  gathering	  and	  exchange	  portal,	  although	  with	  a	  
few	  subtle	  variations.	  Some	  websites	  in	  this	  category	  offer	  additional	  participatory	  options	  such	  as	  
blogs,	  message	  boards	  or	  chat	  forums,	  while	  others	  were	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  the	  provision	  of	  
political,	  cultural	  or	  social	  information	  about	  the	  Karen.	  For	  example,	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  
Karen	  Human	  Rights	  Group	  (KHRG),	  Burma	  Issues	  (BI)	  or	  the	  Thailand	  Burma	  Border	  Consortium	  
(TBBC)	  collected	  information	  from	  inside	  Burma	  and	  the	  borderlands,	  create	  reports	  based	  on	  this	  
information	  and	  then	  place	  them	  on	  their	  websites	  for	  further	  dissemination	  or	  exchange.	  Others,	  
such	  as	  Burmanet	  and	  BI	  Weekly	  distributed	  news	  of	  ongoing	  human	  rights	  violations	  through	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listserves	  and	  email	  bulletins.	  These	  are	  often	  picked	  up	  by	  mainstream	  media	  and	  projected	  back	  
into	  Burma	  through	  media	  outlets	  like	  Voice	  of	  America	  (VOA),	  BBC	  and	  Radio	  Free	  Asia.	  Websites	  
such	  as	  KarenPeople.org	  provided	  political	  and	  cultural	  information	  about	  the	  Karen	  with	  an	  
additional	  function	  of	  allowing	  the	  user	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  online	  message	  board.	  Blogs	  such	  as	  
‘KarenRefugee’	  and	  the	  Committee	  for	  Internally	  Displaced	  Karen	  People’s	  ‘Inside	  News’	  also	  
allowed	  users	  to	  interact	  through	  a	  comments	  function	  (although	  these	  were	  fairly	  under-­‐utilised	  
at	  the	  time),	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  providing	  important	  cultural	  and	  political	  information	  about	  
being	  a	  refugee	  or	  displaced	  person	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Websites	  such	  as	  the	  Karen	  History	  and	  
Cultural	  Preservation	  Society	  and	  the	  Burma	  Library	  act	  more	  traditionally	  as	  a	  library	  of	  data	  
regarding	  the	  history,	  culture	  and	  political	  situation	  of	  the	  Karen.	  
The	  second	  category	  is	  where	  the	  internet	  is	  used	  as	  a	  resource	  tool.	  In	  most	  cases	  NGOs	  and	  CBOs	  
fall	  into	  this	  category.	  These	  organisations	  provide	  information	  for	  sharing	  and	  exchange	  but	  they	  
also	  provide	  important	  resource	  material.	  An	  example	  would	  be	  the	  Karen	  Teacher	  Working	  Group	  
whose	  website	  provides	  education	  texts,	  and	  Karen	  dictionaries	  and	  fonts,	  and	  the	  Mae	  Tao	  Clinic	  
which	  provides	  important	  information	  about	  health	  services,	  training	  and	  education.	  In	  many	  of	  
these	  cases	  the	  internet	  acts	  as	  a	  largely	  supplementary	  function	  to	  existing	  activities.	  For	  example,	  
the	  main	  function	  of	  the	  Mae	  Tao	  clinic	  is	  to	  provide	  health	  services	  to	  refugees,	  migrant	  workers	  
and	  others	  from	  Burma	  who	  cross	  into	  Thailand.	  This	  core	  function	  is	  supplemented	  by	  a	  website	  
which	  allows	  the	  clinic	  to	  disperse	  knowledge	  of	  its	  services	  to	  a	  larger	  audience.	  In	  another	  
example,	  human	  rights	  documentation	  has	  been	  occurring	  in	  the	  borderlands	  for	  many	  decades.	  
The	  internet	  has	  not	  necessarily	  changed	  that	  function	  of	  documentation,	  but	  rather	  the	  form	  it	  
takes:	  providing	  a	  faster	  more	  effective	  and	  accessible	  means	  of	  disseminating	  it.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
purpose	  of	  activists	  in	  the	  borderlands	  remains	  the	  same;	  the	  internet	  simply	  becomes	  an	  
additional	  tool,	  albeit	  a	  significant	  one,	  through	  which	  their	  activism	  can	  be	  disseminated.	  
There	  are	  other	  important	  factors	  to	  consider	  when	  laying	  out	  internet	  use	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Any	  
presentation	  of	  information	  has	  both	  a	  producer	  and	  a	  recipient.	  While	  information	  provided	  on	  
the	  internet	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  clear	  distinctions	  between	  the	  two,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Most	  
raw	  data	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  collected	  in	  the	  Karen	  language,	  and	  with	  a	  few	  exceptions	  this	  is	  
then	  translated	  into	  English	  and	  put	  on	  the	  web	  for	  an	  international	  audience.	  The	  Karen	  produce	  
it,	  an	  international	  audience	  receives	  it.	  But	  in	  many	  cases	  foreign	  researchers,	  volunteers	  and	  
writers	  produce	  English-­‐language	  reports	  and	  other	  documentation	  based	  on	  the	  raw	  data.	  This	  is	  
then	  disseminated	  to	  an	  international	  audience	  as	  well	  as	  a	  local	  English-­‐speaking	  Karen	  audience.	  
The	  Karen	  and	  foreigners	  are	  both	  producers	  and	  receivers.	  A	  smaller	  amount,	  although	  
increasingly	  growing,	  is	  the	  production	  of	  information	  in	  Karen	  and	  Burmese	  intended	  for	  a	  Karen	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audience.	  KweKaLu,	  a	  Karen-­‐language	  newspaper	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this.	  
Information	  is	  collected	  by	  Karen	  staff	  and	  placed	  online	  in	  the	  Karen	  language.	  Much	  of	  the	  art	  
and	  music	  produced	  in	  the	  borderlands	  fits	  this	  type	  as	  well,	  with	  a	  plethora	  of	  Karen-­‐language	  
music	  albums	  appearing	  in	  the	  borderlands	  over	  the	  last	  five	  years.	  Through	  this	  process	  of	  shared	  
information	  creation	  and	  dissemination,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  between	  the	  Karen	  and	  an	  
international	  audience	  are	  able	  to	  form.	  There	  are	  however,	  still	  significant	  obstacles	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  internet	  use	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  a	  more	  diverse	  Karen	  audience.	  
The	  internet	  has	  undoubtedly	  increased	  the	  global	  reach	  of	  the	  Karen	  struggle.	  It	  has	  also	  had	  
considerable	  impact	  upon	  local	  organisations’	  ability	  to	  connect	  with	  global	  audiences.	  However,	  
an	  area	  still	  under	  development	  is	  its	  use	  to	  support	  local	  networking,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  
providing	  for	  a	  Karen	  language	  audience.	  The	  two	  biggest	  obstacles	  remain	  language	  and	  
accessibility.	  For	  many	  years	  the	  use	  of	  Karen	  language	  on	  websites	  was	  limited	  by	  technical	  and	  
visual	  constraints	  around	  the	  Karen	  font.	  While	  this	  has	  been	  resolved	  in	  more	  recent	  years,	  a	  large	  
amount	  of	  internet	  content	  is	  still	  English-­‐orientated;	  this	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  internet	  accessibility	  
and	  user	  inter-­‐connections	  globally.	  
From	  a	  sample	  of	  19	  Karen	  websites	  studied	  in	  2007,	  only	  one,	  KweKaLu,	  had	  substantial	  amounts	  
of	  Karen	  language	  on	  their	  site.	  Four	  others,	  the	  Karen	  Human	  Right	  Group,	  Burma	  Issues,	  the	  
Karen	  Teachers	  Working	  Group	  and	  Drum	  Publications,	  provided	  various	  resources	  in	  Karen	  
language,	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  site	  was	  in	  English.	  Even	  where	  Karen	  language	  is	  used	  it	  is	  mostly	  
Sgaw	  Karen,	  and	  this	  excludes	  audiences	  who	  speak	  Pwo,	  Bwe	  and	  many	  other	  Karen	  dialects.	  
Language	  is	  still	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  obstacles	  to	  wide-­‐spread	  internet	  accessibility,	  but	  KweKaLu	  
with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  Karen	  language	  is	  a	  strong	  example	  of	  the	  internet’s	  potential	  in	  this	  area.	  
While	  language	  and	  accessibility	  pose	  some	  difficulties	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  internet	  developing	  
more	  meaningful	  connections	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  areas	  where	  new	  
technologies	  have	  had	  a	  profound	  effect:	  firstly	  the	  way	  they	  have	  been	  used	  to	  develop	  
solidarities	  between	  organisations	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  secondly	  in	  the	  way	  that	  new	  
technologies	  can	  give	  priority	  to	  personal	  narratives.	  Both	  points	  are	  elaborated	  on	  below.	  
An	  example	  of	  the	  internet	  developing	  solidarities	  between	  organisations	  in	  the	  borderlands	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  five	  Karen	  organisations	  called	  the	  Karen	  River	  Watch	  (KRW).	  
KRW	  is	  made	  up	  of	  the	  Karen	  Environmental	  and	  Social	  Action	  Network	  (KESAN),	  the	  Karen	  Student	  
Network	  Group	  (KSNG),	  the	  Karen	  Office	  for	  Relief	  and	  Development	  (KORD),	  the	  Karen	  Youth	  
Organisation	  (KYO)	  and	  the	  Federation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  -­‐	  Kawthoolei	  (FTUK).	  By	  using	  various	  forms	  
of	  technology	  the	  coalition	  has	  been	  able	  to	  communicate,	  mobilise	  and	  advocate	  in	  more	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collaborative	  and	  efficient	  ways.	  A	  good	  example	  is	  a	  campaign	  the	  coalition	  began	  in	  2003	  against	  
the	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  government’s	  decision	  to	  dam	  sections	  of	  the	  Salween	  River.	  The	  campaign	  
worked	  at	  both	  a	  grassroots	  and	  global	  level	  to	  raise	  awareness	  of	  the	  environmental	  impacts,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  associated	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  impacts,	  of	  such	  a	  large-­‐scale	  development	  
project.	  The	  campaign	  employed	  a	  number	  of	  new	  technologies	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims.	  To	  date,	  the	  
project	  has	  produced	  a	  written	  report,	  a	  DVD,	  a	  tape	  of	  music	  and	  a	  website.	  They	  instigated	  an	  e-­‐
petition	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Thailand	  and	  took	  part	  in	  a	  Global	  Day	  of	  Action	  in	  19	  cities	  across	  
the	  world.	  Production	  of	  the	  tape	  of	  music	  provides	  an	  interesting	  approach	  to	  cross-­‐border	  
sharing	  which	  makes	  use	  of	  both	  new	  technology	  and	  international	  networks.	  A	  group	  from	  KRW	  
along	  with	  other	  associated	  individuals	  set	  up	  a	  temporary	  recording	  studio	  in	  an	  internally	  
displaced	  persons	  (IDP)	  area	  on	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Salween	  River.	  They	  recorded	  six	  songs	  over	  five	  
days.	  When	  villagers	  weren’t	  busy	  they	  came	  down	  and	  watched.	  Many	  of	  the	  songs	  on	  the	  tape	  
are	  based	  on	  Karen	  hta	  which	  is	  a	  form	  of	  oral	  poetry	  traditionally	  used	  to	  pass	  on	  knowledge	  from	  
one	  generation	  to	  the	  next.	  
Originally	  we	  thought	  it	  would	  be	  too	  difficult	  to	  record	  this	  on	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Salween.	  It	  
is	  an	  IDP	  area	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  when	  the	  Burmese	  military	  might	  appear	  …	  The	  use	  
of	  poem,	  song	  and	  performance	  art	  is	  of	  real	  practical	  use	  to	  the	  villagers	  …	  music	  can	  
make	  everything	  concise.	  They	  can	  keep	  the	  tape	  to	  remind	  them	  of	  the	  dam	  issue	  and	  it	  
will	  remain	  in	  their	  memories	  (So	  Pla,	  interview,	  29	  September	  2005).	  
Once	  the	  tape	  was	  finished	  the	  group	  sent	  copies	  back	  to	  the	  village	  where	  they	  had	  recorded	  the	  
music.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  distributed	  along	  the	  border	  and	  through	  international	  networks,	  including	  
being	  able	  to	  be	  downloaded	  from	  the	  KRW	  website.	  By	  using	  the	  web,	  video	  and	  music,	  in	  Karen	  
and	  English	  languages,	  the	  group	  has	  reached	  an	  audience,	  both	  locally	  and	  internationally,	  Karen	  
and	  foreign,	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  never	  have	  been	  possible	  before	  the	  advent	  of	  these	  new	  
technologies.	  The	  connections	  and	  solidarity	  built	  around	  this	  one	  particular	  issue	  is	  indicative	  of	  
the	  way	  new	  technologies	  can	  bring	  politically	  and	  socially	  engaged	  individuals	  together	  around	  
shared	  values	  and	  interests,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  restoring	  the	  value	  of	  the	  voices	  and	  the	  
messages	  they	  provide.	  
Projects	  such	  as	  these	  begin	  to	  show	  the	  inward	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  narrative,	  a	  point	  I	  
explore	  further	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  but	  of	  interest	  to	  my	  argument	  here.	  In	  this	  instance,	  KRW	  was	  
able	  to	  construct	  a	  political	  message	  –	  firstly	  regarding	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  dam	  and	  its	  impact	  upon	  
local	  communities,	  and	  secondly	  regarding	  a	  wider	  message	  of	  Karen	  persecution	  –	  that	  is	  
specifically	  designed	  to	  reach	  and	  influence	  a	  Karen	  audience.	  The	  project	  brings	  an	  inward	  
projection	  of	  solidarity	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  its	  place	  as	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  act	  of	  persecution	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enacted	  upon	  the	  Karen	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  In	  this	  sense	  villagers	  affected	  by	  the	  dam	  are	  
not	  alone	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ongoing	  threats	  of	  displacement	  and	  violence	  enacted	  by	  the	  Burmese	  
military.	  They	  are	  in	  fact	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  Karen	  community	  who	  have	  suffered	  similar	  experiences,	  
making	  them	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  narrative	  that	  can	  articulate	  a	  collective	  response.	  This	  inward	  
projection	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  but	  at	  this	  point	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  new	  
technologies	  can	  enable	  access	  to	  a	  wider	  Karen	  audience	  (including	  the	  inward	  projection	  of	  a	  
Karen	  political	  narrative)	  which	  facilitates	  the	  dissemination	  of	  a	  shared	  Karen	  narrative	  of	  
displacement	  and	  persecution.	  This	  narrative	  manifests	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  (the	  key	  argument	  of	  Chapter	  Eight),	  and	  is	  critically	  informed	  by	  the	  borderlands	  
space	  in	  which	  it	  is	  constructed	  and	  projected.	  
The	  second	  point	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	  new	  technologies	  can	  prioritise	  personal	  
narratives,	  which	  in	  turn	  are	  used	  to	  establish	  a	  collective	  political	  narrative.	  This	  process	  provides	  
legitimacy	  and	  power	  to	  Karen	  political	  voices	  by	  allowing	  Karen	  to	  own	  their	  message	  as	  well	  as	  
fulfilling	  a	  need	  in	  the	  outside	  community	  for	  greater	  ‘proof’	  of	  atrocities	  they	  have	  only	  heard	  
about	  second	  hand.	  In	  2007	  in	  Mae	  La	  Refugee	  camp	  a	  group	  of	  Karen	  students	  started	  a	  blog	  
called	  KarenRefugee.77	  It	  began	  by	  providing	  first-­‐hand	  accounts	  of	  life	  in	  the	  camp	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
aspirations	  of	  youth	  living	  as	  refugees.	  Due	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  resettlement	  program,	  the	  blog	  
went	  on	  to	  include	  entries	  from	  Karen	  refugees	  resettled	  in	  Australia,	  and	  others	  who	  are	  
undertaking	  work	  in	  local	  Karen	  communities	  outside	  the	  camps.	  The	  blog	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  
utilise	  both	  a	  diverse	  user-­‐base	  and	  a	  wide	  international	  audience,	  connecting	  those	  in	  the	  isolated	  
confines	  of	  the	  camp	  with	  the	  greater	  online	  global	  community.	  The	  conversational	  nature	  of	  blogs	  
allows	  Karen	  refugees	  to	  tell	  their	  stories,	  but	  also	  learn	  from	  communities	  they	  would	  not	  
normally	  have	  access	  to.	  
The	  personal	  narrative	  is	  imperative	  to	  this	  type	  of	  technology.	  One	  participant,	  Loo	  Ne,	  
emphasised	  this	  point	  when	  talking	  about	  his	  song,	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’.	  “It’s	  like	  I’m	  reading	  my	  own	  
biography	  since	  I	  was	  a	  child”	  (Loo	  Ne,	  personal	  communication,	  22	  September	  2005).	  For	  Loo	  Ne	  
the	  song	  fulfils	  an	  intensely	  personal	  need	  to	  let	  other	  people	  know	  his	  feelings	  and	  experiences	  as	  
an	  IDP.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  purpose	  of	  writing	  the	  song.	  A	  group	  of	  Karen	  activists	  have	  created	  
a	  video	  clip	  for	  the	  song	  and	  released	  it	  to	  a	  wider	  audience	  on	  YouTube.78	  In	  this	  instance	  
technology	  and	  greater	  opportunities	  for	  dissemination	  allows	  this	  personal	  narrative	  to	  become	  
an	  advocacy	  tool	  as	  well.	  In	  our	  interview	  Loo	  Ne	  expanded	  upon	  this	  when	  he	  said:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  The	  KarenRefugee	  blog	  was	  at	  its	  most	  active	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  It	  has	  remained	  largely	  static	  since	  2009,	  
most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  resettlement	  program.	  The	  blog	  can	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://karenrefugee.livejournal.com/.	  
78	  The	  video	  clip	  of	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’	  can	  be	  viewed	  at	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U0a97qOnrRU.	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Writing	  this	  song	  was	  not	  really	  for	  myself	  because	  it	  is	  a	  story	  I	  already	  know.	  It’s	  like	  I’m	  
using	  different	  tools	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  IDP,	  actually	  not	  only	  the	  IDP	  but	  people	  here	  
[in	  Thailand]	  as	  well.	  It	  can	  cover	  all	  people,	  not	  only	  those	  from	  the	  civil	  war	  zone.	  
Especially	  it	  can	  be	  useful	  for	  human	  rights	  activists	  who	  can	  do	  lobbying	  and	  campaigning	  
with	  it	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  22	  September	  2005).	  
What	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  Loo	  Ne	  speaks	  of	  his	  song	  is	  his	  belief	  that	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’	  
represents	  a	  larger	  collective	  of	  people	  with	  similar	  stories.	  This	  is	  not	  his	  story	  but	  many	  people’s	  
story.	  He	  tells	  it	  as	  a	  way	  of	  reflecting	  the	  experiences	  of	  other	  IDP,	  or	  other	  Karen	  in	  the	  conflict	  
zones	  or	  displaced	  into	  Thailand.	  In	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’	  we	  see	  a	  subjective	  experience	  of	  
displacement	  turned	  in	  to	  a	  collective	  identity	  with	  a	  political	  message	  projected	  through	  an	  
activist	  framework.	  The	  song	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  moving	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  a	  personal	  
narrative	  into	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  in	  turn	  a	  potential	  point	  of	  mobilisation	  
and	  identification	  for	  a	  collective	  community	  of	  Karen.	  
In	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐nineties	  the	  border	  area	  experienced	  an	  influx	  in	  trainings	  around	  video	  and	  its	  
potential	  as	  an	  advocacy	  tool.	  Western	  organisations	  spent	  time	  training	  and	  funding	  local	  activists	  
to	  take	  videos	  into	  the	  conflict	  zone	  and	  record	  first	  hand	  experiences.	  It	  followed	  an	  international	  
trend	  where	  the	  public	  wanted	  ‘to	  see	  for	  themselves’	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  areas	  they	  had	  only	  
previously	  read	  about.	  
I	  think,	  nowadays,	  there	  are	  changes	  in	  many	  places,	  including	  information	  and	  media.	  
More	  and	  more	  people	  are	  aware	  of	  getting	  the	  real	  voice,	  the	  real	  story	  from	  those	  who	  
suffer,	  not	  through	  NGOs	  or	  reports.	  They	  themselves	  want	  to	  see,	  want	  to	  hear.	  First	  of	  all	  
they	  try	  and	  get	  these	  people	  to	  go	  somewhere	  and	  tell	  their	  story	  by	  their	  own.	  That’s	  
what	  they	  try.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  people,	  one	  thing	  is	  like	  the	  
empowerment.	  They	  don’t	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  victims;	  they	  don’t	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  suffering	  
alone.	  It	  will	  give	  them	  awareness	  to	  go	  out	  and	  learn	  they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  are	  
suffering.	  In	  other	  countries	  there	  are	  also	  people	  who	  are	  suffering	  like	  them.	  And	  also	  
there	  are	  people	  who	  support	  them,	  a	  sort	  of	  movement.	  They	  are	  not	  standing	  alone,	  so	  it	  
is	  very	  important	  to	  bring	  their	  voice	  to	  empower	  them	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  19	  September	  
2005).	  
New	  technology	  and	  access	  to	  broader	  networks	  has	  allowed	  the	  Karen	  to	  present	  their	  own	  voices	  
to	  a	  global	  community,	  effectively	  moving	  the	  debate	  beyond	  the	  state	  narrative	  that	  has	  typically	  
excluded	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Loo	  Ne	  in	  the	  comments	  above,	  this	  has	  
produced	  a	  space	  that	  allows	  for	  personal	  narratives	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reinforces	  a	  sense	  of	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empowerment	  for	  those	  whose	  voices	  have	  a	  history	  of	  being	  neglected.	  Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
authorative	  voices	  on	  narrative	  and	  empowerment	  is	  Julian	  Rappaport	  who	  has	  worked	  extensively	  
in	  the	  fields	  of	  community	  psychology	  and	  social	  policy.	  Rappaport	  calls	  neglected	  voices	  “an	  
ignored	  or	  devalued	  resource”,	  and	  as	  a	  resource	  therefore	  subject	  to	  uneven	  distribution.	  Re-­‐
establishing	  the	  value	  of	  these	  stories	  therefore	  requires	  “people	  participate[ing]	  in	  the	  discovery,	  
creation,	  and	  enhancement	  of	  their	  own	  community	  narratives	  and	  personal	  stories”	  (Rappaport,	  
1995,	  p.	  52).	  This	  is,	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  an	  example	  of	  Geoff	  Wood’s	  claim	  to	  put	  the	  
story	  back	  into	  the	  case	  (Wood,	  1985),	  but	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  value	  of	  these	  stories	  which	  
are	  too	  often	  neglected.	  To	  some	  extent	  what	  new	  technologies	  have	  done	  is	  address	  this	  
imbalance,	  allowing	  long-­‐neglected	  or	  devalued	  voices	  to	  develop	  a	  space	  in	  which	  their	  political	  
voice	  is	  supported.	  A	  video,	  a	  web	  page	  or	  a	  blog	  are	  all	  methods	  of	  information	  exchange	  that	  can	  
function	  freely	  and	  largely	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  political	  structures.	  As	  a	  result	  it	  is	  a	  space	  where	  
alternative	  political	  voices	  can	  be	  expressed	  and	  supported,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  capability	  that	  ensures	  
new	  technologies	  are	  an	  integral	  factor	  in	  creating	  spaces	  of	  solidarity	  for	  displaced	  Karen,	  and	  in	  
turn	  help	  develop	  an	  alternative	  space	  where	  those	  political	  needs	  can	  be	  met.	  
Advances	  in	  new	  communications	  technologies	  and	  the	  increased	  capacity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  
utilise	  these	  technologies	  has	  significantly	  improved	  the	  reach	  of	  Karen	  political	  voices,	  and	  
undoubtedly	  increased	  the	  reach	  of	  advocacy	  around	  Karen	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  these	  technologies	  enable	  greater	  connections	  between	  individuals	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  with	  shared	  interests	  and	  activities.	  Evidence	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  these	  technologies	  
can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  organisations	  have	  worked	  together	  on	  projects	  such	  as	  those	  undertaken	  
by	  KRW.	  While	  new	  technologies	  have	  expanded	  the	  reach	  of	  Karen	  political	  messages,	  the	  focus	  
of	  this	  next	  section	  is	  on	  how	  the	  development	  of	  political	  consciousness	  is	  used	  to	  strengthen	  the	  
capacity	  of	  local	  communities	  and	  in	  the	  process	  contribute	  to	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity.	  
POLITICALLY	  CONSCIOUS,	  POLITICALLY	  REFLECTIVE	  
A	  state	  of	  political	  consciousness	  is	  in	  many	  respects	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  two	  practices	  already	  
mentioned;	  it	  also	  represents	  the	  way	  the	  Karen	  typically	  utilise	  new	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  
to	  develop	  the	  capacity	  of	  their	  communities.	  While	  not	  explicitly	  stated,	  many	  Karen	  approach	  
this	  as	  a	  way	  to	  expand	  the	  potential	  power	  and	  influence	  of	  Karen	  political	  agency.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  
contend	  that	  the	  Karen	  attempt	  to	  develop	  political	  consciousness	  in	  their	  communities	  in	  order	  to	  
strengthen	  the	  ability	  to	  convey	  a	  strong	  political	  message	  around	  the	  ongoing	  persecution	  of	  
Karen	  inside	  Burma.	  This	  fulfils	  a	  larger	  need	  to	  develop	  the	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  of	  local	  Karen	  
communities	  both	  inside	  Burma	  and	  along	  the	  border.	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While	  I	  touch	  briefly	  on	  aspects	  of	  more	  formal	  technical	  skills	  transference	  such	  as	  practical	  
trainings	  and	  education,	  this	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  broader	  theme	  of	  political	  consciousness	  and	  
reflection.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  for	  this.	  A	  key	  theme	  that	  emerged	  from	  many	  of	  the	  
displaced	  Karen	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  research	  was	  the	  twin	  desire	  to	  both	  share	  the	  knowledge	  
and	  opportunities	  they	  themselves	  had	  gained	  and	  to	  build	  a	  critically	  aware	  population	  capable	  of	  
strengthening	  the	  Karen	  political	  movement	  and	  ultimately	  resolving	  the	  conflict	  inside	  Burma.	  
This	  motivation	  has	  deep	  historical	  roots,	  and	  is	  framed	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  present	  the	  Karen	  as	  an	  
educated	  and	  civilised	  nation	  with	  its	  own	  history	  and	  literature,	  thus	  putting	  them	  on	  a	  culturally	  
and	  politically	  equal	  footing	  to	  others,	  and	  highlighting	  the	  unjust	  nature	  of	  their	  persecution	  
(Cheesman,	  2002,	  pp.	  209-­‐214).	  This	  position	  is	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Po	  Lin	  Tay,	  an	  early	  
Karen	  historian.	  
If	  at	  some	  time	  our	  texts	  are	  lost,	  what	  will	  become	  of	  our	  race’s	  experiences	  in	  past	  
generations?	  There	  would	  be	  nothing	  to	  serve	  as	  evidence	  of	  Karen	  history,	  whether	  
records,	  newspapers	  or	  written	  news,	  so	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  exactly	  re-­‐identify	  our	  
origins	  and	  would	  become	  a	  generation	  of	  people	  without	  a	  country	  (quoted	  in	  Cheesman	  
(2002,	  p.	  213).	  
It	  is	  a	  sentiment	  echoed	  by	  a	  Karen	  participant	  in	  this	  research,	  U	  Kyi,	  who	  clearly	  saw	  the	  
importance	  of	  learning	  and	  ‘knowing’	  Karen	  history	  and	  culture.	  
Personally,	  for	  me	  I	  think	  it	  is	  really,	  really	  important	  because	  without	  knowing	  your	  own	  
history	  you	  cannot	  do	  anything	  for	  your	  people	  ...	  You	  know	  that	  to	  organise	  people	  you	  
have	  to	  know	  history	  and	  culture,	  this	  is	  what	  I	  believe.	  Because	  if	  you	  would	  like	  to	  give	  
the	  young	  generation,	  let’s	  say	  this	  is	  not	  the	  right	  word	  but	  like	  ideology	  or	  nationalism	  
then	  you	  need	  to	  base	  it	  on	  history.	  If	  you	  cannot	  give	  them	  firm	  information	  then	  they	  will	  
not	  believe.	  That	  is	  why	  history	  is	  important	  (U	  Kyi,	  interview,	  8	  November	  2005).	  
This	  participant’s	  account	  indicates	  a	  perceived	  link	  between	  a	  critically	  aware	  population	  and	  the	  
progress	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  work	  for	  the	  cause,	  to	  educate	  others,	  is	  
seen	  as	  the	  duty	  of	  all	  Karen,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Karen	  peoples,	  their	  history,	  
their	  culture,	  and	  their	  land.	  This	  is	  certainly	  true	  of	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  
research	  who	  expressed	  a	  clear	  duty	  towards	  developing	  a	  politically	  conscious	  population	  as	  a	  
way	  of	  protecting	  and	  developing	  Karen	  identity	  and	  culture.	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  key	  examples	  from	  my	  research	  that	  best	  illustrate	  how	  this	  process	  of	  
political	  consciousness	  helps	  to	  form	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  Imparting	  learnt	  
knowledge	  underlies	  most	  of	  these	  types	  of	  activities.	  One	  participant,	  Saw	  Ba,	  is	  a	  Karen	  artist-­‐
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activist	  with	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  drawing	  cartoons.	  He	  has	  natural	  creative	  ability	  but	  has	  also	  
benefited	  from	  informal	  training	  in	  community	  organisation	  and	  NGO-­‐facilitated	  arts	  programs	  in	  
the	  borderlands.	  A	  number	  of	  his	  cartoons	  have	  been	  published	  in	  KweKaLu,	  a	  Karen	  language	  
newspaper	  distributed	  along	  the	  border	  and	  inside	  Burma.	  In	  our	  interview,	  Saw	  Ba	  said	  the	  main	  
purpose	  behind	  his	  cartoons	  is	  for	  them	  to	  be	  used	  as	  an	  educational	  tool,	  a	  means	  for	  imparting	  
knowledge.	  He	  talked	  about	  a	  particular	  cartoon	  he	  drew	  where	  he	  contemplates	  a	  common	  
refrain	  expressed	  by	  Karen	  in	  Burma’s	  more	  remote	  and	  illiterate	  conflict	  zones	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  He	  
believes	  that	  prolonged	  suffering	  and	  isolation	  has	  caused	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  search	  for	  
explanations	  in	  the	  metaphysical	  world	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  30	  September	  2005).	  This	  will	  often	  
take	  the	  form	  of	  an	  ‘acceptance	  of	  fate’	  or	  ‘God’s	  will’	  and	  this	  then	  frames	  how	  Karen	  perceive	  the	  
injustices	  enacted	  upon	  them	  and	  rationalise	  their	  current	  predicament.79	  
	  
Figure	  1–	  ‘Fate’,	  cartoon	  by	  Saw	  Ba	  
In	  the	  cartoon	  the	  mother	  accepts	  that	  the	  circumstances	  of	  her	  life	  are	  caused	  by	  fate.	  Saw	  Ba	  
told	  me	  that	  the	  mother	  represents	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  believe	  that	  life	  and	  its	  
repercussions	  are	  beyond	  their	  control,	  demobilising	  any	  action	  that	  might	  serve	  to	  change	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Comments	  on	  ‘fate’	  and	  ‘God’s	  will’	  are	  found	  in	  the	  interviews	  of	  many	  displaced	  people	  in	  the	  conflict	  
zones.	  For	  examples	  see	  video	  footage	  produced	  by	  Burma	  Issues	  www.burmissues.org	  and	  the	  Karen	  




conditions,	  and	  in	  effect	  entrenching	  their	  own	  immobility.	  In	  his	  work	  on	  cultural	  pedagogy	  Paulo	  
Freire	  has	  attempted	  to	  account	  for	  this	  cultural	  conditioning	  that	  allows	  people	  to	  inadvertently	  
participate	  in	  their	  own	  subjugation.	  His	  term	  “culture	  of	  silence”	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  understanding	  
the	  sometimes	  paralysing	  effect	  of	  living	  under	  sustained	  periods	  of	  oppression.	  Under	  the	  culture	  
of	  silence	  life	  is	  a	  space	  in	  which	  you	  live	  only;	  where	  blame	  and	  responsibility	  lay	  outside	  the	  
realm	  of	  your	  reality,	  and	  where	  alienation	  from	  those	  in	  power	  has	  caused	  the	  masses	  to	  be	  
complicit	  in	  their	  muteness	  (Freire,	  1972,	  p.	  30).	  It	  is	  these	  kinds	  of	  belief	  that	  Saw	  Ba	  believes	  are	  
damaging	  to	  Karen	  agency	  and	  which	  he	  is	  determined	  to	  address	  through	  his	  cartoons.	  He	  uses	  
knowledge	  and	  skills	  enabled	  by	  his	  presence	  in	  the	  borderlands	  to	  create	  and	  then	  disseminate	  
alternative	  messages	  like	  the	  one	  in	  his	  cartoon	  above.	  His	  knowledge,	  and	  subsequently	  his	  
message	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  comments	  of	  the	  villager’s	  in	  the	  last	  panel	  when	  they	  state	  that	  the	  
conditions	  suffered	  by	  the	  woman	  and	  her	  son	  are	  the	  creation	  of	  fellow	  human	  beings,	  not	  an	  
ethereal	  ‘other’	  from	  a	  different	  realm.	  By	  viewing	  this	  in	  the	  context	  of	  action-­‐cause,	  displaced	  
Karen	  can	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  those	  conditions	  rather	  than	  be	  complicit	  in	  their	  silence.	  Saw	  Ba	  
has	  developed	  this	  knowledge	  or	  political	  awareness	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  self-­‐analysis	  and	  
exposure	  to	  other	  ideas.	  It	  is	  knowledge	  he	  thinks	  is	  important	  to	  share	  and	  he	  achieves	  this	  
through	  his	  art.	  
Cartoons	  have	  been	  used	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  by	  the	  artist	  Pe	  Li	  in	  his	  Hsaw	  Pa	  Kaw	  series.	  Published	  in	  
KweKaLu	  since	  1997	  the	  cartoons	  often	  convey	  educative	  messages	  around	  politics	  and	  being	  a	  
refugee.	  In	  a	  particular	  cartoon	  published	  in	  October	  2005,	  Pe	  Li	  addresses	  the	  concerns	  he	  has	  




Figure	  2	  –	  Hsaw	  Pa	  Kaw	  cartoon	  by	  Pe	  Li,	  KweKaLu,	  October	  2005	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  2005,	  concern	  within	  the	  refugee	  camps	  about	  resettlement	  to	  third	  countries	  was	  
particularly	  heated	  and	  dominated	  by	  misinformation.	  Many	  thought	  they	  would	  be	  leaving	  to	  be	  
resettled	  the	  next	  day,	  not	  understanding	  that	  the	  process	  might	  take	  months	  if	  not	  years.	  Pe	  Li’s	  
cartoons	  at	  this	  time	  showed	  concern	  that	  little	  was	  being	  done	  to	  address	  the	  cultural	  realities	  of	  
resettlement.	  From	  simple	  things	  such	  as	  differences	  in	  the	  styles	  of	  dressing,	  to	  more	  potentially	  
debilitating	  differences	  such	  as	  making	  a	  living	  and	  understanding	  what	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  would	  be	  
like	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Australia	  or	  America.	  As	  more	  and	  more	  people	  complained	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  
information	  being	  handed	  out	  to	  those	  in	  the	  camps,	  Pe	  Li’s	  message	  through	  his	  Hsaw	  Pa	  Kaw	  
cartoon	  became	  increasingly	  important	  in	  reaching	  the	  people	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  resettlement	  
process,	  those	  in	  the	  camps.	  It	  was	  a	  reminder	  to	  the	  people	  that	  resettlement	  was	  not	  necessarily	  
the	  golden	  land	  promised,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  without	  its	  own	  difficulties	  and	  struggles.	  For	  many,	  
resettlement	  is	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  appalling	  and	  protracted	  living	  arrangements	  of	  the	  refugee	  
camps	  along	  the	  border.	  However	  it	  can	  also	  be	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  whole	  new	  set	  of	  challenges	  for	  
displaced	  Karen	  to	  face,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  knowledge	  that	  is	  conveyed	  in	  Pe	  Li’s	  cartoons.	  
The	  objective	  of	  both	  these	  cartoonists	  work	  is	  to	  convey	  knowledge	  and	  ideas.	  In	  their	  work	  they	  
critically	  analyse	  the	  realities	  that	  impact	  the	  everyday	  lives	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
and	  inside	  Burma.	  As	  an	  easily	  accessible	  and	  understood	  medium,	  cartoons	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  
reach	  a	  large	  and	  dispersed	  audience.	  In	  his	  ‘fate’	  cartoon,	  Saw	  Ba	  talks	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	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developing	  a	  culture	  of	  political	  reflection	  through	  art,	  and	  he	  believes	  the	  medium	  of	  cartoons	  is	  
currently	  underutilised	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  develop	  a	  forum	  for	  a	  Karen	  political	  culture.	  In	  
our	  interview	  he	  expressed	  it	  like	  this:	  
From	  my	  experience	  I	  don’t	  see	  the	  Karen	  draw	  so	  much	  compared	  to	  the	  Burmese	  and	  
other	  cultures.	  I	  mean	  in	  terms	  of	  making	  a	  living	  from	  your	  art	  and	  having	  your	  work	  
published.	  Karen	  people	  draw	  but	  they	  don’t	  pass	  on	  their	  work	  to	  others,	  it’s	  mostly	  just	  
for	  themselves.	  I	  would	  like	  us	  to	  have	  our	  own	  drawing	  culture	  that	  is	  widespread,	  that	  
shows	  our	  own	  ideas,	  opinions,	  culture	  and	  identity	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  30	  September	  
2005).	  
In	  a	  sense	  he	  is	  articulating	  the	  element	  of	  ‘silence’	  currently	  pervading	  this	  artistic	  medium	  and	  its	  
associated	  messages.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  Karen	  people	  must	  be	  responsible	  for	  articulating	  
their	  “ideas,	  opinions,	  culture	  and	  identity”	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  30	  September	  2005)	  if	  a	  political	  
culture	  is	  to	  be	  sustained.	  To	  achieve	  this	  requires	  a	  critical	  consciousness	  of	  social-­‐political-­‐
cultural	  realities.	  Returning	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Paulo	  Freire	  for	  a	  moment,	  this	  critical	  consciousness	  is	  
a	  process	  of	  ‘conscientization’.	  Freire	  defines	  this	  as:	  
Conscientization	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  in	  which	  men,	  not	  as	  recipients,	  but	  as	  knowing	  
subjects,	  achieve	  a	  deepening	  awareness	  both	  of	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  reality	  which	  shapes	  
their	  lives	  and	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  transform	  that	  reality	  (1972,	  p.	  52).	  
In	  Figure	  1,	  the	  cartoon’s	  message	  is	  a	  call	  for	  this	  type	  of	  consciousness.	  It	  encourages	  an	  
awareness	  of	  the	  political	  realities	  which	  cause	  suffering.	  It	  asks	  people	  to	  discard	  their	  beliefs	  in	  
fate	  and	  God’s	  will	  and	  embrace	  a	  deepening	  awareness	  of	  reality	  based	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  
individuals,	  not	  on	  what	  Saw	  Ba	  depicts	  as	  a	  demobilising	  spiritual	  realm.	  
A	  further	  example	  of	  this	  conscientization	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  way	  another	  participant	  Po	  Hsan	  
articulates	  his	  motivation	  for	  teaching	  art	  to	  school	  students.	  Po	  Hsan	  is	  an	  artist	  in	  Mae	  Sot	  who	  
has	  spent	  many	  years	  teaching	  art	  to	  migrant	  children.	  He	  expressed	  strong	  views	  about	  the	  role	  
art	  can	  play	  in	  education.	  
Education	  is	  important.	  It’s	  not	  only	  about	  transferring	  technical	  skill	  but	  also	  sharing	  with	  
them	  the	  many	  social	  and	  political	  issues	  they	  will	  confront.	  Children	  need	  to	  see	  strong	  
positive	  ways	  forward	  and	  I	  believe	  art	  can	  provide	  this	  (Po	  Hsan,	  interview,	  11	  October	  
2005).	  
Further	  on	  in	  our	  interview	  Po	  Hsan	  expanded	  upon	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  educating	  
through	  art:	  firstly	  it	  provides	  skills	  for	  critical	  thinking,	  secondly	  it	  builds	  a	  relationship	  between	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the	  artist	  and	  nature,	  and	  thirdly	  it	  provides	  a	  means	  to	  articulate	  emotion.	  In	  this	  way,	  his	  art	  
classes	  convey	  the	  technical	  skill	  needed	  to	  create	  art	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  supporting	  the	  
conscientization	  of	  critical	  young	  minds	  so	  that	  they	  can	  transform	  the	  political	  realities	  that	  
oppress	  them.	  
There	  are	  many	  other	  examples	  of	  projects	  that	  develop	  political	  consciousness	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  
some	  of	  which	  provide	  more	  practical,	  immediate	  benefits	  through	  their	  use	  of	  international	  
advocacy	  tools.	  For	  example,	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  use	  their	  newly	  acquired	  
skills	  to	  educate	  and	  train	  those	  unable	  to	  access	  the	  same	  systems	  from	  which	  they	  benefited.	  In	  
2005	  I	  interviewed	  members	  of	  the	  Karen	  Student	  Network	  Group	  (KSNG)	  about	  their	  community	  
theatre	  program,	  ‘Theatre	  for	  the	  Oppressed’.	  This	  program	  aims	  to	  educate	  refugee	  and	  IDP	  
populations	  on	  political,	  cultural	  and	  social	  issues,	  and	  in	  a	  format	  that	  is	  accessible	  to	  both	  literate	  
and	  illiterate	  audiences.	  One	  of	  their	  Drama	  Representatives	  told	  me	  that	  many	  of	  the	  
communities	  they	  work	  with	  cannot	  read	  or	  write.	  If	  they	  have	  access	  to	  radios	  it	  is	  rarely	  in	  their	  
ethnic	  language.	  He	  believes	  community	  theatre	  has	  a	  number	  of	  benefits:	  it	  is	  more	  accessible,	  
more	  easily	  understood,	  delivered	  in	  the	  audiences	  own	  language,	  and	  made	  familiar	  and	  relevant	  
to	  their	  everyday	  lives.	  Given	  that	  most	  of	  their	  audiences	  have	  had	  limited	  education	  
opportunities	  and	  spend	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  adult	  life	  in	  demanding	  physical	  activity,	  he	  also	  says	  
that	  it	  is	  very	  important	  to	  the	  group	  that	  they	  incorporate	  capacity	  building	  into	  their	  programs	  
(KSNG,	  interview,	  26	  October	  2005).	  	  
KSNG	  also	  conducts	  community	  theatre	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps,	  transferring	  their	  knowledge	  about	  
social	  issues	  such	  as	  domestic	  violence	  and	  alcohol	  and	  drug	  use,	  as	  well	  as	  educating	  the	  camp	  
population	  on	  the	  resettlement	  program	  and	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  issues	  at	  both	  the	  local	  
and	  global	  level.	  For	  example,	  in	  2004	  KSNG	  took	  part	  in	  a	  joint	  project	  that	  aimed	  to	  educate	  
villagers	  about	  the	  Salween	  Dam	  campaign.	  They	  conducted	  evening	  drama	  performances	  that	  
drew	  up	  to	  a	  hundred	  villagers,	  five	  times	  the	  number	  that	  took	  part	  in	  the	  daily	  formal	  training	  
activities.	  Later,	  they	  conducted	  this	  same	  performance	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  The	  same	  KSNG	  
Drama	  Representative	  explained	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  this:	  
Many	  of	  the	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps	  did	  not	  know	  about	  this	  campaign	  or	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  
Salween	  River	  until	  they	  had	  seen	  our	  performance.	  Drama	  is	  the	  facilitator	  between	  those	  
inside	  and	  those	  outside.	  We	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  link	  across	  the	  chasm	  that	  often	  exists	  
between	  those	  inside	  Burma	  and	  those	  living	  along	  the	  border	  ...	  they	  told	  us	  they	  
understood	  the	  issues	  about	  the	  dam	  a	  lot	  more	  and	  that	  they	  would	  undertake	  activities	  
to	  support	  those	  who	  were	  objecting	  to	  the	  dam	  (KSNG,	  interview,	  26	  October	  2005).	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Imparting	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  in	  ways	  that	  develop	  and	  strengthen	  local	  capacities	  is	  integral	  to	  
the	  work	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  For	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  education	  and	  skills	  are	  
an	  important	  part	  of	  developing	  local	  communities	  –	  both	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  inside	  Burma	  –	  as	  
well	  as	  improving	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  political	  Karen	  voice.	  Whether	  it	  be	  educating	  for	  greater	  
political	  consciousness	  or	  developing	  technical	  skill,	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  become	  
equipped	  with	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  they	  feel	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  to	  share.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  are	  helping	  
to	  strengthen	  the	  ability	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  convey	  a	  strong	  political	  message	  around	  the	  
ongoing	  persecution	  of	  Karen	  inside	  Burma,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  generally	  developing	  the	  capacity	  of	  
local	  Karen	  communities.	  
Together,	  these	  three	  practices	  –	  a	  new	  political	  capacity	  (developed	  through	  political	  
consciousness)	  combined	  with	  a	  more	  effective	  vehicle	  (new	  technologies)	  and	  access	  to	  a	  broader	  
audience	  (through	  international	  networks)	  –	  are	  evidence	  of	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  develop	  an	  
interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border.	  This	  interchange	  is	  evident	  in	  shared	  projects	  
with	  local-­‐global	  reach	  such	  as	  the	  KRW	  dam	  campaign,	  Karen	  engagement	  with	  global	  human	  
rights	  networks,	  partnerships	  that	  form	  around	  the	  production	  and	  consumption	  of	  music	  and	  art,	  
and	  political	  messaging	  that	  challenges	  the	  state	  narrative,	  to	  name	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  examples	  that	  
have	  been	  explored	  across	  this	  chapter	  so	  far.	  What	  this	  interchange	  does,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  main	  
thesis	  argument,	  is	  establish	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  that	  due	  to	  their	  sociality	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  
sit	  in	  tension	  to	  the	  modern	  territorial	  domain.	  This	  tension	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  borderlands	  
space,	  but	  it	  also	  gives	  form	  to	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  identity	  constructs	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  as	  
they	  relate	  to	  that	  space.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  activities,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  at	  a	  more	  
abstract	  level	  in	  that	  they	  form	  around	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution,	  
something	  that	  in	  many	  senses	  is	  less	  physical	  and	  tangible	  but	  which	  sits	  at	  the	  core	  of	  all	  this	  
activity.	  In	  some	  respects	  this	  incorporates	  membership	  to	  a	  collective	  group	  that	  has	  experienced	  
persecution	  due	  to	  the	  heavy	  militarisation	  occurring	  on	  the	  Burma	  side	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  
Solidarity,	  in	  terms	  of	  talking	  about	  a	  community	  based	  on	  shared	  feelings	  and	  a	  corresponding	  set	  
of	  interests	  and	  responsibilities,	  forms	  from	  this	  base	  point	  of	  shared	  persecution	  and	  develops	  
through	  to	  a	  shared	  political	  narrative	  around	  which	  the	  community	  can	  mobilise.	  This	  next	  section	  
looks	  at	  the	  form	  this	  political	  narrative	  takes	  and	  argues	  that	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  are	  
framed	  by	  a	  political	  narrative	  based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  This	  
narrative	  develops	  a	  key	  component	  of	  Karen	  identity,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  is	  critically	  
informed	  by	  the	  political	  and	  activist	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  space.	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ACTIVISM:	  PROJECTING	  A	  POLITICAL	  MESSAGE	  
Up	  until	  this	  point	  the	  chapter	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  international	  networking,	  new	  
technologies	  and	  political	  consciousness	  all	  strengthen	  Karen	  capacities	  to	  form	  networks	  of	  
solidarity	  from	  which	  they	  can	  advocate	  for	  political	  change	  in	  Burma.	  This	  section	  now	  turns	  to	  an	  
element	  that	  sits	  at	  the	  core	  of	  these	  activities.	  I	  argue	  that	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  are	  framed	  
by	  a	  political	  narrative	  based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  This	  
argument	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  this	  political	  narrative,	  along	  with	  a	  
narrative	  based	  on	  cultural	  recovery	  (discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter)	  are	  key	  components	  of	  Karen	  
social	  practices,	  but	  more	  than	  this	  they	  ultimately	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  projected	  Karen	  identity	  
that	  emanates	  from	  the	  borderlands.	  
This	  section	  examines	  a	  number	  of	  activities	  which	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  argument	  around	  a	  
political	  narrative	  based	  on	  shared	  persecution.	  These	  activities	  are	  drawn	  from	  data	  collected	  
over	  periods	  of	  fieldwork	  between	  2005	  and	  2010.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  this	  research	  are	  the	  
political	  messages	  inherent	  in	  activism	  –	  particularly	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  fall	  outside	  
formal	  political	  organisations	  –	  and	  also	  how	  cultural	  expression	  is	  used	  as	  a	  method	  to	  convey	  
these	  messages.	  My	  interest	  in	  cultural	  expression	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  advocacy	  comes	  from	  my	  
experience	  of	  the	  borderlands	  during	  numerous	  research	  trips	  during	  the	  aforementioned	  period,	  
including	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  thesis	  as	  well	  as	  my	  work,	  pre-­‐thesis,	  for	  a	  local	  NGO.	  These	  
experiences	  indicated	  a	  common	  use	  of	  cultural	  expression	  as	  an	  activist	  tool	  that	  could	  document	  
experiences	  and	  make	  calls	  for	  action.	  For	  example,	  songs	  about	  displacement	  and	  the	  armed	  
struggle	  are	  common,	  as	  are	  drawings	  of	  Karen	  culture	  and	  Burmese	  Army	  attacks	  on	  villages.	  In	  
addition,	  the	  practice	  of	  these	  types	  of	  expression	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  non-­‐formal	  involvement	  in	  the	  
politics	  of	  the	  borderlands	  and	  by	  extension	  to	  inside	  Burma.	  
Some	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  examples	  of	  advocacy	  framing	  the	  practice	  of	  cultural	  expression	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  the	  way	  that	  inanimate	  forms	  of	  human	  rights	  documentation	  are	  increasingly	  being	  
used	  in	  more	  dynamic	  forms	  of	  advocacy	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level,	  framed	  by	  artistic	  mediums,	  and	  
in	  particular	  new	  technologies.	  These	  artist-­‐activists	  combine	  factual	  information	  with	  a	  more	  
appealing	  dissemination	  format,	  suggesting	  a	  broadening	  awareness	  of	  their	  audience.	  A	  common	  
technique	  was	  to	  infuse	  art	  with	  the	  voices	  or	  stories	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  U	  Kyi,	  a	  research	  
participant,	  spoke	  about	  talking	  to	  Karen	  inside	  Burma	  and	  then	  using	  their	  words	  in	  his	  songs.	  In	  
this	  way	  he	  says	  he	  is	  paying	  respect	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  those	  otherwise	  silenced	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  exposing	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  they	  suffer.	  An	  interesting	  element	  of	  this	  technique	  is	  U	  
Kyi’s	  ability	  to	  move	  stories	  and	  voices	  across	  international	  boundaries	  in	  ways	  that	  physical	  
movement	  cannot.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  story	  of	  persecution	  can	  be	  physically	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confined	  to	  Burmese	  territory,	  the	  story	  is	  not;	  it	  transverses	  a	  global	  setting,	  using	  
communications	  technologies	  to	  connect	  with	  international	  networks,	  and	  with	  others	  who	  share	  
similar	  stories,	  to	  form	  a	  larger	  collective	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  
critical	  mass	  of	  solidarity	  develops	  around	  this	  collective	  narrative,	  forming	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  
based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  
Many	  Karen	  artists	  in	  the	  borderlands	  draw	  strength	  from	  their	  ‘people’	  inside	  Burma	  to	  direct	  this	  
activism,	  often	  returning	  to	  Karen	  State	  to	  document	  cultural	  practices.	  As	  U	  Kyi	  states:	  “I	  love	  to	  
go	  inside	  and	  see	  my	  people	  and	  my	  land.	  When	  I	  see	  them	  I	  gain	  strength	  from	  them	  and	  grow	  
more	  committed	  to	  the	  struggle”	  (Interview,	  10	  October	  2005).	  However,	  such	  experiences	  can	  
also	  create	  further	  trauma	  in	  the	  telling.	  Anthropologist	  Marita	  Eastmond,	  who	  collected	  the	  
narratives	  of	  Chilean	  refugees	  in	  the	  late	  eighties,	  found	  that	  for	  many	  of	  the	  refugees	  “it	  was	  a	  
struggle	  between	  the	  moral	  imperative	  not	  to	  forget	  and	  the	  extreme	  pain	  of	  remembering”	  (2007,	  
p.	  259).	  It	  is	  a	  sentiment	  echoed	  by	  U	  Kyi	  who	  told	  me:	  “It’s	  difficult	  to	  write	  songs	  because	  you	  
have	  to	  remember	  your	  experience”	  (Interview,	  17	  October	  2005).	  
This	  epic	  but	  nuanced	  struggle	  between	  ‘not	  forgetting	  and	  remembering’	  is	  exactly	  what	  U	  Kyi	  did	  
when	  he	  wrote	  his	  song	  ‘Do	  Not	  Forget’.	  He	  uses	  strong	  language	  to	  describe	  the	  experiences	  of	  
many	  Karen	  inside	  Burma,	  producing	  a	  narrative	  that	  is	  both	  a	  documentation	  of	  human	  rights	  
abuses	  and	  a	  denunciation	  of	  political	  violence.	  An	  excerpt	  of	  the	  song	  is	  written	  below:	  
Old	  or	  young,	  they	  show	  them	  no	  respect,	  all	  are	  treated	  brutally	  
They	  split	  our	  skin	  in	  torture	  and	  put	  salt	  in	  our	  wounds	  
They	  disembowel	  us	  and	  hold	  it	  tauntingly	  in	  our	  faces	  
They	  cut	  off	  our	  fingers	  and	  hang	  us	  feet	  up	  
Our	  children	  are	  choked,	  pounded	  and	  whipped	  ‘til	  necks	  hang	  loose	  
	  
Our	  virgin	  women	  have	  been	  raped	  to	  death	  and	  left	  to	  rot	  	  
Creating	  our	  hatred	  
Small	  children	  thrown	  to	  the	  skies	  and	  impaled	  upon	  enemy	  spears	  
These	  are	  not	  tall	  tales	  but	  reality	  
‘Do	  Not	  Forget’,	  by	  U	  Kyi	  
The	  lyrics	  of	  this	  particular	  song	  act	  as	  documentation	  of	  real-­‐life	  events	  and	  atrocities,	  acting	  as	  an	  
historical	  record	  of	  a	  particular	  period	  of	  time	  and	  place	  that	  might	  otherwise	  be	  lost.	  In	  describing	  
the	  writing	  of	  ‘Do	  Not	  Forget’,	  U	  Kyi	  said	  while	  he	  himself	  had	  never	  seen	  a	  child	  impaled	  upon	  
enemy	  spears,	  he	  believes	  the	  events	  he	  describes	  in	  this	  song	  are	  commiserate	  with	  events	  
described	  in	  many	  human	  rights	  reports	  that	  document	  such	  atrocities.	  There	  is	  no	  need	  for	  him	  to	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construct	  ‘tall	  tales’	  of	  abuse,	  he	  says,	  because	  these	  events	  are	  the	  reality	  experienced	  by	  many	  
Karen	  living	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  These	  two	  stanzas	  of	  the	  song	  also	  project	  a	  collective	  experience	  of	  
persecution,	  it	  is	  our	  children	  choked	  and	  pounded	  and	  our	  women	  beaten	  and	  raped,	  and	  this	  
becomes	  a	  Karen	  narrative	  around	  which	  a	  displaced	  community	  can	  mobilise	  and	  identify.	  
This	  need	  to	  document	  events	  is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  another	  artist	  interviewed.	  He	  talked	  
about	  living	  through	  a	  Burmese	  Army	  attack	  on	  Huay	  Kalok	  refugee	  camp	  in	  1997,	  and	  how	  he	  
dealt	  with	  this	  through	  his	  drawing.	  
For	  me	  drawing	  can	  tell	  a	  story.	  Like	  when	  the	  camp	  burnt	  down	  I	  used	  my	  drawings	  to	  
document	  the	  burning.	  It	  means	  I	  can	  keep	  it	  as	  a	  record.	  But	  also	  I	  drew	  this	  and	  UNHCR	  
took	  it	  and	  made	  an	  exhibition	  with	  it.	  So	  when	  the	  people	  saw	  the	  exhibition	  it	  reminded	  
them	  that	  the	  camp	  had	  been	  burnt	  down	  …	  Even	  though	  we	  take	  refuge	  in	  Thailand	  our	  
life	  is	  still	  not	  safe,	  we	  are	  still	  faced	  with	  burning	  and	  persecution	  (Nyi	  Nyi,	  interview,	  19	  
October	  2005).	  
Nyi	  Nyi	  also	  talks	  of	  an	  outward	  projection	  of	  persecution.	  He	  needs	  to	  let	  other	  people	  know	  
about	  the	  camp’s	  destruction,	  remind	  them	  of	  the	  atrocity	  that	  was	  committed	  by	  the	  DKBA	  and	  
Burmese	  Army	  troops.	  Disseminating	  this	  message	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  was	  facilitated	  by	  an	  
international	  organisation,	  UNHCR.	  Nyi	  Nyi,	  like	  many	  others	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  conveys	  an	  
outward	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  narrative	  characterised	  by	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement,	  
violence	  and	  trauma.	  These	  experiences	  and	  their	  articulation	  build	  upon	  each	  other	  to	  produce	  a	  
political	  narrative	  that	  helps	  define	  the	  identity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
A	  common	  theme	  throughout	  the	  many	  pieces	  of	  cultural	  expression	  viewed	  by	  this	  author	  
between	  2005	  and	  2010	  is	  this	  idea	  of	  injustice.	  Shared	  experiences	  of	  persecution	  are	  a	  common	  
thread	  framing	  the	  content	  and	  political	  messages	  of	  stories	  produced	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  is	  also	  
a	  significant	  factor	  in	  motivating	  activists	  in	  the	  borderlands	  to	  advocate	  on	  behalf	  of	  those	  
exposed	  to	  the	  continuing	  realities	  of	  persecution.	  One	  participant	  in	  this	  study,	  Po	  Hsan,	  spoke	  of	  
his	  art	  as	  having	  political	  purpose,	  but	  also	  his	  motivation	  to	  document	  lived	  experiences	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  informing	  others.	  His	  comments	  suggest	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  recording	  actual	  events	  
so	  as	  they	  are	  not	  lost,	  but	  also	  in	  presenting	  a	  political	  statement	  around	  the	  continued	  
persecution.	  
When	  I	  first	  saw	  the	  IDP	  children	  inside	  I	  felt	  so	  painful	  I	  wanted	  to	  draw	  their	  faces.	  I	  
wanted	  people	  to	  know	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Burmese	  military’s	  operations	  and	  I	  really	  feel	  




Loo	  Ne	  shares	  a	  similar	  sentiment	  when	  he	  highlights	  the	  plight	  of	  IDPs	  in	  his	  song	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’.	  
Security	  and	  shelter	  are	  vanishing	  
Health,	  food	  and	  education	  I	  lack	  of	  
I	  can’t	  think	  for	  tomorrow	  
Because	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  survive	  today	  
	  
The	  military	  regime	  destroyed	  my	  lands	  and	  home	  
I	  wonder	  who	  even	  knows	  our	  suffering	  
	  
I	  miss	  the	  place	  where	  I	  was	  born	  
Where	  my	  mother	  rocked	  me	  in	  the	  cradle	  
Peace,	  love	  and	  unity	  were	  there	  
Natural	  resources	  abundant	  
And	  a	  picture	  of	  ‘home’	  was	  in	  my	  eyes	  
	  
Now	  the	  worlds’	  greed	  destroyed	  this	  unity	  and	  peace	  
Oh,	  I	  miss	  the	  place	  where	  I	  was	  born	  
I	  long	  for	  the	  songs	  my	  mum	  sang	  to	  me	  
And	  her	  love	  drags	  me	  to	  recall	  the	  place	  I	  once	  lived	  
Wishing	  to	  be	  back	  there	  before	  the	  end	  of	  my	  days	  
	  
The	  children	  are	  naked	  
The	  mothers	  are	  sobbing	  
The	  fathers	  disheartened	  
And	  all	  because	  of	  war	  
	  
And	  I	  want	  to	  go	  home	  when	  the	  light	  shows	  my	  way	  
	  
I	  can’t	  think	  of	  tomorrow	  
Because	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  survive	  today	  
My	  farm	  and	  home	  has	  been	  destroyed	  by	  the	  military	  regime	  
I	  wonder	  who	  even	  knows	  our	  suffering	  
	  
Dark	  clouds	  are	  growing	  darker	  
And	  the	  military	  troops	  approach	  our	  home	  
We	  are	  moving	  from	  place	  to	  place	  and	  suffering	  daily	  
	  
Oh	  I	  want	  to	  be	  free	  
Oh	  where	  has	  all	  the	  education	  gone	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I	  want	  to	  learn	  
	  
I	  want	  to	  rest	  like	  the	  birds	  at	  night	  
But	  I	  have	  to	  worry	  for	  tomorrow	  
And	  that	  worry	  brings	  screams	  while	  I	  sleep	  
‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP,	  by	  Loo	  Ne	  
‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’	  conveys	  Loo	  Ne’s	  personal	  story	  but	  it	  also	  places	  his	  experience	  in	  a	  broader	  
global	  context.	  He	  talks	  of	  our	  suffering	  and	  our	  home	  and	  the	  destruction	  caused	  by	  the	  world’s	  
greed.	  When	  he	  speaks	  about	  his	  song	  he	  sees	  it	  as	  his	  own	  story	  but	  also	  the	  story	  of	  a	  greater	  
collective	  narrative.	  It	  is	  a	  lived	  and	  shared	  experience	  which	  gathers	  meaning	  and	  power	  in	  the	  
telling.	  	  
I	  just	  wrote	  this	  song	  because	  I	  want	  to	  show	  the	  life	  of	  the	  IDP	  through	  the	  song.	  It’s	  like	  
I’m	  reading	  my	  own	  biography	  since	  I	  was	  a	  child	  but	  I	  also	  see	  other	  children	  who	  are	  still	  
facing	  these	  same	  problems	  that	  I	  faced	  as	  a	  child.	  In	  my	  opinion	  to	  tell	  this	  type	  of	  story	  is	  
the	  first	  step.	  It	  shows	  only	  the	  problem,	  trouble	  and	  worries	  of	  the	  IDP	  and	  all	  those	  who	  
live	  in	  the	  civil	  war	  zone.	  My	  idea	  is	  to	  write	  another	  song	  after	  this	  one,	  because	  this	  one	  
only	  shows	  the	  oppression	  and	  the	  next	  one	  is	  about	  the	  power	  in	  you.	  Because	  this	  one	  
tells	  the	  true	  story	  but	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  radio	  listener	  you	  are	  a	  victim	  under	  this	  
oppression	  and	  people	  see	  you	  as	  powerless	  but	  in	  the	  reality	  people	  are	  doing	  many	  
different	  things	  and	  they	  survive,	  they	  are	  still	  there,	  without	  having	  any	  weapons	  to	  
protect	  themselves.	  No	  education,	  food	  scarcity,	  no	  healthcare,	  but	  they	  stay	  there.	  Their	  
energy	  and	  their	  power	  is	  still	  going	  strong	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  22	  September	  2005).	  
In	  both	  songs,	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’	  and	  ‘Do	  Not	  Forget’,	  the	  authors	  convey	  a	  message	  of	  solidarity	  
around	  the	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  While	  ‘Do	  Not	  Forget’	  is	  biting	  
with	  hatred	  and	  bitterness,	  ‘Story	  of	  an	  IDP’	  conveys	  a	  deep	  sorrowful	  energy.	  It	  is	  a	  romanticised	  
memory	  of	  ‘home’	  and	  a	  previous	  way	  of	  life.	  Yet	  underlying	  both	  these	  songs	  is	  a	  focused	  attempt	  
to	  use	  cultural	  expression	  to	  both	  educate	  and	  advocate,	  to	  bring	  people	  together	  around	  a	  shared	  
purpose	  and	  to	  convey	  a	  shared	  political	  message.	  As	  Loo	  Ne	  explains	  in	  the	  interview	  above,	  the	  
story	  is	  his	  story	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  story	  of	  many	  children	  still	  experiencing	  persecution	  and	  
displacement	  inside	  Burma.	  He	  suggests	  a	  collective	  exposure	  to	  atrocities	  but	  also	  a	  collective	  
response	  not	  to	  succumb	  to	  its	  disempowering	  qualities.	  
These	  pieces	  of	  cultural	  expression	  (voices)	  from	  the	  borderlands	  tell	  many	  stories	  about	  the	  lives	  
and	  political	  motivations	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  They	  offer	  insight	  into	  individual	  and	  collective	  
narratives	  with	  a	  recurring	  theme	  of	  shared	  experiences	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  The	  very	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presence	  of	  these	  voices	  also	  tells	  us	  something	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  borderlands,	  in	  that	  the	  
borderlands	  enables	  these	  voices	  greater	  access	  to	  global	  networks	  and	  advances	  in	  
communications	  technologies,	  and	  an	  increased	  exchange	  of	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  that	  is	  framed	  
by	  political	  consciousness.	  This	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  constitutes	  one	  
of	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  I	  argue	  for	  across	  this	  thesis,	  the	  development	  of	  networks	  
of	  solidarity.	  One	  result	  of	  these	  social	  practices	  is	  an	  emerging	  Karen	  political	  voice,	  empowered	  
by	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  to	  build	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  belonging	  and	  a	  shared	  political	  
narrative	  that	  informs	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  
CONCLUSION	  
This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  where	  activism	  around	  persecution	  has	  intersected	  with	  particular	  
mechanisms	  of	  social	  power	  –	  international	  networking,	  new	  technologies	  and	  political	  
consciousness	  –	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  have	  been	  able	  to	  form	  that	  enable,	  broaden	  and	  
strengthen	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice	  which	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  These	  
networks	  of	  solidarity	  also	  become	  an	  important	  conduit	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  political	  narrative	  
based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  
common	  community.	  
The	  presence	  and	  importance	  of	  these	  practices	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  or	  so	  has	  changed	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice	  is	  projected	  outward	  to	  an	  external	  audience,	  developing	  a	  form	  of	  
activism	  that	  is	  more	  powerful,	  but	  also	  driven	  by	  a	  more	  informal	  political	  power.	  This	  informal	  
political	  power	  develops	  because	  of	  a	  more	  fluid,	  heterogeneous	  and	  contested	  approach	  to	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  practices	  of	  activism	  (Chapter	  Five),	  networks	  of	  
solidarity	  (this	  chapter)	  and	  processes	  cultural	  recovery	  (to	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter).	  
These	  form	  the	  dominant	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  
addition,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  these	  practices	  sit	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  which	  has	  tended	  to	  treat	  the	  borderlands	  space	  with	  a	  more	  homogenous	  political	  authority	  
that	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  narrative	  of	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain.	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  tension	  is	  an	  
integral	  characteristic	  of	  the	  space,	  and	  as	  such	  critically	  informs	  many	  of	  the	  activities	  that	  occur	  
there.	  
This	  chapter	  is	  important	  to	  my	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  develops	  the	  political	  narrative	  
that	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  projected	  Karen	  identity.	  In	  other	  words,	  through	  the	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  
discussed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  displaced	  Karen	  are	  able	  to	  construct	  a	  political	  narrative	  of	  shared	  
persecution	  around	  which	  they	  can	  mobilise.	  This	  narrative	  forms	  a	  key	  part	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  
projected	  from	  the	  borderlands.	  What	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  ascertained	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  political	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narrative	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  inward	  projection	  to	  a	  collective	  Karen	  audience	  and	  its	  influence	  over	  a	  
collective	  Karen	  identity,	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  that	  the	  next	  chapter	  turns.	  I	  contend	  that	  a	  further	  layer	  
to	  the	  construction	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  incorporates	  social	  practices	  that	  inform	  
an	  inward	  projection	  of	  identity	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  based	  on	  the	  selective	  
recovery	  of	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths	  which	  emphasise	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  As	  a	  threatened	  
culture,	  this	  inward	  projection	  includes	  protective	  mechanisms	  which	  show	  a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  






‘SYMBOLIC	  ANCHORS	  OF	  COMMUNITY’80	  
PROCESSES	  OFCULTURAL	  RECOVERY	  
I	  was	  born	  in	  a	  refugee	  camp	  in	  a	  foreign	  land	  
I	  was	  told	  that	  a	  small	  bamboo	  house	  is	  my	  home	  
A	  life	  confined	  by	  barbed	  wire	  is	  not	  my	  home	  
A	  living	  fed	  by	  others	  is	  not	  my	  home	  
A	  life	  without	  dignity	  is	  not	  my	  home	  
Freedom	  and	  equality	  is	  what	  I	  want	  
To	  uphold	  my	  beautiful	  home	  
‘I	  Dream	  of	  Home’	  by	  Saw	  Ba	  
Nyi	  Nyi	  and	  I	  sit	  in	  a	  room	  in	  Mae	  Sot,	  Thailand.	  We	  are	  four	  kilometres	  from	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
border.	  We	  watch	  a	  television	  screen	  which	  is	  showing	  video	  footage	  of	  Karen	  villagers	  in	  
Nyaunyglebin	  District	  of	  Karen	  State.	  Nyi	  Nyi	  watches	  as	  some	  of	  the	  men	  assemble	  a	  klo’,	  the	  
traditional	  Karen	  drum.	  They	  bless	  it	  with	  rice	  whisky	  and	  call	  on	  the	  spirits	  to	  protect	  them.	  With	  a	  
number	  of	  deep	  vibrations	  they	  begin	  a	  traditional	  Karen	  hta.	  Nyi	  Nyi	  expresses	  surprise	  at	  seeing	  
the	  klo’	  played.	  He	  has	  heard	  about	  the	  klo’	  he	  says,	  but	  he	  has	  never	  seen	  one	  nor	  heard	  one	  
played	  before.	  “I	  know	  the	  story	  of	  it	  from	  learning	  about	  it	  at	  school	  and	  from	  the	  old	  people	  but	  
I’ve	  never	  seen	  it	  for	  myself”,	  he	  says.	  And	  then	  more	  quietly,	  “I	  feel	  proud	  to	  hear	  my	  people	  still	  
playing	  this	  traditional	  instrument”	  (Author’s	  field	  notes,	  19	  October	  2005).	  
Nyi	  Nyi	  is	  distanced	  from	  his	  homeland	  by	  both	  the	  fixed	  geographical	  certainty	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  
border	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  created	  by	  his	  displacement	  to	  Thailand.	  An	  outcome	  of	  this	  
displacement	  is	  that	  he	  is	  forced	  to	  develop	  new	  ways	  of	  connecting	  to	  and	  representing	  both	  his	  
homeland	  and	  his	  cultural	  identity.	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  borderlands	  facilitates	  the	  
recovery	  of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  which	  in	  turn	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  projected	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  
cultural	  identity	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  selective	  recovery	  of	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths	  which	  
reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation,	  and	  that	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  
and	  persecution.	  	  
This	  cultural	  recovery	  most	  commonly	  occurs	  through	  three	  significant	  processes	  which	  are	  made	  
possible	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  and	  these	  form	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
The	  first	  process	  is	  the	  public	  projection	  of	  “remembered	  places”	  (Gupta	  &	  Ferguson,	  1992,	  p.	  11)	  
which	  act	  as	  a	  ‘symbolic	  anchor’	  from	  which	  a	  homeland	  and	  collective	  cultural	  identity	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  This	  phrase	  comes	  from	  Akhil	  Gupta	  and	  James	  Ferguson’s	  article	  ‘Beyond	  Culture’	  where	  they	  state	  that	  
“Remembered	  places	  have	  often	  served	  as	  symbolic	  anchors	  of	  community	  for	  dispersed	  people”	  (1992,	  p.	  
11).	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  use	  the	  phrase	  ‘symbolic	  anchors	  of	  community’	  as	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  
memory	  in	  the	  narratives	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  but	  also	  more	  broadly	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  any	  imaginative	  
reconstruction	  that	  leads	  to	  collective	  representations.	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constructed	  and	  projected.	  I	  contend	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  use	  this	  public	  
projection	  of	  memory	  to	  provide	  a	  linear	  continuity	  to	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  that	  is	  currently	  
under	  threat	  from	  disruption	  and	  upheaval.	  These	  ‘remembered	  places’	  act	  as	  a	  beacon	  around	  
which	  the	  Karen	  can	  mobilise	  and	  in	  turn	  strengthen	  and	  project	  a	  version	  of	  the	  identity	  under	  
threat.	  
The	  second	  process	  is	  where	  cultural	  practices	  are	  re-­‐established	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  
through	  a	  process	  of	  cultural	  reification.	  The	  nature	  of	  these	  cultural	  practices	  changes	  in	  line	  with	  
experiences	  of	  forced	  displacement	  and	  exposure	  to	  elements	  of	  cultural	  exchange	  and	  adaptation	  
conditioned	  by	  the	  borderlands.	  As	  a	  result	  cultural	  practices	  are	  reified	  in	  a	  learnt	  environment	  
rather	  than	  through	  the	  everyday	  (as	  would	  presumably	  be	  the	  case	  for	  those	  still	  inside	  Burma).	  In	  
addition,	  a	  fear	  of	  loss	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  and	  the	  resulting	  need	  to	  preserve	  and	  protect	  the	  
associated	  culture	  has	  seen	  selected	  cultural	  identifiers	  lifted	  out	  of	  the	  everyday	  and	  used	  to	  
reinforce	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  mobilise.	  
The	  third	  process	  is	  where	  displaced	  Karen	  pursue	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  by	  imagining	  a	  vision	  
of	  the	  future.	  These	  imaginings	  prioritise	  a	  connection,	  both	  physically	  and	  metaphorically,	  to	  a	  
Karen	  homeland.	  Due	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  displacement,	  this	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  occurs	  at	  a	  
largely	  abstract	  level	  that	  gives	  credence	  to	  a	  shared	  Karen	  narrative,	  and	  ultimately	  a	  Karen	  
identity.	  
Together,	  these	  three	  processes	  constitute	  the	  main	  form	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  Over-­‐arching	  all	  three	  processes	  is	  the	  reification	  of	  a	  Karen	  culture,	  made	  up	  
of	  reclaimed	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths	  that	  are	  framed	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  
and	  persecution.	  This	  process	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  namely	  
because	  it	  is	  enabled	  by	  key	  features	  of	  the	  space:	  a	  population	  with	  shared	  experiences	  of	  
persecution	  and	  displacement	  that	  has	  led	  to	  heightened	  attention	  paid	  to	  cultural	  identifiers;	  
access	  to	  resources	  that	  have	  helped	  shape	  and	  disseminate	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  that	  forms	  the	  
basis	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity;	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  security	  that	  allows	  the	  practice	  and	  projection	  of	  ethnic	  
culture	  to	  occur	  without	  fear	  of	  retribution;	  and	  a	  close	  geographical	  proximity	  that	  allows	  the	  flow	  
of	  cultural	  activities	  across	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  processes	  of	  cultural	  
recovery	  that	  are	  occurring	  in	  the	  borderlands	  are	  distinct	  from	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  that	  could	  
be	  found	  inside	  Burma	  or	  among	  the	  greater	  Karen	  diaspora	  for	  example.	  
This	  chapter	  sets	  up	  the	  third	  key	  mode	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands:	  processes	  of	  cultural	  
recovery.	  It	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  ties	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  that	  is	  
framed	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  to	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  This	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narrative	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  cultural	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  further	  
supporting	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  borderlands	  becomes	  the	  setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  are	  
in	  part,	  framed	  by	  a	  flow	  of	  people,	  ideas	  and	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  connections	  to	  family,	  culture	  
and	  identity.	  This	  manifestation	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  is	  discussed	  more	  fully	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  where	  
I	  argue	  that	  it	  forms	  one	  of	  two	  narratives	  that	  have	  come	  to	  represent	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  but	  for	  the	  moment	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  cultural	  narrative	  is	  projected	  
through	  the	  activism	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  and	  in	  turn	  forms	  a	  key	  component	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  
the	  borderlands.	  
Together,	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  last	  three	  chapters	  constitute	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  –	  practices	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery.	  
These	  practices	  are	  evidence	  of	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  that	  can	  be	  mapped	  across	  the	  borderlands	  
domain,	  intersecting	  at	  times	  with	  the	  processes	  that	  are	  so	  integral	  to	  this	  thesis:	  the	  operations	  
of	  the	  state,	  agency	  and	  activism,	  global	  processes	  and	  political	  contestation.	  These	  practices	  are	  
enmeshed	  in	  the	  spatiality	  of	  the	  borderlands;	  they	  are	  both	  enabled	  by	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  
characteristic	  of	  it.As	  social	  constructs,	  they	  also,	  importantly	  for	  this	  thesis,	  set	  the	  conditions	  
from	  which	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  constructed	  and	  projected.	  Articulating	  the	  
nature	  of	  this	  identity	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
MEMORY:	  THE	  PUBLIC	  PROJECTION	  OF	  ‘REMEMBERED	  PLACES’	  
In	  refugee	  and	  diaspora	  literature,	  remembered	  places	  are	  often	  constructed	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  what	  
Gupta	  and	  Ferguson	  call	  “symbolic	  anchors	  of	  community	  for	  dispersed	  people”	  (1992,	  p.	  11).	  In	  
this	  sense,	  the	  constructions	  served	  by	  memory	  act	  as	  a	  beacon	  around	  which	  the	  chaos	  and	  
destruction	  of	  displacement	  is	  replaced	  by	  familiar	  elements	  of	  cultural	  identity	  or	  community.	  This	  
section	  proposes	  a	  greater	  analysis	  of	  this	  ‘symbolic	  anchor’.	  I	  contend	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  use	  a	  public	  projection	  of	  memory	  to	  provide	  a	  linear	  continuity	  to	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  
identity	  that	  is	  currently	  under	  threat	  from	  disruption	  and	  upheaval.	  This	  requires	  an	  expanded	  
vision	  of	  Gupta	  and	  Ferguson’s	  concept	  of	  ‘remembered	  places’	  for	  it	  necessarily	  takes	  into	  
account	  the	  range	  of	  elements	  that	  constitute	  that	  place	  –	  culture,	  ethnic	  symbolism,	  tradition,	  
identity,	  myths,	  and	  history	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  In	  this	  expanded	  vision,	  the	  process	  of	  ‘remembering	  
place’	  takes	  individual	  experiences	  and	  projects	  them	  as	  collective	  memories,	  which	  in	  turn	  act	  as	  a	  
beacon	  around	  which	  the	  Karen	  can	  mobilise,	  and	  then	  project	  a	  version	  of	  the	  identity	  under	  
threat.	  
During	  field	  work	  in	  2005	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  artwork	  produced	  by	  many	  of	  the	  
displaced	  Karen	  I	  was	  interviewing.	  These	  mostly	  constituted	  subjective	  representations	  of	  Karen	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culture	  and	  identity.	  These	  artworks	  made	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  my	  own	  observations	  and	  
arguments	  around	  how	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  is	  constructed,	  practiced	  and	  projected.	  One	  
possible	  way	  of	  handling	  these	  artworks	  is	  to	  see	  them	  as	  important	  subjective	  constructs	  of	  a	  
Karen	  cultural	  identity	  and	  ultimately	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  As	  such	  they	  can	  be	  viewed,	  and	  
subsequently	  analysed,	  as	  a	  powerful	  response	  to	  Burmese	  military	  persecution	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  
cultural	  obsolescence.	  
A	  common	  theme	  running	  through	  these	  pieces	  of	  art	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  idealise	  the	  past	  by	  
depicting	  the	  Karen	  homeland	  through	  a	  romanticised	  lens,	  a	  position	  that	  was	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  
the	  current	  reality	  of	  conflict	  and	  militarisation	  in	  Karen	  State.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
the	  song	  ‘I	  love	  you	  my	  Kawthoolei81’,	  written	  by	  U	  Kyi,	  a	  participant	  in	  this	  research.	  The	  song	  
comes	  from	  a	  trip	  he	  made	  to	  Karen	  State	  in	  2002	  where	  he	  found	  himself	  on	  top	  of	  a	  mountain	  
with	  a	  view	  of	  his	  Karen	  State	  (Kawthoolei)	  which,	  for	  a	  brief	  moment,	  seemed	  to	  defy	  all	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  death	  and	  destruction	  that	  existed	  below	  the	  tree	  line	  (U	  Kyi,	  personal	  
communication,	  17	  October	  2005).	  
I	  love	  you	  my	  kawthoolei	  
The	  green	  pastures	  
The	  mountains,	  the	  rivers	  and	  the	  streams	  
In	  the	  valleys	  the	  birds	  are	  singing	  
And	  the	  flowers	  bloom	  in	  vibrant	  colours	  
Beauty	  and	  wealth	  are	  in	  you	  
And	  bring	  me	  perfect	  bliss	  
	  
When	  the	  sun	  sets	  
And	  I	  look	  upon	  my	  Karen	  land	  
There	  is	  only	  happiness	  
I	  have	  to	  stay	  away	  from	  you	  
While	  others	  take	  you	  over	  
And	  your	  beauty	  becomes	  fields	  of	  death	  
My	  blood	  and	  my	  sweat	  I	  sacrifice	  for	  you	  
I	  give	  you	  my	  life	  
And	  stay	  true	  to	  you	  my	  Kawthoolei	  
	  
I	  will	  fight	  for	  my	  return	  my	  Kawthoolei	  
As	  many	  lives	  have	  been	  sacrificed	  for	  you	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Kawthoolei	  is	  used	  here	  to	  reference	  Karen	  State.	  For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  origin	  and	  use	  
of	  this	  term,	  see	  my	  comments	  on	  page	  183.	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We	  have	  exchanged	  our	  blood	  and	  sweat	  for	  your	  return	  
There	  will	  come	  a	  day	  my	  Kawthoolei	  
When	  we	  will	  meet	  again	  to	  enjoy	  our	  life	  
	  
The	  land	  of	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  
We	  will	  not	  give	  to	  others	  
We	  will	  struggle	  for	  the	  return	  
Of	  our	  Kawthoolei	  
‘I	  love	  you	  my	  kawthoolei’	  by	  U	  Kyi	  
In	  this	  song	  U	  Kyi	  invokes	  a	  romanticised	  depiction	  of	  the	  landscape.	  He	  freezes	  this	  depiction	  in	  a	  
time	  where	  birds	  sing	  in	  the	  valley,	  flowers	  bloom	  in	  vibrant	  colours,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  bliss	  
that	  invades	  him	  as	  he	  looks	  over	  a	  place	  that	  is	  obviously	  dear	  to	  him.	  Yet	  he	  immediately	  
juxtaposes	  this	  with	  imagery	  that	  acknowledges	  the	  destruction	  of	  this	  beauty:	  fields	  of	  death,	  and	  
the	  blood	  and	  sweat	  sacrificed	  as	  others	  take	  it	  over.	  The	  loss	  associated	  with	  the	  romanticised	  
beauty	  of	  the	  place	  is	  heightened	  by	  the	  brutality	  in	  which	  it	  is	  being	  destroyed.	  U	  Kyi	  
acknowledges	  the	  immediacy	  of	  this	  moment	  –its	  temporal,	  aspirational	  nature	  –	  it	  is	  a	  time	  and	  
an	  image	  that	  no	  longer	  exists	  outside	  of	  his	  song.	  But	  perhaps	  most	  interesting	  is	  the	  way	  he	  
correlates	  this	  moment	  with	  the	  motivation	  for	  what	  he	  does	  and	  writes.	  The	  systematic	  
destruction	  of	  his	  Karen	  homeland	  defines	  the	  struggle	  projected	  from	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  The	  romanticised	  beauty	  of	  what	  is	  being	  destroyed	  only	  intensifies	  the	  urgency	  of	  
that	  struggle.	  
Naw	  Mu,	  another	  participant	  interviewed	  in	  2005	  had	  recently	  arrived	  at	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  
She	  showed	  a	  similar	  tendency	  in	  her	  writing.	  In	  our	  interview	  she	  described	  her	  village	  by	  saying	  
there	  is	  “no	  village	  like	  my	  village”	  and	  that	  it	  always	  “comforts	  me	  and	  brings	  me	  pleasure	  [to	  
think	  of	  it]”	  (Naw	  Mu,	  interview,	  27	  September	  2005).	  Her	  experiences	  inside	  Karen	  State	  and	  her	  
journey	  to	  the	  border	  compelled	  her	  to	  write	  a	  poem,	  her	  first	  ever,	  about	  her	  village	  back	  inside	  
Burma.	  
My	  Beautiful	  Village	  
My	  beautiful	  village	  that	  I	  love	  the	  most	  
Is	  the	  village	  that	  I	  was	  born	  
You	  look	  very	  lovely	  by	  the	  evergreen	  mountain	  
The	  stream	  is	  flowing	  down	  
Carrying	  with	  it	  a	  beautiful	  sound	  
Beside	  my	  village	  there	  is	  a	  night	  flower	  
It	  spreads	  a	  fragrant	  smell	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The	  village	  that	  I	  grew	  up	  in	  
	  
Is	  such	  a	  beautiful	  village	  
Even	  though	  I	  am	  far	  away	  from	  you	  
I	  remember	  you	  always	  
Not	  only	  in	  my	  time	  
But	  from	  my	  forefathers	  time	  
With	  all	  my	  sincerity	  	  
I	  hope	  you	  will	  always	  be	  permanent	  
‘My	  Beautiful	  Village’	  by	  Naw	  Mu	  
Naw	  Mu	  also	  uses	  idyllic	  and	  unique	  language	  to	  depict	  her	  homeland.	  She	  shows	  that	  the	  memory	  
of	  her	  home	  stays	  with	  her	  and	  informs	  her	  current	  thinking.	  She	  mentions	  the	  presence	  of	  
historical	  and	  cultural	  connections	  to	  her	  village,	  acknowledging	  that	  what	  she	  talks	  of	  in	  her	  poem	  
is	  something	  bigger	  than	  just	  her:	  “Not	  only	  in	  my	  time,	  But	  from	  my	  forefathers	  time”.	  She	  
employs	  a	  particular	  use	  of	  time,	  linking	  hers	  and	  her	  ancestor’s	  time	  to	  arrive	  at	  an	  understanding	  
of	  what	  constitutes	  home,	  in	  this	  instance	  her	  village.	  While	  not	  explicitly	  stated	  the	  implication	  is	  
that	  her	  village’s	  historical	  continuity	  is	  under	  threat,	  a	  poignant	  reminder	  of	  this	  is	  in	  the	  last	  line	  
of	  the	  poem:	  “I	  hope	  you	  will	  always	  be	  permanent”.	  
U	  Kyi	  also	  creates	  a	  temporal	  frame	  around	  his	  message	  in	  ‘I	  love	  you	  my	  Kawthoolei’.	  He	  begins	  in	  
the	  past,	  a	  land	  untarnished	  in	  its	  beauty,	  then	  moves	  to	  the	  present	  where	  that	  same	  land	  is	  
ravaged	  by	  conflict,	  and	  then	  back	  to	  the	  past	  as	  he	  invokes	  the	  historical	  myth	  of	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah,	  
and	  the	  Karen’s	  claim	  over	  the	  land.	  While	  the	  romanticised	  depiction	  of	  home	  is	  frozen	  in	  a	  time	  
where	  things	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  peaceful	  and	  beautiful,	  the	  conceptual	  idea	  of	  home	  moves	  between	  
times.	  In	  ‘I	  love	  you	  my	  Kawthoolei’	  home	  is	  something	  that	  transverses	  time	  and	  the	  songs	  
movement	  through	  time	  works	  to	  both	  solidify	  Karen	  claims	  over	  Kawthoolei	  and	  de-­‐legitimise	  the	  
actions	  of	  those	  who	  only	  exist	  in	  the	  present,	  ‘those	  trying	  to	  take	  it	  over’.	  In	  both	  these	  pieces	  of	  
art	  home	  is	  a	  more	  abstract	  presence	  in	  a	  larger	  historical	  order,	  moving	  it	  beyond	  the	  idea	  of	  
home	  as	  a	  material	  object	  alone.	  
Such	  heightened	  levels	  of	  loss	  and	  chaos	  incur	  a	  yearning	  for	  things	  that	  are	  stable	  and	  familiar,	  an	  
attempt	  to	  re-­‐link	  the	  historical	  continuity	  that	  has	  been	  ruptured	  in	  the	  displacement.	  When	  
interviewed	  about	  the	  song	  ‘I	  Love	  you	  my	  Kawthoolei’,	  U	  Kyi	  said	  he	  remembers	  his	  home	  where	  
he	  could	  play	  football,	  travel	  freely,	  and	  hunt	  and	  fish.	  He	  can	  no	  longer	  do	  these	  things,	  yet	  he	  




I	  compare	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  past	  and	  now.	  In	  the	  past	  our	  land	  is	  full	  of	  natural	  resources	  
and	  animals.	  Traditionally	  Karen	  people	  go	  hunting,	  but	  now	  you	  cannot	  do	  this	  anymore	  
because	  of	  landmines,	  fighting,	  soldiers,	  the	  situation	  of	  our	  country	  is	  poorer,	  poorer,	  
poorer.	  So	  some	  day	  we	  wish	  to	  see	  our	  land	  as	  before	  (U	  Kyi,	  interview,	  8	  November	  
2005).	  
U	  Kyi	  attempts	  to	  draw	  a	  line	  between	  his	  memory	  of	  home	  in	  the	  past,	  through	  its	  present	  
destruction	  and	  to	  the	  day	  he	  can	  see	  his	  home	  as	  it	  was	  before.	  War	  and	  conflict	  have	  disrupted	  
the	  continuity	  of	  this	  trajectory,	  destabilising	  his	  perception	  of	  the	  world	  he	  knows.	  Memory	  and	  
the	  utilisation	  of	  memory	  in	  general,	  is	  a	  way	  to	  dispel	  the	  sense	  of	  disruption	  caused	  by	  the	  
displacement.	  Instead	  he	  holds	  on	  to	  a	  picture	  of	  home	  that	  is	  familiar,	  that	  gives	  purpose	  and	  
meaning	  to	  his	  memory,	  but	  that	  also	  attributes	  responsibility	  for	  its	  current	  destruction.	  In	  this	  
sense,	  the	  remembered	  place	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  protecting	  and	  preserving	  what	  is	  under	  threat	  
of	  being	  lost.	  
While	  both	  the	  song	  and	  the	  poem	  offer	  individual	  interpretations	  of	  lived	  experience,	  they	  also	  
present	  a	  number	  of	  commonalities	  that	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  collective	  narrative	  that	  is	  
characterised	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  violence,	  loss	  and	  displacement.	  Both	  artworks	  use	  the	  device	  of	  
romanticised	  depiction	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  juxtaposing	  it	  with	  the	  brutal	  realities	  of	  loss	  and	  
displacement.	  Both	  are	  constructs	  of	  current	  realities	  intermingled	  with	  references	  to	  historical	  
events	  and	  past	  suffering.	  Both	  employ	  time	  as	  a	  device	  to	  represent	  the	  meaning	  of	  home	  and	  the	  
significance	  of	  its	  destruction.	  Both	  artworks	  address	  a	  greater	  external	  audience	  as	  well	  as	  
providing	  a	  sense	  of	  collective	  identity	  as	  a	  nation.	  U	  Kyi	  does	  this	  by	  evoking	  the	  homeland	  of	  the	  
Karen	  nationalist	  struggle,	  Kawthoolei	  –	  the	  spiritual	  home	  of	  all	  Karen	  people,	  and	  Naw	  Mu	  does	  
this	  by	  drawing	  an	  historical	  line	  to	  the	  time	  of	  her	  forefathers,	  illustrating	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  
and	  community	  attached	  to	  the	  land	  she	  speaks	  of.	  Both	  artworks	  are	  also	  aimed	  at	  a	  more	  
localised	  Karen	  audience	  familiar	  with	  their	  experiences	  (Eastmond,	  2007,	  p.	  258).	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  
that	  both	  songs	  were	  originally	  written	  in	  Sgaw	  Karen.	  The	  content	  of	  the	  songs	  also	  suggests	  they	  
were	  written	  for	  an	  audience	  with	  a	  particular	  empathy	  or	  understanding	  of	  its	  message.	  The	  loss	  
of	  land	  and	  its	  association	  with	  home	  is	  a	  feeling	  familiar	  to	  many	  displaced	  Karen,	  and	  references	  
to	  cultural	  myths	  and	  ancestral	  continuity	  suggest	  familiarity	  with	  a	  common	  historical	  narrative.	  
By	  singling	  out	  these	  cultural	  symbolisms	  of	  land	  and	  myth,	  and	  consequently	  using	  them	  to	  
represent	  a	  common	  Karen	  understanding	  of	  home,	  both	  these	  pieces	  of	  art	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
collective	  narrative	  of	  Karen	  displacement	  and	  ultimately	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  identity.	  Taken	  at	  a	  
big-­‐picture	  level	  there	  is	  much	  that	  can	  be	  ascertained	  from	  this	  presentation	  of	  a	  collective	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experience	  and	  its	  articulation	  into	  a	  collective	  narrative.	  Anthropologist	  James	  Clifford,	  talking	  
specifically	  about	  diaspora	  communities,	  elaborates	  on	  how	  he	  sees	  this	  process	  working.	  
…diaspora	  cultures	  work	  to	  maintain	  community,	  selectively	  preserving	  and	  recovering	  
traditions,	  “customizing”	  and	  “versioning”	  them	  in	  novel,	  hybrid,	  and	  often	  antagonistic	  
situations	  (1994,	  p.	  317).	  
Leaving	  to	  one	  side	  the	  issue	  of	  diaspora	  communities,	  what	  interests	  me	  in	  Clifford’s	  point	  is	  the	  
idea	  of	  a	  live	  and	  discursive	  construction	  of	  community,	  based	  on	  the	  selective	  recovery	  and	  
presentation	  of	  cultural	  traditions.	  There	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  construct	  a	  Karen	  history	  through	  the	  selective	  recovery	  of	  historical	  cultural	  myths	  
and	  traditions	  that	  emphasise	  a	  unique	  ethnic	  identity.	  Many	  Karen	  activists	  infuse	  their	  cultural	  
expression	  with	  references	  to	  such	  myths,	  employing	  mythical	  figures	  and	  symbols	  supposedly	  
unique	  to	  Karen	  culture	  and	  asserting	  these	  as	  key	  ethnic	  identifiers.	  These	  ethnic	  identifiers	  
differentiate	  the	  Karen	  from	  the	  dominant	  culture,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  culture	  claimed	  by	  the	  Burmese	  
military.	  These	  ethnic	  identifiers,	  woven	  into	  the	  telling	  of	  mythohistories,	  may	  include	  references	  
to	  unique	  language,	  kinship	  and	  religious	  practices,	  elements	  which	  are	  often	  used	  as	  indicators	  of	  
a	  national	  ethnic	  culture,	  although	  they	  are	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  (Eriksen,	  1993).	  
Social	  anthropologist	  Thomas	  Hylland	  Eriksen	  sees	  ethnic	  symbolisms	  as	  “crucial	  for	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  through	  periods	  of	  change”	  (Eriksen,	  1993,	  p.	  68).	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  
reassure	  the	  threatened	  culture	  of	  an	  “ethnic	  belongingness”	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  for	  a	  continuity	  
and	  authenticity	  of	  history	  and	  culture	  which	  may	  have	  been	  undermined	  by	  the	  upheaval	  caused	  
by	  their	  displacement	  (Eriksen,	  1993).	  The	  key	  to	  Eriksen’s	  observation	  is	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  pre-­‐
existing	  ethnic	  homogeneity,	  something	  to	  revert	  back	  to.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  too	  simple	  to	  
suggest	  the	  Karen	  had	  or	  have	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  ethnic	  homogeneity.	  Existing	  studies	  (Cheesman,	  
2002;	  Rajah,	  2002;	  South,	  2007;	  Thawnghmung,	  2008)	  question	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  
identity	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  material	  culture,	  suggesting	  instead	  that	  purports	  to	  a	  nationalist	  
identity	  are	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  lingual	  identification.	  One	  way	  
of	  working	  through	  this	  discrepancy	  is	  to	  look	  at	  how	  displaced	  Karen	  recover	  certain	  elements	  of	  
ethnic	  symbolism	  to	  portray	  a	  national	  ethnic	  culture,	  moving	  the	  debate	  away	  from	  the	  
authenticity	  of	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  homogeneity	  and	  towards	  the	  construction	  of	  cultural	  identity.	  This	  
cultural	  recovery	  works	  to	  sustain	  a	  collective	  memory	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  development	  or	  
construction	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Karen	  nation	  is	  being	  used	  for	  
political	  mobilisation.	  To	  mobilise	  requires	  shared	  interests,	  and	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  these	  shared	  interests	  include	  cultural	  constructs	  around	  people,	  myths	  and	  places	  
which	  are	  used	  to	  establish	  what	  I	  argue	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  collective	  Karen	  identity.	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There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  examples	  in	  the	  cultural	  expression	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
that	  can	  support	  such	  a	  claim.	  In	  the	  song	  ‘I	  love	  you	  my	  Kawthoolei’,	  U	  Kyi	  talks	  of	  Karen	  state	  as	  
the	  land	  of	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah,	  often	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  Karen’s	  greatest	  mythical	  heroes.	  Taw	  Meh	  
Pah’s	  story	  can	  vary	  depending	  on	  who	  tells	  it	  but	  essentially	  the	  myth’s	  power	  lies	  in	  the	  belief	  
that	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  is	  the	  Karen’s	  ancestral	  father,	  and	  the	  presumption	  that	  all	  Karen	  share	  this	  
common	  descent.82	  The	  oft-­‐repeated	  story	  sees	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  leading	  his	  people	  from	  the	  ‘River	  of	  
Flowing	  Sand’	  (generally	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  Gobi	  desert)	  to	  Burma	  where	  they	  settled.	  This	  myth	  
provides	  the	  Karen	  with	  a	  story	  of	  origin,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  ancestral	  line	  that	  connects	  
Karen	  today	  with	  Karen	  of	  the	  past.	  Many	  Karen	  have	  used	  this	  myth	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  ancestry	  
places	  them	  as	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  Burma	  (Hla,	  1939),	  although	  most	  historians	  attribute	  
this	  position	  to	  the	  Mon	  (Falla,	  1991,	  p.	  13).	  However,	  the	  myth	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  
distinguishing	  the	  Karen	  as	  a	  distinct	  race	  to	  the	  Burmans	  and	  provides	  what	  Mikael	  Gravers	  calls	  
“the	  genealogical	  foundation	  of	  a	  common	  Karen	  national	  identity	  despite	  religious	  and	  cultural	  
differences”	  (Gravers,	  1998,	  p.	  253).	  
Of	  course	  mythohistories	  like	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  must	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  a	  cultural	  construct,	  rather	  than	  a	  
factual	  certainty.	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  that	  disputes	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  events	  and	  locations	  that	  
make	  up	  the	  myth	  (Rajah,	  2002);	  suggesting	  there	  is	  little	  historical	  evidence	  to	  support	  it.	  
Mythohistories	  do	  however	  serve	  an	  important	  purpose.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  what	  may	  seem	  like	  the	  
debilitating	  reality	  of	  persecution,	  the	  re-­‐creation	  of	  mythohistories	  acts	  as	  an	  anchor	  for	  displaced	  
communities	  as	  they	  reformulate	  their	  history	  and	  traditions;	  reinforcing	  a	  common	  ancestral	  
rooting	  and	  cultural	  identity.	  It	  shows	  a	  consciousness	  of	  Karen	  heritage,	  history	  and	  ethnic	  
identifiers	  being	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  historical	  order.	  In	  many	  respects	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  
‘being	  in	  the	  world’,	  an	  important	  concept	  for	  cultures	  who	  feel	  under	  threat.	  It	  also	  provides	  
legitimisation,	  and	  therefore	  significance	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  culture	  and	  identity.	  This	  continuity	  
with	  a	  past,	  epitomised	  by	  the	  placement	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  as	  present	  in	  a	  vast	  historic	  order,	  
provides	  a	  sense	  of	  stability	  and	  order	  to	  what	  is	  otherwise	  a	  time	  of	  great	  upheaval	  for	  a	  Karen	  
cultural	  identity.	  
The	  retelling	  of	  foundational	  myths	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  threatened	  cultures	  can	  retain	  this	  
historical	  continuity.	  A	  myth	  that	  appears	  across	  the	  different	  Karen	  religions	  and	  ethnicities	  is	  that	  
of	  the	  Golden	  Book,	  although	  each	  may	  tell	  a	  slightly	  different	  version.	  Interestingly,	  it	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  A	  shortened	  version	  of	  the	  myth	  is	  that	  due	  to	  an	  expanding	  family,	  or	  in	  some	  versions	  persecution,	  Taw	  
Meh	  Pah	  led	  his	  family	  away	  from	  their	  home	  in	  Tibet	  in	  search	  of	  richer	  lands.	  Upon	  reaching	  Karen	  State	  
Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  left	  his	  family	  and	  went	  on	  ahead	  to	  find	  the	  path.	  His	  track	  was	  obscured	  and	  the	  Karen	  
remained	  in	  the	  area	  waiting	  for	  his	  return.	  To	  read	  further	  versions	  of	  the	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  myth	  see	  Jonathan	  
Falla’s	  ‘Truth	  Love	  and	  Bartholomew’	  (1991),	  Mikael	  Gravers’	  ‘The	  Karen	  Making	  of	  a	  Nation’	  (1998)	  and	  




sustained	  cultural	  relevance	  over	  a	  substantial	  historical	  period.83	  The	  version	  related	  here	  was	  
told	  by	  a	  Sgaw	  Karen	  person	  and	  is	  based	  on	  a	  book	  by	  Thara	  Htoo	  Hla	  E.	  The	  simplest	  version	  of	  
this	  story	  is	  that	  God	  (Y’wa)	  bestowed	  gifts	  upon	  three	  brothers,	  the	  Karen,	  the	  Burman	  and	  the	  
white	  brother.	  The	  Karen	  brother	  receives	  the	  Golden	  Book,	  the	  book	  of	  wisdom,	  but	  he	  leaves	  it	  
in	  his	  field	  one	  day	  and	  the	  white	  brother	  takes	  it.	  The	  white	  brother	  uses	  the	  Golden	  Book	  to	  bring	  
wisdom	  to	  the	  western	  world	  and	  the	  Karen	  are	  left	  languishing	  as	  they	  await	  the	  return	  of	  their	  
Golden	  Book.84	  The	  Karen	  often	  interpret	  this	  story	  in	  different	  ways.	  Some	  use	  it	  to	  explain	  why	  
the	  Karen	  have	  suffered	  throughout	  history	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  failure	  to	  protect	  the	  Golden	  Book	  
from	  the	  white	  brother,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  continue	  to	  suffer	  until	  the	  white	  brother	  returned	  
with	  the	  book.	  In	  his	  article	  ‘Ariya	  and	  the	  Golden	  Book’,	  Theodore	  Stern	  talks	  about	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  myth	  which	  view	  the	  return	  of	  the	  white	  brother	  as	  the	  dawn	  of	  a	  new	  era	  of	  
Karen	  nation-­‐hood;	  where	  centuries	  of	  subjugation	  to	  Burmese	  and	  Mon	  kings	  would	  be	  replaced	  
by	  a	  Karen	  king	  and	  the	  elevation	  of	  the	  Karen	  race	  (Stern,	  1968,	  p.	  304).	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  myth	  
contains	  beliefs	  that	  Karen	  suffering	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  divine	  order	  which	  one	  day	  will	  be	  
eradicated	  by	  the	  return	  of	  Y’wa	  and	  the	  Golden	  Book.	  It	  also	  evokes	  strong	  political	  aspirations	  for	  
a	  Karen	  nation,	  where	  the	  downtrodden	  will	  rise	  up	  and	  rule	  their	  own	  land.	  
This	  myth	  is	  then	  interpreted	  through	  a	  number	  of	  events	  across	  Karen	  history.	  When	  American	  
Baptist	  missionaries	  entered	  Karen	  State	  in	  the	  1800s,	  bringing	  with	  them	  their	  bibles,	  it	  seemed	  
feasible	  that	  this	  could	  be	  the	  White	  Brother	  returning	  with	  the	  Golden	  Book.	  The	  inference	  is	  that	  
the	  missionaries	  were	  successful	  in	  converting	  many	  of	  the	  Karen	  to	  Christianity	  because	  the	  Karen	  
believed	  the	  bible	  was	  their	  long	  lost	  book	  of	  wisdom	  (Falla,	  1991;	  Gravers,	  2007;	  Hinton,	  1983).	  
There	  are	  other	  more	  contemporary	  versions.	  One	  is	  that	  leaders	  of	  the	  Karen	  resistance	  evoke	  the	  
myth	  to	  justify	  the	  moral	  obligation	  of	  the	  White	  Brother	  to	  provide	  weapons	  to	  their	  armed	  
movement	  (Stern,	  1968,	  p.	  313).	  Another	  interpretation	  of	  the	  story	  was	  told	  to	  me	  by	  one	  of	  the	  
Karen	  people	  I	  interviewed	  for	  this	  research,	  and	  involves	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  In	  this	  depiction	  
western	  NGOs	  (the	  White	  Brother)	  look	  after	  the	  Karen	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  because	  they	  are	  
indebted	  to	  the	  Karen	  for	  stealing	  their	  Golden	  Book	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Saw	  Ba,	  personal	  
communication,	  10	  October	  2005).	  Rather	  than	  being	  viewed	  as	  victims,	  this	  version	  allows	  the	  
Karen	  to	  see	  their	  current	  predicament	  as	  the	  repayment	  of	  a	  debt.	  Of	  course	  these	  recountings	  of	  
the	  myth	  are	  highly	  questionable,	  not	  least	  because	  the	  written	  documentation	  of	  these	  stories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Theodore	  Stern’s	  ‘Ariya	  and	  the	  Golden	  Book’	  (1968)	  provides	  a	  pivotal	  account	  of	  the	  different	  
interpretations	  that	  constitute	  the	  history	  to	  this	  myth.	  
84	  This	  particular	  version	  comes	  from	  ‘The	  Golden	  Book’	  by	  Thara	  Htoo	  Hla	  E,	  published	  by	  the	  Karen	  Baptist	  
Convention	  in	  1955.	  Other	  versions	  range	  from	  a	  dog	  stealing	  the	  book,	  to	  the	  book	  being	  burnt	  in	  the	  paddy	  
fields.	  The	  outcome	  is	  generally	  the	  same	  however.	  The	  Karen	  lose	  their	  wisdom	  through	  their	  own	  
foolishness.	  Other	  versions	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Golden	  Book	  story	  and	  the	  conversions	  of	  the	  Baptist	  
missionaries	  can	  be	  found	  in	  ‘True	  Love	  and	  Bartholomew’	  by	  Jonathan	  Falla	  (1991).	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relies	  on	  the	  translations	  of	  the	  Baptist	  missionaries	  who	  were	  likely	  entrenching	  their	  own	  
agendas	  in	  interpreting	  the	  stories	  (Falla,	  1991,	  p.	  231).	  
The	  origins	  of	  such	  myths	  are	  undoubtedly	  important,	  particularly	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  
purpose	  behind	  their	  construction.	  But	  of	  most	  interest	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  way	  these	  myths	  are	  
interpreted	  and	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  borderlands	  setting,	  and	  what	  part	  this	  plays	  in	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  political	  Karen	  identity.	  By	  remodelling	  mythohistories	  to	  suit	  the	  contemporary	  
setting,	  the	  Karen	  are	  taking	  historical-­‐mythical	  accounts	  and	  ensuring	  a	  continuity	  of	  culture	  and	  
identity	  across	  considerable	  historical	  platforms;	  from	  the	  first	  arrival	  of	  the	  Karen	  in	  Burma	  to	  the	  
contemporary	  setting	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  Karen	  are	  
attempting	  to	  establish	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  around	  which	  they	  can	  form	  a	  common	  point	  of	  
identification,	  and	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  used	  as	  a	  point	  of	  mobilisation	  for	  the	  threatened	  Karen	  culture.	  
Another	  common	  representation	  of	  a	  Karen	  ethnic	  culture	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  drawings	  of	  many	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Here,	  ethnic	  identifiers	  such	  as	  dress,	  music,	  employment	  and	  
religious	  practices	  are	  reinforced	  through	  their	  presentation	  in	  visual	  mediums.	  Nyi	  Nyi,	  a	  Karen	  
artist	  I	  interviewed	  spoke	  of	  why	  he	  felt	  compelled	  to	  draw	  the	  Karen	  culture.	  His	  drawings	  can	  be	  
seen	  in	  figures	  1	  and	  2	  below.	  
I	  always	  draw	  pictures	  of	  our	  culture,	  like	  our	  traditional	  instruments.	  That	  way	  I	  can	  
explain	  this	  is	  Karen,	  this	  is	  what	  our	  culture	  looks	  like.	  We	  are	  one	  of	  the	  big	  ethnic	  groups	  
in	  Burma,	  we	  have	  a	  great	  culture	  and	  our	  culture	  can	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  group	  of	  people	  
(Nyi	  Nyi,	  interview,	  19	  October	  2005).	  
	  
Figure	  3	  -­‐	  Artist:	  Nyi	  Nyi	   	   	   	   Figure	  4	  –	  Artist:	  Nyi	  Nyi	  
Another	  artist	  I	  interviewed	  expressed	  a	  similar	  sentiment.	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I	  would	  draw	  my	  culture;	  sometimes	  I	  would	  draw	  our	  New	  Year’s	  celebrations,	  sometimes	  
our	  traditional	  dance,	  the	  dohne.	  I	  wanted	  to	  describe	  our	  ethnic	  culture,	  how	  we	  dance,	  
what	  we	  wear,	  things	  like	  that.	  Culture	  is	  important	  for	  ethnic	  groups	  (Po	  Hsan,	  interview,	  
11	  October	  2005).	  
Both	  these	  artists	  speak	  of	  their	  ethnic	  Karen	  culture	  as	  something	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  preserved	  and	  
recognised.	  The	  hse	  (Karen	  dress)	  and	  the	  ta’na	  (Karen	  harp)	  in	  the	  drawings	  above	  are	  elements	  
of	  Karen	  culture	  that	  can	  identify	  a	  person’s	  Karen	  identity.	  Drawing	  them	  reminds	  people	  of	  who	  
they	  are	  and	  what	  makes	  them	  distinct.	  For	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  it	  serves	  an	  
additional	  purpose:	  projecting	  remembered	  objects	  and	  places	  to	  document	  what	  is	  under	  threat	  
of	  being	  lost.	  What	  both	  artists	  are	  speaking	  of	  typically	  falls	  into	  Eriksen’s	  observation	  of	  “ethnic	  
belongingness”	  in	  periods	  of	  change,	  the	  need	  to	  show	  a	  continuity	  of	  ethnic	  distinction	  that	  can	  
be	  traced	  throughout	  history.	  ‘Remembered	  places’	  are	  of	  course	  created	  through	  retrospection,	  
with	  a	  tendency	  towards	  selective,	  subjective	  recovery,	  and	  this	  can	  make	  their	  legitimacy	  
questionable.	  These	  elements	  will	  always	  make	  what	  is	  told	  open	  to	  historical	  dispute,	  in	  itself	  a	  
legitimate	  concern,	  but	  rather	  than	  debating	  the	  historical	  accuracy	  of	  these	  ‘remembered	  places’,	  
this	  thesis	  is	  more	  concerned	  with	  how	  a	  remembered	  culture	  is	  articulated	  and	  used	  in	  the	  
formation	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Under	  these	  circumstances	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  public	  
projection	  of	  a	  shared	  remembered	  culture	  develops	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  that	  sits	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  
projected	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
To	  date,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  use	  a	  public	  projection	  
of	  ‘remembered	  places’	  to	  establish	  a	  collective	  cultural	  narrative	  that	  attempts	  to	  stabilise	  and	  
legitimise	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity.	  In	  the	  borderlands	  we	  can	  see	  this	  working	  in	  two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  
the	  public	  projection	  of	  memory	  is	  used	  to	  selectively	  recover	  a	  Karen	  history,	  origin	  myths	  and	  
cultural	  icons	  that	  give	  meaning	  to	  a	  collective	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  
displaced	  Karen	  display	  ethnic	  identifiers	  that	  reinforce	  a	  distinctive	  Karen	  identity,	  such	  as	  the	  
Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  myth	  and	  referencing	  key	  cultural	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  da	  thee	  bli	  (Karen	  string	  
dance)	  or	  ta’na	  (Karen	  harp).	  It	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  way	  a	  Karen	  history	  is	  told	  that	  establishes	  
ethnic	  continuity	  across	  vast	  historical	  platforms	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Golden	  Book	  myth.	  
Secondly,	  the	  public	  projection	  of	  memory	  utilises	  the	  contemporary	  setting,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  used	  to	  
establish	  a	  collective	  narrative	  around	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  In	  this	  
case,	  what	  is	  remembered	  often	  ‘romanticises’	  what	  has	  been	  lost	  as	  well	  as	  reinforcing	  claims	  of	  
cultural	  subjugation.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  public	  projection	  of	  memory	  becomes	  a	  ‘symbolic	  anchor’	  
around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  conceptualise	  ‘home’	  and	  mobilise	  as	  an	  ethnic	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community.	  The	  public	  projection	  of	  a	  remembered	  cultural	  history	  is	  used	  to	  construct	  events,	  
narratives	  and	  myths	  that	  give	  meaning	  to	  that	  world	  which	  defines	  a	  collective	  Karen	  identity.	  
This	  process	  of	  projected	  memory,	  in	  effect	  constitutes	  an	  imagined	  connection	  to	  a	  place	  that	  is	  
no	  longer	  inhabited,	  including	  embodying	  the	  cultural	  identifiers	  attached	  to	  that	  place.	  Because	  it	  
is	  no	  longer	  inhabited,	  displaced	  Karen	  retain	  that	  connection	  through	  a	  pattern	  of	  reification,	  
where	  cultural	  practices	  are	  re-­‐established	  in	  a	  learnt	  environment,	  in	  a	  space	  that	  is	  not	  
considered	  ‘home’.	  In	  this	  next	  section	  I	  look	  at	  how	  this	  process	  of	  reification	  works.	  	  
RE-­‐ESTABLISHING	  CULTURAL	  PRACTICES:	  PROCESSES	  OF	  CULTURAL	  REIFICATION	  
Re-­‐establishing	  cultural	  practices	  in	  times	  of	  displacement	  and	  disruption	  is	  often	  defined	  by	  
complex,	  inter-­‐locked	  factors	  which	  re-­‐orientate	  conceptualisations	  of	  home.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  
contend	  that	  cultural	  practices	  are	  re-­‐established	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  through	  a	  process	  
of	  cultural	  reification,	  and	  that	  these	  cultural	  practices	  change	  in	  line	  with	  experiences	  of	  forced	  
displacement	  and	  exposure	  to	  elements	  of	  cultural	  exchange	  and	  adaptation	  conditioned	  by	  the	  
borderlands.	  This	  process	  of	  cultural	  reification	  is	  integral	  to	  my	  main	  chapter	  argument	  because	  it	  
illustrates	  a	  key	  component	  in	  the	  recovery	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity:	  a	  heightened	  preoccupation	  with	  
cultural	  identifiers	  which	  are	  lifted	  out	  and	  learnt	  in	  terms	  of	  establishing	  a	  collective	  Karen	  
identity.	  
There	  are	  two	  key	  distinctions	  that	  frame	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  cultural	  reification	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
The	  first	  is	  that	  cultural	  practices	  in	  the	  borderlands	  are	  largely	  reified	  in	  a	  learnt	  environment	  
rather	  than	  being	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  everyday.	  This	  is	  further	  complicated	  as	  traditional	  roles	  of	  
cultural	  practice,	  preservation	  and	  custodianship	  become	  ambiguous	  in	  the	  displacement.	  As	  I	  will	  
show,	  this	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  roles	  between	  those	  who	  remain	  inside	  Burma	  and	  those	  
who	  reside	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  The	  second	  distinction	  is	  that	  a	  fear	  of	  loss	  of	  ethnic	  
identity,	  and	  the	  resulting	  need	  to	  preserve	  and	  protect	  that	  culture,	  has	  seen	  selective	  cultural	  
identifiers	  lifted	  out	  of	  the	  everyday	  and	  used	  to	  reinforce	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  around	  
which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  mobilise.	  Unpacking	  all	  these	  elements	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  what	  
role	  cultural	  practices	  play	  in	  times	  of	  displacement,	  and	  how	  they	  have	  helped	  to	  develop	  a	  
collective	  Karen	  narrative.	  
Many	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  have	  not	  seen	  their	  ‘home’	  for	  up	  to	  twenty	  years.	  Many	  children	  
under	  the	  age	  of	  15	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  born	  in	  Thailand	  or	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  Many	  of	  the	  older	  Karen	  
I	  spoke	  with	  during	  the	  period	  2005	  to	  2007	  expressed	  their	  concern	  over	  the	  loss	  of	  culture	  and	  
identity,	  especially	  regarding	  Karen	  youth.	  Their	  comments	  indicated	  a	  fear	  of	  losing	  important	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practices	  that	  identify	  or	  establish	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  Karen	  as	  a	  distinct	  ethnic	  group.	  Such	  a	  
concern	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  story	  relayed	  to	  me	  by	  a	  Karen	  person	  I	  interviewed	  in	  the	  borderlands	  in	  
2005.	  He	  told	  me	  he	  asked	  his	  six	  year	  old	  sister	  if	  she	  would	  one	  day	  like	  to	  help	  the	  Karen	  people.	  
She	  had	  replied	  to	  him	  by	  asking	  ‘Who	  are	  the	  Karen?’	  He	  told	  me	  his	  sister	  was	  born	  and	  bought	  
up	  in	  the	  refugee	  camp	  and	  had	  little	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Karen	  struggle	  (Zaw	  Kyi,	  interview,	  26	  
October	  2005).	  It	  is	  possible	  she	  was	  still	  too	  young	  to	  fully	  grasp	  the	  history	  and	  significance	  of	  
being	  Karen.	  But	  for	  this	  Karen	  man	  the	  story	  was	  used	  to	  express	  his	  concern	  about	  how	  the	  
Karen	  culture	  was	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  lost.	  It	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  comes	  across	  in	  many	  of	  the	  interviews	  I	  
conducted	  in	  the	  borderlands	  between	  2005	  and	  2010.	  
Long	  term	  incarceration	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps,	  and	  therefore	  removal	  from	  typical	  community	  
patterns,	  has	  motivated	  Karen	  authorities	  in	  the	  borderlands	  to	  provide	  alternative	  opportunities	  
for	  learning	  Karen	  culture.	  A	  typical	  example	  is	  that	  cultural	  practices	  are	  now	  studied	  in	  a	  learnt	  
environment,	  most	  commonly	  the	  schools	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  This	  creates	  a	  reification	  of	  
cultural	  practice	  where	  the	  intent	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  culture	  is	  preserved	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  it	  not	  
lost.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  Karen	  history	  and	  language	  form	  part	  of	  the	  school	  curriculum	  in	  the	  
refugee	  camps.	  Another	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Mae	  La	  Refugee	  Camp	  where	  in	  2005	  a	  group	  
called	  Le	  Geh	  were	  teaching	  what	  is	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  the	  traditional	  Karen	  script	  (Le	  Saw	  
Wei).	  Le	  Geh	  also	  taught	  traditional	  animist	  religious	  practices	  and	  traditional	  Karen	  music,	  
including	  learning	  the	  Karen	  harp	  (ta’na).	  Refugee	  camp	  committees	  have	  also	  facilitated	  the	  
practice	  of	  traditional	  Karen	  dances	  and	  ceremonies	  such	  as	  the	  dohne	  (traditional	  Karen	  dance)	  
and	  da	  thee	  bli	  (string	  dance).	  The	  greater	  Karen	  community	  in	  the	  borderlands	  also	  continue	  to	  
practice	  Karen	  New	  Years	  and	  Karen	  Revolution	  Day	  celebrations.	  Other	  traditional	  ceremonies	  
have	  also	  been	  adapted	  to	  the	  new	  context.	  One	  Karen	  participant	  told	  me	  that	  the	  traditional	  
Karen	  wrist-­‐tying	  ceremony	  has	  now	  become	  an	  annual	  celebration	  in	  the	  camps.	  Traditionally	  the	  
ceremony	  occurs	  in	  August	  each	  year,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  rice-­‐planting	  season	  when	  families	  would	  
return	  home	  and	  celebrate	  being	  together	  again.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  traditional	  setting,	  many	  
Karen	  along	  the	  border	  have	  forged	  a	  new	  version	  of	  the	  ceremony.	  He	  told	  me	  that	  because	  most	  
people	  can’t	  go	  back	  to	  Burma	  and	  be	  with	  their	  families	  they	  join	  together	  with	  the	  camp	  family	  
instead,	  facilitating	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  Karen	  community	  and	  family	  (Nyi	  Nyi,	  personal	  communication,	  
4	  October	  2005).	  
For	  those	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  seeing	  cultural	  practices	  in	  traditional	  settings	  becomes	  an	  anomaly,	  
and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  Karen	  still	  living	  inside	  Burma	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  maintaining	  cultural	  
practices.	  Nyi	  Nyi’s	  story	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  an	  example	  of	  where	  institutionalised	  
learning	  of	  cultural	  practices	  occurs.	  Nyi	  Nyi	  has	  learnt	  about	  the	  klo’	  (drum)	  but	  he	  has	  never	  seen	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it	  outside	  of	  a	  picture	  and	  he	  has	  never	  heard	  it	  played.	  In	  the	  video	  footage	  Nyi	  Nyi	  not	  only	  sees	  
the	  klo’	  played	  but	  also	  experiences	  the	  traditional	  ceremony	  required	  before	  such	  a	  revered	  
instrument	  can	  be	  used.	  He	  is	  seeing	  it	  played	  in	  a	  traditional	  setting	  but	  he	  is	  viewing	  it	  through	  a	  
detached	  lens,	  or	  the	  schism	  of	  the	  border.	  He	  can	  see	  it,	  but	  he	  cannot	  participate	  in	  it.	  He	  can	  
know	  it,	  but	  he	  cannot	  practice	  it.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  Nyi	  Nyi	  believes	  he	  is	  missing	  important	  cultural	  
learning	  unless	  he	  can	  participate	  in	  these	  traditional	  practices.	  
For	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  Karen	  people	  who	  remain	  inside	  Burma	  often	  take	  
on	  the	  role	  of	  cultural	  custodians.	  There	  are	  inter-­‐related	  complexities	  evident	  in	  this	  statement	  
and	  these	  are	  addressed	  shortly,	  however	  there	  is	  first	  some	  benefit	  in	  looking	  at	  where	  this	  role	  
as	  custodian	  might	  occur.	  During	  field	  work	  in	  2005	  I	  was	  told	  of	  a	  group	  of	  Monypwa	  (an	  ethnic	  
subgroup	  of	  the	  Karen)	  numbering	  about	  3,000	  who	  managed	  to	  continue	  to	  practice	  their	  
traditional	  cultural	  ceremonies.	  This	  includes	  orcheeobwa,	  an	  annual	  animist	  food	  festival,	  and	  
spirit	  ceremonies	  practiced	  with	  traditional	  musical	  instruments	  such	  as	  the	  klo’,	  moe	  (gong)	  and	  
paw	  ku	  (xylophone).	  I	  was	  told	  by	  Nyi	  Nyi	  that	  the	  Monypwa	  were	  extremely	  protective	  of	  their	  
culture	  and	  practiced	  it	  very	  strictly	  (Nyi	  Nyi,	  personal	  communication,	  15	  October	  2005).	  This	  
includes	  participating	  in	  spirit	  ceremonies	  for	  protection	  and	  prosperity,	  and	  ex-­‐communication	  if	  
you	  marry	  outside	  the	  group.	  I	  watched	  video	  footage	  of	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  Monypwa	  elders.	  
They	  were	  asked	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  the	  threats	  to	  their	  traditional	  practices.	  They	  replied	  that	  
Burmese	  troops	  were	  a	  threat.	  When	  asked	  how	  they	  could	  resist	  the	  Burmese	  troops	  they	  
answered	  they	  couldn’t.	  They	  could	  only	  flee	  and	  return	  once	  the	  troops	  had	  left.	  They	  told	  the	  
interviewer	  they	  had	  already	  been	  relocated	  a	  number	  of	  times	  but	  they	  always	  returned	  because	  
they	  needed	  their	  chicken,	  pigs	  and	  land	  to	  fulfil	  their	  traditional	  practices.85	  
Despite	  Burmese	  military	  threats	  and	  great	  disruption	  in	  their	  lives,	  these	  Monypwa	  continued	  to	  
return	  to	  their	  land	  to	  practice	  their	  cultural	  traditions,	  arguably	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  in	  itself,	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Video	  footage	  courtesy	  of	  Burma	  Issues,	  translated	  by	  Nyi	  Nyi,	  [Mae	  Sot],	  15	  October	  2005	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if	  the	  Monypwa	  do	  not	  articulate	  it	  as	  such.86	  Karen	  I	  spoke	  with	  in	  the	  borderlands	  viewed	  the	  
Monypwa	  as	  custodians	  of	  Karen	  cultural	  practices;	  in	  ways	  they	  themselves	  were	  unable	  to	  fill	  
because	  of	  their	  displacement	  to	  the	  borderlands.	  But	  the	  Monypwa	  face	  significant	  threats	  to	  
their	  continued	  role	  as	  cultural	  custodians	  and	  this	  implies	  a	  more	  complicated	  reality	  to	  the	  roles	  
of	  those	  inside	  and	  outside	  Karen	  state.	  One	  such	  perceived	  threat	  is	  the	  increased	  penetration	  of	  
western	  culture	  into	  traditional	  Karen	  communities.	  One	  Karen	  person	  interviewed	  said	  that	  
trading,	  even	  in	  the	  more	  remote	  areas,	  has	  meant	  that	  many	  Karen	  villagers	  have	  been	  exposed	  
to	  western	  clothing,	  food,	  soft	  drink	  and	  even	  pornography	  CDs.	  For	  many	  villagers	  this	  is	  their	  first	  
significant	  contact	  with	  a	  world	  outside	  their	  village.	  Even	  the	  Monypwa	  community	  mentioned	  
above	  has	  had	  its	  numbers	  reduced	  by	  conversions	  to	  Christianity	  and	  relocations	  to	  Burmese	  
Army	  bases	  which	  disrupts	  traditional	  practices.	  The	  Burmese	  Army’s	  policy	  of	  ethnic	  unification	  
also	  means	  many	  points	  of	  ethnic	  distinction	  are	  assimilated	  or	  eradicated,	  for	  example	  important	  
ethnic	  distinguishers	  like	  language	  and	  history	  cannot	  be	  taught	  in	  Burma’s	  government	  run	  
schools.	  
What	  these	  examples	  show	  is	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Burma,	  being	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  perceived	  
traditional	  cultural	  practice	  is	  not	  always	  conducive	  to	  their	  continued	  practice	  or	  retention.	  And	  
herein	  lies	  the	  somewhat	  paradoxical	  dichotomy	  of	  Karen	  cultural	  practice	  and	  custodianship.	  For	  
while	  Karen	  people	  inside	  Burma	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  the	  keepers	  of	  cultural	  practices,	  it	  is	  Karen	  
in	  the	  borderlands	  who	  have	  largely	  taken	  responsibility	  for	  documenting	  and	  preserving	  those	  
cultural	  practices.	  This	  illustrates	  an	  important	  division	  embodied	  by	  the	  border.	  Inside	  Burma	  
cultural	  practices	  are	  conducted	  in	  traditional	  settings	  but	  at	  great	  personal	  cost	  to	  those	  
participating	  in	  them:	  to	  the	  point	  where	  security	  often	  overshadows	  the	  importance	  of	  what	  they	  
are	  achieving.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  borderlands	  culture	  is	  reconstructed	  and	  practiced	  in	  a	  new	  
setting,	  a	  setting	  the	  Karen	  mostly	  tolerate	  but	  do	  not	  necessarily	  embrace,	  and	  that	  is	  deemed	  a	  
temporary	  substitute	  for	  how	  life	  should	  be	  lived	  and	  culture	  practiced.	  But	  interestingly,	  it	  is	  also	  
a	  setting	  where	  greater	  personal	  security	  means	  traditional	  cultural	  practices	  can	  be	  learnt	  and	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  When	  the	  Karen	  interviewer	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  villager’s	  return	  to	  their	  homes	  and	  their	  continued	  
practice	  of	  cultural	  traditions	  is	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  against	  the	  Burmese	  military,	  one	  of	  the	  old	  villager’s	  
repeated	  that	  they	  were	  helpless	  to	  do	  anything	  against	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  While	  the	  Karen	  interviewer	  
saw	  this	  as	  an	  act	  of	  resistance,	  it	  was	  not	  necessarily	  seen	  or	  articulated	  as	  such	  by	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  act.	  
This	  incident	  does	  however	  reinforce	  a	  point	  made	  by	  James	  C	  Scott	  when	  he	  outlines	  “the	  ordinary	  
weapons	  of	  relatively	  powerless	  groups:	  foot	  dragging,	  dissimulation,	  false	  compliance,	  pilfering,	  feigned	  
ignorance,	  slander,	  arson,	  sabotage,	  and	  so	  forth.	  These	  Brechtian	  forms	  of	  class	  struggle	  have	  certain	  
features	  in	  common.	  They	  require	  little	  or	  no	  coordination	  or	  planning;	  they	  often	  represent	  a	  form	  of	  
individual	  self-­‐help;	  and	  they	  typically	  avoid	  any	  direct	  symbolic	  confrontation	  with	  authority	  or	  with	  elite	  
norms.	  To	  understand	  these	  commonplace	  forms	  of	  resistance	  is	  to	  understand	  what	  much	  of	  the	  peasantry	  
does	  “between	  revolts”	  to	  defend	  its	  interests	  as	  best	  it	  can”(J.	  C.	  Scott,	  1985,	  p.	  29).	  My	  argument	  that	  
Monypwa	  actions	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  confers	  with	  Scott’s	  sense	  of	  false	  compliance:	  the	  




practiced	  in	  relative	  safety,	  and	  where	  education	  opportunities	  have	  taught	  many	  Karen	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  preservation	  to	  threatened	  cultures	  and	  the	  skills	  needed	  to	  achieve	  that	  
preservation.	  Po	  Khai,	  a	  participant	  in	  this	  research,	  writes	  music	  with	  this	  idea	  of	  preservation	  in	  
mind.	  
I	  try	  to	  use	  the	  Karen	  words.	  I	  want	  to	  remember.	  Because	  some	  of	  our	  Karen	  friends,	  like	  
me,	  when	  we	  speak	  we	  copy	  some	  Burmese	  words	  and	  some	  English	  words.	  When	  I	  visited	  
my	  nephew	  I	  saw	  some	  children	  and	  other	  groups	  of	  people	  who	  grew	  up	  in	  the	  SPDC	  area.	  
They	  don’t	  know	  about	  the	  suffering	  from	  the	  past.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  this	  of	  the	  next	  
generation	  to	  come.	  Do	  we	  forget	  our	  suffering	  that	  we	  suffered	  in	  the	  past	  and	  the	  fact	  
that	  our	  enemy	  is	  trying	  to	  lose	  our	  culture	  in	  the	  world	  (Po	  Khai,	  interview,	  11	  October	  
2005).	  
A	  common	  story	  I	  have	  heard	  from	  different	  Karen	  people	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  how	  the	  Burmese	  
military	  attempts	  to	  destroy	  their	  culture.	  In	  our	  interview,	  Po	  Khai	  said	  that	  the	  SPDC	  claim,	  “In	  
the	  future	  if	  you	  want	  to	  see	  Karen	  culture	  you	  will	  have	  to	  go	  to	  the	  museum”	  (Po	  Khai,	  interview,	  
11	  October	  2005).	  For	  Po	  Khai,	  and	  many	  other	  Karen	  artists	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  this	  concern	  feeds	  
its	  way	  into	  their	  art.	  They	  are	  practicing	  and	  preserving	  what	  they	  know	  and	  what	  they	  have	  
experienced	  for	  future	  generations.	  Aspects	  of	  the	  borderlands	  enable	  this	  preservation	  to	  take	  
place.	  Access	  to	  technology	  means	  that	  websites	  now	  document	  Karen	  dress,	  music,	  dance,	  
literature	  and	  story-­‐telling.	  Musicians	  and	  artists	  incorporate	  Karen	  language	  and	  Karen	  stories	  into	  
their	  artwork.	  Education	  curriculums	  in	  the	  camps	  teach	  Karen	  history	  and	  culture.	  Not	  only	  has	  
education	  and	  technology	  provided	  a	  means	  of	  preserving	  Karen	  culture,	  it	  has	  done	  so	  for	  
contemporary	  times,	  turning	  it	  into	  transferable	  and	  easily	  digestible	  formats	  –	  for	  example	  over	  
the	  internet	  or	  in	  an	  album	  of	  music.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  these	  activities	  are	  attempts	  to	  ensure	  the	  
Karen	  ethnicity	  is	  a	  living	  culture,	  not	  something	  that	  can	  only	  be	  found	  in	  a	  museum,	  and	  that	  
Karen	  culture	  is	  something	  to	  be	  preserved,	  not	  lost.	  
The	  borderlands	  space	  brings	  a	  further	  complexity	  to	  this	  dynamic	  of	  cultural	  reification.	  While	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  in	  many	  ways	  facilitates	  cultural	  preservation	  and	  reification	  it	  also	  provides	  
opportunities	  for	  cultural	  change	  and	  adaptation	  that	  pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  Karen	  attempts	  to	  
preserve	  and	  practice	  their	  culture.	  While	  adaptation	  and	  change	  are	  now	  considered	  accepted	  
norms	  of	  cultural	  identification	  and	  practice	  (Appadurai,	  2005;	  Geertz,	  1976),	  this	  does	  not	  
discount	  the	  fear	  and	  resistance	  that	  often	  comes	  with	  that	  change.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  resettlement	  program	  which	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  the	  borderlands	  in	  2004.	  It	  has	  
arguably	  created	  the	  largest	  upheaval	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity	  since	  the	  initial	  
large-­‐scale	  refugee	  exoduses	  of	  the	  early-­‐1980s.	  The	  resettlement	  program	  was	  a	  point	  of	  great	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discussion	  among	  people	  I	  interviewed	  in	  2005.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  program	  was	  still	  in	  its	  infancy	  and	  
a	  lot	  of	  uncertainty	  surrounded	  its	  implementation,	  let	  alone	  the	  possible	  impact	  upon	  a	  Karen	  
cultural	  identity.	  Many	  Karen	  interviewed	  at	  the	  time,	  expressed	  concerns	  around	  the	  negative	  
impact	  of	  resettlement	  on	  the	  Karen	  culture.	  Comments	  ranged	  from	  concerns	  about	  cross-­‐cultural	  
marriages	  in	  third	  countries	  to	  fears	  the	  Karen	  culture	  would	  be	  lost	  through	  domination	  by	  a	  
much	  more	  powerful	  western	  culture.	  The	  theme	  emanating	  from	  most	  people’s	  comments	  was	  
that	  the	  resettlement	  program	  had	  a	  feeling	  of	  permanency,	  of	  immediate	  and	  unavoidable	  change	  
with	  long-­‐term	  ramifications.	  Many	  expressed	  the	  belief	  that	  by	  staying	  in	  the	  borderlands	  they	  
had	  the	  best	  possible	  chance	  of	  lessening	  the	  disruption,	  and	  of	  retaining	  their	  Karen	  identity	  and	  
connection	  to	  their	  homeland.	  Saw	  Ba	  expressed	  some	  of	  these	  concerns:	  
At	  the	  moment	  many	  Karen	  who	  have	  left	  to	  the	  third	  country	  stay	  in	  Karen	  communities	  
and	  they	  celebrate	  Karen	  New	  Year	  and	  Karen	  traditional	  wrist	  tying,	  so	  I	  think	  they	  
maintain	  their	  identity.	  This	  generation	  is	  fine,	  but	  maybe	  in	  the	  future,	  I	  don’t	  know,	  if	  we	  
are	  strong,	  if	  we	  have	  people	  to	  organise	  us,	  but	  I	  don’t	  know.	  Because	  you	  stay	  in	  the	  
capitalist	  country.	  It’s	  difficult	  right.	  You	  have	  to	  care	  about	  work	  and	  money.	  But	  here	  you	  
don’t	  care	  about	  work	  so	  much,	  you	  care	  about	  your	  community.	  In	  the	  third	  country	  you	  
forget	  about	  your	  family,	  you	  have	  to	  go	  and	  look	  for	  a	  job.	  Another	  thing	  I	  heard	  is	  that	  
the	  relationship	  between	  children	  and	  their	  parents	  is	  very	  bad	  there.	  When	  they	  talk	  to	  
their	  parents	  there	  is	  no	  respect.	  It’s	  different,	  there’s	  something	  changing,	  just	  in	  one	  
generation	  (Saw	  Ba,	  interview,	  21	  July	  2007).	  
But	  concerns	  about	  a	  disappearing	  culture,	  particularly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  western	  assimilation,	  have	  
been	  evident	  in	  the	  borderlands	  for	  some	  time.	  Many	  Karen	  I	  interviewed	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  
expressed	  concerns	  over	  inter-­‐racial	  marriages,	  which	  are	  dissuaded	  despite	  their	  increasing	  
visibility.	  Others	  spoke	  of	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  domestic	  violence	  and	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  use	  
which	  they	  associated	  with	  western	  influences.	  These	  concerns	  underlay	  their	  resistance	  to	  the	  
resettlement	  program	  and	  are	  also	  present	  as	  social	  commentary	  in	  some	  of	  the	  cultural	  
expression	  I	  witnessed	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  This	  social	  commentary	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Saw	  Pa	  Kaw	  
cartoon	  already	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  of	  this	  thesis,	  where	  Saw	  Pa	  Kaw	  comments	  to	  his	  friend	  
who	  is	  about	  to	  leave	  for	  resettlement:	  “You	  look	  like	  them,	  I	  worry	  you	  will	  forget	  us”	  (see	  Figure	  
2	  in	  Chapter	  Six).	  By	  embracing	  western	  dress	  and	  moving	  far	  from	  her	  cultural	  origins	  Saw	  Pa	  Kaw	  
is	  implying	  his	  friend	  will	  forget	  her	  people,	  her	  culture	  and	  her	  identity,	  to	  be	  replaced	  instead	  
with	  a	  myriad	  of	  western	  influences.	  
These	  intersecting	  relationships	  around	  cultural	  preservation	  and	  cultural	  change	  bring	  heightened	  
attention	  to	  the	  necessity	  to	  define	  what	  Karen	  is	  and	  means.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  layering	  of	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cultural	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  where	  culture	  continues	  to	  be	  ‘lived’,	  but	  in	  a	  form	  that	  tends	  
towards	  a	  nationalist	  construct.	  This	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  culture	  is	  learnt	  
and	  ultimately	  practiced.	  Rather	  than	  being	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  everyday	  (as	  it	  would	  for	  those	  
inside	  Burma),	  cultural	  symbols	  are	  lifted	  out	  of	  the	  everyday	  and	  given	  defining	  categorisations	  
around	  national	  identity.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  the	  traditional	  woven	  hse	  (two	  narrow	  strips	  
of	  woven	  cloth	  sewn	  together	  to	  form	  a	  loose	  fitting	  garment)	  is	  considered	  Karen	  national	  dress.	  
The	  klo’	  (drum)	  and	  kweh	  (a	  horn	  usually	  made	  from	  an	  elephant’s	  tusk	  or	  a	  buffalo’s	  horn)	  are	  
sacred	  instruments	  associated	  with	  intense	  patriotism	  and	  romanticisation;	  an	  affirmation	  of	  their	  
revered	  status	  is	  that	  they	  are	  symbols	  on	  the	  Karen	  national	  flag.	  A	  Karen	  history	  of	  martyrs	  and	  
revolutionary	  heroes,	  including	  the	  leadership	  and	  ultimate	  ambush	  of	  the	  KNU’s	  founder	  Saw	  Ba	  
U	  Kyi,	  is	  taught	  in	  the	  schools	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps.	  A	  portrait	  of	  Saw	  Ba	  U	  Kyi,	  and	  other	  leaders	  
such	  as	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi	  and	  Bo	  Mya,	  will	  often	  line	  the	  walls	  of	  Karen	  houses	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
These	  national	  symbols	  are	  reified	  through	  the	  formal	  learnt	  environment,	  attributed	  meaning	  and	  
purpose	  in	  ways	  that	  lift	  cultural	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands	  out	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  everyday	  and	  
into	  a	  constructed	  nationalist	  paradigm.	  While	  this	  process	  remains	  a	  largely	  subjective	  construct	  
of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  (a	  point	  elaborated	  on	  further	  in	  the	  next	  chapter),	  it	  does	  hold	  real	  ramifications	  
for	  displaced	  Karen,	  who	  not	  only	  believe	  a	  Karen	  nation	  exists,	  but	  that	  it’s	  also	  something	  worth	  
struggling	  for.	  
The	  continued	  practice	  of	  a	  cultural	  identity	  is	  a	  key	  concern	  for	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  I	  interviewed	  
as	  part	  of	  this	  research.	  Many	  saw	  their	  identity	  and	  culture	  under	  threat	  from	  the	  militarisation	  
that	  led	  to	  their	  displacement	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  domination	  from	  external	  factors	  such	  as	  western	  
influences	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  initial	  displacement	  often	  disrupts	  familiar	  cultural	  patterns,	  but	  
even	  when	  cultural	  practices	  are	  re-­‐established,	  the	  nature	  of	  displacement	  forces	  these	  practices	  
into	  new	  more	  complex	  forms.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  occurs	  in	  instances	  of	  cultural	  
exchange	  and	  adaptation	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  changing	  relationship	  between	  Karen	  inside	  Burma	  and	  
Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Traditional	  cultural	  roles	  change,	  so	  too	  does	  the	  cultural	  content,	  which	  
in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  shows	  evidence	  of	  becoming	  more	  political	  in	  intent.	  This	  is	  both	  a	  
response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  political	  domination	  by	  the	  Burmans	  and	  to	  reinforce	  political	  messages	  
particular	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  changing	  
nature	  of	  cultural	  practice,	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  also	  re-­‐establish	  these	  practices	  as	  a	  




In	  addition	  to	  the	  public	  projection	  of	  memory	  and	  a	  process	  of	  cultural	  reification,	  displaced	  Karen	  
also	  pursue	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  by	  imagining	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  that	  prioritises	  a	  
connection,	  both	  physically	  and	  metaphorically,	  to	  a	  Karen	  homeland.	  This	  process	  uses	  the	  
memory	  of	  place	  and	  culture	  to	  construct	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future.	  Due	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  
displacement,	  this	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  also	  occurs	  at	  a	  largely	  abstract	  level	  that	  gives	  credence	  to	  
a	  shared	  Karen	  narrative,	  and	  ultimately	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  These	  imaginings	  are	  crucial	  to	  my	  main	  
chapter	  argument	  because	  they	  embody	  the	  process	  of	  ‘making’	  place	  and	  culture	  through	  the	  
recovery	  of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity,	  as	  well	  as	  acting	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  that	  
identity.	  
Displaced	  Karen	  approach	  this	  imagining	  through	  a	  framework	  of	  retrospection	  of	  the	  past	  as	  well	  
as	  critical	  awareness	  of	  the	  current	  realities	  they	  face.	  This	  duality	  frames	  what	  I	  believe	  is	  a	  search	  
for	  meaning;	  the	  Karen	  are	  looking	  to	  understand	  their	  own	  experiences	  by	  placing	  them	  in	  a	  
broader	  social	  and	  political	  context.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	  imagine	  their	  
future	  is	  contingent	  upon	  their	  experiences	  in	  the	  past.	  For	  example,	  these	  imaginings	  often	  
project	  a	  world	  free	  of	  the	  constraints	  of	  suffering	  and	  persecution,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  are	  a	  
construct	  based	  on	  displaced	  Karen	  experiences	  of	  the	  loss	  associated	  with	  that	  persecution.	  
Anthropologist	  James	  Clifford	  calls	  this	  the	  living	  of	  “loss	  and	  hope	  as	  a	  defining	  tension”	  (1994,	  p.	  
312).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  nature	  of	  displacement	  forces	  many	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  into	  a	  daily	  
confrontation	  with	  loss	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  hope	  –	  of	  return	  or	  a	  resolution	  to	  their	  
predicament	  –	  often	  defines	  the	  constructs	  evident	  in	  their	  imagined	  vision	  of	  the	  future.	  For	  
Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  the	  process	  of	  imagining	  incorporates	  the	  presentation	  of	  possibility	  and	  
a	  vision	  of	  the	  future,	  but	  also	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  subjugation	  and	  persecution	  which	  has	  led	  to	  
their	  current	  circumstances.	  Displaced	  Karen	  build	  upon	  these	  past	  experiences	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
create	  an	  alternate	  vision	  for	  the	  future.	  
In	  2005	  a	  Karen	  woman	  from	  Tham	  Hin	  refugee	  camp	  narrated	  her	  story	  using	  imagery	  that	  
illustrates	  a	  powerful	  vision	  of	  her	  future	  that	  fuses	  the	  past	  with	  the	  present.	  
Looking	  back	  I	  would	  say	  my	  life	  is	  like	  this.	  I	  would	  go	  and	  stand	  in	  the	  shade	  of	  a	  tree	  
near	  my	  home	  that	  I	  left	  in	  Burma.	  This	  tree,	  the	  insects	  had	  eaten	  the	  inside	  of	  it	  out	  and	  
worms	  gorged	  themselves	  on	  the	  leaves.	  If	  I	  stay	  under	  this	  tree	  then	  the	  shit	  of	  the	  worms	  
would	  drop	  on	  me	  and	  eventually	  the	  branches	  will	  fall	  off	  and	  hit	  me.	  So	  I	  have	  to	  leave	  
the	  shade	  of	  this	  tree.	  If	  I	  go	  back	  I	  want	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  shade	  of	  a	  tree	  that	  provides	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coolness	  and	  it	  should	  be	  a	  tree	  that	  we	  plant	  ourselves	  (Moo,	  personal	  communication,	  
15	  September	  2005).	  
The	  metaphors	  she	  uses	  here	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  threads	  of	  her	  life	  that	  motivate	  these	  
imaginings.	  Central	  to	  the	  picture	  Moo	  paints	  is	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  what	  is	  typically	  portrayed	  as	  a	  
sign	  of	  strength	  and	  growth,	  the	  tree,	  rooted	  in	  the	  ground	  from	  which	  its	  life	  source	  comes.	  She	  
highlights	  its	  susceptibility	  to	  rot	  when	  infested	  with	  parasites,	  the	  insects	  being	  representative	  of	  
the	  Burmese	  military’s	  slow	  destruction	  of	  the	  Burmese	  land	  and	  its	  people.	  Her	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
‘gorge’	  to	  describe	  the	  parasites’	  feeding	  frenzy	  suggests	  that	  the	  extravagant	  ‘fattening’	  of	  the	  
military	  is	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  its	  people	  and	  natural	  resources.	  While	  her	  use	  of	  the	  words	  ‘shade’	  
and	  ‘coolness’	  to	  describe	  her	  imagined	  future	  sit	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  more	  heated	  metaphors	  
which	  could	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  death	  and	  destruction	  which	  has	  shaped	  her	  experiences	  
inside	  Burma.	  In	  this	  metaphor,	  where	  heat	  burns,	  shade	  soothes.	  
The	  narrative	  has	  a	  visually	  powerful	  retrospection	  of	  the	  past;	  her	  life	  has	  been	  the	  slow	  rotting	  
and	  final	  destruction	  of	  her	  home.	  She	  realises	  this	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  she	  can	  remain	  in	  and	  survive.	  
This	  retrospection	  allows	  her	  to	  construct	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future;	  in	  that	  vision	  her	  home	  is	  strong,	  
protective	  and	  cool,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  home	  that	  she	  makes	  herself.	  The	  memory	  of	  her	  past	  experience	  is	  
significant	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  her	  future	  vision,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  fairly	  typical	  theme	  running	  through	  
much	  of	  the	  cultural	  expression	  witnessed	  during	  my	  field	  work	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Even	  when	  
participants	  in	  this	  research	  called	  for	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  future	  rather	  than	  the	  past,	  their	  imaginings	  
were	  rarely	  free	  of	  the	  remembered	  past.	  Another	  participant,	  Naw	  Hser,	  spoke	  about	  a	  song	  she	  
had	  written	  in	  2002,	  called	  ‘Making	  the	  World	  a	  Better	  One’.	  
There	  was	  this	  world	  conflict	  and	  the	  conflict	  in	  Burma	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  think	  about	  how	  
we	  could	  live	  together	  peacefully.	  I	  don’t	  want	  our	  young	  people	  to	  just	  have	  hatred	  and	  
revenge.	  You	  know	  if	  someone	  kills	  my	  parents	  and	  then	  I	  kill	  theirs,	  the	  hatred	  will	  never	  
end.	  I	  don’t	  mean	  we	  should	  forget	  about	  our	  history	  but	  that	  we	  should	  find	  a	  positive	  
way	  forward	  (Naw	  Hser,	  interview,	  7	  November	  2005).	  
The	  song	  was	  written	  in	  response	  to	  a	  time	  of	  great	  upheaval.	  September	  11	  was	  fresh	  in	  her	  mind	  
and	  Burma	  had	  reached	  its	  tenth	  year	  since	  the	  results	  of	  the	  democratic	  election	  had	  been	  
denied.	  The	  song	  was	  written	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Burma’s	  internal	  conflict,	  but	  also	  to	  greater	  global	  
upheaval	  –	  it	  is	  very	  much	  a	  product	  of	  past	  events.	  But	  for	  this	  Karen	  woman	  there	  is	  also	  concern	  
regarding	  the	  disempowering	  aspects	  of	  hatred	  and	  revenge	  associated	  with	  past	  injustices.	  As	  a	  
result	  her	  final	  comment	  is	  one	  of	  peace	  and	  pursuing	  a	  way	  forward,	  a	  mixture	  of	  practical	  action	  
and	  imagined	  possibilities.	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A	  common	  theme	  running	  through	  the	  imaginings	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  the	  idea	  
of	  returning	  to	  their	  home.	  It	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  comments	  of	  Nyi	  Nyi	  who	  said	  that,	  “We	  hope	  to	  
live	  one	  day	  in	  our	  own	  land”	  (Nyi	  Nyi,	  personal	  communication,	  6	  November	  2005),	  but	  it	  also	  
often	  permeates	  to	  a	  much	  deeper	  level	  in	  the	  songs	  and	  poems	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  A	  participant	  
interviewed	  in	  2005	  later	  sent	  me	  a	  poem	  he	  had	  written	  about	  his	  life.	  He	  called	  it	  ‘I	  Dream	  of	  
Home’.	  The	  poem	  begins	  with	  a	  dream	  of	  what	  his	  home	  should	  be.	  He	  then	  juxtaposes	  this	  with	  
three	  segments	  which	  represent	  different	  periods	  in	  his	  life:	  internally	  displaced	  person,	  refugee,	  
and	  migrant	  worker.	  He	  finishes	  with	  a	  plea	  for	  them	  all	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  human	  beings	  and	  finally	  
he	  repeats	  his	  dream	  of	  home,	  only	  now	  he	  talks	  of	  our	  home.	  
‘I	  Dream	  of	  Home’	  
I	  Dream	  of	  Home	  
I	  want	  to	  go	  Home	  
I	  have	  dreamed	  of	  it	  for	  so	  long	  
Home	  will	  be	  filled	  with	  love	  
freedom	  and	  equality	  
Home	  will	  provide	  me	  with	  protection,	  security	  and	  love	  
At	  my	  home	  I	  won't	  worry	  about	  hunger	  
and	  my	  crying	  and	  suffering	  will	  fade	  away	  
I	  will	  see	  the	  smile	  of	  the	  bright	  sun	  
and	  the	  sun's	  rays	  will	  bring	  me	  peace	  
Everybody	  will	  be	  happy	  
At	  my	  home	  
We	  will	  celebrate	  Peace	  with	  true	  justice	  
	  
Internally	  Displaced	  Person	  
I	  was	  born	  in	  the	  jungle	  
People	  say	  that	  I	  am	  homeless	  
But	  I	  have	  hope	  to	  have	  a	  home	  
Where	  I	  won't	  flee	  like	  wild	  animals	  
My	  meal	  is	  not	  Klee	  Ti	  
When	  the	  killings,	  rape	  and	  destruction	  of	  my	  paddy	  field	  
I	  couldn't	  see	  with	  my	  eyes	  
When	  apprehension	  and	  tragedy	  
Fear	  and	  tears	  were	  gone	  





I	  was	  born	  in	  refugee	  camp-­‐a	  foreign	  land	  
I	  was	  told	  that	  a	  small	  bamboo	  house	  is	  my	  home	  
A	  life	  confined	  by	  barbed	  wire	  is	  not	  my	  home	  
A	  living	  fed	  by	  others	  is	  not	  my	  home	  
A	  life	  without	  dignity	  is	  not	  my	  home	  
Freedom	  and	  equality	  what	  I	  want	  
To	  uphold	  my	  beautiful	  home	  
	  
Migrant	  Worker	  
I	  wasn't	  born	  in	  my	  parents'	  homeland	  
I	  am	  told	  that	  my	  home	  is	  everywhere	  
But	  I	  am	  not	  recognized	  as	  a	  legal	  person	  with	  legal	  document	  
Always	  afraid	  of	  Thai	  police	  and	  moving	  my	  cloth-­‐tent	  
I	  want	  to	  return	  to	  my	  native	  land	  
My	  home	  is	  not	  here	  where	  exploitation	  and	  corruption	  occur	  
Not	  where	  deception	  and	  human	  trafficking	  happen	  
There	  is	  neither	  slave	  nor	  master	  at	  my	  home,	  but	  everything	  is	  equal	  
	  
We	  are	  a	  human	  being	  
We	  are	  the	  three	  people	  from	  different	  places,	  but	  have	  one	  dream	  
We	  are	  the	  three	  people	  with	  different	  lives,	  but	  have	  one	  suffering	  
We,	  the	  three	  people	  who	  don't	  want	  
Hate,	  oppression,	  domination,	  discrimination,	  segregation	  
Envy,	  corruption,	  killing,	  war,	  rape	  and	  torture	  
	  
We	  need	  a	  HOME	  
Our	  home	  will	  be	  filled	  with	  love	  
freedom	  and	  equality	  
Our	  home	  will	  provide	  us	  with	  protection,	  security	  and	  love	  
We	  will	  see	  the	  smile	  of	  the	  bright	  sun	  
and	  the	  sun's	  rays	  will	  bring	  me	  peace	  
Everybody	  will	  be	  happy	  
At	  our	  home	  
We	  will	  celebrate	  Peace	  with	  true	  justice	  
	  
We	  want	  to	  go	  home…	  
We	  want	  to	  go	  home	  …	  
We	  want	  to	  go	  home	  …	  
168 
 
“I	  Dream	  of	  Home’	  by	  Saw	  Ba	  
This	  poem	  has	  multiple	  layers	  to	  it,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  already	  been	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  It	  
paints	  a	  romanticised	  picture	  of	  home	  –	  a	  place	  of	  bright	  sun,	  celebration	  and	  love.	  It	  juxtaposes	  
the	  brutality	  of	  the	  past	  with	  hope	  for	  the	  future	  –	  suffering,	  killing	  and	  hunger	  replaced	  by	  
happiness,	  peace	  and	  justice.	  In	  another	  sense	  it	  is	  a	  call	  to	  action	  –	  to	  work	  to	  bring	  equality,	  
peace	  and	  justice	  back	  to	  a	  land	  that	  has	  been	  denied	  these	  things	  for	  so	  long.	  It	  places	  the	  
situation	  of	  the	  Karen	  into	  a	  global	  context	  –	  the	  internally	  displaced	  person,	  the	  refugee	  and	  the	  
migrant	  worker	  are	  all	  human	  beings	  and	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  global	  community.	  And	  finally	  it	  is	  a	  plea	  
to	  return,	  to	  be	  rid	  of	  the	  hate,	  oppression,	  war	  and	  torture	  and	  to	  be	  back	  in	  the	  place	  that	  is	  Saw	  
Ba’s	  home.	  
But	  one	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  techniques	  used	  in	  this	  poem	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  three	  segments	  
that	  represent	  stages	  in	  Saw	  Ba’s	  life.	  In	  these	  stanzas	  he	  makes	  a	  very	  strong	  statement	  about	  
what	  home	  means.	  As	  an	  internally	  displaced	  person	  he	  is	  told	  he	  is	  “homeless”,	  as	  a	  refugee	  that	  
his	  home	  is	  a	  “bamboo	  house”,	  and	  as	  a	  migrant	  worker	  that	  his	  home	  is	  “everywhere”	  but	  not	  in	  
his	  homeland.	  Yet	  he	  lists	  all	  the	  reasons	  why	  these	  are	  not	  his	  home	  and	  rejects	  their	  claims	  upon	  
him.	  Instead	  he	  offers	  his	  own	  vision	  of	  home,	  one	  that	  is	  full	  of	  love,	  has	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  
and	  where	  people	  are	  protected	  and	  secure.	  Rather	  than	  accept	  the	  interpretations	  of	  home	  
imposed	  on	  him	  by	  others,	  he	  imagines	  his	  own	  home,	  and	  it’s	  a	  mixture	  of	  what	  he	  remembers	  it	  
to	  be	  (free	  of	  hunger	  and	  suffering),	  what	  he	  has	  learnt	  from	  his	  time	  in	  the	  borderlands	  (that	  it	  
should	  incorporate	  peace	  and	  justice),	  and	  ultimately	  what	  he	  imagines	  it	  will	  be	  (a	  place	  of	  
freedom	  and	  equality).	  This	  kind	  of	  imagining	  connects	  Saw	  Ba	  to	  his	  home;	  it	  also	  allows	  him	  to	  
articulate	  his	  own	  vision	  of	  home	  rather	  than	  someone	  else’s.	  He	  is	  retrospective	  of	  past	  events,	  he	  
finds	  meaning	  in	  them	  to	  better	  articulate	  his	  current	  circumstances,	  but	  he	  also	  uses	  that	  critical	  
understanding	  to	  construct	  his	  vision	  of	  home	  in	  the	  future.	  Used	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  imaginings	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  can	  find	  the	  positive	  ways	  forward	  that	  Naw	  Hser	  talked	  about	  
in	  her	  earlier	  comments.	  
While	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  imaginings	  of	  many	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  are	  linked	  to	  
past	  events,	  there	  are	  instances	  where	  imaginings	  reconstruct	  an	  imagined	  return	  that	  is	  not	  based	  
on	  past	  memories.	  Naw	  Hser	  spoke	  of	  this	  when	  describing	  her	  song	  writing:	  	  
Writing	  as	  a	  person	  who	  had	  lived	  most	  of	  their	  life	  along	  the	  border	  my	  songs	  are	  often	  
about	  returning	  to	  my	  homeland.	  Not	  about	  going	  back	  to	  what	  we	  had,	  because	  many	  of	  
us	  don’t	  remember	  Burma	  anymore	  or	  were	  born	  in	  the	  refugee	  camps,	  but	  imagining	  
what	  we	  will	  return	  to	  in	  the	  future	  (Naw	  Hser,	  interview,	  23	  October	  2005).	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For	  many	  Karen	  wanting	  to	  return	  home,	  the	  image	  is	  one	  of	  an	  imagined	  future,	  not	  necessarily	  
what	  they	  remember	  their	  home	  to	  be	  like	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  reality	  for	  many	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  is	  that	  home	  is	  a	  distant	  memory	  at	  best,	  but	  more	  likely	  a	  learnt	  one.	  What	  therefore	  
awaits	  a	  population	  whose	  claim	  to	  the	  land	  is	  one	  riddled	  with	  uncertainty?	  U	  Kyi	  has	  also	  given	  
considerable	  thought	  to	  this	  concern.	  
Actually	  I	  talk	  with	  many	  families	  from	  the	  camp	  and	  they	  want	  to	  go	  back	  to	  their	  home.	  
But	  as	  for	  their	  children	  they	  want	  to	  go	  back	  but	  they	  don’t	  know	  exactly	  where	  their	  land	  
is.	  Maybe	  they	  will	  learn	  about	  their	  land	  from	  the	  school,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult.	  So	  now	  they	  
face	  the	  problem	  where	  when	  they	  came	  here	  they	  were	  only	  one	  person,	  they	  married	  
and	  had	  children	  and	  now	  there	  are	  many	  more	  people.	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  compare	  
to	  before	  and	  what	  they	  will	  go	  back	  to.	  I	  think	  this	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  problems.	  But	  I	  think	  
that	  if	  we	  have	  peace	  in	  our	  land,	  maybe,	  no	  not	  maybe,	  I	  think	  we	  have	  many,	  many	  spare	  
places	  for	  our	  people	  (U	  Kyi,	  interview,	  8	  November	  2005).	  
U	  Kyi’s	  last	  comment	  highlights	  a	  serious	  concern	  for	  any	  vision	  of	  the	  future.	  Underlying	  the	  desire	  
to	  return	  is	  a	  need	  to	  establish	  how	  that	  might	  occur	  and	  what	  it	  might	  result	  in.	  There	  are	  many	  
factors	  that	  might	  hinder	  this	  process,	  and	  again,	  a	  predominant	  consideration	  in	  U	  Kyi’s	  comment	  
is	  time.	  The	  longer	  Karen	  stay	  in	  the	  borderlands	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  remember,	  or	  imagine,	  
what	  their	  home	  might	  be,	  and	  the	  more	  complicated	  the	  social	  unit	  becomes	  as	  more	  and	  more	  
people	  become	  integral	  to	  the	  process	  of	  what	  that	  imagined	  return	  might	  be.	  In	  this	  instance	  time	  
is	  problematic;	  its	  ramifications	  are	  felt	  in	  current	  realities	  and	  in	  turn	  can	  blemish	  future	  action.	  
While	  not	  reading	  too	  much	  into	  U	  Kyi’s	  hesitation	  over	  the	  word	  ‘maybe’,	  it	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  
uncertainty	  that	  characterises	  life	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  is	  an	  uncertainty	  steeped	  in	  the	  unknown	  
future,	  the	  illegal	  status	  most	  Karen	  obtain	  in	  the	  borderlands	  and	  the	  unsustainable	  existence	  of	  
being	  a	  refugee,	  IDP	  or	  illegal	  migrant.	  This	  uncertainty	  often	  finds	  its	  way	  into	  the	  cultural	  
expression	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  this	  study	  and	  is	  an	  important	  indication	  of	  the	  complexities	  
involved	  in	  any	  imagining	  of	  the	  future.	  
The	  word	  ‘maybe’	  also	  implies	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  tensions	  which	  can	  occur	  when	  places	  
imagined	  at	  a	  distance	  must	  become	  lived	  spaces	  (Gupta	  &	  Ferguson,	  1992).	  While	  imagining	  
which	  occurs	  at	  a	  distance	  provides	  useful	  insights	  into	  theoretical	  considerations	  of	  imagined	  
communities	  (used	  to	  mean	  something	  broader	  then	  Benedict	  Anderson’s	  interpretation)	  and	  
spatial	  understandings,	  it	  does	  add	  a	  level	  of	  complexity	  to	  any	  practical	  implementation	  of	  that	  
vision.	  At	  a	  distance,	  many	  of	  the	  pieces	  of	  cultural	  expression	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  imagine	  a	  
Karen	  homeland	  of	  beauty	  and	  wealth.	  But	  any	  future	  return	  will	  need	  to	  account	  for,	  among	  other	  
things,	  the	  loss	  of	  land	  to	  the	  military	  or	  subsequent	  inhabitants,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  effects	  of	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militarisation	  such	  as	  landmines,	  agrarian	  deterioration	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  natural	  resources.	  
These	  are	  complex	  practical	  concerns	  not	  often	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  imagining.	  
These	  references	  to	  land	  are	  one	  the	  most	  common	  themes	  found	  in	  Karen	  imaginings	  of	  the	  
future,	  and	  indicate	  the	  importance	  of	  land	  in	  Karen	  conceptualisations	  of	  cultural	  identity.	  Its	  
importance	  lies	  in	  its	  spiritual	  role	  –	  land	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  many	  traditional	  cultural	  ceremonies,	  
as	  well	  as	  its	  agrarian	  role	  –	  it	  provides	  essential	  food	  and	  employment	  for	  many	  communities	  and	  
individuals.	  But	  land	  is	  also	  central	  to	  the	  struggle	  for	  nation-­‐hood.	  It	  represents	  both	  a	  physical	  
location	  that	  is	  being	  fought	  over,	  and	  an	  ideological	  conceptualisation	  of	  Karen	  culture	  and	  
identity.	  This	  means	  land	  is	  talked	  about	  in	  terms	  that	  frame	  a	  key	  subsidiary	  argument	  of	  this	  
thesis;	  it	  is	  both	  a	  fixed	  geographical	  place	  (territory),	  and	  a	  space	  which	  is	  attributed	  cultural	  
meaning	  and	  identity.	  Some	  of	  those	  I	  interviewed	  talked	  about	  a	  specific	  piece	  of	  land	  to	  which	  
they	  would	  return	  to	  or	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  militarisation	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  control	  pieces	  of	  land.	  
The	  notion	  of	  land	  in	  these	  instances	  falls	  into	  typical	  state	  understandings	  of	  ownership	  and	  
control	  over	  territory.	  For	  others,	  land	  was	  home,	  and	  represented	  the	  peace	  and	  justice	  they	  were	  
fighting	  for.	  In	  these	  instances	  land	  conceptualises	  meaning	  and	  identification,	  it	  epitomises	  the	  
struggle	  and	  represents	  the	  end	  goal.	  The	  role	  of	  a	  homeland	  in	  the	  Karen	  struggle	  for	  ethnic	  
identification	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  in	  
Karen	  imaginings	  of	  home,	  land	  is	  a	  crucial	  point	  of	  identification.	  
In	  a	  way	  these	  imaginings	  are	  a	  conversation	  with	  the	  past	  and	  the	  future	  which	  happens	  to	  take	  
place	  in	  the	  present.	  Examples	  used	  above	  show	  that	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
retrospective	  views	  of	  the	  past	  form	  a	  vision	  for	  their	  future.	  Michael	  Fischer	  in	  Ethnicity	  and	  the	  
Arts	  of	  Memory	  calls	  this	  the	  modern	  version	  of	  the	  Pythagorean	  arts	  of	  memory:	  “retrospection	  to	  
gain	  a	  vision	  for	  the	  future”	  (1986,	  p.	  198).	  This	  retrospection	  is	  a	  search	  for	  meaning,	  to	  
understand	  the	  totality	  of	  experiences	  in	  the	  broader	  social	  and	  political	  context.	  Its	  vision	  for	  the	  
future	  is	  in	  turn	  both	  a	  critique	  of	  domination	  and	  a	  celebration	  of	  possibility,	  and	  it	  is	  here	  that	  
Karen	  imaginings	  of	  the	  future	  can	  provide	  powerful	  antidotes	  to	  the	  despair	  and	  destruction	  often	  
inherent	  in	  current	  realities.	  
CONCLUSION	  
As	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  negotiate	  the	  difficult	  terms	  dictated	  by	  their	  displacement	  
and	  consequent	  emplacement	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  attitudes	  to	  home	  and	  cultural	  identity	  change.	  
This	  chapter	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  facilitates	  the	  recovery	  of	  a	  Karen	  
cultural	  identity,	  largely	  conducted	  through	  the	  processes	  of	  remembering	  place,	  cultural	  
reification	  and	  imagining	  a	  future	  ‘home’.	  In	  turn,	  this	  cultural	  recovery	  develops	  a	  Karen	  cultural	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narrative,	  made	  up	  of	  reclaimed	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths	  that	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  
nation,	  and	  which	  are	  framed	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  This	  cultural	  
narrative	  becomes	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  projected	  from	  the	  borderlands	  
space	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  cultural	  heritage	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  identify	  
and	  mobilise.	  
What	  is	  increasingly	  apparent	  is	  that	  this	  Karen	  identity	  projected	  from	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  
complex	  construct	  made	  up	  a	  number	  of	  elements	  discussed	  over	  the	  last	  four	  chapters.	  Taken	  
together,	  these	  chapters	  have	  developed	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  by	  mapping	  the	  social	  practices	  
of	  displaced	  Karen	  across	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  and	  tying	  these	  practices	  to	  a	  performative	  
dimension	  of	  Karen	  identity.	  Notably,	  this	  has	  included	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  borderlands	  space	  gives	  
rise	  to	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  activities	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  as	  they	  
negotiate	  their	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  In	  addition	  to	  developing	  our	  
understanding	  of	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice,	  the	  last	  four	  chapters	  have	  also	  helped	  uncover	  
the	  influences	  on	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  These	  include	  a	  process	  of	  
cultural	  recovery	  that	  reinforce	  a	  shared	  Karen	  cultural	  narrative	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  
nation	  and	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  and	  shared	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  that	  underpin	  a	  political	  
identity-­‐narrative	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  projection	  of	  this	  identity	  is	  enabled	  by	  access	  to	  international	  networks	  and	  new	  
technologies,	  a	  close	  geographical	  proximity	  and	  connection	  to	  a	  Karen	  ‘homeland’,	  and	  political	  
agency,	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  institutionalised	  status	  accorded	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  These	  elements	  highlight	  the	  range	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  factors	  that	  impact	  
the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  But	  they	  don’t,	  as	  yet,	  
articulate	  what	  that	  identity	  is.	  This	  therefore	  is	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  next	  and	  final	  chapter,	  where	  I	  
build	  upon	  these	  influences	  to	  develop	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  
critically-­‐informed	  by	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  conveyed	  through	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  





TO	  BE	  KAREN	  IS	  TO	  BE	  PERSECUTED	  
IDENTITY	  FORMATION	  IN	  THE	  BORDERLANDS	  
The	  revolution	  struggle	  should	  not	  be	  monopolised	  by	  one	  person	  or	  particular	  group.	  
It	  should	  be	  a	  leading	  struggle,	  inclusive	  of	  everyone	  who	  is	  oppressed	  ...	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  consolidate	  and	  mobilise	  the	  people,	  to	  reinforce	  them	  to	  a	  national	  struggle.	  
There	  are	  many	  ways	  for	  organising	  and	  mobilising	  our	  people	  ...	  	  
To	  encourage	  them	  to	  change	  the	  oppressive	  system	  which	  they	  are	  facing	  
(extract	  from	  an	  article	  written	  by	  Saw	  Eh	  Doh	  Doh	  Moo,	  KweKaLu	  newspaper,	  19	  January	  2009)	  
This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  discussed	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  –	  patterns	  of	  
activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity,	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  –	  inform	  the	  construction	  and	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Over	  the	  last	  three	  chapters	  I	  have	  begun	  to	  
develop	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  parameters	  of	  this	  identity,	  so	  that	  I	  can	  now	  argue	  that	  Karen	  
identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  commonly	  manifests	  in	  two	  ways:	  firstly	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  
persecution	  and	  displacement,	  and	  secondly	  as	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  based	  on	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  
unified,	  homogenous	  Karen.	  While	  both	  forms	  play	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  Karen	  
identity	  from	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  
displacement	  more	  readily	  lends	  itself	  as	  a	  unifying	  force	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  
identify	  and	  mobilise.	  The	  notion	  of	  Karen-­‐ness	  and	  a	  Karen	  nation	  is	  more	  commonly	  used	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  consolidating	  Karen	  claims	  to	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  as	  well	  as	  larger	  claims	  
around	  governance,	  political	  representation	  and	  human	  rights.	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  is	  the	  shared	  
experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  that	  helps	  to	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  
To	  make	  this	  argument,	  the	  chapter	  moves	  through	  the	  following	  steps.	  It	  first	  examines	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  three	  chapters	  and	  
the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  chapter	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  
examine	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  identity	  through	  two	  key	  manifestations.	  Firstly,	  that	  a	  Karen	  identity	  
forms	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  that	  is	  developed	  through	  
activist	  practices,	  and	  that	  this	  narrative	  acts	  as	  a	  primary	  reference	  point	  around	  which	  displaced	  
Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  and	  mobilise.	  Secondly,	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  idea	  
of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen	  identity	  by	  examining	  key	  colonial	  and	  missionary	  texts	  which	  
arguably	  construct,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  provide	  the	  first	  written	  articulation	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
Karen.	  The	  content	  of	  these	  early	  texts	  carry	  through	  to	  present	  day	  discourses	  where	  they	  are	  
used	  to	  further	  develop	  and	  embed	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  
in	  the	  way	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  is	  reinforced	  through	  the	  KNU’s	  nationalist	  agenda	  as	  well	  as	  
through	  media,	  activist	  and	  diaspora	  discourses	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Both	  these	  manifestations	  rely	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on	  attributes	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  for	  their	  form	  and	  projection,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  borderlands	  
becomes	  a	  critical	  component	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
This	  chapter	  develops	  the	  third	  subsidiary	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis:	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  is	  formed	  through	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  identity-­‐making	  that	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  present,	  
specifically	  influenced	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  displacement,	  
and	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  constituting	  both	  real	  and	  imagined	  cultural	  
identifiers	  and	  mythologies.	  I	  contend	  that	  this	  is	  often	  a	  fluid	  process,	  the	  Karen	  constructing,	  
adapting	  and	  reifying	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  their	  political	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  
Karen	  claim	  to	  a	  political	  self,	  a	  point	  from	  which	  they	  can	  protest	  the	  persecution	  and	  
discrimination	  waged	  against	  them.	  
This	  chapter	  also	  brings	  together	  the	  key	  components	  of	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  by	  mapping	  key	  
modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  Karen	  identity	  against	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  the	  
main	  thesis	  argument	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  product	  of	  
particular	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space	  from	  which	  it	  is	  
projected.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  Karen	  identity	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  both	  
shaped	  by	  and	  reconfirms	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  chapter	  is	  structured	  to	  
provide	  conclusions	  to	  the	  arguments	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  five	  chapters,	  and	  while	  it	  ties	  the	  
various	  elements	  of	  this	  thesis	  together,	  a	  formal	  conclusion	  to	  my	  main	  thesis	  argument	  will	  be	  
reiterated	  in	  the	  next	  and	  final	  chapter.	  
MODES	  OF	  SOCIAL	  PRACTICE	  AND	  THE	  PERFORMATIVE	  DIMENSION	  OF	  IDENTITY	  
Patterns	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  form	  the	  key	  modes	  
of	  social	  practice	  displayed	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  These	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  
help	  develop	  a	  performative	  dimension	  of	  Karen	  identity	  which	  manifests	  in	  two	  ways:	  as	  a	  
narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  and	  as	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen.	  The	  
nature	  of	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  have	  been	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  three	  chapters,	  but	  I	  
now	  bring	  them	  together	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  how	  they	  inform	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
space.	  
The	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  discussed	  over	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven	  set	  up	  the	  conditions	  for	  
the	  expression	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  This	  is	  done	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  ways.	  One	  way	  is	  by	  opening	  up	  the	  political	  landscape,	  a	  process	  that	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  first	  
mode	  of	  social	  practice	  in	  the	  borderlands	  –	  patterns	  of	  activism	  that	  contest	  the	  predominant	  
political	  structures	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  state,	  which	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have	  largely	  seen	  a	  contraction	  of	  political	  space	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  state-­‐centric	  demand	  for	  
primacy	  over	  identity,	  this	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  space	  has	  seen	  an	  array	  of	  socio-­‐political	  agents	  
emerge.	  One	  outcome	  of	  this	  has	  been	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  more	  informal	  political	  power	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  that	  develops	  through	  contested	  social	  relations.	  
The	  most	  significant	  and	  visible	  contribution	  these	  agents	  and	  their	  informal	  political	  power	  have	  
made	  is	  to	  open	  up	  the	  socio-­‐political	  space	  to	  include	  broader	  messages	  and	  more	  participatory	  
forms	  of	  political	  engagement.	  Women’s	  organisations,	  environmental	  groups,	  healthcare	  teams,	  
human	  rights	  documenters	  and	  artists	  have	  all	  helped	  to	  shape	  a	  broader	  political	  message	  that	  
contests	  state	  attempts	  at	  a	  hegemonic	  political	  message.	  Compared	  to	  inside	  Burma,	  there	  is	  
greater	  opportunity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  for	  forms	  of	  political	  agency	  like	  this	  to	  occur.	  As	  the	  socio-­‐
political	  space	  in	  the	  borderlands	  opens	  to	  these	  broader	  interests,	  so	  does	  their	  increased	  
influence	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  agency	  and	  ultimately	  identity	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
These	  agents	  are	  able	  to	  shape	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  ways	  unseen	  before,	  through	  
opportunities	  for	  self-­‐descriptions	  of	  Karen	  identity,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  agency,	  and	  
through	  greater	  freedoms	  to	  articulate	  the	  complexities	  of	  that	  identity.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  changing	  political	  landscape,	  we	  also	  see	  more	  integrative	  measures	  of	  
contemporary	  systems	  of	  connection	  emerge,	  specifically	  around	  international	  networking,	  new	  
technologies	  and	  political	  consciousness	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Six).	  This	  is	  the	  second	  significant	  
mode	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  informs	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Being	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
has	  given	  Karen	  the	  opportunity	  to	  connect	  with	  people	  and	  ideas	  in	  ways	  not	  available	  to	  them	  
inside	  Burma.	  This	  means	  an	  act	  of	  defiance	  or	  the	  destruction	  of	  a	  village	  can	  very	  quickly	  be	  
connected	  to	  larger	  advocacy	  networks	  where	  they	  are	  documented	  and	  used	  to	  further	  highlight	  
the	  plight	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  Through	  a	  blog	  post,	  an	  uploaded	  video	  or	  a	  human	  rights	  report,	  
displaced	  Karen	  can	  push	  stories	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  to	  an	  external	  audience.	  It	  also	  
means	  that	  a	  Karen	  person	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  more	  easily	  connected	  to	  larger	  communities	  (the	  
Karen	  diaspora,	  international	  sympathisers	  and	  governments)	  than	  they	  have	  ever	  possibly	  been	  in	  
their	  lives.	  Displaced	  Karen	  have	  access	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  resources	  and	  agents	  that	  can	  both	  
support	  their	  work	  against	  ongoing	  persecution	  and	  help	  shape	  the	  political	  message	  the	  Karen	  
want	  to	  project.	  
These	  types	  of	  connections	  are	  fundamental	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  the	  activism	  that	  occurs	  
there.	  Many	  of	  these	  connections	  have	  already	  been	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  
of	  their	  capacity	  to	  form	  new	  networks	  of	  solidarity,	  but	  they	  are	  worth	  reiterating	  here	  because	  
they	  establish	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity,	  solidarity	  around	  a	  political	  
narrative	  of	  shared	  persecution.	  In	  addition,	  these	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  act	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	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outward	  expression	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  central	  to	  forms	  of	  activism	  occurring	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  
Finally,	  the	  changing	  political	  landscape	  and	  these	  new	  systems	  of	  connection	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  
undermine	  the	  crucial	  role	  the	  idea	  of	  nation	  and	  culture	  play	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  
in	  the	  borderlands	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Seven).	  A	  ‘Karen’	  nation	  and	  culture	  is	  evident	  in	  a	  
process	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  selective	  recovery	  of	  cultural	  icons	  and	  
origin	  myths	  that	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  ‘Karen’.	  This	  recovery	  forms	  through	  a	  cultural	  
exchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  in	  particular	  learnt	  history	  and	  cultural	  traditions,	  
the	  practice	  of	  music	  and	  arts,	  and	  the	  shared	  stories	  of	  a	  ‘remembered	  home’.	  These	  practices	  in	  
turn	  develop	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  that	  feeds	  into	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  conveys	  a	  
sense	  of	  being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  based	  on	  the	  current	  circumstances	  of	  persecution	  and	  
displacement.	  This	  process	  of	  identity	  making	  is	  the	  third	  significant	  mode	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  
informs	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  A	  Karen	  nation	  and	  culture	  are	  integral	  components	  of	  
a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  but	  their	  place	  in	  the	  larger	  formation	  of	  identity	  takes	  on	  far	  
more	  subtle	  forms	  then	  is	  usually	  argued.	  As	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  
connects	  with	  new	  technologies	  and	  global	  networks,	  this	  thesis	  has	  shown	  that	  a	  political	  
narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  are	  developed	  and	  projected	  
through	  activist	  practices.	  This	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  is	  closely	  aligned	  to	  a	  recovery	  of	  
cultural	  identity	  that	  has	  procured	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  elements	  to	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  reinforcing	  
larger	  claims	  around	  governance,	  political	  representation,	  persecution	  and	  human	  rights.	  This	  is	  
the	  more	  nuanced	  form	  in	  which	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  and	  political	  identity	  forms	  and	  is	  projected.	  
What	  we	  find	  in	  the	  borderlands	  then	  is	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  framed	  through	  a	  shared	  
experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution,	  and	  an	  intensification	  of	  ‘being	  Karen’	  (reifying	  
cultural	  identity,	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  a	  unified	  Karen	  identity),	  both	  of	  which	  are	  enabled	  by	  a	  
combination	  of	  practices	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity,	  and	  processes	  of	  culture	  recovery,	  and	  
framed	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  and	  geographical	  space	  in	  which	  it	  occurs,	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  
is	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  nature	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  They	  do	  this	  by	  developing	  a	  space	  in	  which	  Karen	  identity	  can	  be	  practiced	  and	  
projected,	  including	  providing	  opportunities	  for	  political	  agency	  and	  mobilisation,	  but	  also	  by	  
providing	  a	  space	  in	  which	  that	  identity	  can	  be	  examined,	  including	  reifying,	  shaping	  and	  re-­‐
shaping	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  cultural	  messages	  that	  are	  integral	  to	  that	  identity.	  Taken	  together,	  
these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  help	  displaced	  Karen	  shape	  and	  project	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  that	  is	  
specific	  to	  their	  circumstances	  of	  displacement	  and	  the	  space	  they	  currently	  inhabit;	  bringing	  a	  
unique	  form	  of	  adaptability	  and	  reification	  to	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  
176 
 
the	  borderlands.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  these	  practices	  are	  taken	  together	  and	  examined	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  the	  borderlands	  space	  in	  which	  they	  operate,	  that	  a	  more	  accurate	  description	  and	  
understanding	  of	  Karen	  identity	  can	  occur.	  
If,	  as	  I	  argue,	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  frame	  the	  practice	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  then	  what	  form/s	  does	  this	  identity	  take?	  Over	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  
contend	  that	  this	  identity	  tends	  to	  manifest	  in	  two	  distinct	  and	  inter-­‐connected	  forms:	  firstly	  as	  a	  
narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  identify	  and	  mobilise,	  
and	  secondly	  as	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen	  with	  a	  shared	  cultural	  heritage.	  It	  is	  to	  
these	  manifestations,	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  Karen	  identity	  that	  the	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
KAREN	  IDENTITY	  THROUGH	  A	  NARRATIVE	  OF	  PERSECUTION	  AND	  DISPLACEMENT	  
A	  key	  element	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  that	  it	  forms	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  
persecution	  and	  displacement,	  and	  this	  narrative	  acts	  as	  a	  primary	  reference	  point	  around	  which	  
displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  identify	  and	  mobilise.	  This	  form	  of	  Karen	  identity	  partially	  
develops	  through	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  have	  framed	  many	  of	  the	  arguments	  across	  
this	  thesis,	  namely	  patterns	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery.	  
While	  this	  section	  focuses	  on	  a	  manifestation	  of	  Karen	  identity,	  it	  is	  clearly	  linked	  to	  these	  modes	  
of	  social	  practice	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  enable,	  broaden	  and	  shape	  the	  projected	  identity.	  
A	  number	  of	  writers	  have	  made	  reference	  to	  themes	  of	  persecution,	  displacement	  and	  alienation	  
in	  relation	  to	  Karen	  identity,	  and	  drawn	  links	  to	  representations	  of	  these	  themes	  in	  traditional	  
Karen	  mythology	  and	  contemporary	  narratives	  (Cheesman,	  2002;	  Cusano,	  2001).	  My	  argument	  
builds	  on	  these	  observations	  but	  also	  differs	  in	  two	  aspects.	  Firstly,	  I	  emphasise	  the	  place	  this	  
narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  has	  on	  the	  formation	  and	  projection	  of	  Karen	  identity	  
because	  it	  constitutes	  a	  key	  component	  of	  how	  the	  Karen	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  And	  secondly,	  I	  draw	  a	  close	  link	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  and	  
how	  this	  narrative	  is	  formed	  and	  projected.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  point	  of	  Karen	  identification	  is	  
formed	  by	  and	  through	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  occurs,	  and	  applies	  a	  spatial	  specificity	  to	  identity	  
formation	  in	  the	  borderlands	  that	  has	  to	  date	  received	  limited	  academic	  attention.	  This	  position	  is	  
based	  on	  a	  claim	  substantiated	  over	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter:	  that	  a	  predilection	  to	  shared	  
experiences	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  has	  intensified	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  now	  
constitute	  a	  primary	  component	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
point	  of	  reference	  for	  political	  mobilisation.	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In	  discussing	  Karen	  identity	  with	  various	  participants	  in	  the	  borderlands	  it	  became	  obvious	  that	  the	  
process	  of	  identification	  was	  complexly	  understood.	  Some	  Karen	  identified	  as	  a	  refugee	  or	  
displaced	  person,	  others	  as	  an	  activist,	  human	  rights	  defender	  or	  community	  organiser.	  Some	  
identified	  themselves	  as	  Buddhist,	  others	  as	  Christian	  or	  Animist.	  And	  for	  others	  still	  it	  involved	  
hyphenates,	  Thai-­‐Karen,	  or	  half	  Sgaw-­‐half	  Pwo.	  These	  identities	  are	  not	  self-­‐contained,	  nor	  do	  they	  
act	  independently	  of	  each	  other.	  For	  many	  Karen	  it	  is	  common	  to	  embody	  two	  or	  more	  seemingly	  
contradictory	  forms	  of	  identity.	  One	  Karen	  Christian	  friend,	  previously	  a	  soldier	  in	  the	  KNLA,	  
showed	  me	  a	  tattoo	  he	  had	  on	  his	  arm	  which	  constitutes	  a	  grid	  of	  three	  squares	  by	  three.	  Each	  
square	  has	  a	  Burmese	  letter	  in	  it	  which	  he	  calls	  “the	  nine	  most	  powerful	  letters	  in	  the	  Burmese	  
alphabet”.	  The	  tattoo	  is	  supposed	  to	  protect	  him	  from	  Burmese	  bullets	  as	  it	  had	  been	  infused	  with	  
the	  protection	  of	  the	  spirits.	  He	  saw	  no	  contradiction	  between	  his	  Christian	  beliefs	  and	  his	  Animist	  
tattoo,	  or	  indeed	  his	  Karen	  identity	  and	  using	  the	  Burmese	  language.	  It	  was	  perfectly	  legitimate	  to	  
embody	  elements	  of	  both.	  
However,	  the	  majority	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  I	  spoke	  with	  over	  the	  course	  of	  conducting	  research	  for	  
this	  thesis	  and	  in	  my	  previous	  work	  with	  communities	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  identify	  
themselves	  as	  Karen.	  It	  is	  clearly	  a	  subjective	  relationship,	  but	  it	  also	  encompasses	  a	  sense	  of	  Karen	  
identity	  based	  on	  cultural	  heritage	  that	  links	  the	  Karen	  across	  a	  vast	  historical	  order.	  Pushed	  
further	  there	  are	  other	  common	  trends.	  To	  be	  a	  Karen	  is	  to	  be	  persecuted,	  to	  have	  experienced	  
significant	  displacement	  and	  family	  death,	  to	  be	  living	  in	  a	  foreign	  land,	  or	  to	  be	  uneducated.	  These	  
constitute	  a	  collective	  sense	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  that	  underpins	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands,	  perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  specific	  cultural	  traits.	  
In	  a	  way	  this	  collective	  trauma	  manages	  to	  unite	  the	  Karen	  in	  a	  way	  that	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  
Karen	  identity,	  based	  on	  shared	  cultural	  traits,	  is	  unable	  to.	  It	  does	  this	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  act	  of	  
persecution	  does	  not	  discriminate	  against	  ethnic	  sub-­‐group,	  religion	  or	  language;	  nor	  does	  it	  
require	  justification	  of	  common	  ancestry,	  culture	  or	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  narrative.	  Almost	  every	  
Karen	  person	  in	  the	  borderlands	  has	  some	  experience	  of	  persecution	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Burmese	  
military.	  My	  point	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  traditional	  forms	  of	  identification	  that	  focus	  on	  
ethnic	  and	  cultural	  identifiers	  as	  supposed	  truths,	  a	  problematic	  approach	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
prove,	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  should	  be	  approached	  from	  a	  position	  of	  self-­‐description.	  
This	  position	  exposes	  a	  strong	  relationship	  to	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  
persecution	  which	  then	  becomes	  enmeshed	  in	  the	  political	  narrative	  of	  the	  Karen	  people,	  and	  
ultimately	  contributes	  to	  the	  form	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
This	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  is	  underpinned	  by	  a	  process	  in	  which	  persecution,	  oppression	  and	  
alienation	  become	  part	  of	  what	  being	  Karen	  is.	  Individual	  experiences	  of	  persecution	  form	  part	  of	  a	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larger	  narrative	  of	  oppression	  that	  both	  unites	  and	  mobilises	  the	  Karen.	  One	  way	  in	  which	  
displaced	  Karen	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  experiences	  is	  through	  an	  historical	  narrative	  that	  the	  Karen	  
have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  oppression	  in	  Burma	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  (Cheesman,	  2002,	  p.	  208).	  
This	  historical	  narrative	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  oppression	  is	  recited	  through	  early	  myths	  such	  as	  the	  
Golden	  Book	  (suffering	  as	  result	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  book	  of	  wisdom)	  and	  later,	  colonial	  accounts	  of	  
ongoing	  oppression	  by	  the	  Burmans	  (Hla,	  1939;	  Po,	  2001),	  and	  more	  contemporary	  human	  rights	  
reports	  that	  document	  persecution	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  Throughout	  these	  narratives	  of	  
persecution	  the	  perpetrator	  may	  change	  (the	  Mongols,	  the	  Mon,	  the	  Burmans,	  the	  Burmese	  
military,	  the	  ‘Generals’	  etc.),	  but	  the	  suffering	  of	  oppression	  remains	  consistent,	  eventually	  
developing	  into	  a	  form	  of	  a	  national	  narrative	  where	  to	  be	  Karen	  is	  to	  be	  persecuted.	  
This	  position	  as	  a	  recipient	  of	  persecution	  is	  also	  reinforced	  through	  the	  stories	  of	  many	  of	  the	  
participants	  in	  this	  research.	  Reference	  to	  persecution,	  oppression	  and	  alienation	  are	  common	  
themes,	  so	  is	  reference	  to	  a	  larger	  historical	  process	  that	  links	  this	  persecution	  to	  what	  being	  Karen	  
is.	  One	  participant,	  Moo,	  gives	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  this	  process	  manifests.	  
I	  am	  Karen.	  I	  was	  born	  in	  the	  mountains	  and	  my	  parents	  were	  farmers.	  When	  I	  was	  young	  
my	  parents	  told	  me	  they	  were	  suffering	  from	  before	  I	  was	  born	  ...	  Why	  do	  we	  Karen	  
people	  have	  to	  suffer	  from	  our	  grandparents	  through	  to	  now.	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  with	  this”	  
(Moo,	  personal	  communication,	  15	  September	  2005).	  
Another	  research	  participant,	  Po	  Khai,	  expresses	  similar	  sentiments	  in	  a	  song	  he	  wrote,	  ‘The	  
Burden	  of	  our	  People’.	  
Have	  we	  forgotten	  our	  suffering	  from	  the	  past	  
Our	  history	  shows	  our	  enemies	  eliminate	  us	  
Our	  grandparents	  tried	  to	  find	  us	  shelter	  
In	  a	  place	  where	  we	  could	  not	  be	  found	  
Free	  of	  death	  
	  
We	  try	  to	  find	  a	  place	  of	  freedom	  
A	  sheltered	  place	  where	  the	  wild	  animals	  hide	  but	  still	  we	  are	  not	  free	  
Our	  grandparents	  struggled	  for	  the	  next	  generation	  to	  be	  free	  
Struggling	  for	  many	  years	  but	  still	  we	  are	  not	  free	  
	  
We	  have	  faced	  the	  Revolution	  for	  more	  than	  50	  years	  
Some	  gave	  their	  eyes,	  their	  limbs,	  their	  lives	  
Some	  saw	  death	  in	  their	  fight	  for	  freedom	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But	  we	  continue	  to	  fight	  for	  our	  country	  and	  people,	  we	  will	  not	  surrender	  
This	  is	  our	  commitment,	  our	  inspiration	  
	  
The	  yoke	  of	  the	  Revolution	  has	  been	  carried	  by	  our	  grandparents	  
And	  now	  the	  new	  generation	  must	  carry	  it	  forward	  to	  our	  destiny	  
‘The	  Burden	  of	  our	  People’	  by	  Po	  Khai	  
In	  a	  subsequent	  interview	  Po	  Khai	  elaborated	  on	  this	  reference	  to	  the	  yoke	  of	  the	  revolution:	  “This	  
is	  the	  yoke	  that	  our	  legend	  carry	  until	  they	  die,	  the	  new	  generation	  has	  to	  take	  that	  yoke	  from	  the	  
old	  generation	  and	  carry	  it	  to	  their	  destiny”	  (Po	  Khai,	  interview,	  11	  October	  2005).	  Both	  Po	  Khai	  
and	  Moo	  show	  a	  keen	  awareness	  of	  the	  longevity	  of	  Karen	  suffering,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  goes	  back	  
beyond	  the	  immediate	  circumstances.	  Po	  Khai	  articulates	  a	  typical	  nationalist	  take	  on	  the	  struggle	  
by	  attaching	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  and	  obligation	  to	  the	  suffering.	  He	  indicates	  that	  the	  “yoke	  of	  
the	  revolution”	  must	  continue	  on	  with	  the	  next	  generation	  or	  at	  least	  until	  the	  conflict,	  and	  by	  
extension	  the	  persecution	  of	  the	  Karen	  is	  resolved.	  
These	  two	  examples	  are	  not	  isolated	  occurrences;	  there	  are	  many	  other	  references	  similar	  to	  these	  
in	  the	  stories	  of	  those	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  research.	  In	  his	  song	  ‘Do	  Not	  Forget’,	  U	  Kyi	  talks	  of	  a	  
history	  of	  oppression	  that	  can	  be	  “re-­‐opened	  from	  1949”,	  the	  time	  of	  independence	  from	  Britain.	  
He	  talks	  of	  “our	  virgin	  women	  have	  been	  raped	  and	  left	  to	  rot”,	  an	  oppressor	  that	  feels	  no	  pity	  for	  
“man,	  women	  or	  child”,	  “children	  impaled	  upon	  enemy	  spears”	  and	  disembowelment	  held	  
“tauntingly	  in	  our	  faces”.	  Another	  participant,	  Loo	  Ne	  explained:	  “You	  try	  to	  do	  something	  because	  
your	  grandfather,	  your	  grandmother,	  your	  father	  are	  struggling	  and	  fighting	  for	  a	  long,	  long	  time,	  
and	  you	  always	  hear	  the	  story	  of	  suffering,	  suffering,	  suffering”	  (Loo	  Ne,	  interview,	  19	  September	  
2005).	  Another	  participant	  explained	  why	  at	  one	  point	  in	  his	  life	  he	  thought	  about	  joining	  the	  
armed	  resistance	  movement.	  
My	  father	  was	  killed,	  my	  uncles	  were	  killed,	  my	  cousin	  was	  killed,	  my	  friends	  were	  killed	  
and	  my	  people	  were	  killed	  by	  war,	  torture,	  abuse	  and	  rape.	  Without	  sacrificing	  your	  blood,	  
you	  aren’t	  free	  from	  slavery	  and	  I	  learnt	  that	  from	  the	  elders.	  Fighting	  meant	  for	  me	  to	  
protect	  my	  family,	  my	  village,	  my	  people	  (Saw	  Ba,	  personal	  communication,	  9	  January	  
2009).	  
While	  persecution	  is	  a	  central	  component	  in	  these	  examples,	  they	  also	  serve	  to	  highlight	  a	  number	  
of	  other	  themes	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  persecution	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Persecution	  is	  often	  framed	  by	  references	  to	  family	  and	  community,	  and	  these	  entail	  complex	  
representations.	  Many	  Karen	  I	  spoke	  with	  as	  part	  of	  this	  research	  had	  experienced	  the	  death,	  
torture	  or	  maiming	  of	  loved	  ones.	  Some	  explained	  that	  a	  motivation	  for	  fleeing	  was	  to	  protect	  their	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children	  or	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  safer,	  more	  progressive	  prospects	  in	  life.	  Then	  there	  were	  those	  
who	  cited	  family	  and	  community	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  their	  impassioned	  willingness	  to	  sacrifice	  for	  the	  
struggle.	  This	  sacrifice	  is	  tied	  up	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  persecution	  suffered	  but	  also	  embedded	  in	  the	  
political	  narrative	  of	  the	  nationalist	  struggle	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  KNU.	  These	  may	  be	  quite	  
individual	  and	  subjective	  accounts	  of	  persecution,	  but	  they	  are	  integral	  to	  the	  larger	  
representation	  of	  Karen	  identity	  because	  they	  provide	  context	  to	  the	  shared	  experiences	  of	  
displacement	  and	  persecution	  around	  which	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  forms.	  
Persecution	  is	  also	  often	  framed	  by	  the	  loss	  of	  land,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  production	  of	  an	  
imagined	  homeland	  and	  culture.	  The	  most	  obvious	  manifestation	  of	  this	  deeply	  felt	  relationship	  to	  
‘the	  land’	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  way	  the	  KNU	  use	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  homeland	  to	  motivate	  their	  
political	  struggle;	  a	  struggle	  that	  aims	  to	  reunite	  the	  Karen	  with	  their	  Kaw	  La	  or	  homeland.	  But	  it	  is	  
also	  tied	  to	  the	  close	  spiritual	  and	  agricultural	  connections	  that	  Karen	  have	  to	  the	  land.	  Land	  is	  
their	  sustenance,	  their	  work,	  and	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  their	  spirituality.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  metaphysical	  
aspect	  that	  is	  played	  out	  through	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘temporariness’	  that	  is	  assigned	  to	  the	  refugee	  
camps	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  Thailand.	  While	  often	  incorporating	  many	  unwanted	  
connotations,	  to	  be	  a	  refugee	  has	  some	  value	  to	  displaced	  Karen	  because	  it	  indicates	  temporary	  
exile,	  not	  permanent	  displacement	  and	  acculturation	  ‘somewhere	  else’.	  In	  this	  sense	  many	  Karen	  
take	  pride	  in	  their	  status	  as	  a	  displaced	  person	  because	  it	  harbours	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  will	  one	  day	  
return	  to	  their	  rightful	  home.	  
These	  examples	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  that	  the	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  is	  both	  part	  of	  being	  a	  Karen	  
person	  (a	  condition	  shared	  by	  all	  who	  have	  been	  displaced	  to	  the	  borderlands,	  but	  also	  through	  
the	  historical	  narrative	  of	  oppression,	  all	  Karen	  more	  broadly)	  and	  a	  condition	  to	  be	  fought	  against	  
(underpinning	  Karen	  activism	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nationalist	  struggle).	  In	  the	  process	  both	  become	  part	  
of	  how	  the	  Karen	  identify	  and	  mobilise	  themselves.	  The	  sheer	  weight	  and	  pervasiveness	  of	  these	  
collective	  traumas	  ensures	  they	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  Karen	  expression	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  and	  this	  in	  
turn	  places	  them	  as	  a	  dominant	  framing	  of	  Karen	  identity.	  Far	  from	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  purely	  negative	  
state	  of	  affairs,	  this	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  has	  empowering	  qualities,	  particularly	  in	  the	  way	  it	  
helps	  to	  mobilise	  Karen	  around	  this	  shared	  oppression.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  mobilisation	  
has	  a	  purely	  altruistic	  agenda	  aimed	  at	  eradicating	  oppression.	  Part	  of	  that	  mobilisation	  has	  seen	  
Karen	  oppression	  weaved	  into	  a	  nationalist-­‐militarist	  narrative,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  Po	  Khai’s	  
comments	  that	  Karen	  suffering	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  yoke	  of	  the	  Karen	  revolution.	  The	  KNU	  
has	  also	  used	  this	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  oppression	  to	  reinforce	  its	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  agenda	  




However,	  Karen	  persecution,	  and	  its	  use	  as	  a	  motivating	  force	  for	  mobilisation,	  resonates	  more	  
broadly	  than	  a	  singularly	  nationalist	  agenda.	  This	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  lends	  itself	  as	  a	  unifying	  
force	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  identify	  and	  mobilise	  with	  much	  broader	  implications	  for	  
individual	  agency,	  community	  organisation,	  civil	  society	  and	  heterogeneous	  political	  organisation.	  
A	  more	  diverse	  range	  of	  agendas	  are	  also	  evident	  such	  as	  human	  rights,	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  
diversity,	  political	  representation	  and	  plurality,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  politics.	  This	  is	  
where	  my	  argument	  around	  the	  relationship	  between	  modes	  of	  social	  practice,	  identity	  and	  
mobilisation	  is	  particularly	  evident.	  The	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  discussed	  over	  the	  last	  three	  
chapters	  are	  the	  dominant	  patterns	  of	  practice	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands;	  they	  are	  
underpinned	  by	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  and	  act	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  
projection	  of	  a	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  around	  which	  the	  Karen	  can	  mobilise.	  In	  other	  words,	  
these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  have	  enabled	  and	  broadened	  the	  possibilities	  for	  Karen	  identity	  in	  
the	  borderlands.	  
So	  how	  does	  this	  relationship	  between	  experience,	  projected	  narrative,	  and	  ultimately	  identity	  
formation	  work?	  Let	  me	  first	  give	  some	  practical	  examples	  of	  how	  I	  see	  this	  relationship	  working.	  A	  
mother	  in	  the	  refugee	  camp,	  who	  wants	  more	  for	  her	  children	  than	  a	  life	  of	  persecution,	  utilises	  
the	  services	  of	  international	  agencies	  and	  the	  humanitarian	  apparatus	  to	  resettle	  her	  family	  in	  a	  
third	  country.	  A	  Karen	  activist	  uses	  her	  experience	  of	  persecution	  to	  advocate	  for	  other	  Karen,	  
tapping	  in	  to	  global	  networks	  and	  utilising	  new	  technologies	  to	  get	  her	  message	  out.	  A	  refugee,	  
after	  coming	  in	  to	  contact	  with	  a	  western	  environmental	  group,	  establishes	  a	  grassroots	  
environmental	  network	  that	  develops	  projects	  and	  raises	  awareness	  about	  damage	  to	  the	  
environment,	  realising	  that	  persecution	  and	  environmental	  destruction	  in	  Burma	  often	  go	  hand	  in	  
hand.	  A	  Karen	  refugee,	  displaced	  from	  Burma’s	  urban	  area	  and	  having	  never	  known	  her	  Karen	  
culture	  or	  language,	  begins	  to	  reify	  that	  culture	  by	  learning	  Karen	  ceremonial	  practices,	  language	  
and	  mythologies	  in	  the	  refugee	  camp.	  
What	  these	  examples	  illustrate	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  
displacement,	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  through	  which	  this	  shared	  experience	  is	  framed	  and	  
articulated,	  and	  mobilisation	  that	  will	  bring	  some	  sort	  of	  change	  –	  perhaps	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  
conflict	  or	  merely	  extracting	  the	  Karen	  from	  their	  current	  circumstances	  (through	  say	  the	  
resettlement	  program).	  It	  is	  the	  act	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  from	  which	  so	  much	  oscillates	  
outwards.	  The	  various	  narratives	  shared	  by	  participants	  across	  this	  thesis,	  and	  many	  others	  
besides,	  establish	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  as	  a	  point	  of	  reference	  
around	  which	  they	  and	  others	  identify	  and	  mobilise.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  are	  mapping	  their	  identity	  
against	  a	  spatial	  and	  political	  backdrop	  that	  defines	  what	  being	  a	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is,	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namely	  someone	  who	  identifies	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution,	  with	  being	  Karen,	  even	  if	  such	  
cultural	  identifiers	  remain	  elusive	  and	  subjective,	  and	  whose	  identity	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  their	  
practices	  as	  an	  activist,	  an	  agent,	  and	  a	  voice	  for	  themselves	  and	  for	  others	  who	  have	  shared	  their	  
experiences.	  That	  this	  narrative	  of	  persecution,	  this	  performance	  of	  Karen	  identity	  exists	  is	  a	  
testament	  to	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.	  It	  is	  an	  identity	  that	  has	  been	  formed	  and	  projected	  
based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  occur	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  namely	  an	  interchange	  of	  
people,	  ideas	  and	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  connections	  to	  home,	  culture	  and	  identity,	  which	  sit	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  a	  territorial	  domain.	  This	  relationship	  between	  space,	  practice	  and	  identity	  
supports	  my	  main	  thesis	  claim	  that	  the	  borderlands	  space	  becomes	  the	  setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  
practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity,	  an	  identity	  that	  I	  have	  argued	  here	  
largely	  manifests	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  
NARRATIVE	  OF	  A	  HOMOGENOUS	  KAREN:	  A	  PAN-­‐KAREN	  NATIONALIST	  IDENTITY	  
While	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  formed	  through	  a	  narrative	  of	  
persecution	  and	  displacement,	  there	  is	  another	  manifestation	  of	  Karen	  identity	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  
considered.	  One	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  Karen	  identity,	  and	  the	  one	  that	  garners	  considerable	  academic	  
attention,	  is	  through	  the	  narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen.	  As	  already	  shown	  in	  this	  thesis	  
there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  homogenous	  Karen.	  The	  Karen	  share	  no	  common	  
language,	  religion,	  political	  ideology	  or	  territory	  (Cheesman,	  2002;	  Cusano,	  2001;	  South,	  2007).	  
Throughout	  history	  the	  Karen	  have	  tended	  to	  live	  as	  semi-­‐autonomous	  communities	  with	  local	  
allegiances	  rather	  than	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  part	  of	  a	  ‘one’	  unified	  Karen	  community	  (Lieberman,	  
1978).	  Yet	  over	  time	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  has	  formed	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  is	  the	  projected	  symbol	  
of	  the	  nationalist	  Karen	  struggle	  now	  centred	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands,	  and	  undoubtedly	  acts	  
in	  some	  ways	  as	  a	  unifying	  force	  to	  other	  Karen.	  
This	  section	  examines	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  homogenous	  Karen	  through	  key	  colonial	  and	  missionary	  texts	  
which	  arguably	  construct,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  provide	  the	  first	  written	  articulation	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity,	  and	  which	  have	  been	  carried	  through	  to	  present	  day	  discourses	  around	  Karen	  
identity.	  These	  early	  written	  accounts	  are	  typically	  attributed	  to	  the	  modern	  documentation	  of	  a	  
Karen	  culture	  by	  Baptist	  missionaries	  and	  colonial	  administrators	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1800s.	  The	  
content	  of	  these	  early	  texts	  carry	  through	  to	  present	  day	  discourses	  where	  they	  are	  used	  to	  further	  
develop	  and	  embed	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  a	  
pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  is	  reinforced	  through	  the	  KNU’s	  nationalist	  agenda,	  but	  also	  through	  media,	  
activist	  and	  diaspora	  discourses	  in	  the	  borderlands	  which	  tend	  to	  convey	  the	  image	  of	  a	  ‘Karen	  
people’	  and	  a	  ‘Karen	  struggle’.	  But	  instead	  of	  taking	  this	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  as	  a	  given,	  I	  contend	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that	  this	  notion	  of	  Karen-­‐ness	  and	  a	  Karen	  nation	  is	  commonly	  utilised	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
consolidating	  Karen	  claims	  to	  persecution	  and	  displacement,	  and	  ultimately	  to	  seek	  a	  resolution	  to	  
this	  persecution.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  that	  
has	  helped	  to	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  to	  mobilise	  the	  Karen	  to	  struggle	  against	  
their	  continued	  persecution.	  
While	  the	  arguments	  in	  this	  chapter	  develop	  beyond	  a	  singular	  notion	  of	  the	  pan-­‐Karen	  as	  a	  useful	  
way	  of	  understanding	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  subjective	  
relationship	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  ‘Karen’	  that	  is	  found	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  Karen	  identity	  from	  the	  
borderlands.	  As	  a	  key	  component	  of	  self-­‐descriptions	  of	  Karen	  identity,	  this	  evolution	  is	  worth	  
noting,	  and	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter.	  So	  how	  has	  a	  pan-­‐identity	  formed	  from	  
what	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  pluralistic	  peoples?	  And	  what	  does	  this	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  space	  in	  
which	  it	  is	  has	  developed?	  
The	  Karen,	  a	  missionary-­‐colonial	  construct?	  
Adoniram	  Judson,	  an	  American	  Baptist	  missionary,	  arrived	  in	  Burma	  in	  the	  early	  1800s.	  He	  was	  
tasked	  with	  bringing	  Christianity	  to	  the	  largely	  Buddhist	  population.	  By	  many	  accounts	  his	  early	  
years	  among	  the	  central,	  mostly	  Burman	  population	  failed	  to	  illicit	  many	  conversions	  (Rajah,	  2002,	  
p.	  523),	  and	  this	  appears	  to	  have	  led	  him	  into	  Burma’s	  more	  remote	  hill	  tribe	  areas	  where	  he	  was	  
reportedly	  more	  successful	  in	  converting	  the	  ‘heathen’	  Animist	  and	  Buddhist	  Karen	  to	  
Christianity.87	  During	  this	  period	  Judson,	  subsequent	  missionaries,	  and	  colonial	  administrators,	  
conducted	  the	  first	  modern	  documentation	  of	  Karen	  history	  and	  culture.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  Karen	  
being	  a	  largely	  oral	  culture,	  this	  occurred	  predominantly	  through	  the	  documentation	  of	  Karen	  
poetic	  hta88	  and	  oral	  storytelling.	  Jonathan	  Wade,	  a	  missionary	  in	  the	  1830s,	  is	  credited	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  around	  exactly	  how	  many	  Karen	  were	  converted	  to	  Christianity	  and	  just	  how	  
successful	  the	  Baptists	  missionaries	  were	  in	  this	  task.	  Falla	  suggests	  that	  “no	  more	  than	  one	  quarter	  of	  the	  
Karen	  have	  ever	  been	  converted”	  (Falla,	  1991,	  p.	  18)	  while	  Martin	  Smith	  suggests	  that	  today	  “perhaps	  only	  
one	  sixth	  of	  all	  Karens	  are	  Christian...”	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  44).	  In	  a	  pamphlet	  called	  ‘There	  is	  no	  God	  and	  no	  
soul’	  put	  out	  by	  an	  Italian	  Buddhist	  Monk,	  U	  Lokanatha,	  he	  congratulates	  the	  “7000	  Karens	  of	  Toungoo	  who	  
have	  thrown	  away	  their	  bible”,	  evidence	  at	  least	  of	  a	  large	  number	  who	  resisted	  conversion	  (Lokanatha,	  date	  
unknown).	  Due	  to	  their	  early	  influence	  over	  a	  written	  Karen	  language	  the	  missionary	  story	  remains	  the	  
dominant	  narrative	  of	  this	  period,	  but	  these	  accounts	  must	  be	  treated	  carefully.	  Mikael	  Gravers	  in	  particular	  
highlights	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  the	  role	  various	  religions	  have	  had	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  Karen	  knowledge	  
and	  identity	  (Gravers,	  2007).	  Still,	  the	  role	  Christianity	  now	  plays	  in	  the	  modern	  Karen	  identity	  is	  significant	  
and	  has	  received	  considerable	  interpretation	  from	  academics	  such	  as	  Mikael	  Gravers	  (2007),	  Alexander	  
Horstmann	  (2011),	  and	  Ashley	  South	  (2007).	  
88	  Stories	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  hta	  are	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  story	  of	  Karen	  persecution.	  One	  participant	  
described	  it	  in	  this	  way.	  At	  one	  time	  the	  Karen	  had	  their	  own	  language	  and	  culture	  but	  then	  the	  Burmans	  
arrived	  and	  began	  to	  oppress	  the	  Karen.	  The	  Burmans	  cut	  off	  the	  Karen’s	  hands	  and	  tongues	  to	  stop	  them	  
speaking	  and	  teaching	  their	  ethnic	  language.	  After	  some	  contemplation	  the	  Karen	  decided	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  
language	  that	  the	  Burmans	  couldn’t	  understand,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  Karen	  could	  teach	  their	  children	  
about	  Karen	  culture	  and	  history.	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developing	  a	  Karen	  script	  (based	  largely	  on	  the	  Burmese	  script)	  by	  which	  these	  stories	  and	  htas	  
were	  used	  to	  establish	  a	  larger	  cultural	  identity	  and	  history	  of	  the	  Karen.89	  Wade’s	  script	  was	  
undoubtedly	  a	  powerful	  tool	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  validation	  of	  a	  modern	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity.	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  early	  colonial-­‐missionary	  texts	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  
a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity.	  Karen	  historian	  Aung	  Hla’s	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  Karen	  culture	  and	  
migration	  ‘A	  Karen	  History’	  (Hla,	  1939)	  draws	  on	  Karen	  hta	  to	  establish	  key	  ethnic	  identifiers	  such	  
as	  a	  common	  history	  and	  culture.	  Aung	  Hla	  recites	  one	  hta	  meant	  to	  clarify	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
Karen	  country	  and	  a	  common	  ancestor,	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah,	  who	  led	  his	  people	  to	  the	  promised	  land	  of	  
Kaw	  Lah90:	  
Within	  our	  great	  main	  country,	  
Who	  had	  the	  noble	  sovereignty?	  
Our	  land	  that’s	  genuinely	  Karen	  land,	  	  
By	  whose	  rule	  did	  it	  stand?	  
	  
Within	  our	  real	  motherland,	  	  
Taw	  Meh	  Pah,	  great	  chief	  of	  our	  clan,	  	  
Our	  land	  that’s	  genuinely	  an	  ancient	  homeland	  
Was	  ruled	  by	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah,	  the	  immortal	  man.	  
	  
Our	  forefathers	  of	  ancient	  times,	  	  
Exhorted	  us	  to	  seek	  and	  to	  find,	  
That	  pleasant	  place	  we	  named	  Kaw	  Lah	  (Green	  Land)	  
Wither	  host	  thou	  excelled	  most	  lands	  by	  far?	  
	  
The	  pleasant	  country	  of	  the	  Karens,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  historians	  and	  anthropologists	  place	  Wade’s	  script	  as	  only	  one	  in	  a	  range	  of	  Karen	  
scripts	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  have	  emerged	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century’s.	  Wade’s	  script	  
benefited	  from	  early	  adoption	  by	  missionaries,	  but	  also	  its	  adoption	  by	  the	  Karen	  political	  elite,	  particularly	  
the	  KNU,	  which	  have	  helped	  embed	  this	  script	  as	  the	  primary	  written	  language	  of	  the	  Karen.	  For	  further	  
discussion	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  Karen	  written	  language	  see	  William	  Womack’s	  PhD	  dissertation,	  ‘Literate	  
Networks	  and	  the	  Production	  of	  Sgaw	  and	  Pwo	  Karen	  Writing	  in	  Burma,	  c.1830-­‐1930’	  (2005).	  
90Kaw	  Lah	  can	  be	  translated	  from	  Karen	  to	  mean	  ‘Green	  Land’	  and	  is	  loosely	  associated	  with	  the	  land	  of	  the	  
Karen	  or	  what	  is	  currently	  known	  as	  Karen	  state.	  Meh	  Ywa,	  also	  known	  as	  Htee	  Hset	  Meh	  Ywa	  is	  translated	  
to	  mean	  ‘Land	  of	  the	  Flowing	  Sand’.	  Many	  interpretations	  (see	  Hla,	  1939,	  pp.	  37-­‐38	  for	  example)	  take	  Htee	  
Hset	  Meh	  Ywa	  to	  mean	  somewhere	  in	  or	  around	  the	  Gobi	  Desert.	  Regardless	  of	  its	  geographical	  location,	  
Htee	  Hset	  Meh	  Ywa	  is	  usually	  taken	  to	  mean	  the	  land	  of	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  original	  land	  of	  
the	  Karen	  before	  their	  migration	  south.	  One	  research	  participant	  explained	  it	  in	  this	  way:	  “Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  and	  
Htee	  Hset	  Meh	  Ywa	  is	  a	  bit	  complicated.	  I	  think	  no	  one	  knows	  exactly.	  This	  place	  does	  not	  really	  exist	  in	  the	  
world.	  It	  is	  more	  like	  Htee	  Hset	  Meh	  Ywa	  is	  Heaven	  and	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  is	  God”	  (Loo	  Ne,	  personal	  
communication,	  18	  November	  2011).	  Loo	  Ne’s	  comment	  shows	  the	  clear	  biblical	  influence	  which	  is	  often	  
associated	  with	  these	  early	  Karen	  myths.	  
185 
 
Where	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  ruled	  over	  the	  clans,	  	  
The	  pleasant	  Karen	  land	  Kaw	  Lah	  
Was	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah’s	  land	  called	  Meh	  Ywa.	  
(Hla,	  1939,	  p.	  37)	  
In	  a	  KNU	  publication	  dated	  1981,	  Saw	  Moo	  Troo	  takes	  this	  foundation	  myth	  even	  further,	  stating:	  
In	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  ‘Who	  is	  a	  Karen?’	  one	  of	  the	  answers	  should	  be	  (1)	  one	  who	  can	  
claim	  his	  ancestry	  to	  Toh	  Meh	  Pah	  and	  (2)	  one	  who	  possesses,	  maintains	  and	  cultivates	  the	  
legacies	  bequeathed	  to	  him	  by	  the	  said	  forebear	  and	  his	  predecessors.	  The	  writer	  
maintains	  that	  anyone	  who	  treasures	  and	  upholds	  these	  inheritances	  is	  a	  Karen	  though	  he	  
may	  not	  have	  a	  drop	  of	  blood	  from	  this	  tribe	  (Cited	  in	  Falla,	  1991,	  p.	  11).	  
There	  are	  obvious	  religious	  overtones	  in	  many	  of	  these	  early	  myths,	  and	  there	  are	  discrepancies	  
and	  claims	  to	  legitimacy	  that	  caution	  against	  privileging	  a	  literal	  meaning.	  But	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  
of	  looking	  at	  the	  continued	  recital	  of	  these	  types	  of	  myths,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  metaphorical	  
meanings.	  The	  story	  of	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah	  highlights	  a	  recurrent	  theme	  in	  the	  telling	  of	  Karen	  culture	  
and	  identity,	  that	  the	  Karen	  harbour	  a	  long	  history	  of	  persecution	  and	  flight.	  This	  can	  be	  found	  not	  
only	  in	  the	  early	  documentation	  work	  of	  the	  missionaries	  and	  colonial	  administrators,	  but	  also	  in	  
the	  literature	  of	  the	  KNU	  and	  more	  importantly	  for	  the	  arguments	  made	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  
narratives	  of	  the	  displaced	  Karen	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Time	  and	  again,	  flight	  and	  
persecution	  frame	  the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  identify	  themselves;	  this	  is	  
particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  arguments	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
A	  number	  of	  these	  early	  missionary	  accounts	  also	  make	  mention	  of	  the	  colonial-­‐missionary	  role	  in	  
building	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  first	  comes	  from	  Donald	  Smeaton’s	  book	  ‘The	  Loyal	  
Karens	  of	  Burma’	  where	  he	  quotes	  from	  the	  letters	  of	  the	  missionary	  Dr	  Vinton	  who	  gives	  an	  
account	  of	  a	  battle	  in	  which	  the	  Karen	  played	  a	  prominent	  part.	  
So	  far	  from	  being	  daunted,	  I	  never	  saw	  the	  Karen	  so	  anxious	  for	  a	  fight.	  This	  is	  just	  welding	  
the	  Karens	  into	  a	  nation,	  not	  an	  aggregation	  of	  clans.	  The	  heathen	  Karens	  to	  a	  man	  are	  
brigading	  themselves	  under	  the	  Christians.	  This	  whole	  thing	  is	  doing	  good	  for	  the	  Karen.	  
This	  will	  put	  virility	  into	  our	  Christianity	  (Smeaton,	  1920,	  pp.	  15-­‐16,	  italics	  are	  mine).	  
In	  another	  account,	  the	  prominent	  Karen	  Dr	  San	  C	  Po,	  writing	  in	  1928	  talks	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  in	  
emphatic,	  almost	  prophetic	  terms.	  His	  book	  is	  predominantly	  a	  nationalist	  proclamation	  of	  Karen	  




“Karen	  Country,”	  how	  inspiring	  it	  sounds!	  What	  thoughts,	  what	  manly	  feeling,	  what	  
wonderful	  visions	  of	  the	  future	  the	  words	  conjure	  forth	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  Karen	  (Po,	  2001,	  
p.	  81).	  
While	  much	  of	  this	  early	  work	  makes	  mention	  of	  the	  various	  Karen	  clans,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  
convey	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  collective	  Karen	  people	  and	  there	  is	  little	  insight	  into	  how	  these	  clans	  might	  be	  
brought	  together	  to	  be	  a	  ‘Karen	  nation’.	  Likewise,	  there	  are	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	  seemingly	  
objective	  ethnic	  identifiers	  such	  as	  language,	  dress,	  customs,	  and	  religion.	  But	  there	  are	  obvious	  
problems	  that	  arise	  from	  attempts	  to	  claim	  a	  collective	  identity	  based	  on	  ‘authentic’	  and	  objective	  
ethnic	  identifiers.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Karen	  are	  not	  homogenous	  suggests	  objective	  ethnic	  
determinants	  are	  less	  useful	  in	  trying	  to	  understand	  Karen	  identity	  than	  perhaps	  subjective	  ones	  
are.	  A	  shared	  language,	  political	  ideology,	  religion,	  and	  territory	  are	  some	  of	  the	  common	  traits	  of	  
a	  nation	  and	  are	  seen	  as	  critical	  components	  for	  binding	  people	  together	  under	  a	  common	  national	  
identity	  (Smith,	  1995).	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  Karen,	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  commonality	  across	  these	  traits	  
from	  which	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  could	  naturally	  establish.	  So	  how	  has	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  been	  
able	  to	  form	  if	  not	  around	  these	  objective	  determinants?	  
In	  his	  essay	  ‘Seeing	  ‘Karen’	  in	  the	  Union	  of	  Myanmar’,	  Nick	  Cheesman	  goes	  some	  way	  towards	  
addressing	  this	  concern	  when	  he	  proposes	  an	  examination	  of	  self-­‐descriptions	  to	  understand	  how	  
an	  ethnic	  identity	  is	  defined	  (2002).	  Cheesman	  suggests	  there	  are	  three	  recurring	  themes	  that	  exist	  
in	  these	  early	  writings	  and	  remain	  in	  evidence	  today.	  These	  are	  “narratives	  of	  oppression,	  lack	  of	  
education	  and	  virtue”	  (Cheesman,	  2002).	  Such	  assertions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  many	  of	  the	  historical	  
texts	  and	  mythologies.	  In	  San	  C	  Po’s	  ‘Burma	  and	  the	  Karens’	  (Po,	  2001)	  he	  calls	  the	  Karen	  “shy	  and	  
backward,	  and	  often	  lacking	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  competition	  ...”.	  Prominent	  missionary	  Harry	  Ignatius	  
Marshall	  mentions	  the	  Karen	  as	  shy,	  cautious	  and	  prone	  to	  being	  preyed	  upon	  by	  others	  (Marshall,	  
1922).	  The	  oft-­‐recounted	  Golden	  Book	  Myth	  (recited	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Seven)	  is	  heavily	  
prescribed	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  Karen	  education;	  having	  lost	  the	  book	  of	  wisdom	  the	  Karen	  must	  rely	  on	  
the	  return	  of	  the	  younger	  ‘white’	  brother	  for	  their	  education.	  
Cheesman’s	  classifications	  of	  self-­‐description	  are	  also	  evident	  in	  references	  to	  Karen	  identity	  today.	  
In	  discussions	  with	  a	  number	  of	  participants	  I	  was	  told	  that	  Karen	  people	  are	  oppressed	  through	  
their	  ignorance	  and	  belief	  in	  traditional	  notions	  of	  fate	  and	  karma.	  I	  have	  heard	  Karen	  people	  say	  
they	  are	  uneducated	  and	  that	  their	  persecution	  is	  part	  of	  God’s	  Will.	  Others	  tell	  me	  that	  the	  Karen	  
are	  simple	  but	  loyal.91	  But	  to	  suggest	  this	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  how	  these	  self-­‐descriptions	  work	  
underestimates	  the	  dynamics	  of	  their	  intent	  and	  perception,	  and	  this	  is	  something	  Cheesman	  
points	  out	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  essay.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Author’s	  field	  notes,	  28	  September	  2005,	  Mae	  Sot	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Among	  these	  strands	  of	  discourse,	  many	  aspects	  of	  Karen	  identity	  that	  appear	  to	  stress	  
subordination	  and	  inferiority	  in	  fact	  have	  antithetical	  implications	  that	  may	  be	  attributed	  
both	  to	  traditional	  mythology	  and	  refinements	  made	  by	  the	  elite.	  Historical	  persecution	  
signifies	  future	  liberation;	  a	  lack	  of	  education	  conceals	  both	  former	  glories	  and	  future	  
renaissance;	  high	  morality	  ensures	  that	  Karen	  autonomy	  remains	  a	  political	  imperative	  
(2002,	  p.	  219).	  
This	  begins	  to	  get	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  These	  narratives	  work	  
on	  a	  number	  of	  levels.	  Myths	  and	  stories	  are	  used	  to	  perpetuate	  a	  common	  ancestry	  and	  ethnic	  
culture.	  They	  are	  used	  to	  validate	  contemporary	  circumstances;	  for	  example,	  the	  Karen	  are	  
uneducated	  because	  the	  white	  brother	  stole	  their	  book	  of	  wisdom.	  They	  serve	  a	  political	  purpose	  
in	  that	  they	  support	  a	  message	  of	  persecution	  based	  on	  ethnicity.	  As	  Cheesman	  states	  above,	  in	  
these	  accounts	  the	  Karen	  may	  be	  portrayed	  as	  victims	  –	  uneducated	  and	  persecuted	  –	  but	  this	  also	  
forms	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  future	  liberation,	  a	  validation	  that	  the	  struggle	  will	  produce	  the	  desired	  
outcome:	  because	  this	  is	  what	  the	  ancient	  myths	  have	  already	  prescribed.	  The	  purpose	  of	  such	  
narratives	  is	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  current	  predicament,	  but	  also	  to	  offer	  restoration;	  that	  
through	  their	  struggle	  the	  Karen	  will	  one	  day	  be	  a	  free	  nation.	  
The	  KNU	  and	  establishing	  a	  nationalist	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  
The	  work	  of	  the	  early	  missionaries	  was	  extremely	  influential	  over	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
foundations	  of	  the	  Karen	  as	  a	  people,	  suggesting	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  
identity	  were	  occurring	  from	  at	  least	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  But	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  and	  a	  Karen	  
nation	  has	  also	  developed	  through	  the	  adaptations	  and	  interpretations	  the	  Karen	  have	  brought	  to	  
this	  documentation	  of	  their	  culture	  and	  history.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious	  example	  of	  this	  is	  how	  the	  KNU	  has	  utilised	  this	  pan-­‐Karen	  discourse	  to	  
establish	  a	  nationalist	  Karen	  identity.	  Many	  of	  these	  early	  writings	  have	  carried	  over	  into	  the	  
nation-­‐building	  ideology	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  militarised	  struggle	  of	  the	  KNU.	  The	  KNU	  has	  
employed	  these	  historical	  accounts	  to	  reinforce	  their	  claim	  to	  represent	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  
Karen	  people.	  
The	  KNU	  has	  undergone	  a	  number	  of	  ideological	  shifts	  throughout	  its	  60	  year	  insurgency,92	  but	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  the	  arguments	  I	  make	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  period	  after	  Bo	  Mya’s	  rise	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  For	  example	  from	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  through	  to	  pre-­‐World	  War	  Two,	  the	  Karen	  movement	  
was	  dominated	  by	  nationalistic	  fervour	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  gain	  political	  representation	  in	  the	  colonial	  
administration.	  The	  sixties	  and	  seventies	  were	  dominated	  by	  a	  socialist	  era	  under	  the	  presidency	  of	  Mahn	  Ba	  
Zan,	  while	  the	  Bo	  Mya	  era	  (1976	  until	  his	  death	  in	  2006)	  was	  dominated	  by	  a	  more	  right-­‐wing	  conservative	  
Christian	  agenda,	  described	  by	  Martin	  Smith	  as	  Bo	  Mya’s	  “bulldog	  brand	  of	  nationalism”	  (1999,	  p.	  391).	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Presidency	  as	  it	  is	  this	  era	  that	  most	  significantly	  defines	  the	  nature	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  today.	  A	  combination	  of	  circumstance	  and	  political	  will	  has	  seen	  the	  dominance	  of	  this	  
KNU	  version	  of	  Karen	  identity.	  It	  typically	  takes	  an	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  form,	  for	  example,	  a	  distinct	  
Karen	  culture,	  a	  claim	  to	  territory	  and	  political	  autonomy,	  and	  persecution	  based	  on	  ethnicity.	  
Since	  the	  mid-­‐seventies,	  the	  KNU	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  a	  conservative,	  Christian,	  Sgaw	  speaking	  
elite	  pushing	  a	  nationalist-­‐militarist	  agenda.	  This	  has	  seen	  the	  early	  translation	  work	  of	  colonial	  
administrators	  and	  Baptists	  missionaries	  incorporated	  into	  the	  nationalist	  agenda	  projected	  by	  the	  
KNU.	  An	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  treatise	  put	  out	  by	  the	  KNU	  in	  1991,	  ‘The	  Karens	  and	  their	  
Struggle	  for	  Freedom’:	  
The	  Karens	  are	  much	  more	  than	  a	  national	  minority.	  We	  are	  a	  nation	  with	  a	  population	  of	  
7	  million,	  having	  all	  essential	  qualities	  of	  a	  nation.	  We	  have	  our	  own	  history,	  our	  own	  
culture,	  our	  own	  land	  of	  settlement	  and	  our	  own	  economic	  system	  of	  life.	  By	  nature	  the	  
Karen	  are	  simple,	  quiet,	  unassuming	  and	  peace	  loving	  people,	  who	  uphold	  the	  high	  moral	  
qualities	  of	  honesty,	  purity,	  brotherly	  love,	  co-­‐operative	  living	  and	  loyalty,	  and	  are	  devout	  
in	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  (KNU,	  1991,	  p.	  5).	  
Under	  the	  KNU,	  a	  Karen	  state,	  Kawthoolei93	  (there	  are	  many	  translations	  of	  this,	  including	  the	  
‘Green	  Land’	  mentioned	  in	  the	  earlier	  hta)	  was	  established	  in	  the	  eastern	  part	  of	  Burma	  and	  is	  
commonly	  portrayed	  in	  both	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  narratives	  as	  the	  Karen’s	  promised	  land.	  
Kawthoolei	  has	  featured	  prominently	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  Karen	  nation	  and	  demand	  for	  an	  
autonomous	  state	  within	  the	  federal	  union	  of	  Burma.	  In	  another	  section	  of	  the	  KNU’s	  1991	  treatise	  
it	  is	  stated:	  
We	  desire	  Kawthoolei	  to	  be	  a	  Karen	  State	  with	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  We	  are	  
therefore	  endeavouring	  to	  form	  a	  genuine	  Federal	  Union	  comprised	  of	  all	  the	  states	  of	  the	  
nationalities	  of	  Burma,	  including	  a	  Burman	  state,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Liberty,	  Equality,	  Self-­‐
determination	  and	  Social	  Progress	  ...	  We	  desire	  the	  extent	  of	  Kawthoolei	  to	  be	  the	  areas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  A	  precise	  translation	  of	  Kawthoolei	  is	  uncertain.	  It	  is	  often	  translated	  as	  “flowerland”,	  “green	  land”,	  “land	  
of	  lilies”,	  or	  “country	  burnt	  black”.	  The	  word	  seems	  to	  have	  first	  come	  in	  to	  use	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  
and	  appears	  to	  be	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  state	  for	  the	  Karen.	  Martin	  Smith	  states	  that	  the	  1947	  Constitution	  
made	  provision	  for	  a	  special	  region	  (not	  a	  state)	  to	  be	  known	  as	  Kawthoolei	  that	  would	  include	  the	  Salween	  
district	  and	  adjoining	  areas	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  82).	  The	  idea	  of	  Kawthoolei	  as	  representing	  Karen	  state	  came	  
later,	  in	  a	  peace	  treaty	  in	  1964;	  this	  also	  included	  the	  consideration	  of	  Karen	  areas	  in	  the	  Tenasserim	  and	  the	  
Irrawaddy	  Delta	  becoming	  part	  of	  Kawthoolei	  (M.	  Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  217).	  Mikael	  Gravers	  also	  suggests	  it	  was	  
first	  used	  in	  publications	  in	  1947	  but	  he	  clearly	  states	  that	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  specific	  geographical	  area	  but	  
rather	  is	  symbolic	  and	  not	  necessarily	  inter-­‐connected	  (Gravers,	  2007,	  p.	  245),	  which	  would	  account	  for	  the	  
many	  Karen	  who	  live	  in	  the	  Irrawaddy	  Delta	  and	  other	  areas	  of	  Burma.	  In	  any	  case,	  Kawthoolei	  is	  generally	  
considered	  a	  nationalist	  construct	  for	  a	  designated	  space	  that	  could	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Karen.	  
Martin	  Smith	  (1999)	  and	  Jonathan	  Falla	  (1991)	  provide	  some	  of	  the	  most	  extensive	  commentary	  around	  the	  
origins	  and	  translations	  of	  this	  term.	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where	  the	  Karens	  are	  in	  majority	  ...	  All	  the	  people	  in	  Kawthoolei	  should	  be	  given	  
democratic	  rights,	  political,	  economical,	  social	  and	  cultural	  (KNU,	  1991,	  p.	  15).	  
There	  is	  a	  distinct	  preoccupation	  in	  the	  KNU	  literature	  on	  dispelling	  any	  doubt	  that	  the	  Karen	  are	  a	  
unified	  nation.	  In	  many	  respects,	  in	  presenting	  these	  historical	  cultural	  ‘truths’	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  
‘unified	  Karen	  identity’,	  the	  KNU	  has	  fallen	  into	  a	  classic	  predicament	  of	  modern	  society,	  forcing	  
plurality	  into	  unity	  and	  therefore	  alienating	  many	  people	  who	  consider	  themselves	  Karen	  but	  
under	  different	  terms	  (South,	  2007).	  
But	  for	  some	  Karen	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  KNU	  vision	  is	  not	  a	  given.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  
youth	  and	  the	  Karen	  diaspora	  now	  in	  third	  countries.	  Many	  view	  this	  as	  a	  failure	  by	  the	  KNU	  to	  
adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  political	  and	  social	  circumstances.	  One	  participant	  talked	  about	  the	  need	  for	  
a	  ‘new	  revolution’	  that	  would	  build	  up	  a	  younger	  generation	  of	  leaders	  and	  bring	  much	  needed	  
change	  and	  rejuvenation	  to	  a	  KNU	  position	  that	  he	  views	  as	  “old	  and	  stale”.94	  A	  statement	  put	  
together	  by	  four	  progressive	  members	  of	  the	  KNU	  executive	  in	  2005,	  shows	  some	  of	  the	  concerns	  
they	  have:	  
Since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Karen	  resistance	  movement	  in	  1949,	  Burma’s	  internal	  political	  
dimensions,	  as	  well	  as	  regional	  and	  international	  situations,	  have	  changed	  significantly.	  At	  
the	  advent	  of	  economic	  globalization	  and	  the	  digital	  world,	  the	  Karen’s	  struggle	  for	  self-­‐
determination	  and	  ethnic	  equality	  cannot	  be	  fought	  purely	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  politics	  ...	  
Having	  fought	  relentlessly	  for	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century,	  we	  as	  a	  movement	  need,	  as	  any	  
healthy	  movement	  does,	  to	  critically	  review	  our	  strategies	  and	  approaches	  ...The	  most	  
challenging	  task	  ahead	  for	  the	  Karens	  is	  to	  generate	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  leadership	  that	  is	  
capable	  of	  looking	  beyond	  the	  same	  voices	  that	  recycle	  the	  old	  mantras	  or	  prescribe	  the	  
same	  solutions,	  which	  can	  grasp	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  ethnicity,	  and	  stay	  attuned	  to	  
the	  regional	  political	  situation	  of	  this	  increasingly	  interconnected	  world.	  The	  Karens	  need	  a	  
leadership	  that	  is	  not	  only	  committed	  to	  the	  Karen’s	  collective	  vision	  of	  self-­‐determination	  
within	  a	  genuine	  union	  of	  Burma,	  but	  that	  is	  also	  skilful	  and	  inventive	  in	  policy	  making,	  
intellectually	  and	  strategically	  flexible,	  and	  capable	  of	  adapting	  to	  and	  taking	  advantage	  of,	  
new	  development	  in	  Burma,	  the	  region	  and	  the	  world	  (IEDS	  blog,	  2005).	  
The	  wording	  of	  this	  statement	  is	  chosen	  carefully.	  There	  is	  respectful	  acknowledgement	  of	  what	  
the	  KNU	  has	  tried	  to	  achieve	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  long	  suffering	  constituents,	  and	  there	  is	  certainly	  no	  
outright	  condemnation	  of	  the	  KNU.	  However,	  the	  message	  is	  clear.	  The	  KNU	  must	  develop	  an	  
inclusive,	  consultative	  agenda,	  genuinely	  representative	  of	  all	  Karen	  regardless	  of	  the	  natural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Author’s	  field	  notes,	  17	  December	  2008	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fracture	  lines	  along	  religion,	  language	  and	  ideology,	  and	  capable	  of	  addressing	  the	  challenges	  of	  an	  
interconnected	  world.	  Such	  an	  achievement	  is	  difficult	  in	  any	  political	  society,	  but	  it	  suggests	  a	  
rethinking	  is	  needed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  genuinely	  representative	  national	  ethos.	  And	  there	  are	  
significant	  obstacles.	  Although	  Bo	  Mya	  died	  in	  2008,	  the	  current	  Karen	  leadership	  seems	  to	  remain	  
deeply	  embedded	  in	  his	  philosophy	  for	  the	  KNU	  and	  militantly	  devoted	  to	  the	  party’s	  founding	  
principles	  set	  out	  in	  1949.95	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  talk	  of	  change	  will	  remain	  a	  long-­‐term	  
challenge.	  
While	  this	  may	  seem	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  KNU’s	  position	  one	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  
KNU	  sees	  itself	  as	  in	  a	  struggle	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Karen	  people.	  They	  have	  pursued	  a	  path	  not	  
uncommon	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  many	  other	  persecuted	  and	  oppressed	  populations	  of	  the	  world.	  They	  
have	  developed	  a	  narrative	  for	  their	  struggle,	  giving	  a	  national	  identity	  to	  a	  people	  and	  their	  
culture	  to	  distinguish	  their	  plight	  and	  to	  support	  their	  claims	  of	  political	  and	  cultural	  persecution.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  KNU	  this	  is	  at	  times	  a	  claim	  to	  represent	  all	  Karen	  against	  the	  Burmese	  oppressor	  
and	  the	  right	  to	  an	  autonomous	  Karen	  State	  within	  a	  Federalist	  Union	  of	  Burma.	  The	  premise	  being	  
that	  the	  competing	  struggles	  of	  numerous	  fractured	  groups	  is	  less	  effective	  than	  a	  united	  Karen	  
struggle	  guided	  by	  a	  nationalist	  agenda.	  
‘Karen-­‐ness’	  reinforced	  by	  external	  agents	  
The	  projection	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  is	  not	  just	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  Karen;	  it	  is	  also	  taken	  up	  
and	  projected	  by	  others.	  A	  range	  of	  external	  agents,	  in	  particular	  the	  international	  media,	  activists	  
and	  the	  Karen	  diaspora,	  all	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  Karen-­‐ness	  in	  the	  way	  they	  present	  the	  Karen	  
struggle	  and	  conduct	  their	  own	  activities.	  
A	  largely	  sympathetic	  international	  media	  reporting	  from	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  have	  typically	  
portrayed	  the	  Karen	  as	  a	  nationalist	  struggle,	  persecuted	  because	  of	  their	  ethnicity	  and	  locked	  in	  a	  
struggle	  against	  a	  brutal	  authoritarian	  dictatorship.	  Coverage	  in	  mainstream	  media	  tends	  to	  fall	  
into	  two	  areas.	  There	  is	  the	  nostalgic,	  almost	  romantic	  vision	  of	  the	  Karen	  as	  the	  underdog,	  
portrayed	  as	  patriotic	  guerrilla	  soldiers	  fighting	  for	  their	  homeland	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  vastly	  better	  
resourced	  oppressor,	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  The	  second	  type	  of	  coverage	  is	  the	  plight	  of	  civilian	  
Karen	  villager’s,	  who	  are	  the	  victims	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  displacement	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
armed	  forces.	  In	  either	  case,	  reporting	  tends	  to	  reinforce	  a	  ‘Karen-­‐ness’	  by	  generalising	  the	  conflict	  
as	  a	  Karen	  conflict,	  with	  little	  account	  of	  its	  diversity	  and	  complexity,	  or	  the	  other	  ethnic	  groups	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  These	  founding	  principles	  are	  laid	  out	  in	  Saw	  Ba	  U	  Kyi’s	  ‘four	  basic	  principles’:	  1.	  For	  us	  surrender	  is	  out	  of	  
the	  question,	  2.	  The	  recognition	  of	  the	  Karen	  State	  must	  be	  complete,	  3.	  We	  shall	  retain	  our	  arms,	  4.	  We	  
shall	  decide	  our	  own	  political	  destiny.	  In	  justifying	  the	  need	  for	  change	  in	  the	  KNU	  one	  participant	  told	  me	  
that	  “If	  Saw	  Ba	  U	  Kyi	  was	  alive	  today	  I’m	  sure	  he	  would	  have	  amended	  his	  four	  basic	  principles	  by	  now”	  
(Author’s	  field	  notes,	  16	  December	  2008).	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also	  engaged	  in	  similar	  struggles.	  This	  reporting	  also	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  features	  to	  
define	  the	  Karen	  struggle	  such	  as	  reporting	  ethnic	  genocide,	  or	  the	  right	  to	  a	  Karen	  ‘homeland’.	  
These	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  features	  are	  also	  presented	  through	  various	  forms	  of	  activism.	  This	  is	  most	  
commonly	  framed	  through	  actions	  that	  raise	  awareness	  and	  call	  for	  action	  against	  the	  ongoing	  
ethnic	  persecution	  of	  the	  Karen.	  Advocacy	  highlighting	  Karen	  displacement,	  killing,	  torture,	  rape	  
and	  land	  confiscation,	  tends	  to	  present	  these	  abuses	  as	  suffered	  by	  a	  people,	  the	  Karen.	  Again,	  we	  
see	  a	  generalisation	  of	  the	  conflict,	  a	  simplification	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  international	  
awareness,	  understanding	  and	  action.	  But	  what	  we	  also	  see	  is	  an	  intensification	  of	  Karen	  ethnicity	  
and	  a	  Karen	  nation	  that	  puts	  a	  spotlight	  on	  the	  abhorrent	  and	  illegal	  nature	  of	  the	  persecution	  and	  
justifies	  action	  taken	  to	  address,	  and	  ultimately	  eradicate	  this	  persecution.	  Many	  in	  the	  wider	  
Karen	  diaspora,	  for	  example	  those	  resettled	  in	  third	  countries,	  take	  this	  one	  step	  further	  and	  
develop	  an	  almost	  militaristic	  affiliation	  to	  their	  Karen	  ethnicity.	  Distance	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  
a	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  community,	  tends	  to	  heighten	  their	  attachment	  to	  the	  Karen	  identity	  and	  
culture,	  for	  many	  this	  can	  manifest	  in	  more	  hardline	  rhetoric	  around	  who	  the	  Karen	  are	  and	  what	  
their	  struggle	  is	  all	  about.	  But	  there	  are	  also	  other	  considerations.	  The	  Karen	  struggle	  is	  adapted	  to	  
garner	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  largely	  ignorant	  (in	  terms	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  Karen	  situation)	  
western	  audience	  with	  competing	  demands	  being	  made	  on	  their	  attention.	  Burma,	  the	  Karen	  
people,	  the	  conflict,	  all	  tend	  to	  be	  simplified	  into	  terms	  this	  western	  audience	  can	  understand.	  The	  
diaspora	  community	  must	  also	  focus	  on	  preserving	  the	  Karen	  culture	  in	  the	  face	  of	  twin	  threats	  –	  
the	  Burmese	  military	  and	  other,	  particularly	  western,	  cultural	  assimilation.	  For	  the	  exiled	  Karen,	  
Karen-­‐ness	  is	  a	  means	  for	  survival,	  and	  often,	  once	  removed	  from	  the	  immediate	  vicinity	  of	  their	  
homeland,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  tools	  available	  to	  them	  to	  account	  for	  their	  experience	  of	  displacement	  
and	  continue	  their	  support	  of	  the	  Karen	  struggle.	  
In	  their	  own	  ways	  these	  external	  agents	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  Karen-­‐ness	  by	  presenting	  the	  conflict	  
in	  terms	  that	  simplify	  and	  corral	  diverse	  groupings	  and	  concerns	  into	  a	  ‘unified’	  struggle	  against	  a	  
military	  oppressor.	  The	  practices	  of	  these	  external	  agents	  serve	  to	  highlight	  that	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  
identity,	  whatever	  its	  origins	  may	  be,	  is	  now	  reinforced	  by	  agents	  that	  may	  have	  no	  real	  connection	  
to	  the	  Karen	  or	  the	  larger	  discourse	  around	  what	  constitutes	  Karen	  culture	  and	  identity.	  It	  is	  telling	  
that	  most	  people	  view	  this	  conflict	  as	  a	  Karen	  struggle,	  not	  a	  Pwo,	  religious,	  or	  gender	  struggle	  for	  
example,	  all	  positions	  that	  could	  make	  equally	  legitimate	  claims	  to	  oppression.	  These	  external	  
agents	  may	  have	  different	  motivations	  for	  embracing	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  but	  the	  outcome	  is	  the	  
same,	  reinforcement	  of	  a	  homogenous,	  unified	  Karen	  people.	  
There	  are	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  texts	  that	  claim	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  is	  an	  artificial	  construct	  
(Hinton,	  1983;	  Rajah,	  1990).	  Hinton	  spends	  much	  of	  his	  essay	  ‘Do	  the	  Karen	  Really	  Exist?’	  pointing	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out	  the	  misleading	  aspects	  of	  conventional	  classifications	  of	  an	  ethnic	  Karen	  identity.	  In	  answering	  
his	  question	  ‘What	  is	  a	  Karen?’	  Hinton	  concludes	  that	  difficulties	  arise	  “due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  
assuming	  cultural	  distinctiveness	  where	  there	  was	  none...”	  (1983,	  p.	  165).	  He	  even	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  to	  
say	  that	  these	  conventional	  classifications	  “have	  helped	  make	  real	  the	  very	  facts	  which	  they	  
inaccurately	  describe”	  (1983,	  p.	  166).	  In	  his	  essay	  ‘Ethnicity,	  Nationalism,	  and	  the	  Nation-­‐State’,	  
Ananda	  Rajah	  notes:	  
It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  now	  that	  Karen	  identity,	  as	  it	  is	  made	  out	  to	  be	  by	  the	  KNU	  is	  an	  
invention,	  rather	  different	  from	  the	  way	  that	  Karen	  in	  village	  communities	  identify	  
themselves,	  and	  that	  the	  Karen	  nation-­‐state	  is,	  to	  use	  Anderson’s	  term	  (1983,	  p.15),	  an	  
“imagined	  political	  community...	  imagined	  as	  both	  inherently	  limited	  and	  sovereign”.	  
(1990,	  p.	  121)	  
While	  both	  Rajah	  and	  Hinton	  put	  forward	  positions	  that	  can	  certainly	  be	  argued,	  these	  texts	  should	  
be	  treated	  with	  caution	  in	  that	  they	  appear	  to	  assume	  authenticity	  lies	  with	  seemingly	  objective	  
historical	  evidence,	  and	  that	  the	  more	  subjective	  ‘constructions’	  of	  the	  colonial-­‐missionary	  era,	  or	  
indeed	  we	  could	  add	  the	  KNU	  or	  modern	  citizenship	  accounts	  of	  identity,	  are	  the	  less	  authentic	  
cousin	  of	  cultural	  objectivity.	  Indeed,	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  ‘constructions’	  actually	  provide	  a	  more	  
holistic	  account	  of	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  how	  identity	  is	  formed	  and	  practiced.	  In	  reality,	  the	  line	  
between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  indicators	  is	  a	  blurred	  one,	  but	  this	  should	  not	  detract	  from	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  identity.	  When	  I	  asked	  a	  Karen	  friend	  born	  in	  the	  hills	  around	  Thailand’s	  northern	  
city	  of	  Chiang	  Mai	  how	  he	  identified	  himself	  he	  told	  me	  “Thai-­‐Karen”,	  subscribing	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  
embodying	  multiple	  identities.	  Thai	  because	  that	  was	  his	  citizenship,	  and	  Karen	  because	  that	  was	  
his	  culture,	  his	  heart.96	  In	  this	  context	  he	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  Karen-­‐ness	  but	  not	  necessarily	  a	  
predilection	  for	  a	  Karen	  state.	  Another	  Karen	  participant	  recited	  in	  earnest	  detail	  the	  origin	  myth	  
of	  Taw	  Meh	  Pah.	  He	  began	  the	  story	  with	  the	  classic	  children’s	  fairytale	  beginning,	  ‘Once	  upon	  a	  
time’,	  and	  when	  I	  asked	  if	  he	  believed	  this	  story	  he	  laughed	  nervously	  and	  said	  no	  not	  really.	  While	  
the	  actual	  details	  of	  this	  myth	  may	  be	  ‘fantastical’	  or	  ‘invented’	  to	  some,	  the	  sentiment	  is	  
absolutely	  taken	  seriously,	  and	  that	  is	  that	  the	  Karen	  have	  a	  history	  and	  a	  culture	  that	  gives	  them	  
power	  and	  legitimacy.	  In	  both	  these	  instances	  seemingly	  objective	  ethnic	  identifiers	  such	  as	  culture	  
and	  language	  mix	  with	  subjective	  interpretations	  of	  historical	  narratives	  and	  modern	  notions	  of	  
citizenship	  and	  belonging.	  
The	  point	  is	  that	  whatever	  the	  origins	  and	  influences	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity,	  it	  is	  now	  developed	  
and	  reinforced	  through	  a	  number	  of	  processes	  that	  lend	  their	  own	  subtle	  variants	  to	  the	  discourse.	  
But	  while	  these	  variants	  may	  distinguish	  them	  to	  some	  level,	  all	  reinforce	  a	  Karen-­‐ness	  by	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  Author’s	  field	  notes,	  8	  December	  2008,	  Mae	  Sot	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privileging	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  narrative,	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  one	  Karen	  struggle	  and	  one	  Karen	  people	  
and	  that	  there	  are	  fundamental	  and	  historical	  ethnic	  identifiers	  around	  which	  this	  narrative	  has	  
formed.	  And	  there	  is	  some	  legitimacy	  to	  elements	  of	  this	  claim.	  For	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  among	  
the	  Karen	  I	  have	  encountered	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  in	  my	  previous	  work	  with	  
Karen	  communities	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  the	  majority	  consider	  themselves	  ‘Karen’	  and	  
attest	  to	  a	  distinct	  Karen	  identity.	  Whether	  this	  is	  a	  result	  of	  nationalist	  or	  missionary-­‐led	  
indoctrination	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  seems	  almost	  irrelevant.	  If	  you	  subscribe	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  
identity	  as	  a	  social	  construct,	  as	  I	  do	  in	  this	  thesis,	  then	  the	  way	  identity	  is	  practiced	  and	  
interpreted	  becomes	  a	  more	  important	  indication	  of	  identity	  then	  where	  or	  how	  it	  originated.	  This	  
is	  not	  to	  ignore	  the	  importance	  of	  how	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  has	  formed	  but	  rather	  proposes	  that	  
the	  focus	  is	  moved	  to	  how	  a	  Karen	  identity	  is	  interpreted,	  particularly	  by	  those	  who	  are	  exposed	  to	  
these	  various	  elements	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
My	  intent	  in	  this	  chapter	  has	  not	  been	  to	  dismiss	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  or	  a	  nationalist	  
sentiment	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  a	  Karen	  
nation	  cannot,	  or	  does	  not	  exist.	  It	  is	  undeniably	  present	  in	  the	  contemporary	  configuration	  of	  the	  
borderlands.	  But	  rather,	  my	  intent	  is	  to	  emphasise	  that	  through	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  a	  
narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  becomes	  a	  key	  reference	  point	  around	  which	  displaced	  
Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  mobilise,	  and	  in	  addition	  becomes	  the	  dominant	  framing	  of	  a	  Karen	  
identity.	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  from	  the	  borderlands,	  the	  notion	  of	  
Karen-­‐ness	  and	  a	  Karen	  nation	  is	  commonly	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  consolidating	  Karen	  claims	  to	  
persecution	  and	  displacement.	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  is	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  
persecution	  that	  has	  helped	  to	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  mobilise	  the	  Karen	  to	  
struggle	  against	  their	  continued	  displacement.	  This	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  becomes	  a	  
point	  of	  reference	  to	  which	  all	  these,	  and	  many	  others	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  and	  
unite.	  
A	  Karen	  nation	  is	  certainly	  feasible,	  but	  its	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  representing	  all	  Karen	  will	  remain	  
elusive	  while	  it	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  with	  a	  unified,	  nationalistic	  agenda.	  
Perhaps	  it	  is	  time	  to	  see	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  space	  
in	  which	  it	  is	  constructed	  and	  projected:	  a	  space	  that	  harbours	  a	  range	  of	  diverse	  Karen	  peoples	  
who	  commonly	  identify	  with	  a	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  and	  who	  
procure	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  to	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  reinforcing	  larger	  claims	  around	  
governance,	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  political	  self.	  This	  is	  both	  the	  potential	  and	  uniqueness	  of	  a	  
Karen	  identity	  as	  it	  is	  developed	  and	  projected	  from	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  It	  acts	  in	  asymbiotic	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relationship	  to	  the	  space	  –	  shaped	  by	  modes	  of	  social	  practice,	  the	  geographical	  location,	  and	  the	  
interchange	  that	  occurs	  within	  and	  across	  the	  nation-­‐state	  border.	  
CONCLUSION	  
This	  chapter	  highlights	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  description	  of	  
Karen	  identity	  offered	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  conclusive,	  but	  not	  definitive.	  There	  are	  many	  other	  parallel	  
and	  interconnected	  trajectories	  that	  could	  equally	  be	  argued	  to	  represent	  a	  Karen	  identity	  and	  this	  
shows	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  how	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  formed	  and	  practiced.	  This	  
thesis	  does	  however,	  highlight	  a	  key	  conceptual	  framework	  in	  which	  Karen	  identity	  can	  be	  
understood:	  the	  formation	  and	  projection	  of	  identity	  within	  the	  construct	  of	  a	  borderlands	  space.	  
This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  critically	  inform	  the	  construction	  and	  
projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  identity	  manifests	  in	  two	  key	  ways:	  as	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  
persecution	  and	  displacement	  and	  as	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen	  that	  reinforces	  
the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation.	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  that	  truly	  unites	  and	  represents	  all	  
Karen	  people,	  means	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  has	  become	  a	  more	  
effective	  way	  for	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  to	  identify	  and	  mobilise.	  This	  narrative	  has	  
been	  woven	  into	  the	  contemporary	  accounts	  of	  displacement	  due	  to	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  through	  
historical	  origin	  myths	  and	  texts,	  and	  serves	  to	  provide	  a	  locus	  from	  which	  the	  Karen	  can	  make	  
sense	  of	  their	  plight,	  but	  also	  provide	  a	  common	  narrative	  around	  which	  they	  can	  identify	  and	  
mobilise.	  
This	  version	  of	  Karen	  identity	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  space	  in	  which	  it	  is	  conceived	  and	  projected,	  and	  this	  
is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  three	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  construction	  and	  
projection	  of	  Karen	  identity.	  These	  processes	  do	  not	  follow	  a	  linear	  path.	  Patterns	  of	  activism,	  
networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  are	  informed	  by	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  In	  
other	  words,	  their	  existence	  is	  only	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  space	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  But	  they	  
also	  make	  up	  a	  key	  component	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  borderlands	  space	  I	  talk	  of	  in	  this	  thesis.	  In	  








This	  thesis	  has	  examined	  how	  a	  group	  of	  Karen,	  displaced	  from	  Burma	  and	  now	  residing	  on	  the	  
Thai	  side	  of	  the	  national	  boundary,	  conceive	  of	  and	  relate	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space	  they	  occupy.	  At	  
the	  centre	  of	  this	  relationship	  between	  space	  and	  people	  is	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  a	  
broader	  space	  that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  national	  border	  that	  separates	  Burma	  and	  Thailand,	  a	  space	  
that	  this	  thesis	  has	  treated	  as	  a	  ‘borderlands’.	  This	  interchange	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  sociality	  
that	  occurs	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  territorial	  domain,	  and	  is	  broadly	  mapped	  through	  the	  operations	  
of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen,	  two	  key	  agents	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  found	  that	  in	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  the	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  take	  on	  a	  fluid	  
and	  contested	  form,	  framed	  by	  processes	  of	  constructing,	  adapting,	  rejecting	  and	  reifying	  elements	  
of	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  and	  political	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  a	  Karen	  narrative	  of	  persecution,	  and	  
ultimately	  establish	  a	  Karen	  political	  self.	  This	  often	  sits	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Thai	  
and	  Burmese	  nation-­‐states,	  which	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  space	  that	  is	  more	  homogenised;	  defined	  
and	  treated	  as	  representing	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  political	  authority	  over	  a	  delineated	  territorial	  
domain	  and	  its	  inhabitants.	  
This	  tension	  provides	  a	  space	  in	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  protest,	  construct	  and	  redefine	  the	  
parameters	  of	  their	  political	  life.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  –	  patterns	  of	  
activism	  that	  establish	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  that	  enable,	  broaden	  and	  
strengthen	  the	  reach	  of	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice,	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  that	  consolidate	  
the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  a	  Karen	  cultural	  identity.	  These	  practices	  have	  ultimately	  informed	  
the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
In	  this	  context,	  the	  main	  thesis	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  becomes	  the	  setting	  
for	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  There	  are	  three	  
subsidiary	  arguments	  that	  support	  this	  main	  thesis	  argument.	  The	  first	  subsidiary	  argument	  defines	  
the	  space	  in	  which	  practices	  and	  constructions	  occur,	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  The	  second	  
subsidiary	  argument	  analyses	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  activity	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  that	  space,	  
what	  this	  thesis	  argues	  are	  the	  modes	  of	  social	  practice;	  practices	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  
solidarity	  and	  processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery,	  as	  practiced	  by	  displaced	  Karen.	  The	  third	  subsidiary	  
argument	  explores	  the	  type	  of	  identity	  that	  forms	  where	  the	  attributes	  of	  the	  space	  and	  the	  modes	  
of	  social	  practice	  intersect.	  These	  three	  subsidiary	  arguments	  do	  not	  act	  independently	  of	  each	  
other,	  in	  fact	  they	  intersect	  at	  various	  points	  and	  it	  is	  from	  these	  junctures	  that	  this	  thesis	  draws	  
much	  of	  its	  data	  and	  ultimately	  its	  findings.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	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these	  findings,	  before	  finishing	  with	  some	  speculation	  on	  how	  the	  recent	  political	  changes	  in	  
Burma	  may	  impact	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space.	  
SPATIAL	  TENSION	  
The	  first	  subsidiary	  argument	  that	  frames	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  is	  a	  distinct	  
space	  characterised	  by	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  modern	  territorial	  domain,	  characterised	  by	  the	  
modern	  demarcation	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  nation-­‐state	  control	  over	  
it,	  and	  the	  intersection	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations,	  characterised	  by	  a	  fluidity	  of	  
movement	  (of	  information,	  resources,	  ideas,	  culture,	  identity)	  that	  intensifies	  the	  possibilities	  
available	  to	  displaced	  Karen,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  agency	  and	  mobilisation.	  
This	  argument	  spans	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four	  lay	  out	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
territorial	  domain,	  arguing	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  
homogenised	  space	  that	  is	  delineated	  by	  the	  international	  border	  between	  Burma	  and	  Thailand.	  
These	  operations	  include	  many	  features	  typical	  of	  nation-­‐state	  operations:	  checkpoints,	  
citizenship,	  border	  controls,	  local	  bureaucracies	  and	  policing.	  They	  also	  include	  operations	  that	  are	  
more	  specific	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands:	  an	  uneven	  process	  of	  increased	  
militarisation	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border	  in	  order	  to	  control	  ethnic	  opposition	  groups	  and	  
territory	  and	  increased	  regulation	  on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border	  in	  response	  to	  security	  concerns	  
and	  refugee	  influxes.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  contain	  refugees	  in	  designated	  camps	  
along	  the	  border	  and	  to	  monitor	  and	  regulate	  other	  displaced	  persons	  that	  live	  outside	  the	  camps.	  
These	  factors	  represent	  an	  increased	  interest	  and	  penetration	  of	  both	  the	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  
nation-­‐state’s	  to	  consolidate	  control	  over	  the	  border,	  intensifying	  the	  border	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  
authority.	  While	  the	  nation-­‐state	  may	  attempt	  to	  enforce	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  modern	  territorial	  
domain,	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  are	  able	  to	  achieve	  this	  
with	  any	  form	  of	  totality,	  in	  fact	  it	  has	  shown	  the	  often	  complex	  and	  contentious	  practices	  that	  a	  
hardened,	  homogenised	  approach	  to	  the	  border	  must	  eventually	  accommodate.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  almost	  by	  necessity,	  must	  at	  some	  point	  accept	  that	  the	  modern	  
territorial	  domain	  also	  exhibits	  a	  sense	  of	  fluidity	  that	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  what	  
might	  be	  seen	  as	  aberrations	  to	  this	  attempt	  to	  contain	  and	  control:	  activities	  encompassing	  illegal	  
trade	  and	  informal	  population	  movement	  across	  national	  borders,	  as	  well	  as	  policies	  that	  cater	  for	  
non-­‐citizens	  such	  as	  refugees,	  international	  students	  and	  spousal	  visas.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  these	  more	  delineated	  characteristics	  of	  the	  modern	  territorial	  domain,	  are	  the	  
particular	  form	  of	  social	  relations	  laid	  out	  in	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven.	  These	  social	  relations	  are	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framed	  by	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border	  and	  which	  intensifies	  the	  
possibilities	  available	  to	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  Ultimately,	  this	  constitutes	  a	  more	  
fluid	  and	  contentious	  approach	  to	  the	  territorial	  domain,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  it	  
manifests	  as	  resistance	  to	  a	  process	  (institutionalised	  governance)	  that	  inadequately	  captures	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  Karen	  political	  self.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  examination	  of	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  displaced	  
Karen	  has	  shown	  they	  encompass	  some	  of	  the	  following	  characteristics	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  this	  
cross-­‐border	  interchange:	  ongoing	  physical	  and	  psychological	  connection	  to	  the	  Karen	  still	  inside	  
Burma,	  use	  of	  global	  networks	  and	  communications	  technologies	  to	  engage	  and	  connect	  with	  a	  
range	  of	  political	  agents	  globally,	  and	  developing	  flows	  of	  information	  that	  feed	  both	  cultural	  and	  
political	  needs.	  There	  are	  of	  course	  many	  others	  that	  have	  been	  mentioned	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  
These	  conflicting	  uses	  of	  the	  space	  both	  sit	  in	  tension	  and	  intensify	  each	  other,	  a	  situation	  that	  
reflects	  that	  neither	  agent,	  the	  nation-­‐state	  or	  displaced	  Karen,	  have	  absolute	  control	  over	  the	  
space,	  and	  that	  both	  are	  attempting	  to	  articulate	  their	  own	  narrative	  of	  the	  space.	  My	  argument	  
across	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  that	  this	  tension	  informs	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  but	  also	  
that	  it	  frames	  the	  activities	  of	  those	  who	  reside	  there	  or	  have	  a	  political	  interest	  in	  the	  operations	  
of	  the	  space.	  
MODES	  OF	  SOCIAL	  PRACTICE	  
This	  idea	  of	  a	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  space	  that	  informs	  and	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  social	  relations	  
that	  occur	  within	  it,	  leads	  to	  the	  second	  subsidiary	  argument	  this	  thesis	  makes,	  that	  these	  social	  
relations	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  an	  interchange	  that	  occurs	  across	  the	  national	  border,	  and	  this	  
interchange	  is	  framed	  by	  three	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice.	  While	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  
constitute	  a	  larger	  theoretical	  domain	  than	  is	  covered	  in	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  used	  this	  phrase	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  collectively	  describing	  key	  patterns	  of	  practice	  exhibited	  by	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands	  space.	  As	  such	  they	  are	  examples	  of	  modes	  of	  practice	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis	  rather	  
than	  definitive	  categories.	  These	  three	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  are	  patterns	  of	  activism	  that	  
strengthen	  Karen	  agency	  and	  challenge	  institutional	  forms	  of	  governance;	  networks	  of	  solidarity,	  
developed	  through	  international	  networking,	  new	  technologies	  and	  political	  consciousness;	  and	  
processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery,	  constituting	  a	  public	  projection	  of	  ‘remembered	  places’,	  cultural	  
reification	  and	  imagining	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future.	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Seven	  of	  the	  thesis	  lay	  out	  
the	  parameters	  of	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice.	  
Chapter	  Five	  showed	  that	  patterns	  of	  activism	  emerge	  from	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  operations	  of	  
institutional	  governance	  and	  a	  more	  informal	  political	  power	  that	  develops	  through	  the	  contested	  
social	  relations	  of	  displaced	  Karen.	  These	  operations	  of	  institutional	  governance	  aim	  to	  contain	  and	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control	  displaced	  Karen;	  this	  includes	  control	  over	  space	  and	  movement	  through	  institutions	  
tasked	  with	  surveillance	  and	  enforcement,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  administrative	  categorisation	  aimed	  
at	  identifying	  and	  regulating	  displaced	  populations.	  Displaced	  Karen	  contest	  these	  institutional	  
forms	  of	  governance	  because	  they	  do	  not	  adequately	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  political	  self.	  This	  
contestation	  occurs	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  by	  deliberately	  moving	  across	  designated	  boundaries	  and	  
by	  living	  outside	  the	  containment	  lines	  determined	  by	  administrative	  categories,	  for	  example	  
making	  the	  choice	  to	  live	  outside	  of	  the	  refugee	  camps	  or	  rejecting	  the	  refugee	  label	  when	  it	  
doesn’t	  suit	  their	  political	  purposes.	  These	  acts	  of	  contestation	  have	  helped	  displaced	  Karen	  
develop	  a	  political	  self	  by	  pursuing	  forms	  of	  activism	  that	  advance	  their	  political	  claims	  (for	  
example	  resolving	  the	  ongoing	  persecution	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military)	  as	  well	  as	  subverting	  
institutional	  norms	  of	  political	  belonging	  by	  negotiating	  their	  own	  place	  in	  the	  political	  domain	  (for	  
example	  articulating	  a	  political	  self	  that	  can	  encompass	  both	  agency	  and	  marginalisation).	  These	  
actions	  strengthen	  Karen	  political	  agency	  and	  mobilisation	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  
Chapter	  Six	  showed	  that	  the	  Karen	  utilise	  forms	  of	  activism	  and	  political	  agency	  to	  develop	  
networks	  of	  solidarity	  that	  are	  framed	  by	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution.	  
These	  solidarities	  are	  strengthened	  where	  activist	  practices	  intersect	  with	  particular	  mechanisms	  
of	  social	  power.	  These	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  power	  are	  grouped	  into	  three	  categories.	  The	  first	  
category	  involves	  international	  networking.	  Displaced	  Karen	  utilise	  global	  networks	  in	  ways	  that	  
create	  awareness	  of	  Karen	  persecution	  and	  enhance	  the	  political	  capacity	  of	  Karen	  to	  develop	  and	  
present	  a	  Karen	  political	  voice.	  The	  second	  category	  involves	  new	  technologies.	  Communications	  
technologies	  such	  as	  blogs,	  websites	  and	  multimedia	  have	  enabled	  the	  Karen	  to	  produce	  their	  own	  
messages	  and	  project	  them	  to	  a	  larger	  audience,	  both	  internationally	  and	  within	  Karen	  
communities	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  In	  addition	  these	  technologies	  have	  formed	  a	  useful	  platform	  
from	  which	  the	  Karen	  can	  project	  a	  political	  narrative	  of	  displacement	  and	  persecution	  which	  
forms	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  The	  third	  category	  involves	  political	  
consciousness.	  Displaced	  Karen	  develop	  greater	  political	  consciousness	  among	  the	  Karen	  
communities	  inside	  Burma	  and	  in	  the	  borderlands	  in	  order	  to	  convey	  a	  strong	  political	  message	  
around	  the	  ongoing	  persecution	  of	  Karen	  inside	  Burma.	  These	  advances	  in	  communications	  
technologies,	  and	  the	  increased	  capacity	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  utilise	  them,	  has	  improved	  the	  
capacity	  of	  Karen	  political	  voices,	  increased	  the	  reach	  of	  advocacy	  around	  Karen	  persecution	  and	  
displacement,	  and	  enabled	  greater	  connections	  between	  individuals	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  borderlands	  
and	  globally.	  
Chapter	  Seven	  showed	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  utilised	  for	  activism	  and	  solidarity	  have	  also	  been	  
integral	  to	  the	  recovery	  of	  a	  cultural	  identity.	  This	  cultural	  identity	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  selective	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recovery	  of	  cultural	  icons	  and	  origin	  myths	  which	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  is	  then	  
used	  to	  enhance	  claims	  of	  persecution	  and	  a	  political	  voice.	  This	  thesis	  showed	  that	  the	  Karen	  use	  
processes	  of	  ‘remembered	  place’,	  cultural	  reification	  and	  imagining,	  all	  forms	  of	  cultural	  recovery,	  
to	  construct	  a	  cultural	  narrative	  framed	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Karen	  nation	  that	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  
projected	  Karen	  identity.	  
Together,	  these	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  are	  evidence	  of	  a	  set	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  can	  be	  
mapped	  across	  the	  borderlands	  domain.	  At	  times,	  these	  intersect	  with	  other	  processes	  that	  are	  
integral	  to	  this	  thesis,	  such	  as	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  political	  agency,	  global	  processes	  
and	  political	  contestation.	  These	  practices	  and	  intersecting	  relationships	  constitute	  a	  key	  
component	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  they	  both	  make	  and	  are	  made	  by	  the	  borderlands	  space,	  but	  
they	  also	  enable	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  of	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  Karen	  identity	  that	  I	  
argue	  exists	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  an	  identity	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  
displacement.	  
IDENTITY	  
The	  third	  subsidiary	  argument	  this	  thesis	  makes	  is	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  formed	  
through	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  identity-­‐making	  that	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  present,	  specifically	  influenced	  
by	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  displacement,	  and	  conveys	  a	  sense	  of	  
being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  constituting	  both	  real	  and	  imagined	  cultural	  identifiers	  and	  mythologies.	  
The	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  often	  a	  fluid	  process,	  the	  Karen	  constructing,	  adapting	  and	  
reifying	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  their	  political	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  Karen	  claim	  
to	  a	  political	  self,	  a	  point	  from	  which	  they	  can	  protest	  the	  persecution	  and	  discrimination	  waged	  
against	  them.	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  commonly	  manifests	  
in	  two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  as	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  primary	  
reference	  point	  around	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  borderlands	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  and	  mobilise.	  
And	  secondly,	  as	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  based	  on	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  unified,	  homogenous	  Karen.	  The	  
thesis	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  Karen	  identity	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  
practices	  mentioned	  above.	  In	  other	  words,	  patterns	  of	  activism,	  networks	  of	  solidarity	  and	  
processes	  of	  cultural	  recovery	  frame	  the	  construction	  and	  projection	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  This	  thesis	  
has	  shown	  that	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  give	  form	  to	  the	  identity	  by	  incorporating	  present	  
day	  influences	  such	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  or	  the	  influence	  of	  western	  
trends,	  with	  cultural	  identifiers	  that	  convey	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  rooted	  in	  the	  past,	  such	  as	  the	  
adaptation	  and	  dissemination	  of	  Karen	  origin	  myths	  and	  cultural	  icons.	  These	  modes	  of	  social	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practice	  also	  enable	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity	  across	  a	  larger	  global	  order	  by	  providing	  a	  
platform	  and	  tools	  for	  its	  dissemination.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  utilisation	  of	  global	  networks	  and	  the	  
use	  of	  technologies	  with	  far-­‐reaching	  impact	  and	  exposure	  to	  international	  governments,	  media	  
outlets	  and	  the	  greater	  Karen	  diaspora.	  Because	  these	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  are	  critically	  
informed	  by	  the	  space	  in	  which	  they	  operate,	  this	  identity	  takes	  on	  a	  form	  that	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  
borderlands.	  It	  is	  not,	  for	  example,	  a	  form	  of	  Karen	  identity	  that	  is	  replicated	  inside	  Burma,	  or	  in	  
the	  Karen	  diaspora	  around	  the	  world.	  
That	  this	  identity	  also	  includes	  notions	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  is	  also	  reflective	  of	  the	  borderlands	  
space.	  While	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  identity	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  historical	  roots	  in	  the	  
colonial-­‐missionary	  texts	  of	  the	  mid	  to	  late1800s	  (Gravers,	  2007;	  Rajah,	  2002),	  this	  thesis	  has	  
shown	  that	  it	  takes	  on	  a	  particular	  form	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  where	  it	  is	  used	  to	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  
a	  Karen	  nation	  and	  a	  Karen	  nationalist	  movement.	  This	  is	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  intersection	  with	  
the	  nationalist	  armed	  resistance	  movement,	  particularly	  its	  adaption	  and	  consolidation	  to	  fit	  the	  
nationalist	  story	  projected	  by	  the	  KNU,	  and	  the	  way	  it	  has	  been	  used	  by	  global	  agents	  such	  as	  the	  
international	  media,	  the	  Karen	  diaspora	  and	  activists,	  who	  all	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Karen	  
identity	  in	  the	  ways	  they	  present	  the	  Karen	  struggle	  in	  their	  own	  activities.	  
The	  intent	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  not	  to	  look	  at	  Karen	  identity	  from	  a	  conventional	  perspective	  aimed	  at	  
determining	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  efficacy	  of	  ethnic	  identifiers,	  although	  this	  is	  of	  course	  discussed	  
particularly	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  historical	  and	  mythological	  constructs	  of	  ‘the	  homogenised	  Karen’.	  
Instead,	  this	  thesis	  has	  explored	  the	  performative	  dimension	  of	  Karen	  identity,	  in	  other	  words	  how	  
it	  is	  practiced	  and	  interpreted	  by	  those	  Karen	  who	  have	  been	  displaced	  to	  the	  borderlands.	  From	  
this	  position,	  the	  thesis	  has	  found	  that	  Karen	  identity	  in	  the	  borderlands	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  sense	  
of	  fluidity	  and	  complexity,	  integrating	  elements	  of	  an	  ‘homogenised	  Karen’	  identity	  largely	  rooted	  
in	  re-­‐interpreted	  cultural	  traditions	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  a	  collective	  Karen	  experience	  of	  persecution	  
which	  is	  impacted	  by	  events	  in	  the	  present	  day.	  The	  Karen	  treat	  these	  various	  elements	  with	  a	  
sense	  of	  fluidity,	  adapting	  and	  reifying	  them	  as	  they	  become	  useful	  to	  a	  larger	  objective	  of	  
protecting	  and	  preserving	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Karen	  people	  who	  suffer	  under	  the	  Burmese	  military.	  
While	  on	  their	  own	  each	  of	  these	  subsidiary	  arguments	  make	  self-­‐contained	  contributions	  to	  
understandings	  of	  space,	  practice	  and	  identity,	  together	  they	  fulfil	  the	  larger	  prospect	  of	  
understanding	  borderlands	  spaces,	  and	  in	  particular	  how	  that	  space	  relates	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  
displaced	  Karen.	  By	  interconnecting	  spatial	  tension,	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  and	  identity	  in	  this	  
way,	  this	  thesis	  offers	  an	  analytical	  framework	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  practices	  and	  narratives	  of	  
displaced	  Karen	  as	  they	  pursue	  a	  new	  type	  of	  political	  existence	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands.	  It	  
is	  from	  this	  entry	  point	  that	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  becomes	  the	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setting	  for	  modes	  of	  social	  practice	  that	  critically	  inform	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  identity.	  And	  
that	  this	  dynamic	  has	  produced	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  political	  agency,	  framed	  through	  activism	  that	  
has	  come	  to	  represent	  the	  activities	  and	  identity	  constructions	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  in	  the	  
borderlands.	  
Why	  is	  this	  important?	  The	  Karen	  have	  suffered	  persecution	  and	  displacement	  over	  many	  decades.	  
Rather	  than	  be	  seen	  as	  purely	  victims	  of	  these	  sets	  of	  circumstance,	  displaced	  Karen	  have	  utilised	  
the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  borderlands	  space	  to	  engage	  with	  their	  marginalisation,	  contesting	  and	  
constructing	  the	  existing	  socio-­‐political	  structures	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  a	  more	  adequate	  addressing	  and	  
representation	  of	  their	  political	  needs.	  They	  do	  this	  not	  only	  through	  the	  key	  modes	  of	  social	  
practice	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  development	  and	  projection	  of	  a	  Karen	  
identity	  that	  reflects	  their	  experience	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  As	  a	  result,	  displaced	  Karen	  
are	  active	  participants	  in	  their	  own	  political	  narrative	  of	  both	  marginalisation	  and	  agency,	  and	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  has	  both	  enabled	  and	  enriched	  the	  strength	  and	  reach	  of	  that	  narrative.	  This	  is	  
very	  clearly	  an	  important	  dynamic	  that	  links	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  displaced	  Karen	  to	  the	  
borderlands	  space	  in	  which	  they	  operate;	  and	  the	  Karen	  political	  self	  to	  a	  process	  of	  interchange	  
that	  occurs	  across	  the	  nation-­‐state	  border.	  
THE	  FUTURE	  OF	  THE	  BORDERLANDS	  
Recent	  changes	  in	  Burma,	  while	  still	  largely	  uncertain,	  will	  likely	  be	  felt	  in	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  
borderlands.	  This	  requires	  some	  speculation	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  changes	  on	  the	  arguments	  
made	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  more	  generally.	  Over	  the	  last	  year	  Burma	  has	  
experienced,	  arguably,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  potentially	  significant	  political	  progress	  since	  
independence	  in	  1947.	  In	  2010	  elections	  were	  held	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1990,	  bringing	  in	  a	  
nominally	  civilian	  government	  that	  retains	  strong	  military	  links.	  A	  new	  President	  was	  installed,	  
Thein	  Sein,97	  previously	  a	  general	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  incarnation	  of	  the	  Burmese	  dictatorship	  that	  
had	  ruled	  Burma	  for	  the	  previous	  48	  years.	  With	  the	  international	  community	  repeatedly	  calling	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Thein	  Sein	  was	  a	  key	  figure	  in	  the	  Burmese	  military	  until	  he	  resigned	  in	  2010	  in	  order	  to	  contest	  the	  
elections	  as	  a	  civilian.	  He	  became	  head	  of	  the	  USDA	  and	  contested	  the	  seat	  of	  Zabu	  Thiri	  Township	  in	  
Naypyidaw	  which	  he	  reportedly	  won	  with	  91	  percent	  of	  the	  vote.	  He	  had	  previously	  gained	  the	  rank	  of	  
Secretary-­‐1	  in	  the	  Burmese	  military	  (the	  second	  highest	  ranking	  position)	  and	  held	  the	  position	  of	  Prime	  
Minister	  between	  2007	  and	  2011.	  He	  is	  sometimes	  called	  a	  moderate	  and	  a	  reformer	  and	  has	  reportedly	  
been	  instrumental	  in	  brokering	  talks	  with	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi	  and	  relaxing	  many	  of	  the	  oppressive	  military-­‐
instigated	  restrictions	  Burma	  has	  suffered	  under	  for	  nearly	  50	  years.	  But	  Thein	  Sein	  largely	  remains	  an	  
enigma.	  He	  appears	  to	  have	  none	  of	  the	  reputation	  for	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  corruption	  that	  many	  of	  the	  
other	  generals	  have	  acquired,	  but	  he	  has	  worked	  his	  way	  up	  through	  the	  ranks	  of	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  
oppressive	  and	  immoral	  military	  regimes,	  and	  that	  is	  not	  done	  without	  a	  level	  of	  ruthlessness	  and	  strategic	  
drive.	  Time	  will	  tell	  whether	  he	  is	  a	  true	  reformer,	  a	  lackey	  for	  the	  military,	  or	  as	  I	  think	  is	  often	  the	  case	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  decisions	  by	  the	  Burmese	  military,	  an	  arbitrary,	  non-­‐threatening	  choice	  that	  will	  allow	  the	  
real	  orchestrators	  of	  Burma’s	  human	  suffering	  to	  fade	  quietly	  and	  without	  retribution	  into	  the	  background.	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the	  Burmese	  regime	  to	  undertake	  democratic	  reform,	  he	  spent	  most	  of	  2011	  undertaking	  
diplomatic	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  appeasing	  the	  international	  community.	  This	  included	  releasing	  Aung	  
San	  Suu	  Kyi	  from	  house	  arrest	  and	  more	  than	  two	  hundred	  political	  prisoners	  from	  Burmese	  jails,	  
including	  well	  known	  activists	  and	  politicians	  who	  had	  been	  given	  large	  prison	  sentences.	  There	  
has	  been	  expanded	  freedoms	  around	  media	  reporting	  and	  internet	  access.	  New	  legislation	  
protecting	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  and	  forming	  trade	  unions	  is	  currently	  before	  the	  parliament,	  and	  
political	  parties	  were	  allowed	  to	  register	  for	  the	  by-­‐elections	  held	  in	  April	  2012.	  
Thein	  Sein	  has	  used	  these	  steps	  to	  illustrate	  Burma’s	  progress	  towards	  democratic	  reform	  and	  has	  
urged	  the	  international	  community	  to	  lift	  a	  range	  of	  sanctions	  currently	  in	  place.98The	  foreign	  
ministers	  of	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  of	  the	  United	  States	  were	  
the	  first	  high	  ranking	  government	  officials	  from	  their	  respective	  countries	  to	  visit	  Burma	  in	  
decades.	  After	  the	  release	  of	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  political	  prisoners	  in	  mid-­‐January,	  the	  US	  
Government	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  establish	  full	  diplomatic	  ties	  with	  Burma,	  including	  re-­‐
establishing	  its	  Ambassador	  in	  Rangoon.	  
While	  many	  have	  spoken	  of	  these	  changes	  as	  a	  new	  era	  for	  Burma,	  many	  others	  are	  treating	  these	  
developments	  with	  caution,	  and	  rightly	  so,	  Burma	  has	  a	  long	  and	  painful	  history	  of	  not	  fulfilling	  its	  
obligations	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  its	  own	  citizens	  but	  also	  in	  meeting	  the	  demands	  of	  an	  international	  
community	  eager	  for	  reform.	  While	  encouraging,	  the	  concessions	  made	  so	  far	  have	  been	  relatively	  
pain-­‐free	  for	  the	  new	  government,	  and	  their	  resolve	  for	  democratic	  reform	  is	  still	  to	  be	  truly	  
tested.	  
It	  is	  far	  too	  early	  to	  say	  whether	  these	  changes	  constitute	  a	  genuine	  show	  of	  political	  progress,	  or	  
even	  if	  they	  are	  sustainable.	  Any	  democratic	  reform	  will	  be	  seriously	  hindered	  by	  restrictions	  
embedded	  in	  the	  much-­‐maligned	  2008	  Constitution.	  A	  convoluted	  and	  complicated	  piece	  of	  
legislation,	  the	  Constitution	  was	  not	  only	  introduced	  on	  the	  back	  of	  a	  fraudulent	  referendum,	  it	  
effectively	  gives	  the	  military	  veto	  power	  over	  any	  major	  constitutional	  changes,	  in	  effect	  
cementing	  their	  control	  over	  the	  country	  only	  now	  under	  a	  supposedly	  democratic	  structure.	  Even	  
as	  the	  new	  government	  speaks	  the	  language	  of	  reform	  and	  conciliation,	  the	  Burmese	  military	  
continues	  to	  attack	  ethnic	  areas,	  most	  notably	  displacing	  more	  than	  50,000	  civilians	  in	  Kachin	  
State99	  and	  an	  estimated	  30,000	  in	  northern	  Shan	  state100.	  There	  is	  as	  yet	  little	  mention	  of	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Australia	  has	  already	  relaxed	  sanctions	  as	  did	  the	  European	  Union	  after	  the	  April	  by-­‐elections.	  The	  US	  has	  
eased	  some	  sanctions	  to	  allow	  Burma	  to	  get	  financial	  help	  from	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  
and	  World	  Bank,	  and	  has	  indicated	  it	  will	  ease	  some	  of	  the	  other	  economic,	  trade	  and	  financial	  sanctions	  it	  
has	  against	  Burma	  if	  the	  momentum	  for	  political	  reform	  continues.	  
99	  UNHCR	  estimates	  50,000	  have	  been	  displaced	  across	  government	  and	  KIO	  controlled	  areas	  since	  June	  
2011.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  has	  estimated	  the	  number	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  75,000.	  See	  ‘UNHCR	  delivers	  aid	  to	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meaningful	  resolution	  to	  the	  ethnic	  conflict,	  and	  this	  is	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  obstacles	  
confronting	  any	  future	  democratic	  government	  in	  Burma.	  Long-­‐standing	  military	  oppression	  and	  
political	  disaffection	  of	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  means	  resolving	  this	  issue	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  success	  
of	  political	  reform	  in	  the	  country.	  Until	  there	  is	  a	  definitive	  cessation	  of	  fighting	  in	  the	  ethnic	  areas	  
and	  a	  genuine	  integration	  of	  ethnic	  affairs	  and	  representation	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	  see	  a	  positive	  or	  even	  moderately	  successful	  outcome	  for	  a	  democratic	  Burma.	  
The	  impact	  these	  changes	  will	  have	  on	  the	  borderlands	  is	  also	  largely	  uncertain.	  The	  Thai	  
Government	  is	  already	  talking	  of	  repatriating	  refugees	  and	  many	  I	  spoke	  with	  along	  the	  border	  in	  
January	  2012	  stated	  they	  would	  willing	  return	  but	  only	  if	  their	  safety	  was	  guaranteed.	  Large	  
numbers	  of	  refugees,	  including	  many	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  research,	  have	  already	  been	  
resettled	  to	  third	  countries,	  further	  depleting	  the	  social	  and	  political	  capacity	  of	  those	  working	  in	  
the	  borderlands.	  In	  January	  2012,	  the	  KNU	  met	  with	  Burmese	  officials	  in	  Pa’an	  to	  discuss	  a	  
ceasefire	  agreement.	  Conflicting	  reports	  of	  this	  meeting	  show	  the	  uncertainty	  inherent	  in	  these	  
talks	  and	  only	  time	  will	  tell	  whether	  this	  will	  be	  more	  successful	  than	  previous	  attempts	  to	  broker	  a	  
ceasefire.101	  Many	  NGOs	  working	  in	  the	  borderlands	  are	  already	  expressing	  concerns	  about	  
securing	  ongoing	  funding,	  many	  believing	  that	  donors	  who	  were	  previously	  constrained	  by	  
sanctions	  and	  international	  political	  pressure,	  will	  see	  these	  tentative	  political	  reforms	  as	  a	  reason	  
to	  now	  support	  work	  inside	  Burma.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  NGO	  
infrastructure	  in	  the	  borderlands;	  if	  what	  we	  are	  seeing	  now	  is	  indeed	  genuine	  political	  reform	  and	  
this	  continues	  to	  gather	  momentum,	  it	  will	  still	  take	  some	  time	  for	  results	  to	  trickle	  down.	  In	  the	  
meantime	  savvy	  NGOs	  will	  work	  out	  ways	  to	  extend	  their	  work	  inside	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
maintaining	  the	  integrity	  of	  a	  struggle	  that	  has	  looked	  to	  provide	  human	  security	  and	  genuine	  
democratic	  reform.	  For	  many	  NGOs	  who	  already	  attempt	  cross-­‐border	  work,	  a	  calmer,	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
thousands	  in	  Myanmar's	  remote	  Kachin	  state’	  (2012,	  March	  26).	  UNHCR	  News	  Service.	  Retrieved	  June	  13,	  
2012,	  from	  http://www.unhcr.org/4f7061566.html.	  
100	  See	  ‘Over	  30,000	  displaced	  by	  Burma	  Army	  attacks	  face	  humanitarian	  crisis	  in	  northern	  Shan	  State’	  
(August	  10,	  2011).	  Press	  release	  by	  the	  Shan	  Women’s	  Action	  Network	  and	  the	  Shan	  Human	  Rights	  
Foundation.	  Retrieved	  June	  13,	  2012,	  from	  
http://www.shanwomen.org/images/stories/pressrelease/10_8_11_preseles_eng.pdf.	  
101	  Initial	  reports	  stated	  a	  ceasefire	  agreement	  had	  been	  signed,	  although	  further	  clarifying	  statements	  
followed.	  The	  Burmese	  media	  reported	  that	  a	  five-­‐point	  agreement	  had	  been	  signed	  that	  was	  to	  be	  
implemented	  as	  a	  preliminary	  task,	  and	  that	  an	  11-­‐point	  agreement	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  discussed	  at	  the	  
higher	  political	  level.	  The	  KNU	  served	  to	  confuse	  this	  supposed	  agreement	  with	  various	  members	  releasing	  
differing	  ‘clarifying’	  statements	  about	  what	  the	  state	  of	  the	  agreement	  actually	  was.	  KNU	  General-­‐Secretary	  
Zipporah	  Sein	  reportedly	  stated	  that	  no	  ceasefire	  had	  been	  agreed	  upon,	  rather	  that	  an	  agreement	  to	  hold	  
further	  ceasefire	  talks	  had	  been	  signed.	  KNU	  Vice-­‐President	  David	  Tharkabaw,	  called	  the	  initial	  meeting	  “...	  a	  
very	  minor	  and	  very	  small	  initial	  step	  ...”	  and	  that	  the	  government’s	  motive	  was	  to	  make	  ceasefire	  
agreements	  with	  ethnic	  armies	  so	  that	  they	  could	  develop	  the	  resource-­‐rich	  border	  areas	  (See	  ‘David	  
Tharkabaw,	  KNU:	  ‘Treacherous	  offer’	  (2012,	  February	  10).	  Democratic	  Voice	  of	  Burma.	  Retrieved	  June	  13,	  
2012,	  from	  http://www.dvb.no/interview/david-­‐tharkabaw-­‐knu-­‐treacherous-­‐offer/20179.	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peaceful	  borderlands	  region	  will	  likely	  benefit	  their	  activities	  in	  ways	  that	  heavy	  militarisation	  has	  
hindered	  in	  the	  past.	  
But	  there	  are	  still	  significant	  obstacles	  to	  overcome	  before	  any	  genuine	  plan	  for	  repatriation	  can	  
occur.	  There	  are	  over	  140,000	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,102	  and	  this	  
situation	  requires	  answers	  to	  some	  significant	  questions.	  What	  and	  where	  will	  refugees	  and	  
displaced	  person	  return	  to?	  What	  are	  the	  logistics	  of	  even	  moving	  such	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people?	  
Will	  it	  be	  safe?	  The	  Burmese	  military	  continue	  to	  attack	  ethnic	  areas	  but	  there	  are	  also	  safety	  
concerns	  associated	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  militarisation	  such	  as	  undetonated	  landmines.	  While	  
Thailand	  may	  be	  eager	  to	  rid	  itself	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  refugee	  problem,	  these	  are	  issues	  that	  
cannot	  be	  resolved	  overnight.	  They	  indicate	  a	  prolonged	  winding	  up	  of	  border	  operations,	  if	  this	  
were	  to	  happen	  at	  all,	  and	  continued	  cross-­‐border	  familial	  and	  social	  ties	  that	  will	  not	  easily	  be	  
disconnected.	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  will	  likely	  change.	  But	  then	  this	  is	  exactly	  the	  argument	  this	  thesis	  
makes.	  Borderlands,	  made	  up	  of	  intersecting	  social	  relationships,	  by	  their	  very	  nature	  changeable,	  
contestable	  and	  fluid,	  are	  always	  in	  a	  state	  of	  perpetual	  construction.	  Even	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  
hardened,	  homogenous	  territorial	  domain	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  variable	  decisions	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  
nation-­‐state	  and	  other	  border	  agents,	  changes	  that	  occur	  depending	  on	  political	  will,	  diplomatic	  
relations,	  global	  processes	  and	  practicalities,	  among	  other	  things.	  This	  thesis	  provides	  a	  snapshot	  
of	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  not	  only	  during	  a	  period	  of	  time	  (2005	  to	  2010)	  but	  also	  from	  a	  
particular	  social	  and	  political	  perspective.	  It	  shows	  how	  the	  confluence	  of	  a	  range	  of	  factors	  
(political,	  social,	  cultural,	  historical)	  have	  created	  a	  distinct	  space	  in	  which	  displaced	  Karen	  can	  
contest	  the	  structures	  of	  governance,	  articulate	  their	  political	  self,	  and	  construct	  an	  identity	  based	  
on	  a	  narrative	  of	  persecution	  and	  displacement.	  That	  this	  picture	  of	  the	  borderlands	  might	  not	  
exist	  in	  this	  exact	  form	  in	  the	  future	  is	  not	  a	  judgement	  on	  the	  arguments	  made	  in	  this	  thesis,	  but	  
rather	  represents	  the	  realities	  and	  constructs	  of	  a	  borderlands	  space,	  and	  indeed	  reinforces	  a	  key	  
point	  that	  this	  thesis	  makes:	  that	  the	  borderlands	  as	  a	  spatial	  entity	  will	  always	  make	  and	  be	  made	  
by	  the	  agents	  and	  relationships	  that	  constitute	  the	  space.	  
This	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  borderlands	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  claims	  made	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  best	  
posited	  at	  an	  analytical	  level.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  
relationships	  discussed	  across	  this	  thesis	  will	  likely	  continue.	  Displaced	  Karen	  and	  other	  border	  
agents	  will	  continue	  to	  contest	  the	  state	  structures	  and	  institutionalised	  governance	  attached	  to	  
the	  national	  border,	  and	  engage	  in	  the	  social	  practices	  and	  relationships	  that	  give	  meaning	  and	  a	  
practical	  ethos	  to	  the	  space.	  In	  doing	  so,	  these	  agents	  will	  continue	  to	  provide	  definition	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Latest	  figure	  provided	  by	  TBBC	  is	  a	  verified	  caseload	  of	  140,	  356	  (as	  of	  April	  2012).	  
205 
 
substance	  to	  the	  ever	  evolving	  borderlands	  space.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  content	  of	  these	  
activities	  is	  likely	  to	  alter	  as	  new	  realities	  and	  priorities	  emerge.	  For	  example,	  the	  form	  of	  identity	  
projected	  may	  be	  susceptible	  to	  further	  adaptations,	  particularly	  as	  diaspora	  and	  hybrid	  identities	  
gain	  more	  traction	  as	  a	  result	  of	  resettlement	  and	  migration.	  New	  technologies	  will	  continue	  to	  
develop	  and	  change	  the	  way	  displaced	  Karen	  engage	  with	  global	  audiences	  and	  their	  own	  identity	  
and	  narratives.	  And	  while	  the	  conflict	  and	  persecution	  that	  has	  caused	  many	  Karen	  to	  flee	  into	  
Thailand	  may	  ease,	  other	  causes	  of	  mobility	  are	  likely	  to	  replace	  it	  such	  as	  economic	  migration	  or	  
displacement	  due	  to	  large-­‐scale	  development	  projects.	  This	  will	  require	  different	  types	  of	  research,	  
new	  approaches	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  knowledge.	  However,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  work	  conducted	  in	  this	  
thesis	  lies	  in	  its	  contribution	  to	  understandings	  of	  borderlands	  spaces,	  presenting	  knowledge	  that	  
can	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  how	  people	  live	  in	  borderlands	  space,	  how	  they	  engage	  with	  the	  
state	  structures	  that	  attempt	  to	  govern	  these	  spaces	  and	  how	  they	  develop	  notions	  of	  identity	  and	  
political	  agency	  through	  their	  own	  social	  practices.	  
What	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  borderlands	  will	  look	  like	  in	  2012	  and	  onwards	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  determined,	  that	  
will	  depend	  on	  the	  ongoing	  nature	  of	  political	  reform	  inside	  Burma,	  and	  how	  Thailand	  and	  other	  
international	  governments	  and	  donors	  respond	  to	  the	  current	  activities	  servicing	  the	  needs	  of	  
refugees	  and	  displaced	  persons	  in	  the	  borderlands.	  It	  will	  also,	  of	  course,	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  social	  and	  political	  activity	  that	  actively	  and	  reactively	  responds	  to	  the	  space	  and	  to	  the	  
changing	  political	  structures.	  But	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  borderlands	  is	  a	  social	  construct,	  defined	  by	  a	  
set	  of	  fluid,	  contested	  social	  relations	  that	  sit	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border,	  and	  that	  






1. List	  of	  Acronyms	  




LIST	  OF	  ACRONYMS	  
ABSDF	   	   All	  Burma	  Students	  Democratic	  Front	  
BBC	   	   Burmese	  Border	  Consortium	  
BERG	   	   Burma	  Ethnic	  Research	  Group	  
BSPP	   	   Burma	  Socialist	  Programme	  Party	  
CCSDPT	  	   Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Services	  to	  Displaced	  Persons	  in	  Thailand	  
CDP	   	   Chin	  Democracy	  Party	  
COERR	   	   Catholic	  Office	  for	  Emergency	  Relief	  and	  Refugees	  
CPB	   	   Communist	  Party	  of	  Burma	  
DKBA	   	   Democratic	  Karen	  Buddhist	  Army	  
FTUK	   	   Federal	  Trade	  Union	  of	  Kawthoolei	  
IDPs	   	   Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  
KESAN	   	   Karen	  Environmental	  and	  Social	  Action	  Network	  
KHRG	   	   Karen	  Human	  Rights	  Group	  
KIO	   	   Kachin	  Independence	  Organisation	  
KMT	   	   Kuomintang	  
KNLA	   	   Karen	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  
KNU	   	   Karen	  National	  Union	  
KORD	   	   Karen	  Office	  of	  Relief	  and	  Development	  
KPC	   	   Karen	  Peace	  Council	  
KSNG	   	   Karen	  Student	  Network	  Group	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KWO	   	   Karen	  Women’s	  Organisation	  
KYO	   	   Karen	  Youth	  Organisation	  
MOI	   	   Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (Thailand)	  
MSF	   	   Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	  
NDF	   	   National	  Democratic	  Front	  
NGO	   	   Non-­‐governmental	  Organisation	  
NLD	   	   National	  League	  for	  Democracy	  
NUDF	   	   National	  Democratic	  United	  Front	  
NMSP	   	   New	  Mon	  State	  Party	  
NULF	   	   National	  United	  Liberation	  Front	  
SPDC	   	   State	  Peace	  and	  Development	  Council	  
SSA	   	   Shan	  State	  Army	  
TBBC	   	   Thailand	  Burma	  Border	  Consortium	  




A	  NOTE	  ON	  USE	  OF	  NAMES	  
The	  names	  of	  the	  Karen	  participants	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  pseudonyms.	  This	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  the	  
need	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  and	  privacy	  of	  many	  of	  the	  people	  who	  gave	  their	  time	  and	  their	  stories	  
to	  this	  research.	  Some	  participants	  were	  happy	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  by	  their	  real	  name,	  expressing	  
pride	  and	  duty	  in	  owning	  their	  stories	  and	  with	  no	  fear	  of	  the	  ramifications	  in	  doing	  so.	  Others,	  due	  
to	  safety	  concerns	  preferred	  not	  to	  use	  their	  real	  names.	  I	  have	  deliberated	  over	  this	  for	  some	  time	  
and	  I	  feel	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  solution.	  In	  the	  end	  I	  decided	  that	  with	  respect	  for	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  
various	  participants	  and	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  consistency	  across	  the	  thesis	  I	  would	  use	  pseudonyms	  
for	  all	  the	  Karen	  participants	  in	  this	  research.	  This	  should	  not	  detract	  from	  the	  very	  real	  desire	  
many	  have	  to	  identify	  themselves	  and	  their	  experiences	  and	  to	  tell	  these	  stories	  in	  their	  own	  
words.	  
There	  are	  many	  Karen	  and	  Burmese	  words	  that	  appear	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Many	  towns,	  districts	  and	  
states	  have	  both	  Karen	  and	  Burmese	  names.	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  used	  the	  names	  used	  by	  the	  
participants	  themselves.	  These	  mostly	  constitute	  the	  names	  prescribed	  prior	  to	  a	  1989	  decision	  by	  
the	  Burmese	  military	  to	  change	  the	  name	  of	  the	  country	  from	  Burma	  to	  Myanmar	  and	  the	  names	  
of	  many	  of	  its	  key	  cities.	  For	  example	  most	  participants	  refer	  to	  Karen	  State	  rather	  than	  Kayin	  State	  
(the	  reference	  used	  by	  the	  Burmese	  government).	  My	  main	  reason	  for	  using	  these	  pre-­‐1989	  names	  
is	  because	  these	  are	  the	  names	  used	  by	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  research.	  However,	  in	  the	  first	  
instance,	  and	  where	  relevant	  I	  have	  put	  the	  names	  used	  by	  the	  Burmese	  government	  in	  brackets.	  
Many	  Karen	  words	  have	  slightly	  different	  spellings,	  for	  example	  Sgaw,	  S’gaw	  or	  S’Gkaw.	  These	  can	  
vary	  depending	  on	  the	  author.	  As	  a	  result,	  my	  spelling	  of	  Karen	  words	  may	  differ	  from	  the	  spelling	  
used	  by	  other	  authors.	  When	  quoting	  directly	  from	  other	  literature	  and	  authors	  I	  have	  retained	  
their	  spelling	  of	  the	  words,	  in	  all	  other	  instances	  I	  have	  retained	  the	  spelling	  used	  by	  the	  
participants	  themselves.	  As	  there	  is	  no	  universally	  accepted	  convention	  around	  Karen	  spelling	  this	  
seems	  the	  most	  authenticate	  approach	  to	  take.	  
A	  last	  point	  of	  clarification	  is	  needed	  around	  the	  use	  of	  Burma	  or	  Myanmar.	  This	  debate	  is	  often	  
highly	  politicised	  and	  evokes	  passionate	  positions.	  The	  name	  ‘Union	  of	  Myanmar’	  was	  introduced	  
by	  the	  SLORC	  in	  1989	  to	  replace	  the	  ‘Union	  of	  Burma’.	  At	  this	  time	  the	  SLORC	  also	  changed	  the	  
name	  of	  many	  of	  Burma’s	  states	  and	  key	  cities	  and	  towns.	  Many	  believed	  these	  name	  changes	  
lacked	  the	  consultation	  of	  the	  Burmese	  people	  and	  were	  imposed	  by	  an	  illegitimate	  governing	  
authority.	  A	  boycott	  of	  the	  term	  ‘Myanmar’	  has	  since	  become	  part	  of	  the	  opposition	  movement’s	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protest	  against	  the	  ongoing	  human	  rights	  abuses	  against	  the	  Burmese	  people	  and	  political	  
illegitimacy	  of	  the	  military	  regime.	  Depending	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  recent	  political	  changes	  in	  Burma,	  
the	  opposition’s	  position	  on	  this	  may	  change.	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  out	  of	  
respect	  of	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  research,	  I	  have	  retained	  the	  use	  of	  Burma	  in	  
reference	  to	  the	  country,	  Burmese	  when	  referring	  to	  citizens	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  Burmans	  in	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